



WORKING PAPER

Supporting international climate negotiators: a monitoring and evaluation framework

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About this Working Paper

The poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have the most to lose from climate change, but are often unable to fully represent their interests in international climate negotiations. Since July 2011, CDKN's Negotiations Support programme has been providing legal and technical support to negotiators from these countries. Funded by the Climate Window of the UK Department for International Development's Advocacy Fund, its aim is to support positive changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have in securing an international climate change deal, in 2015 and beyond.

This Working Paper describes how CDKN has developed a tailored system for monitoring and evaluating the Negotiations Support programme, using an adapted outcome mapping approach alongside a logical framework (logframe). It also outlines some early lessons from using this approach. We hope that this will be of interest to donors and practitioners who provide support to international negotiators, as well as others involved in both international negotiations and monitoring and evaluation.

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Introduction

CDKN's vision is for international climate change processes and agreements to reflect and respond to the positions and challenges articulated by the countries that are the poorest and most vulnerable to climate change. We help leaders and negotiating representatives from these countries to become informed, active, networked and influential actors in international climate change negotiations. CDKN believes that progressive and equitable outcomes for all parties will only be possible when they have a strong voice and can bring their influence to this international stage.

In support of this goal, CDKN, through the Climate Window of the DFID Advocacy Fund,¹ provides legal and technical support to inform national policy and negotiating positions. We also facilitate training and capacity building for negotiators, support planning for, and meaningful participation in, international talks and key meetings, and improve negotiators' access to information about key climate change issues. We are also developing the evidence base for supporting negotiators. Box 1 (overleaf) contains case studies highlighting how our legal and technical support, training and capacity building work in practice.

Although interactions in international climate negotiations are complex, we are already gleaning some important lessons from CDKN's Negotiations Support programme. We have identified several actions that increase countries' capacity to influence negotiations. These include supporting delegations to agree negotiating priorities collaboratively, retain knowledge and experience, organise themselves and access technical support.

CDKN published another working paper 'Supporting international climate negotiators: Lessons from CDKN' that complements this one.⁴ This describes a detailed set of lessons arising from CDKN's support to climate negotiators during the programme's initial two years, which can inform other programmes that support negotiators. By contrast, this working paper provides a detailed description of CDKN's tailor-made monitoring and evaluation framework for negotiations support, for use by monitoring and evaluation specialists.

A Theory of Change for Negotiations Support

When designing the Negotiations Support programme, CDKN developed a 'Theory of Change' to articulate its understanding and assumptions about the problem the programme sought to address, how change may be brought about among negotiators, the interventions CDKN would support, and the types of change that were necessary to achieve the overall goal.⁵ The types of change, and how they support CDKN's overall goal – changes in the design and delivery of climate compatible policies and practises globally – are summarised as six 'Dimensions of Change' (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Dimensions of Change

Box 1. Case studies: How CDKN's support for negotiators works

Support for Least Developed Countries

CDKN has funded the International Institute for Environment and Development and the consultancy Climate Analytics to provide ongoing support to the Chair of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group of negotiators in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. This has included:

- providing a legal advisor and administrative assistant to the LDC Group Chair
- supporting the LDC Group's strategic planning before and during the UNFCCC negotiation process, for example covering negotiators' workshop, travel and accommodation costs
- funding a core team of technical advisors to the LDC Group Chair, drawn from these countries
- training the LDC negotiation teams in legal, technical and process aspects of the negotiations, as well as negotiation techniques
- supporting the LDC Group's outreach and communication strategy
- providing an advisor to the LDC Group's representative to the Green Climate Fund and the Standing Committee.

During 2011 and 2012, the LDC Group and its Chair increased their engagement and profile in the negotiations, being courted by other key negotiators and quoted and featured in a number of international news stories. Gambia, representing the LDC Group, was cited as playing a key role in forging the 'Durban Alliance' that emerged at the 17th Conference of Parties (COP17).²

Support to the Republic of the Marshall Islands

CDKN funded Independent Diplomat, a non-profit diplomatic advisory group, to provide advice and technical assistance to the Republic of the Marshall Islands and, through the Marshall Islands, to support the work of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). In 2011 and 2012, the Marshall Islands coordinated AOSIS working groups on mitigation (including measurement, reporting and verification) and on legal issues.

During the first year, CDKN support enabled the Marshall Islands to author or contribute to 38 submissions and text proposals in the UNFCCC process, and to provide 160 other written outputs including diplomatic and technical briefings, talking points, statements, press releases and legal analysis. CDKN support also allowed Independent Diplomat to sit alongside the Marshall Islands and other AOSIS negotiators and provide advice during climate negotiations and related meetings.

Independent Diplomat's work has helped the Marshall Islands to become vocal and active within the formal UNFCCC negotiations and in other diplomatic forums, including the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, an informal group of developed and developing countries seeking ambitious outcomes from climate negotiations. The Marshall Islands has also developed and begun implementing a new climate diplomacy strategy, which aims to integrate climate change considerations into the country's foreign policy and all of its diplomatic encounters.

Legal support in the UNFCCC process

The Legal Response Initiative³ was set up in 2009 by lawyers and climate change stakeholders to provide pro bono legal advice on climate change to developing countries. Through training, briefing papers, legal opinions and real-time assistance, it seeks to reduce the disparity between negotiators and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in climate negotiations.

The Legal Response Initiative uses the expertise offered by lawyers from private law firms, NGOs, members of the bar and academics. It operates at three levels:

1. Liaison officers represent the Legal Response Initiative at all the negotiation sessions and work with delegates to draft legal queries requiring advice.
2. A core team runs a 'Situation Room', based at the legal firm Simmons & Simmons in London, which fields legal queries. These are drafted by the liaison officers and given to a legal expert with the appropriate expertise and located in a convenient time zone to provide the advice.
3. A network of legal advisors is responsible for providing legal advice within the timeframes requested by delegates.

CDKN has been funding the Legal Response Initiative's running costs since November 2011, enabling the registered charity to continue and scale up their legal support service, extend their network of pro bono advisers and provide specific legal training to negotiators.

During the first year of support from CDKN, the Legal Response Initiative provided legal advice in response to 105 queries. Some advice took the form of draft negotiation text that was placed directly into text submissions, while other responses were legal analysis that led to interventions by a number of countries.

CDKN is trying to replicate this rapid response model in the field of climate finance. In November 2012 CDKN launched the Climate Finance Advisory Service, which will answer queries from climate finance negotiators during and between meetings of the Green Climate Fund and UNFCCC, as well as provide briefing materials and a website on which all the information can be accessed.

Interactions between the parties in any international negotiation process are complex. This makes it unlikely that any deal resulting from negotiations can be solely attributed to the strength of the negotiating position held by any one country or group. Instead, it will be influenced by a variety of factors. The UNFCCC negotiations are increasingly complex because of the evolving state of climate science, the political implications this has, and the need for consensus in decision-making. The CDKN policy brief 'How to build consensus in climate change negotiations' proposes a model for rationalising this complexity.⁶

Negotiations Support projects do not attempt to influence directly the negotiating positions of countries or of negotiating groups. They must exercise care when attempting to attribute any negotiation 'successes' among the groups they support, as these are unlikely to be attributable to a single cause. It is also politically sensitive for a donor programme – funded in this case by the UK Government – to claim credit for the negotiating success of another country or group. For this reason, CDKN does not attempt to attribute successes in negotiation purely to our interventions. Rather, we seek to understand and trace the changes to which our interventions have contributed. This poses the question: how can we effectively monitor, evaluate and assess the impact of these projects?

A monitoring and evaluation framework for Negotiations Support

At present, the monitoring and evaluation of programmes that support negotiators – not least climate negotiators – is relatively immature, with no consistent set of criteria against which the effectiveness of negotiations support initiatives has been assessed.⁷ Many development programmes describe the links between the activities they support ('outputs') and the associated longer-term changes they contribute to ('outcomes'), using a linear causal chain or logical framework ('logframe'). Indeed, many donors require a logframe approach to be used for accountability purposes.

Because of the complex interactions within international climate negotiations, assessing the outcomes of negotiations support is less straightforward. Mapping a linear causal chain – from output to outcome – is difficult and could be seen as overly simplistic when the focus of an intervention is behaviour change rather than, for example, the impacts of a vaccination programme or an infrastructure project. Instead, CDKN has applied the principles and ideas of outcome mapping in an innovative way and integrated this with a logframe approach. More information about the outcome mapping approach can be found in Box 2. This is the first time that CDKN has used outcome mapping; its use will be reviewed in future years of the Negotiations Support programme.

Table 2 sets out a number of design principles of outcome mapping and why these are relevant to negotiations support. These are adapted from the work of Shaxson and Clench,¹³ who draw on (and in some cases quote) a recent discussion between Ricardo Wilson-Grau, Rick Davies, Terry Smutylo, Irene Guijt and others in the Outcome Mapping Learning Community.¹⁴

CDKN used five of the six Negotiations Support Dimensions of Change as proxies for outcome challenges (see Figure 1), rather than developing them separately for each project and each boundary partner.¹⁷ This was because of the large number of potential boundary partners (including negotiators, delegations or negotiating groups) and because the desired behavioural changes were considered to be relevant across all of these boundary partners. For example, an increase in the number of desired outcomes and the identification of priority negotiating topics by boundary partners in advance of negotiating sessions would be a desirable behavioural change. Furthermore, these changes could be applied to individual negotiators, country delegations or negotiating groups.

Progress markers were identified for Dimensions 2–5 as 'expect to see', 'like to see' and 'love to see', corresponding to the extent of the change associated with CDKN's influence. However, the first Dimension – changes in the influence that negotiators have during negotiations – is heavily influenced by exogenous factors and as such is not within the Negotiations Support programme's sphere of influence. Progress markers for this Dimension were therefore divided into a different hierarchy: 'like to see', 'love to see' and the higher level 'Mount Everest'. The 'expect to see' level was dropped to reflect that no change in the influence of negotiators was expected.

Markers were developed after stakeholder engagement during and after COP17 in Durban, with negotiators from developing and developed country delegations, as well as stakeholders from NGOs and donor

Box 2. A guide to outcome mapping

First introduced by the International Development Research Centre in 2000,⁸ outcome mapping is an approach to planning, monitoring and evaluation that focuses on outcomes – defined as changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the 'boundary partners' (people, groups and organisations) with whom a project or programme works. These changes may be linked to a programme's activities, though may not necessarily be directly caused by them (see Figure 2).⁹

Outcome mapping differs from conventional logic models (such as logframes or causal chains) by recognising that the different actors affected by activities exist in different environments, and that the link between a development activity and its desired outcome may not proceed through a linear cause-effect relationship. It also recognises that the outcomes are changes in the relationships, behaviour, actions, policies and practices of individuals, organisations and communities; it is not just the cumulative effect of interventions. Outcome mapping does not attempt to attribute outcomes to any single intervention or series of interventions. Rather, it explores plausible contributory links between interventions and behavioural change.¹¹

An overall behavioural change – the 'outcome challenge' – is agreed for each boundary partner in the programme. Like all other aspects of outcome mapping, this is done collaboratively with boundary partners, as far as time and resources allow. Outcome challenges for each boundary partner are then characterised more specifically by a number of clearly defined behavioural changes or actions – 'progress markers' – which are divided into three groups, depending on the extent of the change: 'expect to see', 'like to see' or 'love to see'. These can represent the depth of change within both a single actor and a network of actors.

Table 1 shows an example of an outcome challenge and set of progress markers, relating to local community forest management.




Figure 2. Boundary Partners¹⁰

organisations. Between five and 15 progress markers were developed to characterise change within each Dimension.

Figure 3 shows the progress markers for Dimension 2 as an example. The progress markers for Dimensions 1–5, comprising the full outcome map, are included as an annex to this paper.

Defining the outcome challenges as the five Dimensions of Change, and characterising them further with progress markers for all projects, provides a way to assess change consistently. It also allows for a degree of aggregation when monitoring the changes among negotiators, country delegations and negotiating groups and across a number of projects in the Negotiations Support programme.

Progress markers are used to set objectives for each new project. This process involves CDKN project officers, those delivering the support and, where practical, those in receipt of it. Progress markers that are consistently not identified as relevant can be removed from the framework. Likewise, objectives that do not reconcile with any existing progress markers can be pulled into the framework. This is an ongoing and iterative process that is reviewed each time projects undergo an impact assessment.

Implementing our monitoring and evaluation framework

CDKN gathers and examines evidence from various sources to determine whether each progress marker shows:

- evidence of change
- no evidence available
- evidence of no (or negative) change.

Where there is evidence of change or negative change against progress markers, we track the negotiating group to which that evidence relates. A 'group' is either an official negotiating bloc in UNFCCC talks, a formal grouping of countries, or an individual country. The programme worked with a number of groups during its first

Table 1. Examples of progress markers

<p>Outcome challenge: The programme intends to see local communities recognising the importance of, and engage in, the planning of resource management activities in partnership with other resource users in their region. These communities have gained the trust of the other members of the partnership and the recognition of government officials, so they can contribute constructively to debates and decision-making processes. They are able to clearly plan and articulate a vision of their forest management activities and goals that is relevant to their context and needs. They call upon external technical support and expertise as appropriate. They act as champions for model forest concepts in their communities and motivate others in the partnership to continue their collaborative work.</p>	
<p>EXPECT TO SEE LOCAL COMMUNITIES:</p>	
1	Participating in regular model forest partnership meetings
2	Establishing a structure for cooperation in the partnership that ensures that all local interests are represented (mechanics of setting up the structure)
3	Acquiring new skills for involvement in the model forest
4	Contributing the minimum human and financial resources necessary to get the model forest operational
<p>LIKE TO SEE LOCAL COMMUNITIES:</p>	
5	Articulating a vision for the model forest that is locally relevant
6	Promoting the model forest concept and their experiences with model forests
7	Expanding the partnership to include all the main forest users
8	Calling upon external experts when necessary to provide information or meet technical needs
9	Requesting new opportunities for training and extension
10	Identifying opportunities for collaboration with other institutions and actors
11	Identifying opportunities for, and successfully obtaining, funding from a range of sources
<p>LOVE TO SEE LOCAL COMMUNITIES:</p>	
12	Playing a lead role in resource management with view to long- and medium-term benefits
13	Sharing lessons and experiences with other communities nationally and internationally to encourage other model forests
14	Influencing national policy debates and policy formulation on resource use and management

Source: Adapted from Earl, S., Carden, F. and Smutylo, T. (2001)¹²

Table 2. The relevance of outcome mapping to negotiations support

Design principle	Relevance to negotiations support
Outcomes are changes in the behaviour, relationships, actions, policies and practices of actors (individuals, groups, communities, organisations or institutions).	Negotiations occur through human interaction and are driven by behaviour within and beyond the negotiating room. Individuals act within the boundaries and strategies set by their country delegations and sometimes by larger negotiating blocs.
Any intervention is partial in relation to the wider system in which it operates; the sub-system in which it attempts to exert influence is always defined, to some extent, arbitrarily.	An intervention may target a sub-system such as a negotiating group or country delegation, but negotiating outcomes beyond these sub-systems are heavily influenced by the political economy that underlies the negotiations.
The agent of social change controls inputs, activities and outputs, but outcomes can only be influenced, not controlled. This influence is usually partial, often indirect and sometimes unintentional.	Activities (e.g. the provision of legal and technical support) are targeted at agents (negotiators, delegations or negotiating groups). But what happens during a negotiating meeting, and any agreement that might be reached in a meeting, is beyond the control of any individual. Outcomes are unlikely to be attributable to any one actor or group of actors.
Change does not stop with the achievement of intended outcomes. Sustainable change empowers those who will live with the outcomes to assess and respond to needs and conditions that continue to emerge.	Supporting sustainable change within delegations or individual negotiators is particularly important given the ever-changing state of negotiations – where achievement of a specific outcome may quickly become irrelevant as new agendas develop – and the desire by funders for interventions to have a legacy beyond the initial funding period.
Multiple perspectives are inevitable and valid, even if contradictory; sustainable relationships are able to manage any conflicts that may arise.	It is critical that negotiations support is provided in a neutral manner that does not seek to impose a negotiating position on the beneficiary. ¹⁵

Source: Adapted from Shaxson and Clench¹⁶

year, including the LDC Group, the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), AOSIS, and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (there were also a number of smaller groups). This tracking allows us to grade progress markers showing evidence of change or no/negative change as follows:

1. Observations apply to 1–2 groups.
2. Observations apply to 3–4 groups.
3. Observations apply to ≥ 5 groups.

The progress markers in Figure 3 have been colour-coded to show where there has been evidence of change.

2. Changes in capacity of the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries to influence international climate change negotiations (refers to Figure 1, Dimensions of Change)

LOVE TO SEE

Increased proportion of delegates have technical background and/or have been selected to attend meetings due to their technical background rather than their seniority

Delegates increasingly chair or provide lead input into an increased proportion of working groups or meetings

Groups/countries/constituencies are asked to enter formal links with other (influential) groups

LIKE TO SEE

Delegates or countries send sufficient delegations to COPs and intersessionals

Delegates make a greater number/proportion of interventions and submissions in areas relevant to their national or group interests

Delegates in group/country/constituency delegations are supported by more/better working level analysts

Groups/countries/constituencies give more/better press conferences

Groups/countries/constituencies increasingly access available advice and support during COPs

Groups/countries/constituencies delegates ask more sophisticated legal or technical queries to advisors or support services

Delegates increasingly stand up for their opinions, confront other delegations and their positions, and/or constructively disagree with other delegations

Delegates cite relevant legal precedents or technical research to support their positions or to challenge the wording in agreements

EXPECT TO SEE

Groups/countries increasingly identify and agree priorities or desired outcomes in advance of meetings within international climate change negotiations

Delegations are able to attend more meetings (e.g., more parallel negotiation tracks at COPs)

Group/country delegations plan attendance at different sessions (e.g., based on a full understanding of the linkages between them)

Groups/countries spend longer in preparation before international climate change meetings

- Key:**
- N/A – no evidence of change
 - Change in 1–2 groups
 - Change in 3–4 groups
 - Change in ≥ 5 groups

Figure 3. Excerpt from Negotiations Support outcome map showing early progression against progress markers

Box 3. Attribution or plausible contributions?

Change among the groups that have received support from CDKN is measured against the qualitative baselines set at the start of each project. As discussed, it is not possible to attribute these changes solely to CDKN's support. Even when those receiving or delivering negotiations support are asked directly whether they believe any changes they have experienced are attributable to CDKN's interventions, there remains a risk of affirmation through unintentional bias or self-interest.

We can say with certainty that changes were observed that fit the progress markers defined under each Dimension of Change. Beyond this, the nature of the support provided and the various sources of evidence collected suggest that CDKN has made a plausible contribution to these changes. While this assertion can be further strengthened as more corroborating evidence comes to light (unless that evidence suggests the contrary), there will always be some uncertainty about attribution.

Had the Dimensions been designed to describe the changes expected from CDKN's projects, it could be argued that observing change within them would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Dimensions for CDKN's Negotiations Support came from its Theory of Change: CDKN's projects are demand-led and shaped by the needs of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries, so each project has a different profile of Dimensions that it may address.

Table 3 shows how the projects included in CDKN's impact assessments contribute to the Dimensions. Not all projects meet every Dimension, but the Dimensions are used to make sure that CDKN's demand-led projects can plausibly contribute to the changes CDKN aims to bring about.

Table 3. Mapping negotiations support projects to Dimensions of Change (Source: CDKN)

Project description	Dimensions to which the project contributes					Example of how an objective stated at project inception addresses a Dimension (numbered in each case)
	1	2	3	4	5	
Support to the mitigation coordinator for the AGN at COP17	✓	✓	✓			3. Enhanced coordination within the AGN on the mitigation agenda item, through the drafting of briefing notes for the AGN coordinator that could be distributed among the group.
Support to the AGN Chair, including finance group and AGN workshops	✓	✓	✓			2. Increased capacity to contribute to negotiations as a result of legal and technical support for the AGN Chair and other negotiators during workshops.
Informal ministerial meeting on the Durban Platform			✓			3. Support the attendance of AGN negotiators at a ministerial meeting following COP17.
Programmatic support for Phase III of the European Capacity Building Initiative		✓	✓	✓		4. Strengthen the understanding of substantive and legal issues on the UNFCCC negotiating agenda through technical training and briefing papers.
Support for LDC countries in the UNFCCC climate change process		✓	✓	✓	✓	5. Increased understanding by the LDC Group Chair and delegates of UNFCCC finance mechanisms as a result of technical briefing papers, training and support to the Group Chair.
Funding support to the Marshall Islands in the UNFCCC process		✓	✓		✓	2. Build the capacity and understanding of Marshall Islands to participate in the UNFCCC negotiations and the Cartagena Dialogue, including technical and legal advice for preparing briefings.
Facilitation of legal advice to UNFCCC developing country negotiators		✓	✓			3. Enable group coordination and mobilisation through the convening of training groups and the development of briefing documents on issues that affect LDC groups.
Support for a workshop to prepare submission of views on REDD+ under the Ad Hoc Working Groups for Long Term Collaborative Action and the Kyoto Protocol, and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice			✓			3. Workshop for members of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations to coordinate their submission to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, thus strengthening their position within the UNFCCC negotiations.
Provision of negotiations training to Pacific Region negotiators		✓				2. Training of negotiators to build the capacity and understanding of Pacific Region negotiators to participate in the UNFCCC negotiations and to play a fuller part in the process.
Supporting the Legal Advisor and Deputy Lead Negotiator for the Republic of Nauru as Chair of AOSIS		✓	✓		✓	3. Supporting two positions in the AOSIS Secretariat (Deputy Lead Negotiator and Legal Advisor) to increase the capacity within the group to coordinate member states around the AOSIS negotiation strategy, resulting in better preparation for negotiation sessions.
Acting together for bold outcomes – support for an upcoming meeting of like-minded countries in Mexico	✓		✓		✓	5. Supporting LDCs and climate-vulnerable countries to attend face-to-face meetings with other ambitious countries, with the aim of creating alliances across groups and negotiating tracks capable of accessing resources through stronger negotiating positions favoured by a wider constituency aligned with higher ambition.
Supporting the Lead Negotiator for the Republic of Nauru as Chair of AOSIS	✓		✓		✓	1. Additional negotiating capacity provided by the Lead Negotiator is expected to enhance the ability of AOSIS to respond to developments in the UNFCCC process and better influence negotiating outcomes.

Analysis of results and lessons

The outcome map (see the annex to this working paper) shows that change was observed across all five Dimensions of Change. Most change was observed in Dimensions 2 and 3: 'Changes in capacity of the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries to influence international climate change negotiations', and 'Changes in co-ordination, collaboration and mobilisation of the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries in international climate change negotiations'. Within these Dimensions, change was observed in progress markers at all levels – 'expect to see', 'like to see' and 'love to see' – and, for at least half of those markers, among three groups or more.

Change was also observed in Dimension 1 – 'Changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations' – in progress markers at the 'like to see' and 'love to see' levels, though not at 'Mount Everest'. However, less change was observed in Dimensions 4 and 5: 'Changes in the quality and relevance of knowledge and skills to support the poorest and most climate vulnerable country negotiators' and 'Changes in the ability of the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries to leverage and channel climate change-related resources strategically'. Where it was observed, change was generally in progress markers at the 'expect to see' and 'like to see' levels.

The results of the outcome map reveal five key lessons about measuring the outcomes of negotiations support.

1. The changes observed show progress within the Dimensions of Change

The outcome map shows that there has been change across all five Dimensions of Change. Changes were observed in 33 of the 53 progress markers, although no change was observed in the other 20. Because of the limited number of projects covered in this first review, it is not possible to say whether these absences are because the remaining progress markers are unrealistic and should be abandoned, or because they have not yet been observed in projects commissioned to date (in which case they should be targeted more actively by future projects).

While it is too early to say that these results validate the Dimensions and progress markers, they do suggest that they are a useful way to conceptualise changes in the capacity of negotiators from the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries.

2. Progress within each Dimension is not linear

There is evidence of change associated with these first projects at all levels: 'expect to see', 'like to see' and 'love to see'. The more ambitious markers ('like' and 'love') were particularly prevalent for Dimensions 2 and 3 (see Figure 4). This could mean that the allocation of markers among these three levels was not ambitious enough, or that these three levels do still hold but that substantial change is possible in a short space of time.

Outcomes associated with policy influence (such as the inclusion of text that reflects group interests within final COP decisions) were observed alongside capacity building outcomes (such as increased knowledge of developments in the UNFCCC process).¹⁸ This is different to other development interventions that target policy outcomes, where policy influence is expected to occur at the end of a linear causal chain after a set of preparatory interventions aimed at capacity building outcomes. This observation appears to validate CDKN's decision not to rely on a linear causal chain or logframe approach.

This difference might be due to the nature of international negotiations. Policy influence can be exerted directly, once international agreements are ratified by governments, or indirectly, by changing expectations of what is desirable or acceptable. So support for negotiators taking part in sessions where international agreements are shaped could, therefore, be associated with policy influence in a short period of time.

These findings can inform CDKN's planning of future interventions. For instance, future Negotiations Support projects might be targeted towards areas where progress markers are as yet unfulfilled, or which have been shown to contribute towards higher-level change – closer to the CDKN 'super goal' of 'Changes in the design and delivery of climate compatible development policies and practises globally' (Dimension 6, see Box 1). This high-level impact is assessed as part of CDKN's wider impact assessment process.

3. Outcome mapping can dovetail with a logframe

CDKN has worked hard to dovetail its outcome mapping-based methodology with the logframe approach used by its donor, DFID. Since most donors continue to use a logframe approach, there are lessons for other negotiations support programmes.




Figure 4: Proportion of progress markers where change has been observed

CDKN uses a single outcome-level indicator in the logframe for negotiations support: ‘% of outcomes (at ‘expect to see’, ‘like to see’ and ‘love to see’ levels) realised’. This can be derived easily from the results of the outcome map. This is a simplistic way to use the outcome map results, not least because change within outcomes is not linear. But the outcome map provides the forum where these more complex interactions can be tracked and examined for the purposes of learning and evaluation. This leaves the logframe primarily as a simpler means of accountability, one that meets DFID’s requirements.

Other organisations have also used results from outcome mapping to demonstrate progress against logframe indicators. For example, VECO Indonesia (a programme of Vredeseilanden Belgium) uses a format based on outcome mapping as it encourages more internal strategic reflection and accountability. It also dovetails this approach with the logframe format required by its main funder, thus enabling financial accountability to its donor at the same time.¹⁹

4. Information should be triangulated between various sources

Most of the information that is readily available about project outcomes comes from the ‘suppliers’ delivering the support. Where there are political sensitivities, relationships of trust are established between these suppliers and ‘recipients’, those receiving support while support is being delivered. Therefore the supplier is often in the best position to suggest how the recipient’s influence has changed as a result of (or at least in conjunction with) the support provided. However, there is a risk that self-interest may bias – intentionally or not – the objectivity of information from the supplier. It is therefore important to triangulate claims with information from other sources.

CDKN triangulated information from multiple stakeholders and sources to report against its Negotiations Support outcome map. Stakeholders included suppliers, recipients, other negotiators, other donors and NGOs. Sources included the progress reports produced by suppliers, analyses of negotiations, press coverage and anecdotal information such as observations at meetings and informal comments. These helped CDKN to form a rounded view about what outcomes have resulted from – or are associated with – projects. We found that anecdotal information provided useful evidence when corroborated by other ‘formal’ information, though it may be less reliable on its own.

The Overseas Development Institute and the Pacific Institute for Public Policy are piloting an approach that uses formal and informal sources of evidence. These are classified by whether they are consistent or not with

a non-linear theory of change.²⁰ The pilot allows various sources of evidence to be ‘tagged’ based on whether they confirm or challenge that a project is on track, or whether the information is surprising and may be a ‘weak signal’ of unanticipated change. A CDKN Negotiations Support project will be included in this pilot, with findings expected at the end of 2013.

5. Good monitoring and evaluation requires good evidence

Reporting is only as good as the information on which it is based. CDKN funds suppliers to deliver much of its support to recipients and this is the case for most Negotiations Support projects. As described above, this means that reporting from suppliers was necessary (though not sufficient) to report against our monitoring and evaluation framework. But suppliers often vary in their reporting frequencies and formats, making it time-consuming and sometimes difficult to pull out key information for monitoring and evaluation.

CDKN requires its suppliers to use standardised reporting templates, including sections for setting targets and reporting against them for outputs and outcomes. Negotiations Support projects produce these reports during inception and completion and, for longer projects, on a quarterly basis in between. Ideally they are produced in collaboration with the recipient and a CDKN project manager, though the onus is on suppliers to take the lead.

It is much easier to extract and compile information for monitoring and evaluation where there is high-quality reporting in line with the template. This has sometimes required the coaching of suppliers over the course of more than one reporting round. But feedback from project managers and suppliers was positive, once the supplier knew what was required. Some suppliers reported that using the template helped them to clarify their thinking about how their day-to-day activities were contributing to their overall aims and objectives.

Conclusion and implications

Monitoring and evaluating the support provided to negotiators is complex due to the multiple variables at play, and attempts to monitor and evaluate negotiations support programmes are in their infancy. The hybrid monitoring and evaluation framework for supporting international climate negotiators described here is a useful way to assess the impact of this type of support, and may have implications for similar programmes. The framework has several strengths:

- It does not rely on linear causal chains, which risk oversimplifying the non-linear cause and effect of negotiations support projects. Instead, it adapts outcome mapping by using Dimensions of Change as proxies for outcomes challenges.
- Progress markers on the outcome map were linked to a logframe to allow it to be used for reporting purposes.
- It considers similar behavioural changes among different boundary partners using Dimensions of Change as proxies for outcome challenges.
- Changes in both capacity and policy influence can be tracked using this approach.
- It can be used in situations where most information about project outcomes comes from a small number of stakeholders; triangulating anecdotal information with other sources of intelligence helps to overcome political sensitivities.

However, while results suggest the framework is useful, it has not yet been fully validated. Change was not observed in 20 of the progress markers within the outcome map. It is too early to say whether this indicates a lack of progress from projects, or that the markers on the outcome map are not applicable.

The outcome map has been linked to a logframe using the percentage of progress markers within which change has been observed. This may be over-simplistic and does not consider whether some progress markers have greater influence on the role that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries play in negotiations.

We would be interested to hear your views on the issues identified in this paper and your suggestions in relation to the monitoring and evaluation of negotiations support. Questions for feedback and discussion include:

- What examples do you have of the monitoring and evaluation of negotiations support programmes?
- Have you successfully matched outcome-mapping techniques with a logframe?
- Under what circumstances can boundary partners be generalised without losing the ability to meaningfully monitor progress against outcome challenges?
- What tools have you used to monitor and demonstrate progress against an outcome map when information may be confidential or need to come from informal sources?

Please contact the CDKN Negotiations Support team at enquiries@cdkn.org

<http://cdkn.org/themes/climate-negotiators/>

Endnotes

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14. Outcome Mapping Learning Community www.outcomemapping.ca
15. Jefford, S. and Hamza-Goodacre, D. op. cit.
16. Shaxson, L. and Clench, B. op. cit.
17. The sixth and central Dimension – corresponding to the CDKN goal of 'changes in the design and delivery of climate compatible development policies and practices globally' – was not included, as this is only considered to be measurable at the level of CDKN as a whole, and is assessed in CDKN's annual reporting.
18. This is discussed in: Jefford, S. and Hamza-Goodacre, D. (2013) 'Supporting international climate negotiators: Lessons from CDKN'. CDKN working paper. London: Climate and Development Knowledge Network.
19. Guijt, I. (2010) 'Accountability and learning', in J. Ubels, N.A. Acquaye-Baddoo and A. Fowler (eds.), Capacity development in practice. London: Earthscan.
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Annex: Negotiations Support outcome map showing all progress markers and early progress

1. Changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations

'MOUNT EVEREST'

An international agreement receiving support from the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries

Agreements trumpeted as triumphs in the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries' domestic arenas

LOVE TO SEE

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN secure outcomes from international climate change negotiations that reflect their interests

Final negotiation texts for international climate change negotiations include submissions from the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN apply their skills in other kinds of international negotiations

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN are increasingly cited in the press, internationally or domestically

A country supported by CDKN hosts international climate change negotiations, for example UNFCCC negotiations

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN are increasingly sought or courted during final negotiations

LIKE TO SEE

The agendas of meetings within international climate change negotiations are influenced by the groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN contribute to changes in the discourse around climate change issues

2. Changes in the capacity of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries to influence international climate change negotiations

LOVE TO SEE

Increased proportion of delegates have technical background and/or have been selected to attend meetings due to their technical background, rather than seniority

Delegates increasingly chair or provide lead input into an increased proportion of working groups or meetings

Groups/countries/constituencies are asked to enter formal links with other (influential) groups

LIKE TO SEE

Delegates or countries send sufficient delegations to COPs and inter-sessionals

Delegates make a greater number/proportion of interventions and submissions in areas relevant to their national or group interests

Delegates in group/country/constituency delegations are supported by more/better working level analysts

Groups/countries/constituencies give more/better press conferences

Groups/countries/constituencies increasingly access available advice and support during COPs

Groups/countries/constituencies' delegates address more sophisticated legal or technical queries to advisors or support services

Delegates increasingly stand up for their opinions, confront other delegations and their positions, and/or constructively disagree with other delegations

Delegates cite relevant legal precedents or technical research to support their positions or to challenge the wording of agreements

EXPECT TO SEE

Groups/countries increasingly identify and agree priorities or desired outcomes in advance of meetings within international climate change negotiations

Delegations are able to attend more meetings (e.g. more parallel negotiation tracks at COPs)

Group/country delegations plan attendance at different sessions (e.g. based on a full understanding of the links between them)

Groups/countries spend more time preparing for international climate change meetings

3. Changes in the coordination, collaboration and mobilisation of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries in international climate change negotiations

LOVE TO SEE

Groups/countries/constituencies (e.g. LDC Group, AOSIS) present a consistent and united position on key negotiating themes

There are a high number of joint submissions or joint press conferences made by groups/countries/constituencies, or collaborations among groups/progressive countries, relating to key technical issues and negotiating tracks

Delegations join appropriate groups or form cross-group coalitions based on shared interests during international climate change negotiations

LIKE TO SEE

Groups/countries/constituencies demonstrate good organisation of attendance at meetings (e.g. diary control during COPs and inter-sessionals, co-ordination of attendance to parallel negotiation tracks with other relevant delegations)

Groups/countries/constituencies produce joint records or minutes of meetings

Increased numbers of groups/countries/constituencies have media support

Responsibilities for attending events or communicating developments is clearly defined and adhered to by supported groups/countries/constituencies

Groups/countries/constituencies develop knowledge management systems that allow institutional memory to be captured and that support, for example, the rotation of roles such as the chair, or the tracing of developments in negotiating tracks over time

EXPECT TO SEE

Delegates within negotiation groups/countries/constituencies are able to meet virtually or in person well before international climate change negotiation meetings to discuss strategic or technical issues

Negotiating groups submit well-written submissions on strategic negotiation themes

Groups/individuals supported by the Adaptation Fund increasingly prepare strategy documents/position statements prior to COPs

4. Changes in the quality and relevance of knowledge and skills to support negotiators from the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries

LOVE TO SEE

Donors other than CDKN, including wider professional constituencies, support negotiation capacity and collaborate with CDKN to provide support

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN are increasingly asked to support other least developed or most vulnerable country delegations

Groups/countries supported by CDKN develop their own ability to support their (or others') negotiating efforts

LIKE TO SEE

Donors other than CDKN that support negotiation capacity, including wider professional constituencies, use methodologies for training and support developed by the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund

Groups/countries/constituencies seek other support to complement CDKN training

Groups/countries/constituencies increasingly access real-time support around major conferences etc.

Countries and donors are accessing, using and applying the learning that has been produced and disseminated by CDKN to allocate resources to types of support that improve the ability of the least developed and most vulnerable countries to influence climate negotiations

EXPECT TO SEE

Groups/countries/constituencies access knowledge from CDKN sources.

Delegates representing groups or countries supported by CDKN are adequately briefed well before the start of international climate change negotiation sessions

Delegates representing the negotiating groups or countries that have received support from CDKN feel they have more information with which to approach the negotiation process

Groups/countries/constituencies supported by CDKN increasingly identify gaps in their own knowledge and increase their commissioning of research

Funding decisions draw down from CDKN insight or results about what the best interventions are to support capacity to influence international climate change negotiations

5. Changes in the ability of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries to leverage and channel climate change-related resources strategically

LOVE TO SEE

The poorest or most climate-vulnerable countries actually access needed resources from climate change channels

The development of a climate finance system that results in better quality proposals and submissions to the fund by the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries

LIKE TO SEE

Groups/countries/constituencies from the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries are informed about the various funds that are available and accessible to them

The poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries have awareness of the climate change-related resources they require

EXPECT TO SEE

The poorest or most climate-vulnerable countries sit on the formal mechanism that allocates resources

- Key:**
- N/A – no evidence of change
 - Change in 1–2 groups
 - Change in 3–4 groups
 - Change in ≥5 groups

About CDKN

The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) aims to help decision-makers in developing countries design and deliver climate compatible development. We do this by providing demand-led research and technical assistance, and channelling the best available knowledge on climate change and development to support policy processes at country and international level. CDKN is managed by an alliance of six organisations that brings together a wide range of expertise and experience.

About INTRAC

INTRAC strengthens the demand side of governance through a more effective civil society, with the aim of supporting pro-poor policies and programmes and the delivery of services to the poor. This is done through a combination of training, organisational development consultancy, technical support, conferences, research, documentation and dissemination.

About PwC

PwC is the world's largest professional services advisory firm, with representation in almost every country in the world. PwC's network of climate change and development professionals and practitioners is working in more than 100 countries, supporting governments, NGOs and the private sector.



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