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Report

**CDKN EYE Evaluation 2014** 

FINAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Submitted by Itad

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# **Acronyms**

ANI Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura

BAU Business As Usual CC Climate Change

CCD Climate Compatible Development

CCS Climate Change Secretariat

CDKN Climate and Development Knowledge Network

CEL Country Engagement Lead

CF Climate Finance

COLCIENCIAS Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CP Country Programme

CPM Country Programme Manager
CSO Civil Society Organisation

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency

DEC Deep Engagement Country

DFID Department for International Development
DFID Department for International Development
DNP Departmento Nacional de Planeacion

DoC Dimensions of Change

DP Donor Partner

DRM Disaster Risk Management
EIA Economic Impact Assessment
EYE5 End of Year 5 Evaluation

GCF Green Climate Fund

GDC Geothermal Development Cooperation

GoC Government of Colombia GoK Government of Kenya GoN Government of Nepal

HCDA Horticultural Crops Development Authority

HFP Humanitarian Futures Programme

IDEAM Instituto de Hidrologia, Meteorologia y estudos Ambientales

INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
INVEMAR Instituto de Investigaciones Marinas y Costeras

KAM Kenya Association of Manufacturers

KCP Kenya Country Programme

KCV Kenya Country Visit

KEPSA Kenya Private Sector Alliance

KFC Kenya Flower Council
KM Knowledge Management

KMD Kenya Meteorological Department

LDC Least Developed Countries

MoSTE Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment

MADR Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural

MADS Ministerio de Medioambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
MEMR Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources

MEWNR Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (formally MEMR)

MT Medium Term

MTC Medium-Term Change

MTP Mid-Term Plan
MTR Mid-Term Review

NPC National Planning Commission

NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NCCAP National Climate Change Action Plan
NDMA National Drought Management Authority

NPBMF National Performance and Benefit Measurement Framework

NS Negotiation Support
P&P Policy and Practice
PIR Project Impact Review

PM Project Manager

PNUD Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo

RS Research ST Short Term

StARCK Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya

STC Short-Term Change
ToC Theory of Change
ToC Theory of Change

UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
USAID US Agency for International Development

VfM Value for Money

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# **CDKN EYE5 Executive Summary**

### **Background**

The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) is a north-south alliance of NGOs, researchers and private companies. It responds to and supports decision makers to deliver climate compatible development in developing countries. Within the broad scope of climate compatible development, the programme works across four strategic themes. These are as follows (together with hyperlinks to further information on each of them from the CDKN website):

- Climate compatible development strategies and plans <a href="http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-policy-planning/">http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-policy-planning/</a>
- Improving developing countries' access to climate finance <a href="http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-finance/">http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-finance/</a>
- Strengthening resilience through climate-related disaster risk management <a href="http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-disaster-risk-management/">http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-disaster-risk-management/</a>
- Supporting climate negotiators from the least developed and most vulnerable countries http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-negotiations/

These strategic themes (outcomes in the CDKN logical framework) have been supported primarily by spending on advisory services¹ (£24.2m over the first four years of the programme), research (£14.1m over this period), knowledge management (£7.4m), the Advocacy Fund (£7.3m) and partnerships (£3.5m). The programme works in partnership with decision-makers in the public, private and non-governmental sectors nationally, regionally and globally. While the latest annual report (2014) identifies 74 countries that have gained from the programme, country-level support is focussed in 12 priority or deep engagement countries (DECs) and 1 priority sub-region — Bangladesh, Caribbean region, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Uganda.

CDKN is managed by an alliance of organisations led by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), and including Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, INTRAC, LEAD Pakistan, the Overseas Development Institute, and SouthSouthNorth. CDKN has three main governance pillars: the Management Oversight Committee, the Network Council and the Management Team.

CDKN is now in its fifth year of operation although the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund (AF) – one of the five CDKN Outputs – started a year later, in mid-2011. CDKN funding is provided principally by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), who have commissioned this evaluation, and the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS). The initial contract to CDKN was £45.8m but this has been extended, most recently in April 2014. This brings the CDKN budget to a total of £113.7m over the seven-year period to the end of March 2017.

This Report sets out our findings from the end of year 5 evaluation (EYE5) of the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) programme. The EYE5 evaluation has two main audiences: firstly, DFID which as principal funder of CDKN is accountable for the programme delivering. DFID also has an interest in learning from CDKN for other climate programmes.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 1}$  Described as Technical Assistance in the 2014 CDKN Annual Review

Secondly, CDKN wishes to gain an external perspective on progress and draw lessons for strengthening the programme. The Terms of reference (TOR) for this evaluation have been designed by CDKN with DFID input and the TOR / CDKN Statement of Work are given in Annex 1. Somewhat unusually, the evaluation of CDKN has been contracted by CDKN. In order to ensure independence, DFID have supervised and reviewed the work with CDKN reviewing only for factual accuracy. In summary, this evaluation is required to consider:

- Overarching impact: CDKN's credible contribution to the impact indicator 'Developing countries' policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020';
- Progress towards impact within Outcome & Research theories of change (ToCs): Five sections stating the evaluation of each CDKN Outcome/Research theory of change;
- Impact Trajectory: CDKN's overall progress up to Year 5 and likely trajectory in Years 6 and 7; and
- Institutional model: Assessing CDKN's institutional model up to Year 5, including its niche
  and role as a global climate compatible development knowledge network as well as the
  value for money offered by its management model.

### Methodology

Our design for this evaluation uses case studies to test the CDKN Theory of Change (ToC) using a set of overarching evaluation questions. While this is a standard approach, the complexity of CDKN requires us to use two different types of case studies. CDKN aims to deliver the programme ToC through Deep Engagement Countries and Outcome/Research impact pathways that have a global reach. Country case studies tell us about Outcomes and progress towards impact in these representative countries and we have used separate case studies to capture the broader reach of the Outcome/Research strategies. Our assessment of progress towards impact has involved adding up and synthesising contributions from both types of case studies but there have also been some opportunities for triangulation e.g. where a global research programme has led to uptake within a Deep Engagement Country (DEC). In addition to both types of case studies we have drawn on programme-wide evidence using document reviews and interviews with institutional stakeholders. Contribution analysis has been used in both types of case study to help identify the contribution of CDKN in complex policy environments in which other interventions are also taking place.


In order to evaluate the CDKN institutional model we have supplemented the case study analysis with collection and analysis of evidence on the niche and role of CDKN as a global climate compatible development knowledge network, and the value for money offered by its management model. This has been done through document review and interviewing both senior CDKN staff and high level key informants with global overview of climate compatible development. We have also interviewed stakeholders in three major CDKN partnerships identified by DFID. Nonetheless, this evaluation is not an organisational or strategy review and a comprehensive assessment of the CDKN niche would also need to consider CDKN relative to other players in the climate change arena.

### **Findings**

### Overarching impact:

- The evidence from the country and outcome case studies is that CDKN has made a credible contribution to achieving the indicator of impact: 'Developing countries' policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020'.
- At the Outcome level, CDKN has achieved its 2015 logframe indicator milestones related to supporting climate compatible development policies and practices although we have some concerns about particular indicators. Moreover, for each impact pathway we identify constraints to further progress towards impact that will need to be tackled. The recommendations brought together at the end of this summary aim to address these constraints. Evidence on progress from the country and outcome case studies is summarised in the following Figures:

### Progress towards impact: evidence from a sample of deep engagement countries



Evidence of CDKN value added/niche

# Progress towards impact for each Outcome area and Research LogFrame Outcome milestones Achievement of Outcome CF NS indicators or (DoC) **DRM** P&P Dimensions Policy & of Change support Research CF (LF)

CDKN Outcome area and Research

Progress towards impact within Outcome & Research theories of change (ToCs) and impact trajectories – explaining the Outcome/Research summary Figure above:

- Negotiation Support (NS) with £3.8m of outsourced spend since 2013 plus £1.2m shared with the Climate Finance outcome has achieved very good progress. Given the consistency between CDKN, supplier and recipient assessment of progress for the key dimension of change for this outcome ("Changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations") our judgement is that NS has achieved (and very likely exceeded) the expected progress towards outcomes. This is consistent with the reported overachievement relative to milestones of "love to see" and "like to see" outcome map progress markers.
- Climate Finance (CF) has accounted for £1.7m of outsourced spend plus £3m shared with other outcomes since 2013. The CDKN CF portfolio is "work in progress" has not yet achieved the outcome level on the pathway to impact. On the basis of (admittedly unrealistic) logframe indicators we judge 5/11 sample projects to be at this level or 7/11 projects if we used broader CDKN dimensions of change indicators. We expect some improvement in years 6 and 7 as the Adaptation Fund NIEs project shows considerable promise but fundamentally, the ambition of the CF logframe outcome indicators is greater than the CDKN resources and mandate in this area can realistically deliver.
- Disaster Risk Management (DRM) with £3.4m of spend since 2013 plus £14m shared with the Policy & Practice outcome has been in operation for less than four years and some of the projects in our sample are quite new. Nonetheless, we find evidence that the DRM outcome has been very successful in increasing and improving the accessibility of information on climate-related disaster risk to policy-makers and practitioners. There is some evidence of use of this information for policy and planning at a sub-national level but, at the time of the evaluation, there were no examples at the national level. The outcome theory of change projects impact at both sub-national and national levels and significant scaling up will be needed to secure outcomes at the national level in years 6 and 7.
- Policies and Practice (P&P) £5.1m since 2013 plus £16m shared with other outcomes. Our case study project sample evaluation broadly substantiates the CDKN claim that targets have been met for the P&P outcome on "numbers of countries with national, regional and/or subnational climate compatible development policies and practices that have been developed with the significant input of the CDKN". However, we believe there is a lack of clarity on how 'with significant input of the CDKN' is defined and this has impeded honest reflection and learning. More progress has been made against the objective of "climate compatible development policies and practice developed that impact those most affected by climate change" than the second P&P theory of change objective of "understanding drivers and challenges of climate compatible development policies and practices" (which is also not well reflected in the logframe). Based on the sample of P&P projects we have reviewed, the trajectory towards impact for years 6 and 7 looks positive but depends on processes being in place to translate learning on P&P into practice.
- Research is technically a CDKN output feeding into the outcomes above. Yet CDKN has spent £14.3 million on research from 2010-2014 and we were asked to consider Research as if it were a CDKN Outcome and have used a sample of 16 Research case study projects. We find evidence that 10/16 sample projects are producing tangible outcomes (linking directly to P&P and DRM outcomes and dimensions of change) which explains our judgement that Research has made less progress than expected. Our assessment

suggests that a further 4 projects will produce the expected results in time. Contributing flexible, catalytic research funding to accelerate and extend the policy and practice outreach of programmes is CDKN's strength. The smaller and medium-sized application focused projects, where suppliers are well-networked into national and sub-national policy communities, are the strong performers. A majority of research funds have been spent on these projects. Weaknesses include a lack of initiatives to link between research projects nationally, regionally or thematically. There is little evidence of CDKN facilitating access to national policymakers, although there is some regional facilitation. 'Thought leadership' is also weak. The impact trajectory for projects we have reviewed is good but programme gains depend on prioratising a global and cross-regional synthesis and creation of global public goods from the research portfolio.

### The CDKN Institutional model:

Based on systematic assessment of the CDKN niche from country and outcome case studies we find:

- CDKN has been able to add some value in every deep engagement country we looked at by responding to government demand and contracting and managing suppliers effectively. It has added significant value and demonstrated a clear niche in Colombia and India by using the country engagement team to convene and communicate with stakeholders – facilitating the effective uptake of evidence to practice and greater progress than other donors in the same space.
- The work by CDKN country teams in Nepal, Colombia and India to support local uptake of
  research or piloting has also been important. This may not be highly visible at a global
  scale but it is difficult to get right and has required significant investment by CDKN.
  Donors such as DFID have rarely been successful in using country offices to route external
  research in a usable form to decision takers.
- Little evidence of the role and importance of global networking and partnerships in our sample of deep engagement countries but more evidence at the outcome level (with the exception of Policies & Practice). There is clear evidence of how this adds value for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Negotiation Support (NS) and also for Research (through brokering). There is emerging evidence that a combination of networking, technical skills and demand-led legitimacy can drive effective convening for Climate Finance (CF). There is some evidence of synergies across outcome areas (NS/CF) and of research being translated into practice (DRM, CF and to some extent P&P).
- Both CDKN NS and DRM have a niche as leaders in their global areas. For NS, this builds on a combination of: demand-led support; being one of only two major donors in this area; a mix of relevant, trusted specialist suppliers; continuity; close engagement of the NS team with the issues and some knowledge sharing and networking. There has been an effort to distil and transfer lessons but support has been largely tailored to negotiating groups. In the case of DRM, the niche reflects demand-led, translation of scientific research for innovative practice and policy and strategically and effectively leveraging ODI resources to add value to in-country teams. There are also few others translating the science from IPCC findings into practical learning for policy and practice.

Key informants with an overview of climate compatible development (Section 4.1.2) felt that CDKN gained a niche as a result of:

Responding to demand (interviews 137, 097, 068);

- Skills and experience of the consortium (098, 068, 063); and
- Networks and partnerships (098, 096, 097, 068, 065).

Considering the latter point, the three major CDKN partnerships we look at in Section 4.1.1 (the Low Emissions Development Strategies Global Partnership, the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative and Climate Knowledge Brokers Group) suggest that CDKN investment in partnerships has produced value beyond that seen through the lens of projects in Outcome areas. It is beyond our terms of reference to compare this with the partnerships formed by other organisations but discussion with CDKN's partners highlighted the value of CDKN as a:

- Knowledge manager and knowledge broker;
- Knowledge generator;
- Convener of climate compatible development stakeholders and donors; and
- Strategic partner and funder.

### Value for money:

We have been able to compare total administration costs for CDKN with those proposed for the Adaptation Fund derived from costs charged by various UN agencies working on climate change (see Section 4.2). On a like for like basis, CDKN would have an administration cost of 13% relative to the proposed Adaptation Fund administration cost of 17.5% - 18.5%. These comparative figures are approximate but they do suggest that CDKN administration costs are lower than comparable UN agencies. Moreover, the increase in CDKN spend since the mid-term review is likely to have slightly increased this advantage.

#### Gender mainstreaming:

CDKN has committed to strengthening the mainstreaming of gender within its programme to support action to achieve gender equality. It has developed a gender strategy (mainstreaming plan), but the main investments only started in 2014. Indeed, it is illustrative of the still-superficial nature of the gender strategy that gender was not included in the terms of reference or resourcing for the Year 5 Evaluation.

Although not included in our terms of reference, we have attempted to meet CDKN and DFID requests to provide a broad assessment of the likely progress of the CDKN gender strategy, and highlight areas for improvement (in Section 4.3 of the report).

The recent prioritisation of gender within CDKN has come about mainly in response to DFID, although it has been taken on board with good intentions by CDKN senior management. CDKN has commissioned a number of gender and climate projects, and has been developing this as an external theme. There is also a 'gender section' in the commissioning protocol for projects. However, the country programmes reviewed did not demonstrate a strong understanding and prioritization of gender issues within their portfolios, nor did the senior management individuals interviewed. The gender section of the commissioning documents contained superficial comments, speaking in general terms about how women would affected, rather than reflecting a deeper understanding of how women, men, girls and boys of diverse social backgrounds might be differentially affected by the outcomes of a project.

CDKN needs to look across the institution – internally as well as in projects - using an appropriate holistic framework for gender mainstreaming (for example, the Levy

framework) and to resource gender and climate work adequately. Otherwise, well-intentioned senior management will act on the sub-set of constraints they find it easiest to address within their area of work, and the embedding of gender in institutional practice will not happen. This will limit the leadership and CDKN has the potential to provide in gender and climate.

Specifically, investment of resources is needed to:

- Develop an over-arching ethical frame for gender and social inclusion within climate projects;
- Recruit additional specialist gender staff at global and regional levels to support staff commissioning projects; and
- Develop a programme of internal staff development on gender and climate that is monitored and prioritised.

The evolution and application of CDKN's Theory of Change:

CDKN's Theory of Change (ToC) was revised in July 2014, adding the four outcome areas (policies and practice, disaster risk management, climate finance, and negotiations support). This was a coherent and appropriate evolution, building on the 'Dimensions of Change' framework and limitations of the log-frame noted at the mid-term review. We believe that the CDKN ToC is a good example of a global ToC that reflects the evolving understanding of the programme's change process and provides a good framework for aggregating learning.

There are some good examples of its application in programme processes, most notably to guide commissioning and procurement, to support strategy and learning in the Deep Engagement Countries and to frame monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) in a coherent and systematic way across the programme. However, our assessment is that there are also significant limitations to the extent to which ToC-led learning actually took place and informed the global decision-making and strategies of the programme. A key weaknesses has been the lack of mechanisms, channels or incentives for ToC learning and accountability to move beyond the MEL team. The lack of testing or exploration of the assumptions underpinning the ToC and CDKN's approach has also been a significant weakness. As a consequence, there has been a major missed opportunity to learn from CDKN's successes, 'productive failures' and innovations to understand what is actually involved in accompanying government to secure change.

### **Key Lessons**

Below we present key lessons and the associated sub-headings from the main report.

### Increase strategic focus (see section 3.5.1 of the report)

### A lesson for other programmes

CDKN was originally tasked with responding to developing country demand. As the programme has developed it has sought to combine this with a more strategic focus on outcomes. Getting the balance right is extremely difficult and would have been easier if strategic focus had been more of a priority at the outset.

### Key lessons for CDKN and DFID

# Over the past two years CDKN has adopted a more strategic, Outcome-led approach but a stronger strategic focus is needed in a number of areas:

- The greatest added value at a country level comes from Deep Engagement Countries (DECs) with coherent programmes and country teams that have the required capacity and investment (e.g. Colombia and India). CDKN should have fewer, better, DEC programmes.
- Projects should be situated in theories of change. This could be strengthened in all
  Outcome areas but is particularly evident for Research. At a DEC level this should lead
  to more coherent project portfolios e.g. As seen in Colombia relative to Nepal
- Focus more on "best bets" (even if this is just helping successful projects to access external funding to scale) will consume resources and is likely to require CDKN to focus on fewer projects and to drop poorly performing projects more rapidly.
- Outcome strategies need to be sufficiently broad to enable demand-led and opportunistic engagement but must be sufficiently focused to deliver Outcomes with the available resources. The Climate Finance strategies appear to be too broad given the resources available.
- One of the lessons from the Kenya programme is that scenario analysis could help to review political risks for major programmes and encourage CDKN to consider how these can be mitigated. Given the nature of CDKN's work, some risks are better taken by major donors that can engage in dialogue directly with Government.

### Match logframe ambition to resources (see section 3.5.2)

### Key lessons for CDKN and DFID

Evidence from the Climate Finance (CF) and Policy & Practice (P&P) Outcome case studies suggests that the ambition of logframe indicators is unrealistic given available resources

### Key lessons for DFID and other programmes

One of the points made at the 2015 ICF Learning for Change dialogue was that it was not unusual for logframe objectives to be revised downwards once programme experience revealed the magnitude of policy and context constraints relative to the resources available. Rather than doing this the CDKN logframe (Outcome indicators 1.1 and 2.2) relies on the vagueness of CDKN making "significant contributions" to very big policy changes in order to bridge the gap. It would have been better to set more modest objectives.

### Convene and partner to build capacity and scale (see section 3.5.3)

Key lessons for CDKN and other programmes

Large-scale capacity-building is needed to implement CCD policy in a number of areas that CDKN is supporting. We discuss examples of sub-national access to Climate Finance in Rwanda and Kenya (Annex 3) and legal training for Negotiation Support (Annex 4). CDKN does not have a comparative-advantage to do this at scale but CDKN has a track record of convening donor partners and could do more convening on capacity building for CCD. Given the specific need for CCD capacity building there may well be an opportunity for CDKN to develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others to do this.

### Clarify where results can be generalised (see section 3.5.4)

Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes

There is a very high demand for generalizable CDKN findings but, in reality, only certain areas of CDKN work can produce meaningful general findings. It is important to systematically identify opportunities for meaningful synthesis but also to explain when general results are unlikely to be useful.

### Strengthen learning (see section 3.5.5)

Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes

Programme staff are likely to spend too much time on managing projects to undertake reflective learning. Dedicated resources and planning are required to address the problem and CDKN is working on this.

Developing and evolving a theory of change is good practice but there also needs to be mechanisms, channels and incentives to use this as a framework for learning.

### Safeguard the Climate Compatible Development focus (see section 3.5.6)

Key lessons for CDKN

The Research, CF and DRM Outcome and Nepal case studies provide differing examples in which evaluators judged that a more systematic focus on climate compatible development is likely to improve the ultimate impact on the poor and vulnerable. In these examples, climate compatible development screening works in practice through CDKN staff commitment to climate compatible development but it is not systematic and there were cases where this had not worked.

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### More effective private sector engagement (see section 3.5.7)

Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes

Private sector engagement remains very limited and CDKN is far from achieving its 2014 logframe outcome milestone in this area. The Kenya country case study includes evaluation of the CaRROT project – a leading example of CDKN private sector engagement (with Kenyan flower growers). In a number of respects this has been a successful project and there is evidence of individual companies taking initial steps towards accessing climate finance. However, we find significant opportunities have been missed by CDKN due to a lack of strategic planning and capacity building. Even in a country such as Kenya with a strong private sector it seems that CDKN will need a significant in country investment to engage effectively.

### Financial management and project information systems (see section 4.2.4)

Key lessons for DFID and other programmes

The financial management and project information systems for contracted programmes must be fit for the specific programme purpose. Just because a service provider such as PwC has very strong systems in its major business areas, it does not mean that tailored software and systems for a particular contracted development programme will be available. DFID must have the capacity to specify what *reasonably* needs to be in place and ensure these systems are operational. A low cost solution should be used when it is fit for purpose. For a consortium such as CDKN with multiple partners and regional offices this solution should include establishing that processes exist to train relevant staff on how to use the system.

### CDKN's gender strategy (see section 4.3.5)

Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes

Gender mainstreaming needs to start with an assessment of constraints at an institution-wide rather than project level - using an appropriate holistic framework for gender mainstreaming. Solutions then need to be planned and resourced adequately. Otherwise, even well-intentioned senior management will act on the sub-set of constraints they find it easiest to address within their area of work, and the embedding of gender in institutional practice will not happen.

### Recommendations

We have synthesised a number of high-level recommendations from the detailed recommendations in the country and outcome case studies. These are as follows.

Highest priority recommendations

1. CDKN should work with fewer Deep Engagement Countries (certainly no increase on the current number) and ensure coherent programmes and country teams that have

- the required capacity and investment and situate projects in Outcome and Country theories of change.
- 2. CDKN should identify opportunities to convene donor partners and develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others for CCD capacity building and to reflect on what role CDKN will play in capacity building for CCD in the future.
- 3. CDKN should prioratise working with national Ministries and other funders to take successful projects to scale.
- 4. CDKN should discuss with the DFID ICF team how CDKN can package learning so it is most useful to them.

### High priority recommendations

- 1. CDKN should set out where general results matter and can be expected. These can be seen as "learning questions" and could be derived by Outcome/Research and from a discussion between regional teams.
- 2. CDKN should build on existing plans for reflective learning and ensure there is sufficient institutional support to implement this at outcome and deep engagement country level.
- 3. CDKN should put in place a light-touch quality assurance process to ensure a systematic focus on CCD.
- 4. DFID should use engagement with CDKN in years 6, 7 and beyond to encourage a systematic focus on CCD
- 5. CDKN should set out a strategy for private sector engagement that is going to make the most difference in the Climate Finance and Policy & Practice Outcome pathways. In doing so CDKN should engage with DFID to draw on the considerable experience that DFID has in supporting private sector development.
- 6. CDKN should discuss with DFID how both organisations can play a more involved, informed and mutually supportive role when it comes to catalysing headline CCD partnerships and jointly convening partners.
- 7. Emulating the three successful partnerships examples we discuss in this report, CDKN should look to more broadly and systematically build on its strengths in terms of CDKN's role, added value and niche in CCD partnerships and knowledge networks, by creating a broader set of partnerships at the regional and national level.
- 8. CDKN should strengthen reporting that allows easier aggregation of impacts on ultimate beneficiaries. This is likely to require increasing CDKN capacity for economic analysis.
- 9. CDKN should undertake indicative cost-benefit analysis by Outcome area.
- 10. CDKN should strengthen their gender strategy by:

- a. Using a framework such as Levy's "Web of Institutionalisation" for senior management to better understand the institutional change and resources required for gender mainstreaming;
- b. Developing a gender and social inclusion framework;
- c. Investing systematically in internal capacity building on gender and social inclusion for all staff involved in designing and commissioning projects; and
- d. Providing a higher level of technical training to CDKN staff responsible for gender, for example the Gender Champions as well as clear guidance on applying the gender framework.
- 11. CDKN should produce its own conflict of interest guidance. This should include a minimum time gap (of at least 6 months) for consortium member staff leaving CDKN and going back into consortium organisations in a closely related area.
- 12. DFID should require contractors managing programmes that are likely to provide a commercial advantage to produce a conflict of interest policy and show how it has been implemented.

### Medium priority recommendations

- 1. If it is not already done, DFID should undertake an analysis of administration costs by service provider to allow analysis of indicators such as elasticity of administration fees to total spend and average managed contract size.
- 2. DFID should use scenario analysis to review political risks for major programmes and consider how these can be mitigated.

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