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Report  
CDKN EYE Evaluation 2014

## FINAL REPORT

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Submitted by Itad

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Results in development

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## Acronyms

ANI	Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura
BAU	Business As Usual
CC	Climate Change
CCD	Climate Compatible Development
CCS	Climate Change Secretariat
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CEL	Country Engagement Lead
CF	Climate Finance
CIAT	International Centre for Tropical Agriculture
COLCIENCIAS	Ciencias, Tecnología e Innovación en Colombia
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CP	Country Programme
CPM	Country Programme Manager
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DEC	Deep Engagement Country
DFID	Department for International Development
DFID	Department for International Development
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DoC	Dimensions of Change
DP	Donor Partner
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
EIA	Economic Impact Assessment
EYE5	End of Year 5 Evaluation
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDC	Geothermal Development Cooperation
GoC	Government of Colombia
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoN	Government of Nepal
HCDA	Horticultural Crops Development Authority
HFP	Humanitarian Futures Programme
IDEAM	Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y estudios Ambientales
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
INVEMAR	Instituto de Investigaciones Marinas y Costeras
KAM	Kenya Association of Manufacturers
KCP	Kenya Country Programme
KCV	Kenya Country Visit
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KFC	Kenya Flower Council
KM	Knowledge Management
KMD	Kenya Meteorological Department
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MoSTE	Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment

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MADR	Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural
MADS	Ministerio de Medioambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
MEMR	Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources
MEWNR	Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (formally MEMR)
MT	Medium Term
MTC	Medium-Term Change
MTP	Mid-Term Plan
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NPC	National Planning Commission
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NPBMF	National Performance and Benefit Measurement Framework
NS	Negotiation Support
P&P	Policy and Practice
PIR	Project Impact Review
PM	Project Manager
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
RS	Research
ST	Short Term
StARCK	Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya
STC	Short-Term Change
ToC	Theory of Change
ToC	Theory of Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VfM	Value for Money

## CDKN EYE5 Executive Summary

### Background

The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) mission is to support decision-makers in designing and delivering climate compatible development by combining research, advisory services and knowledge management in support of locally owned and managed policy processes. Within the broad scope of climate compatible development, the programme works across four strategic themes. These are as follows (together with hyperlinks to further information on each of them from the CDKN website):

- Climate compatible development strategies and plans – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-policy-planning/>
- Improving developing countries' access to climate finance – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-finance/>
- Strengthening resilience through climate-related disaster risk management – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-disaster-risk-management/>
- Supporting climate negotiators from the least developed and most vulnerable countries – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-negotiations/>

These strategic themes (outcomes in the CDKN logical framework) have been supported primarily by spending on advisory services<sup>1</sup> (£24.2m over the first four years of the programme), research (£14.1m over this period), knowledge management (£7.4m), the Advocacy Fund (£7.3m) and partnerships (£3.5m). The programme works in partnership with decision-makers in the public, private and non-governmental sectors nationally, regionally and globally. While the latest annual report (2014) identifies 74 countries that have gained from the programme, country-level support is focussed in 12 priority or deep engagement countries (DECs) and 1 priority sub-region – Bangladesh, Caribbean region, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Uganda.

CDKN is managed by an alliance of organisations led by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), and including Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, INTRAC, LEAD Paksitan, the Overseas Development Institute, and SouthSouthNorth. CDKN has three main governance pillars: the Management Oversight Committee, the Network Council and the Management Team.

CDKN is now in its fifth year of operation although the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund (AF) – one of the five CDKN Outputs – started a year later, in mid-2011. CDKN funding is provided principally by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), who have commissioned this evaluation, and the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS). The initial contract to CDKN was £45.8m but this has been extended, most recently in April 2014. This brings the CDKN budget to a total of £113.7m over the seven-year period to the end of March 2017.

This Report sets out our findings from the end of year 5 evaluation (EYE5) of the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) programme. The EYE5 evaluation has two main audiences: firstly, DFID which as principal funder of CDKN is accountable for the programme delivering. DFID also has an interest in learning from CDKN for other climate programmes.

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<sup>1</sup> Described as Technical Assistance in the 2014 CDKN Annual Review

Secondly, CDKN wishes to gain an external perspective on progress and draw lessons for strengthening the programme. The Terms of reference (TOR) for this evaluation have been designed by CDKN with DFID input and the TOR / CDKN Statement of Work are given in Annex 1. Somewhat unusually, the evaluation of CDKN has been contracted by CDKN. In order to ensure independence, DFID have supervised and reviewed the work with CDKN reviewing only for factual accuracy. In summary, this evaluation is required to consider:

- **Overarching impact:** CDKN's credible contribution to the impact indicator 'Developing countries' policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020';
- **Progress towards impact within Outcome & Research theories of change (ToCs):** Five sections stating the evaluation of each CDKN Outcome/Research theory of change;
- **Impact Trajectory:** CDKN's overall progress up to Year 5 and likely trajectory in Years 6 and 7; and
- **Institutional model:** Assessing CDKN's institutional model up to Year 5, including its niche and role as a global CCD knowledge network as well as the value for money offered by its management model.

## Methodology



Our design for this evaluation uses case studies to test the CDKN Theory of Change (ToC) using a set of overarching evaluation questions. While this is a standard approach, the complexity of CDKN requires us to use two different types of case studies. CDKN aims to deliver the programme ToC through Deep Engagement Countries *and* Outcome/Research impact pathways that have a global reach. **Country case studies** tell us about Outcomes and progress towards impact in these representative countries and we have used separate case studies to capture the broader reach of the **Outcome/Research strategies**. Our assessment of progress towards impact has involved *adding up* and synthesising contributions from both types of case studies but there have also been some opportunities for triangulation e.g. where a global research programme has led to uptake within a Deep Engagement Country (DEC). In addition to both types of case studies we have drawn on programme-wide evidence using document reviews and interviews with institutional stakeholders. **Contribution analysis** has been used in both types of case study to help identify the contribution of CDKN in complex policy environments in which other interventions are also taking place.

In order to evaluate the CDKN institutional model we have supplemented the case study analysis with collection and analysis of evidence on the niche and role of CDKN as a global climate compatible development (CCD) knowledge network, and the value for money offered by its management model. This has been done through document review and interviewing both senior CDKN staff and high level key informants with global overview of climate compatible development. We have also interviewed stakeholders in three major CDKN partnerships identified by DFID. Nonetheless, this evaluation is not an organisational or strategy review and a comprehensive assessment of the CDKN niche would also need to consider CDKN relative to other players in the climate change arena.

## Findings

### Overarching impact:

- The evidence from the country and outcome case studies is that CDKN has made a credible contribution to the impact indicator 'Developing countries' policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020'.
- At the Outcome level, CDKN has achieved its 2015 logframe indicator milestones related to supporting CCD policies and practices although we have some concerns about particular indicators. Moreover, for each impact pathway we identify constraints to further progress towards impact that will need to be tackled. The recommendations brought together at the end of this summary aim to address these constraints. Evidence on progress from the country and outcome case studies is summarised in the following Figures:



*Progress towards impact within Outcome & Research theories of change (ToCs) and impact trajectories – explaining the Outcome/Research summary Figure above:*

- **Negotiation Support (NS)** – with £3.8m of outsourced spend since 2013 plus £1.2m shared with the Climate Finance outcome – has achieved very good progress. Given the consistency between CDKN, supplier and recipient assessment of progress for the key dimension of change for this outcome (“Changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations”) – our judgement is that NS has achieved (and very likely exceeded) the expected progress towards outcomes. This is consistent with the reported overachievement relative to milestones of “love to see” and “like to see” outcome map progress markers.
- **Climate Finance (CF)** has accounted for £1.7m of outsourced spend plus £3m shared with other outcomes since 2013. The CDKN CF portfolio is “work in progress” has not yet achieved the outcome level on the pathway to impact. On the basis of (admittedly unrealistic) logframe indicators we judge 5/11 sample projects to be at this level and 7/11 on a broader dimension of change basis. We expect some improvement in years 6 and 7 as the Adaptation Fund NIEs project shows considerable promise but fundamentally, the ambition of the CF logframe outcome indicators is greater than the CDKN resources and mandate in this area can realistically deliver.
- **Disaster Risk Management (DRM)** – with £3.4m of spend since 2013 plus £14m shared with the Policy & Practice outcome – has been in operation for less than four years and some of the projects in our sample are quite new. Nonetheless, we find evidence that the DRM outcome has been very successful in increasing and improving the accessibility of information on climate-related disaster risk to policy-makers and practitioners. There is some evidence of use of this information for policy and planning at a sub-national level but, at the time of the evaluation, there were no examples at the national level. The outcome theory of change projects impact at both sub-national and national levels and significant scaling up will be needed to secure outcomes at the national level in years 6 and 7.
- **Policies and Practice (P&P)** – £5.1m since 2013 plus £16m shared with other outcomes. Our case study project sample evaluation broadly substantiates the CDKN claim that targets have been met for the P&P outcome on “numbers of countries with national, regional and/or subnational CCD policies and practices that have been developed with the significant input of the CDKN”. However, we believe there is a lack of clarity on how ‘with significant input of the CDKN’ is defined and this has impeded honest reflection and learning. More progress has been made against the objective of “CCD policies and practice developed that impact those most affected by climate change” than the second P&P theory of change objective of “understanding drivers and challenges of CCD policies and practices” (which is also not well reflected in the logframe). Based on the sample of P&P projects we have reviewed, the trajectory towards impact for years 6 and 7 looks positive but depends on processes being in place to translate learning on P&P into practice.
- **Research** – is technically a CDKN output feeding into the outcomes above. Yet CDKN has spent £14.3 million on research from 2010-2014 and we were asked to consider Research as if it were a CDKN Outcome and have used a sample of 16 Research case study projects. We find evidence that 10/16 sample projects are producing tangible outcomes (linking directly to P&P and DRM outcomes and dimensions of change) which explains our judgement that Research has made less progress than expected. Our assessment suggests that a further 4 projects will produce the expected results in time. Contributing

flexible, catalytic research funding to accelerate and extend the policy and practice outreach of programmes is CDKN's strength. The smaller and medium-sized application focused projects, where suppliers are well-networked into national and sub-national policy communities, are the strong performers. A majority of research funds have been spent on these projects. Weaknesses include a lack of initiatives to link between research projects nationally, regionally or thematically. There is little evidence of CDKN facilitating access to national policymakers, although there is some regional facilitation. 'Thought leadership' is also weak. The impact trajectory for projects we have reviewed is good but programme gains depend on prioritising a global and cross-regional synthesis and creation of global public goods from the research portfolio.

#### *The CDKN Institutional model:*

Based on systematic assessment of the CDKN niche from country and outcome case studies we find:

- CDKN has been able to add some value in every deep engagement country we looked at by responding to government demand and contracting and managing suppliers effectively. It has added significant value and demonstrated a clear niche in Colombia and India by using the country engagement team to convene and communicate with stakeholders – facilitating the effective uptake of evidence to practice and greater progress than other donors in the same space.
- The work by CDKN country teams in Nepal, Colombia and India to support local uptake of research or piloting has also been important. This may not be highly visible at a global scale but it is difficult to get right and has required significant investment by CDKN. Donors such as DFID have rarely been successful in using country offices to route external research in a usable form to decision takers.
- Little evidence of the role and importance of global networking and partnerships in our sample of deep engagement countries but more evidence at the outcome level (with the exception of Policies & Practice). There is clear evidence of how this adds value for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Negotiation Support (NS) and also for Research (through brokering). There is emerging evidence that a combination of networking, technical skills and demand-led legitimacy can drive effective convening for Climate Finance (CF). There is some evidence of synergies across outcome areas (NS/CF) and of research being translated into practice (DRM, CF and to some extent P&P).
- Both CDKN NS and DRM have a niche as leaders in their global areas. For NS, this builds on a combination of: demand-led support; being one of only two major donors in this area; a mix of relevant, trusted specialist suppliers; continuity; close engagement of the NS team with the issues and some knowledge sharing and networking. There has been an effort to distil and transfer lessons but support has been largely tailored to negotiating groups. In the case of DRM, the niche reflects demand-led, translation of scientific research for innovative practice and policy and strategically and effectively leveraging ODI resources to add value to in-country teams. There are also few others translating the science from IPCC findings into practical learning for policy and practice.

Key informants with an overview of climate compatible development (Section 4.1.2) felt that CDKN gained a niche as a result of:

- Responding to demand (interviews 137, 097, 068);
- Skills and experience of the consortium (098, 068, 063); and

- Networks and partnerships (098, 096, 097, 068, 065).

Considering the latter point, the three major CDKN partnerships we look at in Section 4.1.1 (the Low Emissions Development Strategies Global Partnership, the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative and Climate Knowledge Brokers Group) suggest that CDKN investment in partnerships has produced value beyond that seen through the lens of projects in Outcome areas. It is beyond our terms of reference to compare this with the partnerships formed by other organisations but discussion with CDKN's partners highlighted the value of CDKN as a:

- Knowledge manager and knowledge broker;
- Knowledge generator;
- Convener of climate compatible development stakeholders and donors; and
- Strategic partner and funder.

#### *Value for money:*

We have been able to compare total administration costs for CDKN with those proposed for the Adaptation Fund derived from costs charged by various UN agencies working on climate change (see Section 4.2). On a like for like basis, CDKN would have an administration cost of 13% relative to the proposed Adaptation Fund administration cost of 17.5% - 18.5%. These comparative figures are approximate but they do suggest that CDKN administration costs are lower than comparable UN agencies. Moreover, the increase in CDKN spend since the mid-term review is likely to have slightly increased this advantage.

#### *Gender mainstreaming:*

CDKN has committed to strengthening the mainstreaming of gender within its programme to support action to achieve gender equality. It has developed a gender strategy (mainstreaming plan), but the main investments only started in 2014. Indeed, it is illustrative of the still-superficial nature of the gender strategy that gender was not included in the terms of reference or resourcing for the Year 5 Evaluation.

Although not included in our terms of reference, we have attempted to meet CDKN and DFID requests to provide a broad assessment of the likely progress of the CDKN gender strategy, and highlight areas for improvement (in Section 4.3 of the report).

The recent prioritisation of gender within CDKN has come about mainly in response to DFID, although it has been taken on board with good intentions by CDKN senior management. CDKN has commissioned a number of gender and climate projects, and has been developing this as an external theme. There is also a 'gender section' in the commissioning protocol for projects. However, the country programmes reviewed did not demonstrate a strong understanding and prioritization of gender issues within their portfolios, nor did the senior management individuals interviewed. The gender section of the commissioning documents contained superficial comments, speaking in general terms about how women would be affected, rather than reflecting a deeper understanding of how women, men, girls and boys of diverse social backgrounds might be differentially affected by the outcomes of a project.

CDKN needs to look across the institution – internally as well as in projects - using an appropriate holistic framework for gender mainstreaming (for example, the Levy framework) and to resource gender and climate work adequately. Otherwise, well-

intentioned senior management will act on the sub-set of constraints they find it easiest to address within their area of work, and the embedding of gender in institutional practice will not happen. This will limit the leadership and CDKN has the potential to provide in gender and climate.

Specifically, investment of resources is needed to:

- Develop an over-arching ethical frame for gender and social inclusion within climate projects;
- Recruit additional specialist gender staff at global and regional levels to support staff commissioning projects; and
- Develop a programme of internal staff development on gender and climate that is monitored and prioritised.

#### *The evolution and application of CDKN's Theory of Change:*

CDKN's Theory of Change (ToC) was revised in July 2014, adding the four outcome areas (policies and practice, disaster risk management, climate finance, and negotiations support). This was a coherent and appropriate evolution, building on the 'Dimensions of Change' framework and limitations of the log-frame noted at the mid-term review. We believe that the CDKN ToC is a good example of a global ToC that reflects the evolving understanding of the programme's change process and provides a good framework for aggregating learning.

There are some good examples of its application in programme processes, most notably to guide commissioning and procurement, to support strategy and learning in the Deep Engagement Countries and to frame monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) in a coherent and systematic way across the programme. However, our assessment is that there are also significant limitations to the extent to which ToC-led learning actually took place and informed the global decision-making and strategies of the programme. A key weaknesses has been the lack of mechanisms, channels or incentives for ToC learning and accountability to move beyond the MEL team. The lack of testing or exploration of the assumptions underpinning the ToC and CDKN's approach has also been a significant weakness. As a consequence, there has been a major missed opportunity to learn from CDKN's successes, 'productive failures' and innovations to understand what is actually involved in accompanying government to secure change.

### **Key Lessons**

Below we present key lessons and the associated sub-headings from the main report.

### 3.5.1 Increase strategic focus

#### *A lesson for other programmes*

CDKN was originally tasked with responding to developing country demand. As the programme has developed it has sought to combine this with a more strategic focus on outcomes. Getting the balance right is extremely difficult and would have been easier if strategic focus had been more of a priority at the outset.

#### *Key lessons for CDKN and DFID*

**Over the past two years CDKN has adopted a more strategic, Outcome, approach but a stronger strategic focus is needed in a number of areas:**

- The greatest added value at a country level comes from Deep Engagement Countries (DECs) with coherent programmes and country teams that have the required capacity and investment (e.g. Colombia and India). CDKN should have fewer, better, DEC programmes.
- Projects should be situated in theories of change. This could be strengthened in all Outcome areas but is particularly evident for Research. At a DEC level this should lead to more coherent project portfolios e.g. As seen in Colombia relative to Nepal
- More focus on “best bets” (even if this is just helping successful projects to access external funding to scale) will consume resources and is likely to require CDKN to focus on fewer projects and to drop poorly performing projects more rapidly.
- Outcome strategies need to be sufficiently broad to enable demand-led and opportunistic engagement but must be sufficiently focused to deliver Outcomes with the available resources. The Climate Finance strategies appear to be too broad given the resources available.
- One of the lessons from the Kenya programme is that scenario analysis could help to review political risks for major programmes and encourage CDKN to consider how these can be mitigated. Given the nature of CDKN’s work, some risks are better taken by major donors that can engage in dialogue directly with Government.

### 3.5.2 Match logframe ambition to resources

#### *Key lessons for CDKN and DFID*

Evidence from the Climate Finance (CF) and Policy & Practice (P&P) Outcome case studies suggests that the ambition of logframe indicators is unrealistic given available resources

#### *Key lessons for DFID and other programmes*

One of the points made at the 2015 ICF Learning for Change dialogue was that it was not unusual for logframe objectives to be revised downwards once programme experience revealed the magnitude of policy and context constraints relative to the resources available. Rather than doing this the CDKN logframe (Outcome indicators 1.1 and 2.2) relies on the vagueness of CDKN making “significant contributions” to very big policy changes in order to bridge the gap. It would have been better to set more modest objectives.

### 3.5.3 Convene and partner to build capacity and scale

#### *Key lessons for CDKN and other programmes*

Large-scale capacity-building is needed to implement CCD policy in a number of areas that CDKN is supporting. We discuss examples of sub-national access to Climate Finance in Rwanda and Kenya (Annex 3) and legal training for Negotiation Support (Annex 4). CDKN does not have a comparative-advantage to do this at scale but CDKN has a track record of convening donor partners and could do more convening on capacity building for CCD. Given the specific need for CCD capacity building there may well be an opportunity for CDKN to develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others to do this.

### 3.5.4 Clarify where results can be generalised

#### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

There is a very high demand for generalizable CDKN findings but, in reality, only certain areas of CDKN work can produce meaningful general findings. It is important to systematically identify opportunities for meaningful synthesis but also to explain when general results are unlikely to be useful.

### 3.5.5 Strengthen learning

#### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

Programme staff are likely to spend too much time on managing projects to undertake reflective learning. Dedicated resources and planning are required to address the problem and CDKN is working on this.

Developing and evolving a theory of change is good practice but there also needs to be mechanisms, channels and incentives to use this as a framework for learning.

### 3.5.6 Safeguard the Climate Compatible Development (CCD) focus

#### *Key lessons for CDKN*

The Research, CF and DRM Outcome and Nepal case studies provide differing examples in which evaluators judged that a more systematic focus on CCD is likely to improve the ultimate impact on the poor and vulnerable. In these examples, CCD screening works in practice through CDKN staff commitment to CCD but it is not systematic and there were cases where this had not worked.

### 3.5.7 More effective private sector engagement

#### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

Private sector engagement remains very limited and CDKN is far from achieving its 2014 logframe outcome milestone in this area. The Kenya country case study includes evaluation of the CaRROT project – a leading example of CDKN private sector engagement (with Kenyan flower growers). In a number of respects this has been a successful project and there is evidence of individual companies taking initial steps towards accessing climate finance. However, we find significant opportunities have been missed by CDKN due to a lack of strategic planning and capacity building. Even in a country such as Kenya with a strong private sector it seems that CDKN will need a significant in country investment to engage effectively.

### 4.2.4 Financial management and project information systems

#### *Key lessons for DFID and other programmes*

The financial management and project information systems for contracted programmes must be fit for the specific programme purpose. Just because a service provider such as PwC has very strong systems in its major business areas, it does not mean that tailored software and systems for a particular contracted development programme will be available. DFID must have the capacity to specify what *reasonably* needs to be in place and ensure these systems are operational. A low cost solution should be used when it is fit for purpose. For a consortium such as CDKN with multiple partners and regional offices this solution should include establishing that processes exist to train relevant staff on how to use the system.

### 4.3.5 CDKN's gender strategy

#### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

Gender mainstreaming needs to start with an assessment of constraints at an institution-wide rather than project level - using an appropriate holistic framework for gender mainstreaming. Solutions then need to be planned and resourced adequately. Otherwise, even well-intentioned senior management will act on the sub-set of constraints they find it easiest to address within their area of work, and the embedding of gender in institutional practice will not happen.

## Recommendations

We have synthesised a number of high-level recommendations from the detailed recommendations in the country and outcome case studies. These are as follows.

#### *Highest priority recommendations*

1. CDKN should work with fewer Deep Engagement Countries (certainly no increase on the current number) and ensure coherent programmes and country teams that have

the required capacity and investment and situate projects in Outcome and Country theories of change.

2. CDKN should identify opportunities to convene donor partners and develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others for CCD capacity building and to reflect on what role CDKN will play in capacity building for CCD in the future.
3. CDKN should prioritise working with national Ministries and other funders to take successful projects to scale.
4. CDKN should discuss with the DFID ICF team how CDKN can package learning so it is most useful to them.

#### *High priority recommendations*

1. CDKN should set out where general results matter and can be expected. These can be seen as “learning questions” and could be derived by Outcome/Research and from a discussion between regional teams.
2. CDKN should build on existing plans for reflective learning and ensure there is sufficient institutional support to implement this at outcome and deep engagement country level.
3. CDKN should put in place a light-touch quality assurance process to ensure a systematic focus on CCD.
4. DFID should use engagement with CDKN in years 6, 7 and beyond to encourage a systematic focus on CCD
5. CDKN should set out a strategy for private sector engagement that is going to make the most difference in the Climate Finance and Policy & Practice Outcome pathways. In doing so CDKN should engage with DFID to draw on the considerable experience that DFID has in supporting private sector development.
6. CDKN should discuss with DFID how both organisations can play a more involved, informed and mutually supportive role when it comes to catalysing headline CCD partnerships and jointly convening partners.
7. Emulating the three successful partnerships examples we discuss in this report, CDKN should look to more broadly and systematically build on its strengths in terms of CDKN’s role, added value and niche in CCD partnerships and knowledge networks, by creating a broader set of partnerships at the regional and national level.
8. CDKN should strengthen reporting that allows easier aggregation of impacts on ultimate beneficiaries. This is likely to require increasing CDKN capacity for economic analysis.
9. CDKN should undertake indicative cost-benefit analysis by Outcome area.
10. CDKN should strengthen their gender strategy by:

- a. Using a framework such as Levy's "Web of Institutionalisation" for senior management to better understand the institutional change and resources required for gender mainstreaming;
  - b. Developing a gender and social inclusion framework;
  - c. Investing systematically in internal capacity building on gender and social inclusion for all staff involved in designing and commissioning projects; and
  - d. Providing a higher level of technical training to CDKN staff responsible for gender, for example the Gender Champions as well as clear guidance on applying the gender framework.
11. CDKN should produce its own conflict of interest guidance. This should include a minimum time gap (of at least 6 months) for consortium member staff leaving CDKN and going back into consortium organisations in a closely related area.
  12. DFID should require contractors managing programmes that are likely to provide a commercial advantage to produce a conflict of interest policy and show how it has been implemented.

*Medium priority recommendations*

1. If it is not already done, DFID should undertake an analysis of administration costs by service provider to allow analysis of indicators such as elasticity of administration fees to total spend and average managed contract size.
2. DFID should use scenario analysis to review political risks for major programmes and consider how these can be mitigated

## CDKN EYE5 Final Report

### 1 Introduction

#### Introduction

This Report sets out our findings from the end of year 5 evaluation (EYE5) of the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) programme – <http://cdkn.org/>

The CDKN mission is to support decision-makers in designing and delivering climate compatible development by combining research, advisory services and knowledge management in support of locally owned and managed policy processes. Within the broad scope of climate compatible development, the programme works across four strategic themes. These are as follows (together with hyperlinks to further information on each of them from the CDKN website):

- Climate compatible development strategies and plans – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-policy-planning/>
- Improving developing countries' access to climate finance – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-finance/>
- Strengthening resilience through climate-related disaster risk management – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-disaster-risk-management/>
- Supporting climate negotiators from the least developed and most vulnerable countries – <http://cdkn.org/themes/theme-climate-negotiations/>

These strategic themes (outcomes in the CDKN logical framework) have been supported primarily by spending on advisory services<sup>2</sup> (£24.2m over the first four years of the programme), research (£14.1m over this period), knowledge management (£7.4m), the Advocacy Fund (£7.3m) and partnerships (£3.5m). The programme works in partnership with decision-makers in the public, private and non-governmental sectors nationally, regionally and globally. While the latest annual report (2014)<sup>3</sup> identifies 74 countries that have gained from the programme, country-level support is focussed in 12 priority or deep engagement countries (DECs) and 1 priority sub-region – Bangladesh, Caribbean region, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Uganda.<sup>4</sup>

CDKN is managed by an alliance of organisations led by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), and including Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, INTRAC, LEAD International, the Overseas Development Institute, and SouthSouthNorth. CDKN has three main governance pillars: the Management Oversight Committee, the Network Council and the Management Team<sup>5</sup>.

CDKN is now in its fifth year of operation although the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund (AF)<sup>6</sup> – one of the five CDKN Outputs – started in mid-2011. CDKN funding is provided

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<sup>2</sup> Described as Technical Assistance in the 2014 CDKN Annual Review

<sup>3</sup> CDKN Annual Report 2014 – [http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN\\_Annual\\_Review\\_2014\\_compressed.pdf](http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN_Annual_Review_2014_compressed.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> CDKN's Deep Engagement Countries – <http://cdkn.org/how-to-work-with-us/our-work-with-developing-countries/>

<sup>5</sup> Further details on the CDKN governance structure can be found at – <http://cdkn.org/about/governance-structure/>

<sup>6</sup> CDKN Advocacy Fund – <http://cdkn.org/about/advocacy/>

principally by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), who have commissioned this evaluation, and the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS). The initial total value of the contract to CDKN was £45.8m and was extended to include £10m for the management of the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund, £15.1m from DGIS, £1.6m from DFID Caribbean, Rwanda and Kenya and £1m to support IPCC outreach and Future Climate For Africa. Following the mid-term review of 2012/13, in April 14, a further contract amendment worth £43.2m was agreed which extends the project to £116.7m. This contract amendment is made up of three elements: i) £40m from International Climate Fund; ii) £3m from Future Climate for Africa; and iii) £200k from DFID Uganda as co-financing for the economics study. The £40m was provided with bridge funding for an additional 2 years beyond year 5 in order to maintain and expand support to developing countries. Of the approved £40m, it is DFID's intention to make the final £10m available in year 7 conditional on CDKN securing £10m of matched funding from new donors. This brings the CDKN budget to a total of £113.7m over the seven-year period to the end of March 2017 and £3m for the second stage of FCFA which is over a five-year period to the end of March 2019

The EYE5 evaluation has two main audiences: firstly, DFID which as principal funder of CDKN is accountable for the programme delivering. DFID also has an interest in learning from CDKN for other climate programmes. Secondly, CDKN wishes to gain an external perspective on progress and draw lessons for strengthening the programme. The Terms of reference (TOR) for this evaluation have been designed by CDKN with DFID input and the TOR / CDKN Statement of Work are given in Annex 1. Somewhat unusually, the evaluation of CDKN has been contracted by CDKN. In order to ensure independence DFID have supervised and reviewed the work with CDKN reviewing only for factual accuracy. In summary, the TOR require this evaluation to consider:

- **Overarching impact:** CDKN's credible contribution to the impact indicator 'Developing countries' policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020';
- **Progress towards impact within Outcome & Research theories of change (ToCs):** Five sections stating the evaluation of each CDKN Outcome/Research theory of change;
- **Impact Trajectory:** CDKN's overall progress up to Year 5 and likely trajectory in Years 6 and 7; and
- **Institutional model:** Assessing CDKN's institutional model up to Year 5, including its niche and role as a global CCD knowledge network as well as the value for money (VfM) offered by its management model.

The remainder of this report contains our approach to and results of this evaluation. We have tried to keep the main body of the report relatively short and to signpost readers to annexes for more information. As part of this process high-level recommendations have been synthesised from annexes and presented in the main report, with more detailed recommendations for CDKN programme teams contained within each annex. However, as CDKN is a complex and wide-ranging programme many readers will find it useful to read these annexes – particularly the country and outcome case studies in Annex 3 and 4. These annexes are also a major source of evidence for the conclusions presented in this report as they address the evaluation questions for deep engagement country and outcome theories of change. Within the annexes and at some points in the main report we associate individual interviews with views by number rather than by name, to safeguard stakeholder confidentiality. Overall, more than 180 interviews have been undertaken and interviewees are noted in each case study.

Section 2 of the report sets out the major elements of the methodology we have used with full details given in Annex 2. In Section 3, we provide high level findings of progress towards impact based on the case study evidence and key lessons learned. Section 4 considers the performance of the CDKN institutional model both in terms of the CDKN niche and role as a global CCD knowledge network as well as delivering value for money. Gender mainstreaming is also considered as part of institutional performance in this section and we set out key findings and associated recommendations for each of the major institutional topics. Sections 5 and 6 provide summaries of the country case studies and assessments of outcome/research impact pathway progress based on the outcome/research case studies. Section 7 presents conclusions with related high-level recommendations in Section 8.

## 2 Methodology

### 2.1 Overview

Our design for this evaluation uses case studies to test the CDKN Theory of Change (ToC) using a set of overarching evaluation questions (EQs) – shown below. While this is a standard approach<sup>7</sup>, the complexity of CDKN requires us to use two different types of case studies. CDKN aims to deliver the programme ToC through DECs *and* Outcome/Research impact pathways that have a global reach. **Country case studies** tell us about Outcomes and progress towards impact in these representative countries and we have used separate case studies to capture the broader reach of the **Outcome/Research strategies**. Our assessment of progress towards impact has involved *adding up* and synthesising contributions from both types of case studies but there have also been some opportunities for triangulation e.g. where a global research programme has led to uptake within a Deep Engagement Country (DEC). In addition to both types of case studies we have drawn on programme-wide evidence using document reviews and interviews with institutional stakeholders.

**Contribution analysis** has been used in both types of case study to help identify the contribution of CDKN in complex policy environments in which other interventions are also taking place. Contribution analysis<sup>8</sup> is an approach in which the steps from programme inputs through to outcomes in the ToC are examined to establish a plausible association. As articulated by White and Phillips (2012: 42), “a plausible association can be said to have made if the following criteria are met: (1) a reasoned theory of change is set out; (2) the activities of an intervention are shown to have been implemented as set out in the theory of change; (3) the chain of expected results can be shown to have occurred; and (4) other influencing factors have either been shown not to have made a difference, or their relative contribution has been recognised.” We have generated the evidence for contribution analysis from document reviews, interviews with stakeholders, and interviews with independent key informants.

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<sup>7</sup> The reason for taking a theory-based approach is that CDKN is a mixed intervention programme, where effectiveness depends on the collaboration and synergies between different programme strategies and external contributing factors. This makes the use of experimental and statistical designs inappropriate for assessing the programme as a whole or for ex-post impact evaluation, as outcomes result from different combinations of factors and causal mechanisms depending on the context. Evaluation design is discussed further in Annex 2.

<sup>8</sup> Mayne, J. 2001. Addressing attribution through contribution analysis: using performance measures sensibly. Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation 16: 1-24. Available at:


[http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsf/html/99dp1\\_e.html/\\$file/99dp1\\_e.pdf](http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsf/html/99dp1_e.html/$file/99dp1_e.pdf)

Mayne, J. 2008 Contribution analysis: An approach to exploring cause and effect. ILAC Brief 16. Available at:

[http://www.cgiar-ilac.org/files/ILAC\\_Brief16\\_Contribution\\_Analysis\\_0.pdf](http://www.cgiar-ilac.org/files/ILAC_Brief16_Contribution_Analysis_0.pdf)

An overview of the approach is illustrated in Figure 1 below and full details of the methods used and an elaboration of evaluation questions for each type of case study can be found in Annex 2. Key aspects of the methodology are summarised in the remainder of this section of the report.


CDKN Theory of Change (July 2014)



**Table 1: Overarching evaluation questions (EQ)**

Key Question	Data source & collection approach	Data analysis approach
EQ1 – To what extent does the evidence suggest that CDKN has made a credible contribution to developing countries following resilient and sustainable low carbon development pathways?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country case study analysis</li> <li>• Outcome case study analysis</li> <li>• Institutional assessment analysis, including gender mainstreaming</li> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Review of secondary sources on numbers of developing countries following resilient and sustainable low carbon development pathways</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assembling and assessing/verifying evidence against EQ’s</li> <li>• Contribution analysis against CDKN’s overall ToC and our contextual factors, including other actors and alternative explanations</li> <li>• Triangulation across and between case studies – country and outcome level</li> <li>• Peer review – internal team led by team leader</li> </ul>
EQ2 – What evidence is there of progress towards impact within the Outcome and Research Theories of Change?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country case studies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ CDKN staff interviews</li> <li>○ Project interviews</li> <li>○ Donors and multilateral agency interviews</li> <li>○ Key informant interviews</li> <li>○ Document review</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Outcome case studies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ CDKN staff interviews</li> <li>○ Project interviews</li> <li>○ Donors and multilateral agency interviews</li> <li>○ Key informant interviews</li> <li>○ Document review</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assembling and assessing/verifying evidence against Country and Outcome EQ’s</li> <li>• Contribution analysis against the overall CDKN impact pathway, various contextual factors and evidence for alternative explanations.</li> </ul>
EQ3 – What is CDKN’s likely impact trajectory in Years 6 and 7?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country case study analysis</li> <li>• Outcome case study analysis</li> <li>• Institutional assessment analysis, including gender mainstreaming</li> <li>• Donor and multilateral agency interviews</li> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Document reviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of evaluation evidence regarding CDKN’s contribution to outcomes, strengths/ weaknesses against its niche, future priorities and forward business plans.</li> <li>• Analysis of evaluation evidence of contextual enabling/constraining factors, including other actors, at national and international level.</li> </ul>
EQ4 – To what extent does CDKN’s institutional model (covering niche, role and VfM) support the delivery of CDKN’s stated outcomes and impact?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CDKN staff interviews</li> <li>• Project interviews</li> <li>• Donors and multilateral agency interviews</li> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of evaluation evidence regarding CDKN’s contribution to outcomes, assessment of its strengths/ weaknesses against its niche and impact objective, including gender and climate.</li> <li>• Analysis of evaluation evidence of contextual enabling/constraining factors, including other actors, at national and international level.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

Figure 1: Summary of Evaluation Approach



## 2.2 Country case studies

CDKN programmes in DECs address multiple Outcomes and illustrate the overarching ToC in practice (recognising that not all Strategies, Stakeholders, Dimensions of Change or Outcomes will be addressed in any particular country programme). Hence, country case studies provide an opportunity to **partially** test the overarching ToC in microcosm. There are two important reasons why this is only a partial test of the ToC:

- The main focus of CDKN work on the Negotiation Support (NS) outcome and Research is global rather than through DECs.
- We look at five case study countries out of 13 DECs.<sup>9</sup> CDKN and DFID believe these are broadly representative (see below) but even so we can only claim to draw a general inference for the programme as a whole<sup>10</sup>.

As country programmes reflect demand and opportunities for CCD work the mechanisms through which CDKN delivers can vary somewhat although the basic building blocks (the CDKN Output areas) will be similar. Political and country context varies significantly<sup>11</sup>. Given that there is a CDKN approach, broadly similar intervention mechanisms and shared outcomes we have used a common set of evaluation questions (EQs) derived from the programme ToC for each country case study. These common country EQs are set out in Annex 2 and allow us to consider whether CDKN has made the programme relevant to the country context as well as effectiveness in using its niche and contributing to short and medium-term changes.

The resources available allowed for five country case studies. These were chosen:

- To reflect the major types of CDKN investment (spend) in DECs; and
- To make use of MTR case studies to provide a degree of continuity since the MTR against which to assess progress towards impact.

Following three workshops with DFID and CDKN which informed the purpose and scope of the evaluation, three of the MTR country case studies (Rwanda, Kenya and Colombia) continued in the sample but we judged it necessary to replace Ethiopia and Bangladesh with Nepal and India. This was done to better reflect large programme investments across outcome areas e.g. research and DRM, as well as to reflect DFID's priority for EYE5 to focus in some detail on the results of CDKN research.

For *each* case study country we derived context-specific evaluation sub-questions and sampled 5-10 projects that broadly represented the programme (see Inception Report Annexes 5A-E). These were used to test claims of progress towards impact in each case study country made by CDKN in the 2014 CDKN M&E report.

Interviews structured around the EQs were undertaken with:

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<sup>9</sup> Rwanda, Colombia, Nepal, India and Kenya.

<sup>10</sup> We cannot systematically estimate programme impact by scaling up from case study DECs by matching specific non-case study DECs with case study DECs e.g. by saying the magnitude of CDKN impact in Ethiopia is comparable to say that in Rwanda.

<sup>11</sup> CDKN therefore works with country level impact pathways (ToCs) that have a varying mix of common outputs and strategies. Note that we are not using the term "significant" as in "statistically significant".

- CDKN and contractor staff in country (with Skype or phone interviews where relevant interviewees are elsewhere in the region or further afield);
- Government stakeholders;
- Key informants from DFID and other independent sources. DFID country offices were requested to help identify suitable sector experts.

At the Inception stage we committed to obtaining 15 – 20 interviews per case study country (75 – 100 in total) but in practice have exceeded this – securing 110 interviews. In order to test the credibility of CDKN claims against alternative explanations we used contribution analysis, drawing on (“top-down and bottom-up”) evidence from document reviews, interviews with stakeholders and independent key informants.

## 2.3 Outcome/research case studies

These provide an opportunity to test specific impact pathways for:

- Climate Compatible Development Policy and Practice
- Negotiation Support
- Climate Finance
- Disaster Risk Management
- Research

Based on our initial review of outcome ToC documents we specified evaluation questions around:

- **Results** – progress for this specific outcome and linkage with other outcomes;
- **Context** – the assumptions underlying each specific outcome and stakeholders involved in its delivery; and
- **Learning** – the extent to which lessons have been drawn for outcome-related projects and CDKN more generally

Details of evaluation sub-questions and selected projects for each Outcome area and Research can be found as Annexes 6A-6E to the Inception Report.

For *each* Outcome/Research case study, resources allowed us to review 7 -12 projects. The process of sample selection followed three stages:

1. CDKN prepared a list of projects by outcome by spend and date of expected or actual completion.
2. We reviewed CDKN claims for outcome level changes from the 2014 CDKN M&E report; and
3. We selected a purposive sample of projects that allow us:
  - To test these claims (projects that have been completed or have had sufficient time to lead to outcomes); and
  - To capture a broadly representative share of completed project spend.

Given the project sample, the process for addressing the EQs for each impact pathway was to:

1. Review project reporting for the selected projects
2. Set up and undertake interviews with:
  - CDKN and contractor staff (some face-to-face interviews in London with Skype or phone interviews where interviewees are elsewhere);
  - Government and multi-lateral agency stakeholders
  - Key informants from DFID and other independent sources. DFID have been requested to help identify suitable sector experts and we will also use our own networks to do this.
3. Undertake contribution analysis for the major changes to test the credibility of CDKN claims against alternative explanations. This drew on (“top-down and bottom-up”) evidence from document reviews, interviews with stakeholders and independent key informants.

At the Inception stage we estimated obtaining 8–12 interviews per outcome area (40–60 in total). In practice we talked to 56 interviewees specifically for Outcome/Research case studies. In addition, where sampled projects were in both Country and Outcome case studies we drew on the Country case study interviews.

## 2.4 Additional CDKN programme level review

In order to evaluate the CDKN institutional model we have supplemented the case study analysis with collection and analysis of evidence on the niche and role of CDKN as a global CCD knowledge network, and the VFM offered by its management model. This has been done through updating MTR evidence from a literature review and interviewing both senior CDKN staff and high level key informants with global overview of CCD. We have interviewed 15 key informants specifically on institutional issues<sup>12</sup> and have also interviewed stakeholders in three major CDKN partnerships identified by DFID.

## 2.5 The evaluation synthesis process

**Two synthesis workshops have been held to bring together all team members to interrogate findings against evaluation questions. Using these workshops and comparison of documents in a consistent format the team leader has used the following synthesis process:**

1. For country case studies:
  - These have been systematically reviewed against common EQs (based on argumentative interpretation rather than numeric tallies);
2. For outcome/research case studies:

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<sup>12</sup> A large majority of, but not all, institutional interviews and those for case studies were one-to-one interviews.

- Common lessons on drivers and constraints to progress towards impact and the CDKN niche are drawn out but there as intervention mechanisms and contexts differ there is no systematic synthesis.
3. Between Country and Outcome/Research case studies:
    - We have been able to triangulate findings from both types of case studies. For example, we draw on the significant role of Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in the portfolio of CDKN work in India and research programmes with coverage in country case study countries.
  4. Drawing on evidence from the institutional interviews and document review against particular evaluation questions
  5. Adding up findings from all the sources above to draw programme level conclusions on contribution to the impact indicator, overall trajectory and institutional model.

## 2.6 Limitations of the evaluation

The Outcome and Deep Engagement Country case studies have provided powerful lenses for assessing progress towards impact. However, by design, these case studies can only pick up the use of CDKN global functions by projects in outcome areas or country programmes. CDKN have argued that this understates their niche as it fails to capture a small number of important partnerships with counterpart global organisations that support CDKN's convening and knowledge brokering role, as well as the sharing of learning with other institutions in the field. We have therefore added interviews with three key partner organisations identified by CDKN and DFID to our institutional interviews. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that this evaluation is not an organisational or strategy review and a comprehensive assessment of the CDKN niche would also need to consider CDKN relative to other players in the climate change arena.

The budget available for this evaluation has provided some limitations. Inevitably, a sample of 5 from 12 diverse Deep Engagement Countries (DECs) plus the Caribbean sub-region cannot be totally representative. Yet, this sample does capture major potential sources of variation across DECs: regional (Africa, Asia and Latin America), programme size, political and intuitional context, investment in country engagement teams and outcome area focus. For this reason we do not consider that restricting country case studies to 5 countries has been a major limitation. It has been challenging to complete country visits with 6 days per country for one evaluation team member with no local evaluation expert support. However, we have sought and generally received help from DFID country offices or DFID contacts in country to set up interviews with key informants that are independent of CDKN.

## 3 CDKN progress towards impact at EYE5: findings and implications

### 3.1 Overall evidence that CDKN has made a credible contribution to developing countries following resilient and sustainable low carbon development pathways

This evaluation has been asked to consider CDKN progress towards impact where the indicator of impact is 'Developing countries' policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020'. The evidence from the country and

outcome case studies is that CDKN has made a credible contribution to this objective. At the Outcome level, CDKN has largely achieved its 2015 logframe indicator milestones related to supporting CCD policies and practices although we have some concerns about particular indicators. The Figures below summarise findings from the detailed Outcome reports in Annex 4 to present a Red, Amber, Green (RAG) rating on the design of logframe indicators (Figure 2) and actual indicator milestone achievement (Figure 3).

Moreover, for each impact pathway we identify constraints to further progress towards impact. Many of these issues are effectively illustrated by the deep engagement country (DEC) case studies in Annex 3. The remainder of this Section of the report provides a summary of progress towards impact from both case study sources and the key lessons learned.

**Figure 2 : Appropriateness and relevance of indicators and milestones in logframes**

CDKN Programme logframe outcome / output indicator quality				
	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3	Indicator 4
Outcome 1 – Policies and Practice	2&3	1,2&3	2&3	1&2
Outcome 2 – Climate finance	1 & 3	1	1	
Outcome 3 – Disaster risk management	1&2	1,2 & 3	3	
Outcome 4 – Negotiations support				
Research output	1&2	1,2&3	1,2&3	

**Key: Indicator quality assessment RAG rating**

- Red – The indicator:
  1. Is poorly and inappropriately defined relative to the nature and scale of the results anticipated,
  2. Refers only to aggregated results ('counting things'), and,
  3. Is unclear about how CDKN claims and reports progress / results.
- Amber – The indicator:
  1. Is partially defined relative to the nature and scale of the results anticipated,
  2. Refers to either quality or quantity of results, and,
  3. Partially sets out how CDKN claims and reports progress / results.
- Green – The indicator:
  1. Is clearly and appropriately defined relative to the nature and scale of the results anticipated,
  2. Refers to both quality and quantity of results, and,
  3. Clearly sets out how CDKN claims and reports progress / results.

**Figure 3 : CDKN Programme logframe outcome indicator achievement**

CDKN Programme logframe outcome indicator achievement <sup>13</sup> – against Milestone 2 (2014) or 3 (2015) <sup>14</sup>				
	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3	Indicator 4
Outcome 1 – Policies and Practice	Green	Green	Green	Green
Outcome 2 – Climate finance	Amber	Green	Red	
Outcome 3 – Disaster risk management	Amber	Amber	Amber	
Outcome 4 – Negotiations support	Green			
Research output	Green	Green	Green	

**Key: Indicator achievement RAG rating**

- Red – No evidence of delivery against milestone 2 or 3 indicators
- Amber – Partial evidence of delivery against milestone 2 or 3 indicators
- Green – Credible evidence of delivery against milestone 2 or 3 indicators


**3.2 Evidence from the country case studies**

While each country has its own ToC, all seek to directly contribute to “changes in the design and delivery of CCD policies and practice” – CDKN Dimension of Change (DoC) 2. This also reflects the P&P Logframe Outcome that is at the core of each case study country programme. Hence this is a consistent measure to compare progress towards impact across our sample although looking at achievement of medium term changes that are specific to each country’s impact pathway gives a very similar picture. **Error! Reference source not found.** below provides a summary of progress against these measures based on the evidence presented in Section 5 and Annex 3 against country evaluation questions 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8. The dotted lines have been added to highlight useful similarities between Rwanda and Nepal and Colombia and India cases.

<sup>13</sup> Based on the current definition of each indicator as set out in the CDKN logframe and reported against in the 2014-15 Annual Report. Note that Research is an Output not an Outcome in the CDKN Logframe.

<sup>14</sup> This evaluation was originally provided with the CDKN 2013-14 Annual Report and only at the latter stages received the 2014-15 Annual Report. We have used the 2014 Milestones and updated these to the 2015 Milestones where possible.

**Figure 4: Evidence on progress towards impact from the DEC sample**



Both Rwanda and Nepal are examples of relatively small DEC samples with successful projects but a diverse programme with limited coherence. In both cases the stated ambition of the CDKN country outcome ambition far exceeds currently available programme resources. In Rwanda, the supportive political context has been an important factor in driving significant progress towards impact. In Nepal, there is a more difficult political context but the programme has gained from the work by the country engagement lead (CEL), CDKN regional and technical support for knowledge sharing and synergy between Negotiations Support (NS) and Policy and Practice (P&P) Outcomes in country. The CDKN global knowledge network has not been a major factor in the success of these country programmes.

The CDKN programme in Kenya is by far the largest in our sample. It made a strong start with support for Kenya’s national climate strategy (NCCAP) but progress towards outcomes let alone impact has been limited by: political and institutional upheaval and change as a result of the 2013 elections and the new constitution; a simultaneous high level of uncertainty around CDKN’s budget and funding going forwards; and the absence of a strong in-country CDKN team, particularly the failure to retain or replace a CEL in a timely manner. One area of NCCAP support – the geothermal NAMA – has made more progress as a result of a manifesto commitment on energy expansion.

The CDKN programme in Colombia has made the most progress towards impact of the five case study countries. There is strong evidence of processes and products required to get to a practical, finance-ready plan in Colombia’s sectors and territories, plans that have the commitment of governance, public and private actors. Local capacity is high and project suppliers have delivered good quality products but the distinctive feature is the high value added by the CEL and country team rather than suppliers or the global knowledge network. The Country team have provided the strategic leadership, communications and achieved the political/institutional buy-in that is making the difference.


CDKN has made good progress in India by achieving outcomes in just three years. The CDKN country team has been able to effectively leverage ODI translation of research for policy.

Only in the Colombia case do we see such high value addition by the country team. In India, there are successful UNDP and GIZ programmes in this area, but CDKN is considered to have made more progress due to the country team involving multiple actors and communities and in moving the agenda towards the integration of climate change in DRM policy and programming. The India case is judged as demonstrating the highest added value as it combines high value addition by the CDKN country team and global CDKN leverage of ODI research translation for policy. Progress towards impact has arguably been more limited than in Colombia as, to date, CDKN has concentrated its efforts in “testing the waters” and demonstrating pilot models at city and district level. Moving significantly further towards policy impact will require national engagement.

### 3.3 Evidence of progress towards impact within the Outcome and Research case studies

As each outcome/research area has its own impact pathway and Logframe outcome indicators, progress towards impact reported below is based on each impact pathway. The summary in Figure 5 below is based on evidence presented in Section 6 and Annex 4 against outcome evaluation questions 1 and 3.

**Figure 5: Evidence on progress towards impact from each Outcome/Research case study**



**Negotiation Support (NS)** – £3.8m since 2013<sup>15</sup> plus £1.2m shared with CF – has achieved good progress at the outcome level on the basis of NS Dimensions of Change (DoC) 2, 3, 4 and 5 as well.<sup>16</sup> Given the consistency between CDKN, supplier and recipient assessment of progress for the key NS DoC -DoC1 (Changes in the influence that the poorest and most

<sup>15</sup> CDKN has been able to provide outsourced spend by Outcome between 2013 (when CDKN introduced Outcome-level tagging of projects) and the end 2014

<sup>16</sup> Common DoC are used for CF, DRM and P&P but these have been interpreted into NS-specific DoC – see Annex 4

climate vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations) – our judgement is that NS has achieved (and very likely exceeded) the expected progress towards outcomes. This is consistent with the overachievement relative to milestones of “love to see” and “like to see” outcome map progress markers.

Interviews with recipients of support and stakeholders (interviews 070, 138, 139, 144 and 158) provide direct evidence of a CDKN contribution at the DoC level – principally for DoC 1. As there are relatively few donors active in the NS arena and there is an unusually short path between policy making recipients and suppliers, it is possible to largely rule out alternative explanations. Looking forward to years 6 and 7, further progress towards impact depends on whether there is an agreement at the Paris COP that is acceptable to poor and most vulnerable (PMV) countries. This is outside CDKN control.

**Climate Finance (CF)** has accounted for £1.7m of outsourced spend plus £3m shared with other outcomes since 2013. The CDKN CF portfolio has not yet achieved the outcome level on the pathway to impact. On the basis of (admittedly unrealistic) LF indicators we judge 5/11 sample projects to be at this level and 7/11 on a broader DoC basis. In addition, the Adaptation Fund NIEs project shows considerable promise of contributing at the outcome level and this will be seen in years 6 and 7.

Overall, CF is a “work in progress” and is particularly dependent on the external political and institutional context. Private sector engagement has been weak. It is important to note that the ambition of the CF logframe outcome indicators is greater than the CDKN resources and mandate in this area can realistically deliver. CDKN and DFID have avoided addressing this problem by relying on the vague definition of the indicators e.g. “significant input of CDKN”. However, this has helped maintain unrealistic expectations of what CDKN can achieve, encouraged over-claiming of CDKN’s role in high-level changes and discouraged honest reflection and learning by CDKN.

**Disaster Risk Management (DRM)** – £3.4m plus £14m shared with P&P – has been in operation for less than four years and the projects in our sample are on different timelines. Nonetheless, we find evidence that the DRM outcome has been very successful in increasing and improving the accessibility of information on climate-related disaster risk to policy-makers and practitioners. There is limited evidence however as to what extent improved access has led to the use of such information in planning or policy. This is particular the case at the national level.

At the sub-national level, CDKN has worked with a number of cities in Asia, Africa and LAC on elements of climate-related DRM and this work has resulted in these cities making a significant change in the approach to tackling extreme events. However, in relation to the Outcome statement – *to improve the effectiveness and integration of disaster risk management in climate compatible development policies and practices at national and sub national levels* – there is piece-meal evidence of achievements in relation to small sub-national level projects and CDKN still does not have examples at national level. In short, subnational projects have been highly successful but CDKN has not yet achieved its DRM outcome at national level. Looking forward, there are good opportunities for impact in years 6 and 7 with strong demonstration projects and the potential to influence international disaster risk reduction agreements. However, scaling up is required to achieve the intended impact.

**Policies and Practice (P&P)** – £5.1m plus £16m shared with other outcomes. This study has found that overall CDKN’s P&P outcome result reporting is substantiated by our case study project sample evaluation. The numerical outcome targets for CCD programmes and practices have been met with tangible results. However, as noted for CF above, there remains a lack of clarity on how ‘with significant input of the CDKN’ is defined and assessed in CDKN’s P&P reporting and this has impeded honest reflection and learning. CDKN’s P&P-outcome level results also rely heavily on particular projects and there is less evidence of coherent sets of P&P outcome level results at the DEC portfolio level.

More progress has been made against *CCD policies and practice developed that impact those most affected by climate change* than the second P&P ToC objective of *understanding drivers and challenges of CCD policies and practices* (which is also not well reflected in the logframe). Based on the sample of P&P projects we have reviewed, the trajectory towards impact for years 6 and 7 looks positive but CDKN will need to elaborate the processes by which enhanced learning on P&P will lead to direct P&P results.

**Research** – is technically a CDKN output feeding into the outcomes above. Yet CDKN has spent £14.3 million on research from 2010-2014 and we were asked to consider Research as if it were a CDKN Outcome and have used a sample of 16 Research case study projects. We find evidence that 10/16 sample projects are producing tangible outcomes (linking directly to P&P and DRM outcomes and DoCs) which explains why Research is shown below the expected achievement line in Figure 5 above. Our assessment suggests that a further 4 projects will produce the expected results in time.

Contributing flexible, catalytic research funding to accelerate and extend the policy and practice outreach of programmes is CDKN’s strength. The smaller and medium-sized application focused projects, where suppliers are well-networked into national and sub-national policy communities, are the strong performers. A majority of research funds have been spent on these projects. Weaknesses include a lack of initiatives to link between research projects nationally, regionally or thematically. There is little evidence of CDKN facilitating access to policymakers nationally, although there is some regional facilitation. ‘Thought leadership’ is also weak. The impact trajectory for projects we have reviewed is good but programme gains depend on prioritising a global and cross-regional synthesis and creation of global public goods from the research portfolio.

### 3.5 Lessons from the assessment of progress towards impact

By looking at progress towards impact within theories of change at the country level and in each programme outcome (using the case studies structured around evaluation questions) we have identified changes in practice that we judge will help CDKN to deliver their objectives.

#### 3.5.1 Increase strategic focus

*A lesson for other programmes*

CDKN was originally tasked with responding to developing country demand. As the programme has developed it has sought to combine this with a more strategic focus on outcomes. Getting the balance right is extremely difficult and would have been easier if strategic focus had been more of a priority at the outset.

*Key lessons for CDKN*

**Over the past two years CDKN has adopted a more strategic, Outcome, approach but a stronger strategic focus is needed in a number of areas:**

- The greatest added value at a country level comes from Deep Engagement Countries (DECs) with coherent programmes and country teams that have the required capacity and investment (e.g. Colombia and India) - see Section 5 and Annex 3. CDKN should have fewer, better, DEC programmes.
- Projects should be situated in theories of change. This could be strengthened in all Outcome areas but is particularly evident for Research (see Section 6 and Annex 4). At a DEC level this should lead to more coherent project portfolios e.g. As seen in Colombia relative to Nepal (see Section 5 and Annex 3)
- More focus on “best bets” (even if this is just helping successful projects to access external funding to scale) will consume resources and is likely to require CDKN to focus on fewer projects and to drop poorly performing projects more rapidly.
- Outcome strategies need to be sufficiently broad to enable demand-led and opportunistic engagement but must be sufficiently focused to deliver Outcomes with the available resources. The Climate Finance strategies appear to be too broad given the resources available (discussed further below).
- One of the lessons from the Kenya programme (see Section 5 and Annex 3) is that scenario analysis could help to review political risks for major programmes and encourage CDKN to consider how these can be mitigated. Given the nature of CDKN’s work, some risks are better taken by major donors that can engage in dialogue directly with Government.

**Recommendation for CDKN**

Work with fewer Deep Engagement Countries (certainly no increase on the current number) and ensure coherent programmes and country teams that have the required capacity and investment and situate projects in Outcome and Country theories of change.

**Recommendation for DFID**

Use scenario analysis to review political risks for major programmes and consider how these can be mitigated.

**3.5.2 Match logframe ambition to resources**

Evidence from the Climate Finance (CF) and Policy & Practice (P&P) Outcome case studies suggests a mismatch between the ambition of logframe indicators and available resources. To put this in context, the total CF spend (including the CF share of joint projects with other outcome areas) in 2013 and 2014 was approximately GBP 3.2 million.<sup>17</sup> This is expected to deliver the three global outcome indicators:

2.1 The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is designed in a manner in which CDKN has contributed significantly in incorporating the concerns of most vulnerable developing countries in terms of scaled-up finance and a performance and accountability framework to ensure effectiveness.

<sup>17</sup> CDKN estimates of commissioned project spend will inevitably be an overestimate due to overlaps between projects. However, there will also be some CDKN in-house spend in this area and on functions that are shared across all outcome areas.

2.2 # of countries in which national and sub-national climate finance readiness has been built with the significant input of the CDKN.

2.3 Engagements of, and financing by, the private sector indicated by the incorporation of more ‘investment grade’ policy (frameworks, regulations, public finance mechanisms and public-private partnerships) into national, regional and international CCD policy processes.

In contrast, a fairly typical country-specific climate programme that has GBP 15 million of DFID funding has outcome indicators that relate to:

- Regional government planning based on the national climate strategy;
- Job creation as a result of the programme; and
- Government use of tools developed by the programme.

*Key lessons for CDKN and DFID*

Evidence from the Climate Finance (CF) and Policy & Practice (P&P) Outcome case studies suggests that the ambition of logframe indicators is unrealistic given available resources

*Key lessons for DFID and other programmes*

A mismatch between the initial ambition of outcome indicators and programme reality is by no means unknown. One of the points made at the 2015 ICF Learning for Change dialogue was that it was not unusual for logframe objectives to be revised downwards once programme experience revealed the magnitude of policy and context constraints relative to the resources available. Rather than doing this the CDKN logframe (Outcome indicators 1.1 and 2.2) relies on the vagueness of CDKN making “significant contributions” to very big policy changes in order to bridge the gap. It would have been better to set more modest objectives.

**Recommendation for DFID**

Revise outcome indicators in the light of new evidence to keep them realistic even if this means a reduction rather than relying on vague wording such as “significant contributions”.

**3.5.3 Convene and partner to build capacity and scale**

*Key lessons for CDKN and other programmes*

Large-scale capacity-building is needed to implement CCD policy in a number of areas that CDKN is supporting. We discuss examples of sub-national access to Climate Finance in Rwanda and Kenya (Annex 3) and legal training for Negotiation Support (Annex 4). CDKN does not have a comparative-advantage to do this at scale but CDKN has a track record of convening donor partners and could do more convening on capacity building for CCD. Given the specific need for CCD capacity building there may well be an opportunity for CDKN to develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others to do this.

The India and Colombia case studies provide examples where successful CDKN-supported projects need significant external investments to go to scale. CDKN may also have a convening role in this process but these CDKN country programmes are likely to need to build stronger relationships with key national Ministries (e.g. Hacienda in Colombia) in order to support this additional step towards impact. There is also a need to partner international funding agencies to help successful projects scale.

### Recommendation for CDKN

Identify opportunities to convene donor partners and develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others for CCD capacity building and to reflect on what role CDKN will play in capacity building for CCD in the future.

### Recommendation for CDKN

Prioritise working with national Ministries and other funders to take successful projects to scale.

### 3.5.4 Clarify where results can be generalised

#### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

There is a very high demand for generalizable CDKN findings but, in reality, only certain areas of CDKN work can produce meaningful general findings. It is important to systematically identify opportunities for meaningful synthesis but also to explain when general results are unlikely to be useful.

There is a very high demand for generalizable CDKN findings and we suggest that CDKN systematically identifies opportunities for meaningful synthesis but also explains when general results are unlikely to be useful. There is a clear need for global and cross-regional synthesis and creation of global public goods from the research portfolio but not all areas of CDKN work require generalizable results.

Global business practice suggests that only some CDKN work will produce general findings as:

- Mission and systems should be global but delivery has to match local capacity and context; and
- Scale matters for some products but not others.

Care also has to be taken to avoid losing important nuances when generalising. The limitations of generalisable results are illustrated by the example from Negotiations Support of attempting to transfer learning from support to the LDC group to the AGN. This is a case in which there are very different structures, context and personalities. Consequently, lesson learning works better as an internal learning process where the supplier can test out ideas with the AGN chair and when generalised in a public forum (which is necessary to protect trust and relationships) it becomes less meaningful.

Another example is the MTR recommendation to put in place country engagement leaders in DECs was based on the experience in Colombia applied to theories of change in DECs without a CEL. We understood this to imply finding and resourcing an individual or team with significant capacity to get more effective uptake of CDKN project interventions (in the context of a country ToC). This approach has now worked well in India. However, in some other countries we suggest that more attention has been placed on meeting the general recommendation of having a CEL than the underlying argument for a high level of relevant social capital or sufficient resourcing to add significant value.

It may be that the MTR evaluation team over-estimated how easy it would be to generalise a finding from Latin America (where country engagement capacity is relatively accessible) to

CDKN DECs in Africa (where demand for this capacity far exceeds supply). An alternative explanation, as one CDKN commentator remarked, is that faced with DFID demands to spend rapidly in the first two years of the CDKN programme “the Africa team reacted directly to demand but the LAC team planned more strategically”.

### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should set out where general results matter and can be expected. These can be seen as “learning questions” and could be derived by Outcome/Research and from a discussion between regional teams.

### **3.5.5 Strengthen learning**

#### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

Programme staff are likely to spend too much time on managing projects to undertake reflective learning. Dedicated resources and planning are required to address the problem and CDKN is working on this.

Developing and evolving a theory of change is good practice but there also needs to be mechanisms, channels and incentives to use this as a framework for learning.


Evidence from institutional interviews (summarised in Section 4.1) as well as from a number of CDKN staff interviewed in country case studies and outcome case studies (Annex 4, particularly outcome evaluation questions 4 and 5) suggest that CDKN staff are spending too much time on managing projects to do reflective learning. Although a number of good learning case studies have been produced by CDKN/project staff, CDKN typically commissions external consultants to document learning (examples are discussed in various case studies including the Rwanda country and NS outcome cases) and knowledge products are then fed back to key hubs.

The ICF Learning Dialogue confirms that the constraints to internal learning faced by CDKN are very common in other organisations (including DFID). The learning for change booklet<sup>18</sup> and principles resulting from this Dialogue are directly relevant to CDKN.

These 10 principles are shown below with three observations from this evaluation. Firstly, that CDKN will have to incentivise reflective learning – both for staff and for contractors. Secondly, a CDKN internal discussion on what findings can be meaningfully generalised will produce learning questions to feed into the strategic question of how general findings can better deliver impact. Thirdly, evidence from supplier interviews for both CF and NS Outcome case studies suggest that a number of suppliers would like to be part of a community of practice involving other CDKN suppliers in the same area or issue.

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<sup>18</sup> Learning for a low-carbon climate resilient society, DFID and LEAD, 2012

**Figure 6: ICF Learning Dialogue principles and CDKN entry points**

To some extent both the problem and potential solutions have already been recognised by CDKN and over the past year CDKN has worked with LEAD to identify learning questions and learning champions. The 2015 CDKN business plan incorporates resources to undertake a similar exercise and we hope that this approach can be carried through to projects.

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should build on existing plans for reflective learning and ensure there is sufficient institutional support to implement this at outcome and deep engagement country level.

### **3.5.6 Safeguard the Climate Compatible Development (CCD) focus**

#### *Key lessons for CDKN*

The Research, CF and DRM Outcome and Nepal case studies provide differing examples in which evaluators judged that a more systematic focus on CCD is likely to improve the ultimate impact on the poor and vulnerable. In these examples, CCD screening works in practice through CDKN staff commitment to CCD but it is not systematic and there were cases where this had not worked.

We recognise that any CCD screening process has to be light touch to work in practice but also that it is likely to be increasingly important after year 7 as CDKN starts to rely on project or programme funding from funders without a particular interest in CCD.

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

Put in place a light-touch quality assurance process to ensure a systematic focus on CCD.

#### **Recommendation to DFID**

Use engagement with CDKN in years 6, 7 and beyond to encourage a systematic focus on CCD

### **3.5.7 More effective private sector engagement**

### *Key lessons for CDKN, DFID and other programmes*

Private sector engagement remains very limited and CDKN is far from achieving its 2014 logframe outcome milestone in this area. The Kenya country case study includes evaluation of the CaRROT project – a leading example of CDKN private sector engagement (with Kenyan flower growers). In a number of respects this has been a successful project and there is evidence of individual companies taking initial steps towards accessing climate finance. However, we find significant opportunities have been missed by CDKN due to a lack of strategic planning and capacity building. Even in a country such as Kenya with a strong private sector it seems that CDKN will need a significant in country investment to engage effectively.

As discussed in the Climate Finance case study (Annex 4), private sector engagement remains very limited and CDKN is far from achieving its 2014 logframe outcome milestone in this area. The Kenya country case study (Annex 3) includes evaluation of the CaRROT project – a leading example of CDKN private sector engagement (with Kenyan flower growers). In a number of respects this has been a successful project and there is evidence of individual companies taking initial steps towards accessing climate finance and potential for joint P&P and CF results. However, we find significant opportunities have been missed by CDKN due to a lack of strategic planning and capacity building. Even in a country such as Kenya with a strong private sector it seems that CDKN will need a significant in country investment to engage effectively. We also recognise a very large variation in private sector context and capacity in CDKN DECs even within the same region e.g. Rwanda to Kenya.

For the reasons above the generic requirement of the 2014 output indicator 2.1 milestone to ensure “Private sector engagements included in all CDKN activities in CCD planning and climate finance readiness” does not look attainable. A more strategic approach to concentrate resources on private sector engagement that is going to make the most difference in the CF and P&P Outcome pathways is likely to be a better way forward. CDKN would, however, need to carefully articulate what this should look like. In doing so, we suggest that CDKN draws on the considerable experience that DFID has in supporting private sector development, particularly in Africa.

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should set out a strategy for private sector engagement that is going to make the most difference in the Climate Finance and Policy & Practice Outcome pathways. In doing so CDKN should engage with DFID to draw on the considerable experience that DFID has in supporting private sector development.

#### **3.5.8 Consider innovation models for country engagement**

Business innovation models suggest testing new approaches, failing fast and scaling new approaches that work. In contrast, CDKN behaves much more like a traditional donor and invests in establishing DEC relationships and very rarely gives up.

From our DEC case study sample it is not possible to say whether an innovation model approach would have produced greater progress towards impact. It seems unlikely given the significant investment required to work effectively in a DEC. Even in the case of Kenya, the initial “returns” to programme investment were high and we have taken the view that CDKN should simply have done more to mitigate the political risks. Nonetheless, it would be useful

for CDKN to draw some lessons on when and why to invest in or abandon a DEC. This should have value for other contracted-out DFID programmes.

## 4 The CDKN Institutional Model in Practice

### 4.1 The CDKN Niche and Role as a Global CCD Knowledge Institution

The CDKN niche claimed at the mid-term review (MTR) has evolved as CDKN’s focus has moved from developing policy to implementation. There is now a more practical focus and so, for example, we would emphasise the use of partnerships rather than simply having north-south partnerships. While all the aspects discussed at the MTR are still relevant, it seems to us that the ability of CDKN to add value can be articulated as shown in Figure 7 below with the matrix used for the MTR in Figure 8.

**Figure 7: The matrix for assessing the CDKN Niche at EYE5**

Focus on CCD	Responds to Gov’t demand	Fast flexible high-quality delivery	Practical synergies across Outcomes	Transfer of lessons	Thought leadership <sup>19</sup>	Convening partners & stakeholders	Supporting local uptake pathways
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**Figure 8: The matrix for assessing the CDKN Niche at MTR**

Focus on CCD	Responds to Gov’t demand	Fast flexible high-quality delivery	Cross-output synergy		Thought leadership on themes	Deep & broad north-south partnership
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CDKN potentially adds value using all of the components in Figure 7 but CDKN and DFID place a particular emphasis on the ability to add value as a global knowledge institution, as this is the most difficult to replicate using country programmes or other suppliers. These global knowledge components are shaded in Figure 7. This is clearly a simplification in that global learning feeds into flexible and high quality delivery but there remains a distinction between components of the CDKN niche that derive primarily from CDKN as a global knowledge institution and those that do not.

We draw on four sources of evidence of the CDKN niche:

- A small number of interviews with CDKN key partner organisations as defined by CDKN and DFID:
  - LEADS Global Partnership (GP)
  - Green Growth Best Practice (GGBP) initiative
  - Climate Knowledge Brokers Network (CKB)
- Institutional interviews with 13 key informants who are typically senior figures in the climate change and development sectors. They generally do not have detailed knowledge of CDKN activities;
- Country case studies presented earlier in this report; and
- Outcome case studies again presented earlier in this report.

<sup>19</sup> Defined by the Oxford Dictionaries as “One whose views on a subject are taken to be authoritative and influential” but commonly used for institutions as well. Forbes (2012), describes a Thought Leader as one of the foremost authorities in selected areas of specialization, resulting in its being the go-to individual or organization for said expertise.

#### 4.1.1 Evidence from CDKN key partners / knowledge networks interviews

Feedback from DFID and CDKN during the CDKN EYE5 headline findings presentation included a request that the EYE5 team take a more detailed look at CDKN's efforts to build strategic partnerships with a small number counterpart global organisations. CDKN view these partnerships as part of a broader Knowledge Networks output which support CDKN's global convening and knowledge brokering role, as well as the sharing of learning with other institutions in the field. The EYE5 team requested DFID suggest the names of key CDKN counterpart contacts in the following organisations/initiatives, who were then contacted for a short Skype interview:<sup>20</sup>

- LEDS Global Partnership - <http://ledsgp.org/home>
- Green Growth Best Practice (GGBP) initiative - <http://www.ggbp.org/>
- Climate Knowledge Brokers Group (CKB) - <http://www.reeep.org/climate-knowledge-brokers-group>

In addition to interviewing staff members in these organisations, a small set of partnership-focussed interviews were held with key CDKN staff members including CDKN's Chief Executive and CDKN's Knowledge Networks lead. A set of documents illustrating the results generated through CDKN's partnerships / knowledge networks output since the MTR was assessed against the evidence presented through the interviews.

The semi-structured interviews with partner organisation as well as CDKN staff explored the nature of the partnership between their organisation and CDKN in terms of:

- Describing the nature of the partnership
- What they saw as any particular stand out results from the partnership?
- What they perceive as CDKN's added value / niche?

#### CDKN's Partnerships / Knowledge networks output


Following the MTR CDKN produced an approach paper which sets out at high level, CDKN's approach to working in partnership and how the Knowledge Networks (KN) output, and the Partnerships and Networks components of the KN output, support this approach. Following this in September 2014 a Knowledge Networks (KN) Briefing document was produced which *"provides a briefing, for the management team, on how the 'newest' output, Knowledge Networks (KN), works in practice, what some key KN strategy documents are and how Knowledge Networks approaches are integral to CDKN as a whole as well as the programme of work being delivered through the KN output."* (KN briefing: September 2014, p.1) The document explains that at the end of year 4, a strategic decision was made to combine the Knowledge Management and Partnerships outputs of CDKN into the Knowledge Networks (KN) output. The strategy, planning processes and budget have now been combined (the KN budget is an expected £4.59 million over years 5-7). Within the KN output, there is a continuum between Knowledge and Networks. There are some projects which have a very distinct 'Knowledge/Knowledge Management' profile and others that have a very distinct 'Networks/Partnerships' profile within the overall KN output. The additional interviews and document review under EYE5 focussed on CDKN networks / partnerships profile and results rather than the knowledge side of the continuum.

The diagram presented below, taken from the KN Briefing, provides a snapshot of the KN output portfolio, primarily to map out the current KN outsourced portfolio at high level. Relevant to this evaluation, the KN Briefing also states CDKN's primary target audience *"is national level decision-makers (and their advisors) in developing countries, particularly in CDKN's focal countries. In view of CDKN's core mission to support least developed and climate-vulnerable nations to influence international climate negotiations, the global fora for*

<sup>20</sup> Based on DFID recommendation the EYE5 team also approached the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) but the contact did not respond to the request for an interview.

*climate negotiations, such as the UNFCCC and parallel global processes are equally important primary audiences.” (KN briefing: September 2014, p.10).*

## A Snapshot of the KN output portfolio



### Nature of and results delivered by the partnerships

Assessing CDKN results since the MTR under Knowledge Networks is complicated because the knowledge management output and partnerships output are still reported separately in line with the CDKN programme logframe in the 2014-15 Annual M&E Report. This is further complicated because the nature of the CDKN's convening and knowledge brokering role/results that the EYE5 team was requested to further examine tend not to be reflected in the Partnerships output logframe indicators which instead tend to focus on aggregating numbers of activities / organisations / cases. The appropriateness of CDKN logframe indicators to the nature of the results anticipated, planned for and reported is discussed in Section 3.1 above.

Instead CDKN's key partnership results can be assessed in line with the stated overall aim of the output: *"CDKN facilitates increased cooperation and collaboration between key stakeholders on climate compatible development."* The three organisations/initiatives focussed on have all been the subject of CDKN case studies featured in the Annual M&E Reports 2013-14 or 2014-15. Hence it is possible to triangulate the nature of the results reported through these case studies with the evidence generated through the interviews. It is important to state that DFID selected the three organisations/initiatives because they are viewed as high-profile and successful examples of CDKN partnerships activities. They were **not** selected randomly in order to be representative of overall partnerships results. Rather were selected in order to illustrate CDKN's convening and knowledge brokering niche, role and power in line with counterpart institutions in the field.

- **LEDS GP** - The Low Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS) Global Partnership (GP) is a forum of 120 governmental and international institutions. It was founded to advance climate-resilient low emission development through coordination, information exchange, and cooperation among programs and countries working to advance low emissions growth. CDKN is a co-founder of the LEDS GP network and has been involved since the beginning of the network in February 2011. CDKN's central role in creating the GP network and informing its subsequent direction was documented in the MTR. Since then CDKN has continued to play a prominent leadership role. The interviews and documentation confirmed that CDKN has been: instrumental in the formation of regional platforms in Africa, Asia and Latin America (the African Climate & Development Society, the Asia LEDS Partnership and the LAC LEDS Partnership); a work programme; a steering committee; and a greatly expanded membership which was much more developing country focused and was comprised of a wide range of developing and developed countries, donors and NGOs. (interviews 016, 183, 185) As such the LEDS GP is CDKN's most prominent and high-profile partnerships project. For CDKN it illustrates the role the organisation plays on a global CCD stage. As one CDKN stakeholder put it: *"As well as being involved since the beginning and shaping its subsequent growth and success, CDKN's contribution is to convene. CDKN is renowned for bringing partners together."*(016) The role played by CDKN was echoed by both CDKN staff and the GP Secretariat staff interviewed. *"CDKN has played a major role in shaping the GP in terms of the formation of the regional platforms and raising LDC voice within the GP. They have increased the country-driven nature of the work done by the GP. CDKN's unique contribution relate to overall strategic guidance to the partnership, the technical expertise of CDKN staff engaged on the steering committee, and expertise in the design of the knowledge management system. In addition CDKN has brought in international organisations as partner including the UK, Dutch and German governments, as well as several regional institutions."* (185) CDKN's instrumental role in the success of the LEDS GP has been recognised by the US Department of State who in 2014 requested that CDKN play a more prominent role on the co-secretariat. Negotiations are underway for the US Department of State to provide \$1m to support CDKN with this, if this can be co-financed by DFID as part of the effort to leverage co-funding for Year 7. This is clearly a significant development for CDKN and which CDKN believes recognises and illustrates their role and added value to combining CCD knowledge/ thought-leadership with a with convening role which raises developing country partners' voices. As such the LEDS GP provides the best example of CDKN deploying a core set of its unique features or strengths – targeted resourcing, respected in-house technical expertise, and institutional convening power - to add significant value. CDKN's unique contribution has been bringing

LDC voice to prominence on issues around low emissions development, based on their broader CCD expertise and experience.

- Green Growth Best Practice (GGBP) initiative – The Green Growth Best Practice initiative (GGBP) is a global network of researchers and practitioners working to advance understanding in the emerging field of green growth. The GGBP case study in the CDKN 2014-15 Annual M&E report states: *“The first phase of the Green Growth Best Practices Initiative - the Green Growth in Practice: Lessons from Country Experience report - aimed to review and analyse, for the first time, real life best practices and experience, at country and subnational level, on green growth, from planning and policy making, to financing and implementation, and then to monitoring and evaluation. The GGBP project is an example of how CDKN plays a brokering and convening role, and how it fosters strong partnerships and CCD leadership.”* (p. 149). The interviews confirm that CDKN is viewed as having played a key role to the production and delivery of the report as well as a wider shaping and influencing role in terms of the GGBP knowledge sharing platform (interviews 016, 185) In terms of the direct delivery and immediate results of the first phase of the initiative – the production of the best practice lessons – CDKN has played a pivotal role and can credibly claim that without their input the initiative would have been far less successful and may even have failed. As CDKN explain, *“Without CDKN the initiative might not have happened. We brought in another funder, and a range of authors from the network. They were having some real issues with the report – we said we would play a technical critical friend role and been very honest in our feedback. We have also been central to supporting the growth of community of practice of green growth stakeholders.”* (interview 016) Across the interviews CDKN’s contribution is seen in terms of: accessing and providing technical expertise in green growth best practice from both within the CDKN team and across its wider network of partners; broader expertise in knowledge management which could be applied to GGBP initiative; and, a wider CCD brokering and convening role (interview 184) Whilst the interviews and document review do support the claim that CDKN plays a strong brokering, CCD leadership and partnership role, there was less evidence to support CDKN’s convening role as outlined in the above claim - *“The GGBP project is an example of how CDKN plays a brokering and convening role, and how it fosters strong partnerships and CCD leadership.”*
- Climate Knowledge Brokers Group – The CKB group provides an interesting example of where CDKN has taken a small risk to fund the creation of network or group, and when this has proved successful they have decided to capitalise on this success by scaling up their engagement and support. Hence in Year 4 CDKN decided to fund the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) to provide a core coordination function to the CKB. This has delivered some immediate results in terms of growing the LDC membership, developing a clear vision and strategy, taking steps to ensure the group’s independence and sustainability. The other stand-out result of the CDKN support is the Reegle Tagging API (known as the Climate Tagger - <http://www.climatetagger.net/>) which is *“an automated tool that allows websites to ‘tag’ their content with consistent keywords, making it much easier to find and share. The API is now being used by 60 organisations including leading players such as the World Bank, GGKP, NREL, WeAdapt, Climate Tech Wiki, and is being built into the back-end design of the new Climate Smart Planning and the CTCN platforms. It has made the transition from impressive demo, to an emerging industry standard.”* (CDKN 2014-15 Annual M&E Report, p. 102) The claims presented in the Annual M&E Report were validated through the interviews which confirmed that the CKB secretariat at REEEP has used the Climate Tagger to tag almost two million documents in the last two years – in turn making substantial progress towards CCD standardisation in terms of terminology and concepts, and taking a major step towards connecting the most relevant CCD information to the user. (186) In terms of the wider results delivered through the CKB group support, CDKN can rightly claim to have contributed to a more coherent online knowledge infrastructure around CCD. In terms of learning the interviews also verified CDKN’s claim that *“CDKN’s support to the CKB community has gone well because it has responded to a real need: in scoping conversations with some of the key players, the appetite for collaborative working was clear. In addition, CDKN’s ‘low ego’ approach meant taking a collaborative approach from the outset, sharing credit with other partners, and not insisting on strong CDKN branding on everything. CDKN facilitation also helped*

*create space for ideas to emerge and encouraged joint ownership. Not least, CDKN put in resources at key stages, firstly in co-convening the initial CKB workshop and then in sponsoring collaborative projects. CDKN was also willing to take some risks in trying out innovative project ideas with untested partnerships.” (182, 183, 186)*

### **CDKN’s role, added value and niche in partnerships/knowledge networks**

The interviews and document review identified the following strengths in terms of CDKN’s role, added value and niche in CCD partnerships and knowledge networks:

- **Knowledge manager and knowledge broker** – CDKN’s expertise as a knowledge manager and knowledge broker was its most commonly cited strength. CDKN was frequently referred to as ‘cutting edge’ in terms of both its skills and understanding of the requirements of climate change knowledge management and knowledge brokering, and its network and partners to which it connects with and share the knowledge. (016, 182, 184, 185, 186)
- **Knowledge generator** – Most of those interviewed agreed that CDKN plays a greater role than simply managing knowledge, in that it is also a significant knowledge generator. And that is the combination of high-standard knowledge generation combined with CDKN’s knowledge management platforms and knowledge brokering skills that make it unique and combine to form its success (183, 185, 186). Broader examples cited of this unique combined role included CDKN’s outreach programme based on the toolkit they developed around the IPPC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) where CDKN’s Knowledge Management team produced a range of guides, communications toolkits for use by stakeholders and organised policy dialogue events with IPCC authors, young scientist meetings and trainings for journalists in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, as well as outreach activities for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and recently Latin America (183). Similarly CDKN’s role at the 3rd World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015 in Sendai, Japan where CDKN combined with ODI to significantly inform the wording/content of the agreements on gender and DRR to come out of the conference and played a wider role grounding the conceptual and analytical work led by ODI in the context of developing country voice and standpoints on DRR.
- **Convener** – Building on the two roles above, several of those interviewed consider CDKN a key convener in the field of CCD. In particular CDKN is viewed as unique in spanning the views and perspectives of multiple government, regional organisation and donors, uniting and bringing least developed country voice to key debates. This role is most clearly evident through the LEDS GP support where CDKN has catalysed interactions between countries, donors and civil society, particularly championing the involvement of developing country voices (182, 183, 185).
- **Strategic funder and partner** – Finally, most of those interviewed talked positively of CDKN as a strategic funder and partner capable of and relatively unique in combining: an willingness to take a risk; an understanding of the need to core funding for network building and coordination; and a combination of financial resources with in-house CDKN technical support to shape and inform the strategic direction and technical content of the partnerships it is involved in. In relation to the CKB group, CDKN claim in the 2013-14 Annual M&E Report that their *“‘low ego’ approach meant taking a collaborative approach from the outset, sharing credit with other partners, and not insisting on strong CDKN branding on everything. CDKN facilitation also helped create space for ideas to emerge and encouraged joint ownership. Not least, CDKN put in resources at key stages, firstly in co-convening the initial CKB workshop and then in sponsoring collaborative projects. CDKN was also willing to take some risks in trying out innovative project ideas with untested partnerships.”* Those interviews largely supported this sentiment as something that CDKN is characterised for in terms of its high quality, technically-informed and pro-active/supportive partnership approach (184, 185, 186).

Interviewees also noted some common *weaknesses* that limited CDKN delivering in terms of CCD partnerships and knowledge networks. These were:

- **Lack of broader knowledge networks / partnerships strategy and results** – beyond a relatively small number of high-profile CDKN institution to institution partnerships primarily led by CDKN HQ staff and as illustrated by the LEDS GP, CKB group and GGBP initiative above, it is less clear how partnerships are developed and built systematically across the institution at the regional and country level, and between the wider alliance staff. (182, 183)
- **Lack of clarity on the role DFID plays** – the role and relationship between DFID and CDKN in forming and shaping headline partnerships remains unclear. This lack of clarity runs both ways. CDKN should draw on DFID relationships, high-level connections, and influencing power across the global CCD sector. Similarly, DFID should build on and take advantage of the opportunities presented by CDKN’s unique partnership/knowledge networks skills, expertise and positioning as illustrated above in terms of CDKN’s role in the LEDS GP, the IPCC AR5, and the Sendai DRR conference. (185)

#### **Recommendation for CDKN and DFID**

CDKN should discuss with the DFID how both organisations can play a more involved, informed and mutually supportive role when it comes to catalysing headline CCD partnerships and jointly convening partners.

#### **Recommendation for CDKN**

Emulating the three successful partnerships examples illustrated above, CDKN should look to more broadly and systematically build on its strengths in terms of CDKN’s role, added value and niche in CCD partnerships and knowledge networks, by creating a broader set of partnerships at the regional and national level.

#### **4.1.2 Evidence from institutional interviews**

Key informants felt that the following *strengths* provided CDKN with a niche:

- Responsive to demand (interviews 137, 097, 068)
- Skills and experience of the consortium (098, 068, 063)
- Networks and partnerships (098, 096, 097, 068, 065)

Those who identified responsiveness to demand thought it was extremely important. As one put it:

Their ability to respond to national priorities is the main asset – it is unusual for organisations providing assistance not to arrive with their own agenda. As a policy maker it makes a difference to be asked by CDKN how and where can we help? (137)

Practical on-the ground experience as well as CCD and management skills were felt to be particularly valuable consortium skills and experience.

Most institutional interviewees thought that networks and partnerships developed by CDKN were an important part of their niche. This reflects a view that these networks are important for an institution working in the global CCD space and that it is an achievement to have put them in place in a relatively short time. However, we were not given examples of the difference this makes in practice.

Interviewees also noted some common *weaknesses* that limited CDKN delivering as a global CCD knowledge institution. These were:

- **Insufficient and ineffective learning** – spending too much time on managing projects to do reflective learning and also relying on “hub and spoke” rather than internal learning (137, 068, 065, 063, 061, 098);
- **A lack of strategic focus** (068, 097, 064) – discussed in the preceding Section;

- **A failure to present the aggregate impact of CDKN (061,068).** This raises some challenging issues. As CDKN moves along the impact pathway it should be increasingly possible to aggregate CDKN impact in terms of ultimate beneficiaries: who is reached and how CCD makes a difference (see discussion in VFM below). Having a common metric makes it easier to see aggregate impact rather than looking at CDKN outputs in a diverse range of areas. Yet CDKN is typically contributing to Government-led programmes and will often have other partners and we have seen from the Country case studies that interviewees are more likely to mention that CDKN have over- rather than under-claimed achievements. There is a strong case for CDKN reporting that allows easier aggregation of impacts on ultimate beneficiaries but the contributions of others must be acknowledged.
- **Lack of visibility in important parts of Africa,** particularly Francophone Africa (096). The evaluators accept this point but consider that this should be seen through the lens of delivering more strategic and focussed work in line with the resources available – discussed in the Section above.
- **Insufficient synergy with DFID,** e.g. with the ICF (061,064). Our assessment is that there is potential to strengthen this and we understand that DFID have brought regional advisors to a recent MOC but it is important to:
  - Recognise that the high level of ICF outsourcing leaves limited DFID capacity to engage in networking and knowledge sharing. Hence CDKN will need to invest in developing outputs that ICF can pick up at low cost following discussion with the DFID ICF team;
  - Work with the fact that the relationship with DFID Country Offices ranges from excellent to poor. Given relatively high rates of staff turnover, CDKN country and regional teams will need to keep investing to build on good relationships and make use of new opportunities to improve relationships where these have been weak.
  - Be realistic about areas of common interest – it is unlikely that DFID policy teams will pick up excellent CDKN results from LAC and Small Island States.

#### **Recommendation to CDKN and DFID**

CDKN should discuss with the DFID ICF team how CDKN can package learning so it is most useful to them.

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should strengthen reporting that allows easier aggregation of impacts on ultimate beneficiaries. This is likely to require increasing CDKN capacity for economic analysis.

#### **4.1.3 Evidence from country case studies**

An overview from the five deep engagement country (DEC) case studies was given in Figure 4 in the Section above. This shows that being able to add value using the CDKN niche is no guarantee of progress towards impact. The political and institutional context, whether supportive (in the case of Rwanda) or a constraint (as in Kenya) is a critical success factor.

Looking in detail at components of the niche for these countries we were struck by the importance of local (supplier and country team) factors relative to the global. This is particularly true for Rwanda, Kenya, Nepal and Colombia. In India we see a very effective CDKN country team embedding the ODI translation of DRM research for policy with decision takers. By doing this CDKN has leveraged the combination of local “unshaded” elements in the Figure below with output by a thought leader in this area. Across the five DEC case studies this is as close as we get to the global CDKN knowledge component adding significant value but even the India country case study clearly identifies local knowledge of the Indian setting along with technical and political know-how of *the country team* as *the* most important success factor.

In Colombia and India the development and use of *in-country networks and partnerships* by the CDKN country engagement team to add value to projects has been a critical success factor and explains greater progress made by CDKN than other donors working in this space. This has required CDKN to invest significant resources in the country team and a coherent programme of work. In comparison, Nepal is just a collection of loosely related projects with an under-resourced country engagement leader (CEL) and Rwanda and Kenya are even weaker in this regard.

Choice of suppliers, flexible and responsive management but the interruption to funding has damaged the value added by CDKN and delayed projects in most countries. This could justify downgrading from highly to moderately significant.

A strong country engagement team is generally needed for CDKN to be an effective convener of partners and stakeholders at the DEC level. However, the legitimacy and opportunity to convene is frequently driven by CDKN global strengths of demand-responsiveness (and being seen not to be imposing an agenda) and provision of strong technical skills. We have seen this most clearly in Nepal, Colombia and India.

**Figure 9: The major elements of the CDKN niche identified in the EYE5 DEC sample**

Country	Focus on CCD	Responds to Gov't demand	Fast flexible high-quality delivery	Practical synergies across Outcomes	Transfer of lessons	Thought leadership	Convening partners & stakeholders	Supporting local research or piloting uptake pathways
Rwanda								
Kenya								
Nepal								
Colombia								
India								

Key	
	Highly significant
	Moderately significant
	Not significant

The work by CDKN country teams in Nepal, Colombia and India to support local uptake of research or piloting has also been extremely important. This may not be highly visible at a global scale but it is difficult to get right and has required significant investment by CDKN. Donors such as DFID are not seen to have been successful in using country offices to route external research in a usable form to decision takers<sup>21</sup>.

Finally, the reason for “downgrading” the CCD focus in Nepal and Colombia as a contribution to the CDKN niche is some loss of focus on poverty and exclusion relative to climate change dimensions. The CCD concept remains important but has become less significant over time. For India, the project portfolio is fairly narrowly focussed on DRM with a couple of small projects looking at CCD more broadly.

#### 4.1.4 Evidence from outcome and research case studies

The sections in this report on the four outcome areas and on research provide a lens through which we can assess the CDKN niche. This has less depth but more breadth than the country case studies. A summary

<sup>21</sup> A view expressed by participants at the DFID/CDKN strategy presentation of initial EYE5 evaluation findings in February 2015.

across all outcome areas and research is given in Figure 10 below and each outcome chapter includes an analysis of the CDKN niche for this area.

Those elements of the CDKN niche identified for the DEC sample remain important when we look across Outcomes and Research. Across all these areas CDKN adds value by responding to demand without imposing an agenda and bringing to bear a mix of high quality technical skills. In addition, at the outcome level (with the possible exception of P&P) we find greater evidence of the role and importance of global networking and partnerships. There is clear evidence of how this adds value for DRM, NS and Research (brokering). There is emerging evidence that a combination of networking, technical skills and demand-led legitimacy can drive effective convening for CF. For P&P, CDKN has not been able to systematically leverage the comparative advantage and added value of the global alliance.

**Figure 10: Major elements of the CDKN niche in the EYE5 Outcome/Research sample**

Area	Focus on CCD	Responds to Gov't demand	Fast flexible high-quality delivery	Practical synergies across Outcomes	Transfer of lessons	Thought leadership	Convening partners & stakeholders	Supporting local research or piloting uptake pathways
P&P								
NS								
CF								
DRM								
Research								

Key	
	Highly significant
	Moderately significant
	Not significant

Both CDKN NS and DRM have a niche as leaders in their global areas. For NS, this builds on a combination of: demand-led support; being one of only two major donors in this area; a mix of relevant, trusted specialist suppliers; continuity; close engagement of the NS team with the issues and some knowledge sharing and networking. There has been an effort to distil and transfer lessons but support has been largely tailored to negotiating groups. In the case of DRM, the niche reflects demand-led, translation of scientific research for innovative practice and policy and strategically and effectively leveraging ODI resources to add value to in-country teams. There are also few others translating the science from IPCC findings into practical learning for policy and practice.

There is some evidence of synergies across outcome areas (NS/CF) and of research being translated into practice (DRM, CF and to some extent P&P). Although not yet realised, the very significant potential for CF to add value to P&P should also be seen as a niche.

## 4.2 VfM offered by the CDKN management model

### 4.2.1 Cost-benefit analysis

The most powerful economic assessment of CDKN value for money would be a comparison of the economic benefits generated with economic costs using cost-benefit analysis as per HM Treasury guidance<sup>22</sup>. Unfortunately, CDKN has not produced data that would allow such a comparison to be made.

A number of specific projects have the potential to generate data on end-user benefits (e.g. increased access to FONERWA in Rwanda through to Heat Health in India). More generally, producing economic estimates of what is at stake is relatively straightforward where projects have clearly specified benefits of a type that are discussed in the economics of climate change, welfare, environment or health literature. The much bigger challenge is to identify the contribution that CDKN has made to producing these benefits. Only rarely will it be possible to *attribute* estimated benefits to CDKN (although this is possible in cases where bankable projects have been made possible by CDKN support for example). Yet the same credible chain of evidence used to support a claim in contribution analysis can be used to assess the *magnitude* of difference made by CDKN support. So for example, we could expect CDKN to produce evidence of the form:

1. What is at stake economically from CCD policy implemented in territory X?
2. Who is likely to benefit (e.g. all people in a territory or particular groups?)
3. What is the magnitude of CDKN contribution to achieving this change (based on evidence presented)?  
For example, would stakeholders agree it is 0.1%, 1%, 10%?

For DRM, discussion of policy options will often include the reduced impact of ill health and this can be quantified using estimates from the literature on DALYs<sup>23</sup> (combining questions 1 and 2 above).

For NS, the approach to answering questions 1 and 2 would be to consider what would success look like? What difference are supported groups likely to make to a global agreement; b) what happens in practice for the supported countries (e.g. INDCs)?

With answers to both questions 1) and 3) it would be possible to estimate ranges for cost-benefit results of the form:

- Benefits of CDKN support are unlikely to exceed costs;
- Benefits of CDKN support are likely to moderately exceed costs; or
- Benefits of CDKN support are likely to be a multiple of costs.

An answer to question 2) above would allow us to say to what extent this is consistent with CCD.

#### Recommendation to CDKN

Undertake indicative cost-benefit analysis by Outcome area.

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<sup>22</sup> The Green Book: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/220541/green\\_book\\_complete.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220541/green_book_complete.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> Disability Adjusted Life Years – see [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global\\_burden\\_disease/metrics\\_daly/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/)

#### 4.2.2 Cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency comparisons

In the absence of data to undertake CBA the next best solution is to compare how much it costs to achieve a given outcome using alternative intervention options. There is no exact comparison for the work done by CDKN and so for the MTR we provided a comparison of administration costs with the GEF, Adaptation Fund and others. This is more of a cost-efficiency than a cost-effectiveness comparison.

To begin with we consider the cost-efficiency of CDKN administration costs as they have evolved over time. The CDKN administration cost is comprised of procurement fees (3% value of outsourced contracts), management fees for the contract as a whole and the establishment fee paid at the start of the programme. The contribution of each of these elements to date<sup>24</sup> is shown in Table 2 below. The total administration cost has fallen over time and now stands at 11.1%. The main driver for this reduction is the increase in the CDKN total programme spend, that has risen from £34.4m at the time of the MTR (November 2012) to £64.1m at the end of CDKN year 4.

**Table 2: CDKN administration cost over time**

	Original budget	At MTR	At EYE5
<b>Procurement fees</b>		1.9%	2%
<b>Management fees</b>		9.9%	8.5%
<b>Establishment fees</b>		1.1%	0.6%
<b>Total CDKN administration cost</b>	13.6%	12.9%	11.1%

It is difficult for us to judge whether the decrease in the percentage administration cost reflects the full decline in underlying costs associated with the increase in CDKN spend. An increasing spend translates to an increase in contracts that have to be managed although an increasing proportion will be with established suppliers and there are a small number of fixed costs.


#### **Recommendation to DFID**

If it is not already done, DFID should undertake an analysis of administration costs by service provider to allow analysis of indicators such as elasticity of administration fees to total spend and average managed contract size.

For the MTR we drew on analysis by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC Adaptation Fund (AF) to establish a benchmark for their administration charges. To recap, the categories they used are shown below in Figure 11.

<sup>24</sup> Based on figures provided by CDKN to 31 March 2014 (as the financial year 5 had not been completed). Note that the procurement cost is 2% of total programme spend but 3% of the 75% of outsourced contracts.

**Figure 11: Adaptation Fund categorisation of administration charges**



Source: Adaptation Fund (2011) Figure 2

After reviewing administration fees charged by the GEF and World Bank, the Adaptation Fund Board Secretariat recommended to their Ethics and Finance Committee<sup>25</sup> a cap of 8.5% cap on implementing agency fees and a cap of 9-10% of project budget for project execution costs. This would give a total cap of 17.5 – 18.5%.

Using the CDKN administration cost figures for EYE5 from Table 2 above we revise the CDKN administrative project-cycle management and project execution costs originally estimated at the MTR. For comparability, a total CDKN administration cost is estimated based on the figures in Table 2 *plus* a notional 3% procurement fee applied to in-house as well as outsourced spend<sup>26</sup> plus M&E costs. See Table 3 below.

**Table 3: CDKN relative to proposed AF administration costs**

	CDKN (MTR)	CDKN (EYE5)	AF proposed
Procurement fees (extrapolated to all spend)	3.0%	3.0%	
Management fees	9.9%	8.5%	
Establishment fees	1.1%	0.6%	
M&E costs	0.4%	0.9%	
Implementing agency fees			8.5%
Project execution costs			9%-10%
Total comparable administrative costs	14.4%	13%	17.5%-18.5%

**It is important to emphasise that these comparative figures are approximate but they do suggest that CDKN administration costs are lower than comparable UN agencies and that the increase in CDKN spend since the MTR is likely to have slightly increased this advantage.**

<sup>25</sup> Adaptation fund (2011), ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXECUTION COSTS: ANALYSIS OF CURRENT RULES AND COMPARISON OF PRACTICES WITH OTHER FUNDS, Adaptation Fund Board Ethics and Finance Committee Fourth Meeting Bonn, March 16, 2011

<sup>26</sup> For comparability we apply the procurement fee to in-house expenditure. However, we recognise that without being able to earn a margin from the 25% in-house spend CDKN might charge a procurement fee higher than 3%

### 4.2.3 The cost of doing business with CDKN

The CDKN response to the MTR feedback on lowering the cost of doing business with CDKN indicates a willingness to better communicate the reasons for rules and requirements and notes that PwC has put in place a process to expedite the ability to obtain exemptions from insurance requirements for certain types of organisation. In general, though, the message is that CDKN has to implement PwC processes designed to minimise the risk and transactions costs faced by PwC. This is captured in broad terms by the statement from the CDKN response:

“PwC, as lead contracting partner, is a firm that has detailed criteria and processes for contracting individuals in order to mitigate a number of employment risks which cannot easily be circumvented or streamlined for CDKN.”

Systematic review of EYE5 supplier interviews indicates that:

- *The processes required by PwC do impose transactions costs and this is an issue for suppliers used to more flexible arrangements provided by some donors.* Many, but not all, suppliers find that contracting with CDKN is relatively burdensome – noting “a lot of red tape with CDKN”. It is also the case that rigorous contracting processes can delay implementation. There is little that can be done to reduce the transaction cost per contract but **CDKN should aim to avoid multiple short contracts**. This would be helped by having a financial management information system tailored to the needs of CDKN. As one supplier put it “CDKN seem to be unsure whether money will be available and this creates gaps, uncertainty and short contracts”.
- A number of suppliers across regions reported that *CDKN tended to micromanage and ask for more than the ToR as the project was implemented. Yet most suppliers highlighted that CDKN are engaged, responsive and good to work with.* In the words of one supplier “In some ways it is micromanagement but there are advantages to having regular progress reports and many phone calls. It certainly takes up a lot of time and is heavy on management but keeps the focus on the project objectives”. **CDKN can justify regular engagement with suppliers as a legitimate CDKN mode of working and should simply explain what is likely to be involved to new suppliers. However, CDKN has to be on guard against enthusiasm for project results leading to requests that are beyond the ToR without providing additional resources as this is fundamentally unethical.**

A small number of suppliers have raised concerns that PwC staff working for CDKN may have access to information or contacts that produce a competitive advantage and hence generate a conflict of interest (COI). The PwC Code of Conduct only provides general guidance but states:

*We aim to avoid conflicts of interest. Where potential conflicts are identified and we believe that the respective parties’ interests can be properly safeguarded by the implementation of appropriate procedures, we will implement such procedures. p8*

We understand that in practice CDKN COI issues are raised, discussed and resolved through the management team, project approval group and project review group.

#### Recommendation to CDKN

CDKN should produce its own conflict of interest guidance. This should include a minimum time gap (of at least 6 months) for consortium member staff leaving CDKN and going back into consortium organisations in a closely related area.

#### Recommendation to DFID

DFID should require contractors managing programmes that are likely to provide a commercial advantage to produce a conflict of interest policy and show how it has been implemented.

#### 4.2.4 Financial management and project information systems

The MTR identified that CDKN lacked a real-time project management information system and recommended putting in place a system to provide real time data on project funding and performance. This recommendation was not implemented.

In late 2013 the limitations of the CDKN system became evident with a mismatch between regional and global funding and a subsequent budget shortfall at regional level. This led to a loss of momentum in a number of DECAs (identified in our Rwanda and Kenya case studies) and damage to CDKN credibility.

CDKN has subsequently tightened up or added financial controls<sup>27</sup> to ensure:

1. Invoices will only be paid when they have the relevant approvals.
2. Invoices will only be released for payment once the Financial Controller (FC) is satisfied they won't result in an overspend on that individual project unless there are exceptional circumstances.
3. Forecasts are received centrally by the FC for all live contracted projects to identify early if there are going to be any under/over spends and any reasons for these. The use of these monthly forecasts also enable us to track our spend profile and our ability to meet budget.
4. There is a formal closure process now in place to formally record any under/over spends and to make sure projects are officially closed. This process also helps ensure that CDKN identifies any projects which have been delayed and therefore may require a contract variation earlier to prevent scenarios where there is working out of contract.
5. Programmed spend is now tracked against budgets for year 5-7 to identify early any issues with not meeting budget or any areas which look like we may go over budget. This programmed spend includes actual spend and forecasted spend on contracted, post pag and pipeline projects. This means that CDKN are able to catch any over programming early i.e. before it is all contracted and take action to rectify.
6. Spend against budget is monitored on a monthly basis via: monthly regional summaries with each region/output which helps ensure our financial records align with the regions ; and a Commercial board meeting.

**It seems likely that these additional manual controls using Excel are adequate to mitigate the risk of a regional/global budget mismatch in future. However, in addition to the costs of the 2013 funding crisis, it also seems likely that adding manual financial controls will impose delays.**

### 4.3 Gender mainstreaming

#### 4.3.1 Objectives of the review

Since the mid-term review, CDKN has committed to strengthening the mainstreaming of gender within its programme to support action to achieve gender equality. It has developed a gender strategy (mainstreaming plan), but the main investments only started in 2014.

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<sup>27</sup> Email from Pippa Heylings 14/11/2014

Although gender was not included and resourced in our Statement of Work for the EYE5 evaluation, we have attempted to meet CDKN and DFID requests to provide a broad assessment of the likely progress of the CDKN gender strategy, and highlight areas for improvement.

### 4.3.2 Gender Framing – core concepts

We have defined **gender mainstreaming** using the UN Economic and Social Council's definition:

Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.<sup>28</sup>

This definition clearly emphasises that addressing gender issues requires a focus on women, girls, boys and men (not only women and girls), and an analysis of their differential status and access to resources in different situations. Gender mainstreaming is not about developing a project, then 'add women and stir'. It is not just about counting women and men.

Throughout the organisation and at the start of project processes, staff need to be considering gender-differentiated needs, benefits, capacities, risks, influence in decision-making, division of labour, differential effects of an issue on women, men, girls and boys in any given setting. CDKN needs to find an appropriate institutional framework to support the embedding of this type of questioning throughout its work.

Gender mainstreaming requires a process of integrating gender concerns into decision-making systems and practices at all levels within the organization. We have therefore defined a set of **institutional factors** that need to be included in an effective gender mainstreaming strategy as a set of criteria adapted from Levy's 'Web of Institutionalisation'.<sup>29</sup>

Levy identifies a number of organisational processes within which gender issues need to be prioritised if it is to be mainstreamed into systems, processes, knowledge and behaviour of staff. These internal systems work together as a 'web' to build organizational capacity to address gender issues integrally.<sup>30</sup>


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<sup>28</sup> United Nations. "Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997". A/52/3.18 September 1997.

<sup>29</sup> Based on: C. Levy. 'The Process of Institutionalising Gender in Policy and Planning: the web of institutionalisation'. *DPU Working Paper No 74*, Development Planning Unit, University College London (1996).  
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/publications/working%20papers%20pdf/wp74.pdf>

<sup>30</sup> For example, UNEP's Gender Plan of Action (2006) applied Levy's method. See:  
[http://www.unep.org/roa/amcen/Projects\\_Programme/climate\\_change/PreCop15/Proceedings/Gender%20strategies/Unep%20Gender%20Plan%20of%20Action\\_5\\_Feb07.pdf](http://www.unep.org/roa/amcen/Projects_Programme/climate_change/PreCop15/Proceedings/Gender%20strategies/Unep%20Gender%20Plan%20of%20Action_5_Feb07.pdf)

**Figure 12: 'Web of Institutionalisation' for gender mainstreaming (Levy 1996)**



For CDKN, we have grouped these criteria into three sets of categories: institutional, outcome and output dimensions of gender mainstreaming.

**Table 4: Gender mainstreaming criteria**

Gender Mainstreaming Dimension	Gender mainstreaming criteria
<p>1. Institutional aspect of gender mainstreaming: Assessing the potential of CDKN's gender strategy to mainstream gender and making suggestions for strengthening this going forwards</p>	<p>⇒ To what extent is there a political commitment in the organisation to integrate gender into development activities? If there is, where does this commitment lie?</p> <p>⇒ Is there a willingness to allocate existing and future resources to the integration of gender into mainstream policies and programmes?</p> <p>⇒ What is the gender policy framework? To what extent has gender been integrated into existing policy? Is there a specific WID/GAD policy? How does the policy frame gender roles, differential access to resources and gender needs?</p> <p>⇒ Which are the groups responsible for gender issues? For each group, to what extent are they acting in the appropriate roles, have adequate access to and control over resources, and have their gender needs met in a way that will enable them to carry out this responsibility appropriately?</p> <p>⇒ What are the mechanisms in place for staff development in gender-aware practices and decision-making? Which groups are involved in the formulation and implementation of these mechanisms?</p> <p>⇒ What are the current sources of information on gender and development debates for the staff in the relevant parts of your organisation and those in partner organisations? Currently in the organisation, which would be the most appropriate 'channels' for dissemination of such information?</p>
<p>2. Outcome aspect: Assessment of progress against the new gender indicators in the CDKN logframe.</p>	<p>⇒ To what extent do monitoring, evaluation, research and reporting processes use methodologies and reflect knowledge on gender, and the links between sectoral and macro-economic policy, and gender roles, resources and gender needs, as appropriate? For example, disaggregating data by gender.</p>
<p>3. Research and Knowledge Brokering aspect: Review of CDKN research outputs and KM products on gender and climate.</p>	<p>⇒ To what extent do projects and research initiatives and/or secondary research and knowledge brokering use methodologies and reflect knowledge on gender roles, access to and control over resources, and gender needs of women and men?</p>

### 4.3.3 Method and process

Interviews were conducted with CDKN stakeholders involved in the gender strategy. The four Country Case studies conducted for the evaluation in Kenya, Rwanda, Nepal and Colombia included questions on gender. Key documents were also reviewed, as were internal project document templates, but this was limited by the lack of budgeted time.

#### 4.3.4. Findings

Overall, it is early days for CDKN's gender strategy. Good measures are in place but without further investment there is a risk that the strategy will fade into becoming a compliance issue. The recent prioritisation of gender within CDKN has come about mainly in response to DFID (006), although it has been taken on board with good intentions by the senior management.

However, it is illustrative of the still-superficial nature of the gender strategy that gender was not included in the Terms of Reference (ToR) or the resourcing for the Year 5 Evaluation. CDKN wrote the ToR and gender was only included at the request of DFID after the resources had been agreed.

CDKN has commissioned a number of gender and climate projects, and has been developing this as an external theme. There is also a 'gender section' in the commissioning protocol for projects.

However, the country programmes reviewed did not demonstrate a strong understanding and prioritization of gender issues within their portfolios, nor did the senior management individuals interviewed. The gender section of the commissioning documents contained superficial comments, speaking in general terms about how women would be affected, rather than reflecting a deeper understanding of how women, men, girls and boys of diverse social backgrounds might be differentially affected by the outcomes of a project.

This means that CDKN needs to look across the institution – internally as well as projects - using an appropriate holistic framework for gender mainstreaming (for example, the Levy framework) and resource gender and climate work adequately. Otherwise, well-intentioned senior management will act on the subset of constraints they find it easiest to address within their area of work, and the embedding of gender in institutional practice will not happen. This will limit the leadership and CDKN has the potential to provide in gender and climate.

Specifically, investment of resources is needed to:

- develop an over-arching ethical frame for gender and social inclusion within climate projects;
- recruit additional specialist gender staff at global and regional levels to support staff commissioning projects; and
- develop a programme of internal staff development on gender and climate that is monitored and prioritised.

The detailed findings are organised according to the criteria in our frame.

## **Institutional dimensions**

### ***Political commitment in the organisation***

The interviewees consulted on the gender mainstreaming approach feel that political commitment to gender mainstreaming is emerging amongst senior management and staff. This has been a result of strong pressure from the donors to focus on gender issues, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS). The perception is that external pressure was the driver for action from senior management.

Now that actions have been taken and gender issues profiled, many CDKN staff are finding gender and social inclusion issues genuinely interesting and important. However, there is less understanding about how to take action about these issues within CDKN's projects (006; 168).

A gender plan has been agreed, although it does not appear to exist as a stand-alone strategy. The gender approach is mainly documented in the text explaining the gender indicators in the Logical Framework:

- As part of its gender mainstreaming strategy, CDKN currently follows a double-track approach:

*Attention to gender equality is being mainstreamed internally across the programme with the gender lead supporting gender auditing of programmes and gender-sensitive procurement.*

*CDKN encourages and supports the commissioning of new research projects specifically focussing on the gender dimension of CCD. (“CDKN gender integration into log-frame 2014 Final”, internal document).*

In summary, the key elements of the gender plan are:

- addition of gendered indicators in the Logical Framework
- appointment of a dedicated Gender Focal Point (70 days per year)
- identification of Gender Champions to each outcome and regional area
- inclusion of a gender criterion into the project procurement process, mainly in the form of a section to be completed in the Project Procurement Form (PPF)
- start-up of a flagship gender and climate research programme.

The need for senior management to do more has been acknowledged, and there is evidence of a **willingness to allocate resources to the integration of gender** (006; 168).

The integration of the gender criterion in the PPF process is considered helpful, and it has helped some teams to think more about how a project would affect gender issues, although others send it to their gender specialist rather than conducting the analysis themselves.

However, the Country Case Studies found that the information provided in this section in the PPF forms does not reflect a proper understanding of gender issues, nor an assessment of the implications for women and men of a given project. This section in the forms is mainly interpreted as ‘how is the project going to involve women’. Even this more superficial consideration is not supported by a follow-up of whether the project has really made a positive contribution to gender, social inclusion and equality.

This issue stems from the lack of a clear gender framework and policy at the institutional level.

### **Gender policy framework**

No institutional framework appears to have been developed yet for framing and understanding the effects of gender and social identity on issues of exclusion/inclusion, how CCD projects might affect their social position and access to resources, and other issues that should inform the design of CDKN’s projects.

Overall progress could be strengthened with the development of such a framework. It could usefully be a broader gender and social inclusion framework that systematically considers gender, social identity and income levels for each intended programmatic action in a given context. The framework should be supported by practical staff development activities and guidance to help staff analyse how gender factors affect access to resources, influence and ability to meet gender needs within climate change action planning, implementation and evaluation, according to international good practice (Levy 1996).

This is echoed by the recommendations of the gender specialist who has scoped the flagship gender and climate research project. The recommendations include nesting an analysis of gender dimensions of climate change into broader processes of exclusion and inclusion (Summary Note on Draft Gender and Climate Research Strategy, January 2014). As an aside, knowledge from this project should provide a good foundation for gender policy framework.

The framework and guidance would have a direct practical application in helping CDKN staff and partners to understand how they can ensure that the people most affected by climate change benefit from CCD projects.

### **Responsibility for gender issues**

Responsibility for gender issues is nominally spread across the organisation. There is an overall Gender Champion, who is the Chief Executive Officer, a Gender Focal Point and Gender Champions within Outcome and Regional Clusters. However, while there is enthusiasm amongst the Gender Champions, there is not a clear understanding of their role and what actions they should be taking (006; 168).

In practice, much of the day-to-day work is being done within the Gender Focal post. This post has 70 days per year allocated to it, around 0.3 of a full-time post. We were informed that about half of this time is dedicated to managing the flagship research project that specifically focuses on the gender and climate (006; 168). This leaves around 45 days per year to cover the following tasks:

- supporting the procurement team to incorporate a gender-sensitive perspective to the procurement and audit of projects (e.g. reviewing PPF submitted to the PAG meeting);
- advising and assisting regional teams and project managers to integrate a gender perspective in the design and the implementation of their projects;
- providing comments on CDKN's internal and external documents on sections addressing gender considerations (e.g. business plan, annual review).
- reviewing and keeping up to date with existing literature and institutional documentation on gender mainstreaming, and CCD and gender-related topics. Sharing these with staff members through Huddle.
- producing CDKN briefings, and case studies from across CDKN's portfolio to document the gender dimension of CCD.

The Gender Focal post seems considerably under-resourced for providing support across the whole CDKN programme, including Country and Regional Programmes. There is considerable demand for advice from the Gender Focal point from the regions which has been challenging to meet.

### **Evidence from the country case studies on integration of gender into the commissioning of projects**

#### ***Colombia (from the Colombia Country Report)***

The Colombia programme has addressed some aspects of gender within some of its projects by consulting explicitly with women's groups – for example in AVA and Cartagena, especially the islands. However, a gender perspective has not yet been systematically integrated into the team's strategic thinking; for example a search of the Country Programme for the words 'gender' and 'women' did not identify those words in the text.

Part of the reason for this is a lack of prioritisation of a gender analytical framework at the CDKN global level, and another part might flow from the perception that Colombia, as a middle income country enjoys equality and anti-discrimination laws. However, Colombia has severe income inequality and any type of inequality has gendered and social identity aspects that promote or prevent social inclusion. These aspects need to be considered explicitly in the design and implementation of CDKN's future projects if they are to contribute to the ultimate aim of improving the quality of life of the most vulnerable and most challenged by climate change.

In essence, this weakness on gender and equity issues is part of the larger limitation identified within the Colombia programme's results: the **lower profile of poverty, gender and social exclusion dimensions of 'climate compatible development'**.

Furthermore, the evaluator noted that the team opted to change the overall goal in their Impact Pathway:

We have also broadened the scope from "the most vulnerable" to "population" as a whole, which does not mean that we are not paying a special attention to the poorest communities but Climate Change affects both wealthy and poor communities. (Country Programme Document, pg. 63)

However, if an explicit and documented focus is not maintained on the poorest communities, they may slip from view, particularly as the CDKN projects tend to be working within the status quo to achieve a consensus-based plan, supported by the powerful actors who are able to drive change.

Working on the 'inside track' will constrain 'transformational change'. Reduction in vulnerability and improvements to the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable communities must be kept in view as the ultimate objective of equitable and inclusive climate compatible development. A robust framework for understanding gender, social identity and ex/inclusion is required to support this.

#### ***India (from the India Report)***

The India programme has addressed some aspects of gender through one of its projects. However, a gender perspective has not been integrated into the team's strategic thinking; for example when project suppliers were asked about gender dimensions in their respective projects they reported that gender was not part of their programme nor "CDKN requested us for it neither".

CDKN India team is very much aware of this gap and it is considering the best way to approach it.

#### ***Nepal (from the Nepal Country Report)***

There is very little evidence of a specific focus on gender in the CDKN Nepal programme. For example, the EIA assessed the economic costs of climate change in key sectors in Nepal and then assessed the potential adaptation options to respond to current and future risks. Yet the gender differentiated costs were not covered and similarly neither were the gender-specific adaptation mainstreaming options. This may reasonably be explained by being beyond of what was already an ambitious economic impact assessment study.

More broadly, a gender perspective has not yet been systematically integrated into the team's strategic thinking; for example a search of the Country Programme for the words 'gender' and 'women' did not identify those words in the text.

Part of the reason for this is a lack of prioritisation of a gender analytical framework at the CDKN global level, and another part might flow from the essence and focus of the Nepal country strategy on supporting mainstreaming 'headline' CCD P&P concerns before the gender aspects are considered.

#### ***Rwanda (from the Rwanda Country Report)***

There is very little evidence of a specific focus on gender in the CDKN Rwanda programme.

The project to support FONERWA capacity building illustrates the issue. The FONERWA application process includes one question on gender i.e. it requires a statement on how gender is addressed by applicants (051, 052, 053). Apart from this there have not been specific interventions around gender – although as there was only 1 female applicant out of 40 who applied for training she was deliberately selected.

Interviews with district-based stakeholders indicate that there has been more focus on gender issues in practice, although this is not related to CDKN support. "The project preparation has considered gender from stakeholder analysis onwards (because the District Development Plans require this and the Netherlands Government had separately provided training to Caritas on how to mainstream gender)" (052, 053).

#### ***Kenya (from the Kenya Country Report)***

As yet, gender has not been addressed institutionally and systematically in the CDKN Kenya programme. Although a recent emphasis has been placed on addressing gender, this has not yet fed down into concrete

actions or into actual project implementation. There is a somewhat mechanistic treatment of gender at the proposal writing stage, but that doesn't translate through into any monitoring of how or whether gender is being addressed during the project, nor is any support provided from CDKN to build capacity within the suppliers. There did not appear to be a clear framework developed for framing and understanding the effects of gender and social difference on issues of exclusion/inclusion, access to resources within CCD and other issues that should inform the design of projects. We found no evidence of efforts to address gender or social inclusion at the strategic or programming level.

There was a small amount of anecdotal or coincidental low-level evidence for inclusion of gender issues in a few projects (e.g. NCCAP had gender mentioned, but this was not a direct result of CDKN's work; suggestions that more recent on-going projects would include gender considerations) [interview 110]. However, none of the key informants reported any discussion or mention of gender or social inclusion from CDKN past the proposal stage, although several mentioned that support from CDKN [interviews 114, 116]:

*I know during proposal development it was included – we had to write something about gender – but later on it disappeared, yes I don't remember hearing any more about gender. It just happened that the two people managing the project were ladies. There were some requirements at the proposal stage, but they got lost along the way; the gender requirements were not followed through. [We] need support for gender mainstreaming and in terms of reporting. CDKN should check up on gender along the way, which they didn't. [Interview 116, supplier].*

PPF forms include a section on gender considerations, but a) does not delve deep enough into gender or social inclusion issues for Kenya; and b) post-PPF, there is no evidence of either follow-up or support provided for suppliers, clients, stakeholders, or governments on these issues. Given that many organisations and institutions in Kenya are likely to have low levels of capacity to address gender and social inclusion in their activities, there is a key role that CDKN could be playing here in terms of providing support, training, capacity building – or even offering a basic toolkit to use. This need was further emphasised during discussions around gender with suppliers [interview 101, 116] where their understanding of mainstreaming gender in CDKN projects centred around the number of women involved in the project management. Based on assessment of gender in this country programme CDKN should also, as a matter of urgency, consider providing basic training for national and regional CDKN staff, particularly for project managers, on mainstreaming gender and social inclusion.

### **Mechanisms for on-going staff development in gender-sensitive decision-making and practice**

In terms of staff development opportunities in gender-sensitive planning and practice, the Gender Focal Point is producing guidance and a toolkit to support staff (still awaiting approval), and we were informed that there is a gender course available (006; 168). These would be the only mechanisms currently available for staff.

It appears that the Gender Focal point is expected to provide sources of information on gender and development debates for relevant staff to keep up to date on current gender debates and practice. Given the current levels of demand for support on gender from the Gender Focal point, having a good information resource for staff seems unlikely to be rapidly achieved.

Investment into a flagship research programme will produce important new knowledge, but this will be outwardly targeted. There was no evidence of mechanisms being planned to feed the knowledge from the research project back into practical staff development in gender and social inclusion for climate compatible development projects.

**Institutional dimensions:** In summary, the gender review highlights that a fuller understanding is needed amongst senior management of what a commitment to gender mainstreaming involves institutionally and the level of investment required to develop staff capacities to integrate it into their day-to-day work.

**Investment is needed to:**

- develop an over-arching ethical frame for gender and social inclusion within climate projects
- recruit additional specialist gender staff at global and regional levels
- develop a programme of internal staff training and development in gender, social inclusion and climate that is monitored and prioritised.

CDKN staff responsible for gender, for example the Gender Champions, need training, clear guidance and opportunities to access and debate current information to help them to assess the implications for gender and social inclusion in the scoping, design, planning and delivery of projects within country, regional and global programmes.

If these gaps are not addressed, the enthusiasm and interest of staff to make progress on gender and social inclusion may fade into compliance and 'tick-box' exercise.

**Outcome dimensions**

CDKN has integrated gender-sensitive indicators into its Logical Framework reporting. Over time, this is intended to develop a better understanding of specific ways in which it can address gender in its work. They provide a basic framework for obtaining gender-disaggregated information.

However, these indicators do not as yet reflect specific understanding of how climate projects can improve gender and social inclusion outcomes. For example, how do sectoral and macro-economic climate policies and implementation practices need to change to improve gender equity and social inclusion? Some of this knowledge will come from the flagship research project, but it also needs to reflect an internal understanding of CDKN's potential capacities to influence gender outcomes through its climate work.

This is something that will need to develop over time, as CDKN identifies its goals and targets for influence as a climate knowledge and practice programme.

**Table 2: CDKN's gender-related indicators**

- Outcome Indicator 1.4. # and description of cases illustrating changes to CCD policies and programmes in the sectors of agriculture, energy, water and cities, with a verifiable contribution from CDKN, 20% of which have a gender dimension
- Outcome indicator 3.3 # (and description) of cases illustrating where international organisations and national or subnational governments have drawn on CDKN expertise, learning or research on climate-related DRM, 20% of which have a gender dimension
- Outcome indicator 4.1 (indirect changes through modification of outcome map) % of outcomes (at expect to see, like to see and love to see levels) realised, as expressed in advocacy fund outcome map. A Like to See progress marker has been added to the outcome map's Dimension of Change One: Gender increasingly forms part of the discourse in climate negotiations.
- Output indicator 1.4 # (and description) of case studies illustrating:
- Output indicator 4. increased access to and/or use of information on gender in CCD by specific target stakeholders.
- Output indicator 5.1 # of individuals trained by the advocacy fund, disaggregated by gender, country and group.-
- Output indicator 5.4 # of negotiators supported to attend international climate change meetings (and number of meetings attended), disaggregated by gender

**Research and knowledge brokering aspects**

It was beyond the scope of the review to understand whether gender-focused research projects are being implemented with gender-appropriate, ethical methods. Identifying appropriate and ethical methods for conducting gender-sensitive climate research should be a priority for the flagship gender project.

A number of gender-related products are now appearing on the CDKN website. Many of these are coming from projects that were commissioned prior to the prioritising of the gender strategy. They have now been clustered into a thematic page and knowledge resources that provides a good foundation for more strategic positioning of gender and climate knowledge. The evaluation team are aware of a literature review on gender and climate that was produced as part of a gender-focused research project, but it is not known whether this has been published.

#### Outcome dimensions and knowledge aspects:

In summary, the gender indicators and gender-related knowledge products provide a good starting point for developing a theme on gender and climate. However, to make a real contribution to equity and social inclusion requires CDKN to:

- develop a strategic understanding of gender and climate issues in terms of what needs to change in climate policies and practices to improve gender equity and social inclusion, and what aspects it will target through its programmes
- develop an internal understanding of what its capacities are and potential contributions as a climate knowledge and practice programme
- develop practical guidance for CDKN staff in applying gender and social inclusion analysis to their projects.

#### 4.3.5 Recommendations for CDKN's gender strategy

The recommendations to strengthen CDKN's fledgling gender strategy are as follows:

**1. Develop a more informed understanding among senior management of what a commitment to gender mainstreaming involves** institutionally and the level of investment required to develop staff capacities to integrate it into their day-to-day work. There are many gender mainstreaming toolkits and frameworks available. One that we have drawn on is Levy's Web of Institutionalisation as a thorough, accessible and practical resource.

**2. Develop a gender and social inclusion framework** to help guide practical thinking about how to support a systematic consideration of gender, social identity and income levels, and how these affect access to resources and influence within climate change action planning, implementation and evaluation. There are many models and toolkits available that are practical and applicable, especially from the humanitarian sector.

This frame needs to include ethical and normative dimensions – what does CDKN think *needs to be changed* to make progress on equality and inclusion?

**3. Recruit additional specialist gender staff at global and regional levels** to provide technical support to project leads from within the regions. To meet the objectives that CDKN have set themselves, as a minimum, there should be one full-time post at global level and Gender Champions need to receive training if they are to provide technical support (see below).

**4. Invest systematically in internal capacity building** on gender and social inclusion for all staff involved in designing and commissioning projects. The aim of this programme should be to build general confidence and

understanding in assessing gender, social inclusion and climate in projects. This can be supported by specialist advice from global and regional gender staff.

Capacity building is not only training – it should also include mechanisms for staff to keep up with current debates and have the opportunity to debate and reflect on practice.

**5. CDKN staff responsible for gender, for example the Gender Champions, should be given a higher level of technical training** and clear guidance on applying the gender framework. The aim of this programme should be to create confidence and skills in gender, social inclusion and climate so that advice, challenge and support can be given to colleagues. This programme should include opportunities to access and debate current information on gender and climate.

## 4.4 CDKN's Theory of Change: Evolution and future directions

This sub-section provides a limited assessment of the evolution and application of CDKN's Theory of Change (ToC). Although not part of our original TOR, it has been added at the request of DFID. This is in contrast to the assessment of CDKN's progress towards impact within their ToC: this forms the core of this evaluation and is discussed in both the Outcome and Country case studies in the following sections and in Annexes 3 and 4.

### 4.4.1 Evolution of the ToC

CDKN's Theory of Change (ToC) was revised in July 2014, according to the documentation provided to the evaluation (CDKN's Theory of Change, July 2014). This revision involved the addition of four outcome areas:

- policies and practice
- disaster risk management
- climate finance, and
- negotiations support

The focus on key sectors of cities (subnational), water, agriculture and energy were also added at this time.

This was a coherent and appropriate evolution, building on the 'Dimensions of Change' framework and the expanded results framework. At the MTR stage, it was noted that CDKN's Log-frame did not adequately represent the higher-level outcomes beyond outputs. CDKN's ToC has done a good job of capturing this broader and deeper range of results.

Overall, CDKN's ToC is a good example of a global ToC that reflects the evolving understanding of the programme's change process and provides a good framework for aggregating learning. This is not often achieved. It added considerably to the very limited original log-frame and enabled the programme to gather and aggregate data at a global level from across the programme.

There are some good examples of its application in programme processes, most notably to guide commissioning and procurement, to support strategy and learning in the Deep Engagement Countries and to frame monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) in a coherent and systematic way across the programme.

However, our assessment is that there are also significant limitations to the extent to which ToC-led learning actually took place and informed the global decision-making and strategies of the programme. This resulted in a major missed opportunity to learn from the Deep Engagement Countries' experience and consequently, very limited ToC-based learning about effective approaches to facilitate climate compatible development.

#### 4.4.2 Strengths of the ToC

The following are examples of where CDKN's ToC has been integrated into the programme's processes:

- CDKN's ToC has been integrated and applied to frame the commissioning, monitoring, evaluation and learning across CDKN.
- In the procurement process, every CDKN project has to make an explicit contribution to one or more Dimensions of Change and latterly, also to the Outcome areas. This is used to guide decision-making on commissioning.
- The annual M&E reports aggregate and analyse data on the key aspects of the ToC: the Outcomes, 'Dimensions of Change' and Outputs. Of note was the analytical focus in 2015 on a key aspect of CDKN's core change process: Capacity Building in CDKN. This piece sought to draw data and lessons from CDKN's experience to inform future decisions.
- In the area of Negotiations Support, the Dimensions of Change framework informed the development of the outcome map used to guide strategy and implementation.
- In Country Programmes, a systematic and consistent ToC-led MEL approach provided a common framework and tools for data collection, analysis and learning to support strategy development. This process requires a strong, adequately resourced, country team. In the Colombia case, it could be seen that using the country ToC as the starting point for strategic learning and decision-making had considerably strengthened the results and outcomes achieved. However, Colombia was the exception not the norm in DECs and where country programmes had limited capacity the ToC was much more likely to become a "tick-box" exercise.

#### 4.4.3 Weaknesses of the ToC

Despite the points of integration described above, ToC-based learning about the 'how and why' of climate compatible development has been limited. This has been a missed opportunity for CDKN to test current assumptions, identify the constraints that it could focus on in future and to refresh its ToC to frame its strategy.

It would be reasonable to expect that having achieved a well-developed and reasonably integrated ToC, this would lead to more coherence, but across CDKN, there is a thematic silo effect along the outcome-related themes. This means that the potential offered by the ToC for integrated learning at the global level was not realised.

The MEL reports were written by the MEL team, and although approved by the Board, it is unclear to what extent the Board and Senior Management applied the analysis and used the reports to inform their decision-making. Despite M&E having been given a higher priority with the appointment of a senior lead on M&E in 2014, there still did not seem to be adequate mechanisms, channels or incentives for ToC learning and accountability to move beyond the MEL team.

A major weakness was the lack of any testing or exploration of the assumptions underpinning the ToC and CDKN's approach. In the ToC document, the assumptions were well-developed and correctly focused. However, there is no evidence that the assumptions informed the Learning Questions or Cluster Strategies which are the main mechanisms for cross-programme learning.

In Country Programmes being led by only one individual, the ToC tools and process were seen as compliance or remained under-developed. This was a more common situation than the case of team-led Colombia.

Finally, the emphasis on thematic learning means that there is no mechanism for learning about key ToC causal pathways, such as facilitating policy reform or building sectoral capacities.

#### 4.4.4 Conclusions on use of the ToC

CDKN has a lot of successes, ‘productive failures’ and innovations to learn about effective approaches for facilitating climate compatible development.

The evaluation has revealed particularly rich learning about the complex processes of policy reform, building political will and private sector engagement to tackle climate compatible development.

All of these key change processes to support climate compatible development are expressed in its ToC. The ToC document itself is good but has not been reflected in learning practice. Hence learning about ‘what it takes’ - what is actually involved in accompanying government to secure change - has not been built on.

As CDKN considers its future, there would be merit in exploring what its past experience means for a refreshed ToC and programme strategy.

## 5 Progress towards impact: country case studies

### 5.1 Rwanda

The GBP 1.3 million Climate & Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) programme of work in Rwanda since 2010 is very largely comprised of:

1. Technical assistance to support the Government of Rwanda (GoR) in producing their national climate change strategy (2010-11), design of the National Climate and Environment Fund (FONERWA) (2012) and subsequent capacity building for some applicants to FONERWA (2013-15). This cluster accounts for some 75% of total spend to date;
2. Ongoing support to Rwandan components of regional programmes (AMCOW and MAPS);
3. Learning from the Rwanda experience (Film and CCD learning in four African countries reports).

The CDKN programme in Rwanda supports green growth and climate resilience in Rwanda through developing integrated national policy, designing FONERWA, increasing access to and application of climate finance and building capacity to act. The long-term expected change of the programme is “for all relevant national and local development plans and priorities to include Climate Compatible Development (CCD) considerations and be capable of being implemented”.

The CDKN Rwanda Country Programme (RCP) document, August 2014 p42, notes that the CDKN focus in the impact pathway has been centred on medium-term changes, specifically on domestic and international funding for CCD (**CF outcome**) and the development and implementation of CCD projects and programmes (**P&P outcome**). “This is where demand exists from the service recipient and where the strength of the CDKN programme lies.”

**The decision of CDKN to make Rwanda a Deep Engagement Country (DEC) is justified by the progress made by GoR. Progress along the impact pathway has been achieved since the MTR and CDKN has**

contributed to interventions that move Rwanda significantly closer to realising the long-term programme goal. These have been built on a number of government interventions that CDKN has supported and are summarised in the table below. It is important to highlight that these interventions represent a cluster of TA projects, implemented sequentially, that CDKN has funded in response to demand from GoR.

Short-term change (CDKN direct influence)	Significance of change since MTR	CDKN's contribution to the change since MTR
A high quality GGCR Strategy is developed and adopted by Government, with a high level of buy-in from key stakeholders	None	None
Successful establishment, initial operation and increasing capitalisation of FONERWA	Very significant (successful initial capitalisation)	Some. CDKN input was to efficiently contract and manage the supplier (CIDT). The fiduciary and governance design reflected the work of CIDT consultants based on existing models. Initial operation was supported by DFID (ICF) funding. We reject the claim that CDKN contributed the design that made funding by DFID and subsequently KfW possible.
Domestic resources are committed to support CCD interventions	Significant (funds committed)	Some. CDKN input was to efficiently contract and manage the supplier (CIDT). The fiduciary and governance design reflected the work of CIDT consultants based on existing models. We reject the claim that CDKN contributed the design that made funding by GoR possible.
Government officials and planners at the district and national level have increased knowledge and resources to implement climate policy, increase access to climate finance and to climate proof investment decisions	Significant (evidence that $\geq 5$ districts will have funded CCD plans as a result of this project)	CDKN responded quickly and flexibly to the request from FONERWA for TA. CDKN has contracted CIDT to deliver this TA.

As documented in the MTR, from the perspective of Rwandan stakeholders, the Film project has **not** brought knowledge to Rwanda from the global alliance. The “CCD learning in four African countries project” offers *potential* for shared learning from DECs but is at a very early stage. It is disappointing that the opportunity for Rwanda to learn from Ethiopia – another CDKN DEC – about the challenges of *implementing* a national climate strategy has not been taken. This highlights the difficulty in getting country-to-country learning outside formal commissioned studies that take messages back to the CDKN “hub” and then back out to country “spokes”. **CDKN could do more to put in place systems to capture reflective learning by suppliers and CDKN team members involved in delivering these programmes in addition to commissioning external researchers to document lessons.**

The regional programmes with a Rwandan component (AMCOW and MAPS) offer the potential for CDKN to leverage a comparative advantage. We were **not able to find evidence this had occurred** but this could be because the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) project is ongoing and MAPS has barely begun.

In terms of CDKN Dimensions of Change (DoC), there is **strong evidence** that the Rwanda country team is making credible contributions to the DoC 2, 5 and 7. There is also **strong evidence** that there will be a contribution to DoC 1: “Changes in the quality of life for people most affected by climate change” but the impact of this is only likely to be seen in year 7 at the earliest. There is **no or very limited evidence** of direct contributions around DoC 3, 4 and 6.

At the Climate Finance (CF) outcome level, medium-term changes reflect the results of technical assistance to support GoR in producing their national climate change strategy (2010-11), design of FONERWA (2012) and subsequent capacity building for some applicants to FONERWA (2014-15). CDKN support for these interventions has been seen as a contractor of technical assistance (supplied by CIDT). **CDKN deserves credit for being responsive to demand and managing this TA efficiently and effectively. Moreover, CDKN has funded successful TA projects in Rwanda – this is the success criteria normally applied to donor funding. However, our Terms of Reference (ToR) also lead us to consider whether this success reflects a CDKN niche and role as a global CCD knowledge network. There is limited evidence that this additional hurdle has been crossed in Rwanda. That is to say that we do not find the CDKN mission, institutional partnership, mode of operation, global reach, learning or independence has made their intervention notably more efficient or effective than if the supplier had been contracted by another strong development partner.** Consequently, the CDKN niche identified at the time of the MTR holds true today.

When asked about the CDKN niche or comparative advantage, a number of interviewees went out of their way to emphasise that CDKN should actually be judged on the basis of spend (045, 046, 047, 051, 055). As (055) put it, CDKN “is not unique in terms of what is delivered”. We felt there was a frustration at the gap between the vision and claims that had been made by CDKN on one hand and the amount of programme funding to Rwanda on the other. **This reflects a genuine tension between the need for CDKN to respond effectively to demand and the need to concentrate limited resources on strategic points within the Theory of Change (ToC) where it can make a significant difference.** However, the interruption to CDKN funding in 2013 did damage credibility (010, 099) and the earlier practice of over claiming results by CDKN reported in the MTR has left a damaging legacy of distrust. Even now, the ToC reflects a GoR programme that has been supported by three CDKN TA projects but claims are made for the “CDKN programme”.

There is a credible argument made by a number of interviewees (045, 050, 054) that CDKN would provide significant added value if it were able to assist FONERWA to access funding from the GCF. This may happen as the GCF begins to disburse funds in 2015 but this has not happened yet.

The P&P outcome relates to the same cluster of TA projects as the CF outcome above. Indeed, FONERWA CF with CDKN-supported capacity building is playing an important role in getting Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy (GGCRS) messages into district development plans. More broadly, **progress towards the P&P outcome also requires capacity building for sectors at the national level**, e.g. schools to programme work on making buildings climate resilient (050) and greater recognition within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) that infrastructure investment needs to be climate resilient (051). Experience in Ethiopia (DFID SCIP MTR 2013) showed that it is very difficult to get already busy Line Ministry staff to do this unless it is part of their job description and resources are made available. In Rwanda, sub-sector working groups have been set up to look at climate issues in major sectors. This has potential and indicates political interest but doesn’t add any time or resources, and experience suggests that this will be a constraint to preparing FONERWA proposals.

CDKN has recognised the most significant opportunity for impact in Rwanda lies at the interface of CF and P&P outcomes. **Looking forward, the biggest opportunities for impact are likely to remain in this area.** Specifically:

- Mainstreaming climate resilience into sector and district programmes (FONERWA funding can be a route to leverage regular sources of investment or a source of funding itself)

- Sector (e.g. water, energy, education, agriculture) programmes of action for FONERWA funding haven't really happened yet. DFID have pushed for Sector links to the Second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS-2) (050).

We believe it is necessary to consider two possible trajectories towards impact in Rwanda:

**1. Lower case: There is no significant additional funding of FONERWA:**

In this case, by the end of year 7 we expect the following impacts:

- CDKN-funded technical assistance;
- At least 5 district-level FONERWA-funded projects that would otherwise not be funded will be enhancing the quality of life for people most challenged by the effects of climate change;
- CDKN has made a modest contribution to securing the FONERWA-funded Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) project and this is likely (but not yet certain) to result in the mainstreaming of CCD in a number of district development plans;
- Some non-CDKN interventions that draw on the skills of CDKN-trained national pool consultants will target this beneficiary group and be more climate resilient than they otherwise would be;
- Water sector plans may be more climate resilient as a result of the GWP capacity building.

**2. Upper case: FONERWA receives significant additional funding from the GCF following advice from CDKN:**

- The extent of the lower case benefits would be increased, i.e. more bids into FONERWA drawing on CDKN-trained national pool consultants;
- In addition, the critical process of mainstreaming CCD into national sector interventions that impact directly on the quality of life of the target group is likely to accelerate.

At this stage we can say we are confident that the lower case benefits will be obtained and that there is a non-trivial possibility of realising the upper case benefits (or at least some point between the two cases).

**We have a number of recommendations to CDKN**

**Recommendation 1**

Each Country Programme Strategy should identify the stakeholders consulted and their role in producing the Theory of Change.

**Recommendation 2**

While there is no easy answer to this challenge, CDKN should consider explicitly defining the amount of climate finance leverage that is the objective over a particular time frame.

**Recommendation 3**

It would be appropriate to add an assumption to the ToC that MINECOFIN and Line Ministries are able and willing to use sector capacity building budgets to support CCD. CDKN influence in this area is likely to be indirect.

**Recommendation 4**

The proposed CDKN project impact review of support to GWP should look at how trained planners made changes to plans rather than simply reported on planners' perceptions of the training.

**Recommendation 5**

CDKN should reflect the need for capacity building at both national and sub-national level in the ToC.

## Recommendation 6

Although CDKN does not have a comparative advantage in funding large-scale capacity building itself, it does have a good understanding of what capacity is required for effective CF and should engage with and potentially partner development partners that are interested in funding capacity building.

## 5.2 Kenya

The Kenya Country programme has been active since April 2011,<sup>31</sup> with a spend of GBP3.46 million,<sup>32</sup> with CF and P&P as its core outcome focus.

The overall goal of CDKN in Kenya is: “CCD action is promoted at national and sub-national levels of Government. Government and non-state actors (including private sector and civil society) are engaged in CCD action and help to drive NCCAP implementation.”<sup>33</sup>

The key CCD challenges that CDKN has sought to address are centred on:

- Capacity and commitment of GoK to take action on climate change and progress past development to implementation of strategies;
- Build Kenya-specific evidence base to support decision making on adaptation and mitigation options;
- Deeper engagement of wide range of stakeholders, particularly private sector and civil society, to hold GoK accountable.

The Kenya Country Programme functions to a limited extent as a programme: a complementary yet diverse portfolio of projects are in progress in Kenya and are being managed by CDKN, and the six earlier projects that fed into the NCCAP suggest a coherent programme strategy. However, this earlier coherence has tailed off somewhat into a more diverse (and less connected) project portfolio. Furthermore, there is limited in-country CDKN presence, with one individual (the CPM) making up the Kenya CDKN in-country team, and – critically – no CEL. It is the opinion of the evaluation team that this represents a significant missed opportunity for CDKN’s activities in Kenya, particularly given the relatively high level of CDKN investment over the five years, and that it seriously brings into question the validity of Kenya’s status as a DEC.

The choice of Kenya as a DEC is justified by the strong position built and held by CDKN in Kenya during the initial phases of the programme, particularly during the NCCAP related projects (2011-end 2012/early 2013). The programme team is reporting changes at the short-term level, as well as one change at the medium-term level on its impact pathway. These can be partly validated by the evaluation team, and are partly endorsed by the stakeholders interviewed.

CDKN’s early activities in Kenya have had significant impact in terms of P&P – in supporting the Kenyan government in the development of a national climate change action plan and the related policies (climate change bill and climate change framework policy – although not yet passed), in raising awareness, and in bringing key players together. However, progress towards implementation has been slow. CDKN’s progress along the impact pathway has been hampered by the following key factors:

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<sup>31</sup> According to CDKN Country Programme for Kenya (Aug 2014).

<sup>32</sup> CDKN Years 1-5, according to CDKN Country Programme for Kenya (Aug 2014).

<sup>33</sup> There is an inconsistency between the country goal as formulated in the text of the country programme vs. in the Impact Pathway diagram. Small, but significant differences (general public, more direct focus on the NCCAP and CF are explicitly mentioned in the impact pathway version).

1. Political and institutional upheaval and change as a result of the 2013 elections and the new constitution;
2. A simultaneous high level of uncertainty around CDKN's budget and funding going forwards;
3. The absence of a strong in-country CDKN team, particularly the failure to retain or replace a CEL in a timely manner.

There is significant evidence that both factors 2 and 3 worked to limit the effectiveness of CDKN's communications with key actors, and had a detrimental effect on CDKN's relationships in the Kenyan climate arena. Furthermore, the political shifts meant that significant effort had to go into building new relationships, as well as maintaining existing ones. While the CEL and CM worked very hard on this, the absence of a CEL for a large part of 2014 put these new and old relationships at risk. Even while the CEL role was filled, the position was only given for two to three days per month. There is therefore no CDKN 'presence' as an organisation in Kenya, other than the CM.

It is the opinion of the evaluation team that while many of the circumstances were external, and to a large extent outside of CDKN's control, there could have been improvements at the project, programme and institutional levels of CDKN and DFID, which could have helped better prepare CDKN to deal more effectively with the situations that arose, and have had strategies in place to mitigate them. Specific actions could have included: scenario planning; immediate engagement of CEL; greater level of support from DFID to safeguard political momentum; ensuring there was no interruption to CDKN's funding.

The KCP can be characterised as having achieved its outputs (MTR evidence mainly) but that external constraints have played a significant role in preventing it achieving outcomes. However, there are some actions that CDKN could have taken to be better prepared but also when designing the programme.

Given Kenya's status as a 'flagship' DEC country, the country team could have been better resourced, and finding a new and highly effective CEL should have been a critical priority. While CDKN were taking steps to fill this role – and quite rightly, wanted to ensure the job was given to someone who would be an effective CEL – the role of CEL still remains unfilled.

CDKN need strong – and probably multiple – champions of change to give projects momentum and longevity in government. While this is something that CDKN recognise (evidenced both in the KCP and in interviews with CDKN staff) it has not been easy to achieve in reality.

While CDKN seemed to have a very clear mandate for years 1-3 with supporting the development of the NCCAP, the strategy and direction for years 3-5 appear less clear, and even – at certain points – conflicted. For example, different stakeholders (DFID, CDKN staff, suppliers, clients) express different perceptions of CDKN's strategy in Kenya post-NCCAP, ranging from driving implementation of NCCAP at the county-level to focusing on more regional, cross-boundary projects [interviews 122, 120] and from choosing to work in more targeted sectors to diversifying and testing several small, more innovative projects [interviews 110, 117].

Working in Kenya at sub-county level is going to be quite like in Rwanda but it will require significant investment to build capacity and relationships. It seems that the strategy going forward for CDKN in Kenya will be: leave; engage in only a skeleton programme; or ramp up the programme to full investment.

One project that is not typical of the KCP portfolio is the CaRROT project, where evidence shows a 'gap to impact'. The project developed a practical tool for measuring the carbon in the Kenyan flower industry (see section 4.2 for more detail). It has significant potential for impact and use, as well as having clear demand expressed by the service recipient. It also has potential synergies for contributing to other outcomes. For example, it could contribute to the NS by supporting Kenya in terms of international negotiations through equipping Kenyan representatives with information on how carbon intensive the flower industry really is.

Additionally, there is evidence of movement towards positive change on CF: one major flower farmer was thinking about applying for certification and climate funding before CaRROT, but in piloting the tool the farmer has been incentivised to start to apply. This was not only due to the use of the tool, but also to the capacity building element of the process.

Camco delivered the tool as requested but from the Kenyan Flower Council's perspective it wasn't ready (technically needed more work to integrate into their own systems/database. At the moment farmers have to enter things twice. Also some capacity building needed). Is it CDKN's role to do capacity building for the KFC? Strategic analysis would identify this as low hanging fruit to produce impact. They could partner with DPs who are better placed to do capacity building, e.g. UNDP. Demand is important but so is practical implementation.

The idea that CDKN has acted as a global network in the Kenya case is partially supported by the evidence. Documentary and interview evidence confirms that CDKN is seen to 'own' or promote the concept of climate-compatible development in Kenya: that this concept is one 'created' by CDKN globally that has now established itself as a credible concept in Kenya. There is broad buy-in from GoK – particularly MEWNR, MEP and ODP, and increasingly from other ministries less traditionally associated with climate change interests – to engaging on a pathway supported by CDKN of mainstreaming CCD into developing planning and practice. This influence has largely been due to the close support and involvement of CDKN with the NCCAP and its subcomponents.

However, since the completion of the NCCAP projects, CDKN has had a less 'signature' and cohesive approach. The continued absence of a significant in-country presence – and, in particular, without the presence of a CEL with sufficient time and resources dedicated to consistently engaging with key actors and stakeholders – coupled with the previous funding uncertainties and political upheaval has meant that the prominent leadership position CDKN held while supporting the NCCAP process has somewhat faded. The severely limited in-country presence (given that Kenya is a DEC) places a significant limit on allowing CDKN to leverage its global network for the benefit of Kenya, as well as limiting the extent to which stakeholders from inside Kenya can use their relationship with CDKN to access this global network. There has been some success in terms of learning projects and comparisons across countries in the region – but these lessons and experiences are more learning experiences for CDKN rather than the in-country partners.

In terms of CDKN'S added value with the NCCAP project, CDKN: 1) procured good partners to provide strong technical inputs (i.e. had good connections and acted as an effective 'brokering agent'); and 2) more crucially, was able to establish themselves as being (largely) 'without agenda' while remaining a credible climate authority. This meant that they were genuinely perceived as being demand led and responding to (and supporting) the needs of GoK, something that is critical in Kenya within the context of climate change. This is evidenced by their continued presence and relationship with GoK despite considerable political and personnel changes.

However, this could also be symptomatic of their relative inability to drive forward concrete and timely legal and policy changes (such as the climate bill) that could feed through to real impact on the ground. This should also be situated within the context of CDKN facing significant funding uncertainty and a debilitating continued loss of in-country presence; both of which hampered CDKN'S ability to foster strong clout in climate policy with the new regime and their ability to effectively exert pressure on NCCAP implementation. Progress since the NCCAP has been somewhat limited, and doesn't form as much of a cohesive programme.

### **Summary of judgements against evaluation questions**

There is mixed-to-good evidence of short-term changes that map to the short-term changes identified, and contribute to the short-term change/goal, however there is limited evidence for medium-term changes as of yet. There is a lack of clarity in the KCP in terms of where the country programme actually sits on the impact pathway, and where CDKN expect it to progress – this is likely because of the uncertainty surrounding the

direction of the CP as mentioned earlier, and because of the stagnation of progress after the 2013 elections and CDKN funding uncertainty.

## Key lessons

### *Lessons for the Country Programme*

- Strong and consistent in-country presence (whether through the CEL model or otherwise) is crucial to the effectiveness of a deep engagement programme, particularly in terms of maintaining CDKN's position in the Kenyan climate change space, and sustaining effective relationships with key climate change actors.
- Taking a more strategic approach to achieving implementation could be considered right from the outset of a project. This is to ensure that all the hard work and resources that have gone into a project are given the best possible change to be pushed right through to impact
- The Kenya Country Programme initially functioned very cohesively as a programme with the suite of NCCAP SBC projects. While there has been a logical and clear step forward from supporting the development of CCD policy toward driving the *implementation* of policy and *engaging a wider array of key stakeholders* in CCD activities, the more recent projects are less convincing as a cohesive and focused country programme.
- The move towards deeper engagement with a wider set of stakeholders is a necessary move that CDKN has taken – this is particularly the case with the private sector. However, progress still needs to be made in order to effectively engage these groups and catalyse them to action.
- There is room for improvement – as well as potential synergies to be harnessed – in the communication of past and current work and results outside of those directly involved with the project.

### Lessons for CDKN

- Good resourcing on a strong in-country presence for a deep engagement country is key, and should be a matter of the highest priority. CELs in particular are crucial for building and maintaining strong relationships with a diverse range of partners and stakeholders, and a continuous and consistent presence is highly desirable.
- Political upheaval should never be unanticipated or underestimated. From the outset, especially for country strategies where the pathway to impact is closely tied to government activities, a thorough political risk assessment and scenario planning should be undertaken. Having a well-thought through strategy in place could support continued momentum for CCD and CDKN's work while political or institutional change takes place. This might include working from the start on supporting the country's institutions to build their capacity to withstand and adapt to change, and taking careful decisions to engage with a range of relevant actors (striking a balance between achieving buy-in from influential individuals and engaging with as many different individuals and groups as possible) and to ensure genuine ownership of the activities.
- Funding uncertainty can damage relationships and trust, and strong communication and in-country presence is crucial to easing the path through these kinds of uncertainties.
- Engaging with the private sector requires different strategies to state-level engagement – but both must have a genuine appetite for the work in order for projects to progress effectively.

### **There is also room for improvement in terms of communications and learning:**

- Key external actors in Kenya are not aware of most of the projects and work that CDKN are engaged in and producing (outside of NCCAP). As many other donor partners/key actors are working on highly relevant projects, this represents significant missed opportunities.

- While CDKN partners and suppliers (largely) report good communication with CDKN within active projects (with some making a point of praising CDKN'S responsiveness), partners/clients/suppliers also expressed a desire for more cross-project communication, as well as more regular 'updates' communications, and a note of a recent tail-off in communications (respondents referred to CDKN as 'having gone quiet' recently). There could be important untapped synergies from cross-project communication; and this should not be limited to separate 'learning projects' (it should be woven into all projects).
- The lack of in-country presence in a so-called DEC (specifically in terms of a CEL, although this is not the only option for 'deep engagement') has had a considerable negative impact on the frequency and quality of in-country communications.

### Lessons for others

- Understand and be clear the level of resource that is needed for effective engagement at country and sub-national level.
- There is a potential role for DFID, or CDKN working with other donor partners (rather than CDKN alone), to ensure continued momentum for CCD and CDKN's work while political or institutional change takes place. This is likely to require investment of considerable political capital.
- Funding uncertainty can damage relationships and trust, effectively hampering progress toward achieving outcome-level results. Strong communication and in-country presence is crucial to easing the path through these kinds of uncertainties.
- Potential for enhanced communication, sharing and coordination between the in-country DFID and CDKN offices as well as with the London-based offices. This could promote further synergies between the DFID and CDKN programmes.

## 5.3 Nepal

The Nepal Country programme has been active since mid-2011. Across all outputs to date Climate & Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) have invested GBP 1.3 million in Nepal, with a further GBP 1.16 million planned in Years 5 and 6. The Nepal programme has been comprised of 3 work-streams:

- CDKN's initial engagement focused on a Climate Compatible Development (CCD) knowledge management strategy through support to the set-up of the Nepal Climate Change Knowledge Management Center (NCKMC) – KMAS-0001
- Subsequent support has taken the form of a dual-track approach:
- Support to raise Nepal's capacity and confidence to engage with international negotiations – AAAS-0010
- Support to improve access to relevant and high quality information and knowledge on climate change in Nepal – AAAS-0011

### Key findings

**Critical drivers and challenges** – There is strong evidence that CDKN has considered the critical drivers and challenges that shape CCD policy in Nepal (see Annex 3 for details). The assumptions that accompany the impact pathway demonstrate a clear and coherent understanding of national socio-political and economic context as well as an informed and nuanced understanding of critical drivers and constraints that face the key institutions CDKN is required to work with and support.

**Relevance** – There is strong evidence that CDKN's strategy and role is considered relevant within the wider country context, focusing on contributing to changes, which there is clear demand for in Nepal. The shift in emphasis to support CCD practice through targeted support to develop new knowledge in key sectors is also appropriate and reflects CDKN's understanding of the evolving CCD context in Nepal.

The impact pathway is well conceived and reflects CDKN's strategy in Nepal. Key assumptions have been assessed and revised as the programme has progressed and the context in Nepal has evolved. Interviews with the programme team illustrate a deep and sound understanding of the evolving CCD context in Nepal as well as how CDKN's strategy responds to this.

**Resourcing** – The level of ambition of the strategy relative to CDKN's role and resources presents more of a challenge. Whilst the overall level of ambition, in terms of the medium-term changes above, is not in itself unrealistic; what is less clear is the extent of the contribution to these results that CDKN can claim relative to the resources they have put in.

There is limited evidence that the role CDKN plays and resources it deploys in Nepal are adequate to deliver on the strategy. Most of the stakeholders interviewed view CDKN in Nepal positively as the commissioner of a small number of high-quality projects. As will be explained in more detail in Section 3, most government and development partner stakeholders do not see CDKN as an 'institution' with a clear role, mandate and strategy on climate change (CC) in Nepal. Rather, CDKN is present on a project-to-project basis, funding Nepal to Chair the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group at the UN CC negotiations or commissioning key knowledge products such as the Economic Impact Assessment (EIA). Very few stakeholders see CDKN as funding a coherent programme of work against a strategy in Nepal.

**Stakeholder engagement** – There is strong evidence that a relevant network of stakeholders have been engaged by CDKN in Nepal. The Nepal Country Engagement Lead (CEL) is clearly well known and respected amongst these key stakeholders, particularly key stakeholders in the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE), the lead agency responsible for CCD in Nepal.

CDKN's relationship with DFID Nepal appeared limited to ad hoc project-by-project engagement as opposed to a deeper strategic relationship that may be expected from two institutions with very closely aligned strategic objectives and a shared funding source. There was no evidence of DFID Nepal playing a role to amplify CDKN's 'voice' or vice versa.

**Leveraging niche and comparative advantage** – The idea that CDKN has acted as a global network in the Nepal case is partially supported by the evidence. Documentary and interview evidence confirms that CDKN is seen to 'own'/promote the concept of climate compatible development in Nepal and that there is broad buy-in from MoSTE and increasingly from the National Planning Commission (NPC) to engaging on a pathway supported by CDKN of mainstreaming CCD into developing planning and practice. However, this influence has come about through the successful delivery of a small portfolio of projects in Nepal and not because CDKN has been able to draw on and leverage international knowledge and experience from across the CDKN alliance.

CDKN is not considered to have a coherent programme of support in Nepal for two reasons:

- The projects CDKN has commissioned in Nepal have largely been delivered in a dual-track linear fashion – one project to the next – rather than complementary set of projects that equate to a programme.
- CDKN does not have a permanent institutional presence in the country beyond a part-time CEL so is unable to offer stakeholders a CDKN 'door to knock on' should they want to engage with CDKN as a global network.

In terms of the definition of niche and comparative above, CDKN can be considered to be 'punching above their weight'. Projects commissioned have been designed, managed and delivered to a high standard. These projects have responded to a clearly articulated Nepalese demand, and have been participatory in nature from the outset. CDKN has actively sought to combine national experts to lead these projects with technical support from international experts and organisations where required. The CEL, with support from the Asia

Regional Team, has played an expert convenor role project-by-project to ensure outputs are widely disseminated, well received, and that new knowledge generated from these projects is targeted at a wide range of relevant stakeholders.

Yet the mode of operation has largely been project based, meaning CDKN is not viewed as an alliance or knowledge network with a genuine institutional presence and clearly understood niche in Nepal. Put simply, beyond the relatively small CDKN project portfolio and the relationships managed by the CEL, CDKN is not seen as a programme which is 'greater than the sum of its parts' in Nepal, albeit a set of parts which have been delivered to a high standard.

Interestingly, a consistent and clearly articulated vision of the niche and added value CDKN could and should play in Nepal was expressed across virtually all the interviews conducted. The role expressed builds on CDKN's mission and broader global reputation as a knowledge generator, capacity builder, knowledge broker and independent convenor. In Nepal this was as express as a goal of taking the lead in supporting evidence-based national consensus building on CCD in Nepal delivered through three key activities:

- Evidence generation and capacity building – generating new knowledge through funding-targeted research and mentoring key Nepalese individuals;
- Knowledge synthesis – packaging and communicating new knowledge to appropriate stakeholder groups; and
- Convening and facilitating dialogue – within and between key Government of Nepal (GoN) and development partner stakeholders.

Short-term results – There is strong evidence that the individual projects have delivered impressive results since the MTR. AAAS-0011 – Economic Impact Assessments of Climate Change in Nepal is the most recognised, and its full results are yet to be realised as the report was only launched in June/July 2014. Similarly, CDKN can claim a substantial contribution to delivering results related to Nepal's role and participation in international climate negotiations. Negotiations that support interventions are clearly an area where CDKN has a defined niche and leadership role in Nepal. In terms of the scale and sustainability of results, whilst other CDKN results reporting suffers from being based on a single or small set of projects, results reporting under negotiations support suffers additionally from being related primarily to an individual rather than broader and more sustainable national capacity.

There is strong evidence that the results of the CDKN projects are considered high quality, important and significant at a national level. As individual projects, they represent real, effective demonstrations of critical aspects of a pathway towards CCD in Nepal.

No systematic reference to gender was revealed at the short-term change strategy level. Some projects have considered gender dimensions of CCD in their work but this was not reflected beyond project-level outputs.

Short-term results as a package – There is limited evidence that CDKN's short-term results in Nepal amount to a coherent strategy or package that is energised and informed by the broader CDKN alliance, synergised across strategies, and 'greater than the sum of its parts' in terms of a boarder CDKN country strategy. Very few key informants interviewed were aware of CDKN's package of interventions across a set of strategy areas and in the form of a Deep Engagement Country (DEC) strategy. Rather, stakeholders' perspectives of CDKN are that of the individual projects they have been involved in or made aware of.

Role of the Country Engagement Leader in delivering results – A critical factor in the successful delivery of CDKN's projects in Nepal is the role played by the CEL. Stakeholders and broader key informants were unanimous in their praise for the CEL, both in terms of the technical support provided to project suppliers and his wider role building relationships with GoN counterparts and facilitating exchanges between key stakeholders, given the resources available to him. However, the Nepal CEL is a part-time role, providing on

average between 10-12 days input per month, and this is insufficient given the scale of the ambition presented in the Country Programme System document and wider CDKN DEC narrative.

Outcome-level results – There is some evidence that CDKN Nepal is making a contribution at the Policy and Practice (P&P) outcome level as described opposite. There are two key factors that constrain this contribution as has been discussed in the preceding sections:

- Results being claimed at the outcome level predominantly relate to one or two specific projects rather than a more coherent programmatic or strategic contribution; and
- The focus specifically on agriculture, energy and water is a relatively new strategy which will only materialise and begin to deliver results in Years 5-7; hence it is too early to expect outcome-level results to be evident.

There is strong evidence that CDKN has made a significant and direct contribution to the NS outcome. This is an outcome area where CDKN combines a clearly defined institutional niche with the CEL in Nepal who has the ability to build and sustain strong working relationships with key stakeholders.

Contribution to CDKN's mission – There is some evidence, discussed in detail throughout preceding sections, that CDKN Nepal is supporting decision-makers in delivering CCD in support of locally-owned and managed policy processes. However, results contributing to the mission are predominantly drawn from two relatively small and siloed streams of work – the EIA and the negotiations support provided to the LDC and wider climate negotiations teams. There is very little evidence that CDKN strategies (research, advisory services, knowledge management, etc.) have been and will be effectively combined to deliver these changes. As such, results in terms of a coherent Nepal country strategy that is 'greater than the sum of its parts' are limited, and the extent to which they are present stem from the limited yet effective inputs of the part-time CEL.

Evidence of impact – As would be expected given the scale and duration of the investment, there is little evidence at present that CDKN Nepal has contributed directly to enhancing the quality of life for the people most challenged by the effects of climate change.

### **Lessons and recommendations**

Three closely related key lessons with associated recommendations to CDKN emerge from the Nepal country study:

Match the level of ambition to resources – The level of ambition of CDKN's strategy relative to CDKN's role and resources is mismatched. CDKN's programme in Nepal comprises a relatively modest portfolio of five national projects and two regional projects managed and supported by a part-time CEL. It is clear that these projects and the support of the CEL can only make a contribution to the delivery of the medium-term results set out in the strategy. It is also the case that CDKN's contribution is provided with a complex context characterised by a large number of climate change projects, programmes and initiatives each taking place within, across and outside government. So whilst there is strong evidence that CDKN's strategy is relevant and that this is accurately reflected in the ToC/impact pathway, there is limited evidence that the role CDKN plays and resources it deploys in Nepal are adequate to deliver on the strategy.

Enhance the level of resources to function as a genuine deep engagement country – A critical factor in the successful delivery of CDKN's projects in Nepal is the role played by the CEL. Stakeholders and broader key informants were unanimous in their praise for the CEL, both in terms of the technical support provided to project suppliers and his wider role building relationships with GoN counterparts and facilitating exchanges between key stakeholders, given the resources available to him. However, the Nepal CEL is a part-time role, providing on average between 10-12 days input per month, and this is insufficient given the scale of the ambition presented in the Country Programme System document and wider CDKN DEC narrative. The

potential for truly transformational change in the long term in Nepal requires sufficient investment in a deep engagement country strategy to both expand the portfolio of projects CDKN has in Nepal and to provide an adequate supporting infrastructure – a full-time CEL input to generate a genuine CDKN institutional presence in Nepal – to deliver the strategy effectively and with maximum synergy and impact.

Align the strategy with CDKN’s niche and comparative advantage – A consistent and clearly articulated vision of the niche and added value CDKN could and should play in Nepal was expressed across virtually all the interviews conducted. The role expressed builds on CDKN’s mission and broader global reputation as a knowledge generator, capacity builder, knowledge broker and independent convenor. There was considerable consensus that CDKN is well placed and has a strong reputation to build on as independent convener working between the GoN and the bigger development partners, generating synthesising and disseminating evidence on CCD to inform policy and practice. In essence this means focusing CDKN’s strategy and activities in Nepal more closely on CCD ‘facilitation’ rather than CCD ‘practice/implementation’ – by taking on an explicit and headline national role in CCD knowledge management/knowledge brokering as the ‘knowledge network’ in CDKN suggests. More specifically, this was as expressed as a goal of ‘taking the lead in supporting evidence-based national consensus building on CCD in Nepal’ delivered through three key activities:

- Evidence generation and capacity building – generating new knowledge through funding targeted research and mentoring key Nepalese individuals;
- Knowledge synthesis – packaging and communicating new knowledge to appropriate stakeholder groups; and
- Convening and facilitating dialogue – within and between key GoN and development partner stakeholders.

## 5.4 India

The GBP 2.5 million CDKN programme of work in India has been active since 2011. The programme supports the strengthening of designing and delivering Climate Compatible Development (CCD) policies and plans across different levels of government. Specifically, CDKN addresses the integration of climate change and disaster risk management as a vehicle for new and better CCD policies.

### Key Findings

#### *Short-term results*

There is **strong evidence of impressive work** done in the three years CDKN has been working in the country. Tangible results include:

- The first action plan in South Asia targeting an often-unrecognised climate risk – extreme heat – in Ahmedabad. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) have already started investing in implementing the plan, with a media and communications campaign to educate the public on preventative measures.
- The Gorakhpur district climate smart disaster risk management plan. As a result of this piece of work, the Uttar Pradesh State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) has written to all districts in the State directing them to follow the process undertaken in Gorakhpur. In addition, there is strong demand from the State Government for CDKN technical support to all 75 district governments.
- The Madurai city corporation has developed a ‘future proofing’ action plan which demonstrates a new integrated CCD approach to urban development and tackling the city’s deep-rooted problems of poverty and development.
- In Uttarakhand, the State government now has a framework for refining and prioritising their State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC), the first step to implementation.

- Gender has been integrated in two State Governments Adaptation plans, and the central Government has made it mandatory for all States to follow suit. The project has also put gender concerns on the agenda of the UNDP, entrusted to help State governments formulate the SAPCCs. UNDP is incorporating gender at the SAPCCs' implementation stage now due to influence of CDKN's research on the subject.

There is also **strong evidence that stakeholders consider these results to be important and significant** demonstrable results for India to move from plans towards implementation. There are other similar results from UNDP and GIZ, but CDKN is considered to have made more progress through involving multiple actors and communities and in moving the agenda towards the integration of CC in Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy and programming.

In a country like India, three years is a short term in which to identify meaningful outcome level achievements. So far, CDKN has concentrated its efforts in "testing the waters" and demonstrating pilot models at city and district level. This has been CDKN's strategic plan from the beginning as a means of building its reputation and network of partners in the countries. However, work so far has been on ad-hoc basis – identifying quick "easy" wins in the country.

### Strategy

In India, a priority for State Governments is DRM and CDKN has focused on this area as an entry point to supporting wider CCD. This has proven to be an effective strategy for influencing policymaking in the programming and practice in the country. However, stakeholders, partners and funding agencies are not aware of the CCD approach and, in particular, how DRM contributes to CCD. Therefore, short-term and medium-term changes in the country are mostly contributing to DRM and projects and programmes (P&P) outcomes. How CDKN can make the transition from supporting DRM policies to mainstreaming these within development processes is not clear.

The current ToC does not reflect this pathway of change. Although not explicitly mentioned in the India Country Programme (ICP) and its theory of change (ToC), the programme is working under the assumption that Climate Smart DRM will contribute to CCD policies, programming and funding in the country. Available evidence puts this assumption under question and points to the need for CDKN India to unpack the theory of change linking DRM outcomes to the overall CCD objectives.

**Short-term results as a package** – There is limited evidence that CDKN's results in India amount to a coherent strategy or package that is energised and informed by the broader CDKN alliance, synergised across strategies and 'greater than the sum of its parts' in terms of a boarder CDKN country strategy. Very few key informants interviewed were aware of CDKN's package of interventions across a set of strategy areas and in the form of a DEC strategy. Rather, stakeholders' perspectives of CDKN are that of the individual projects they have been involved in or made aware of.

Donor agencies and development partners working on DRM and climate change adaptation (CCA) are not aware of CDKN's investments, partnerships or contribution to the overall DRM and CC agenda. This is partially explained by the limited amount of CDKN's investments in the country (compared to other agencies). Nonetheless, CDKN has not engaged directly with other development agencies in the country, even if this is identified as a critical short-term change in India Programme impact pathway. To date, evidence about the level of influencing government and donors funding streams is almost non-existent.

### Leveraging niche and comparative advantage

The idea that CDKN has acted as a global network in the Nepal case is barely supported by the evidence. Many stakeholders voiced appreciation for the fact that CDKN is funding early research and knowledge generation on critical emerging themes, saying this is unusual for a donor, since it could be seen as risky. Interviewees observed that such knowledge is needed to develop national thinking on and to serve as the basis programmatic action. Yet, CDKN's identity and reputation as an international programme does not

seem to have been a success factor. Knowledge of the Indian setting along with technical and political know-how of the country team appears to have been the more decisive success factor. In this regard, most partners see CDKN as ‘another source of funding’.

**Outcome level results** – For the CDKN global outcomes, the country programme is contributing to P&P and DRM primarily but for both it is coming from the sub-national, bottom-up perspective. CDKN India has succeeded in engaging at the local (city), district and state level, across several states, which have the responsibility of developing and implementing DRM plans. However, it has not directly engaged with key government actors at the national level. Interviewees recognise the value of working directly at sub-national level as it is where capacity levels are lower and implementation needs to be tailored to the specific state conditions. But, the lack of engagement at national level is considered to be a major gap in CDKN’s approach, as national engagement is needed to open the space for action and to contribute to changes and impact at scale. CDKN is not as visible nationally to other actors beyond their partners and suppliers.

**Evidence of impact** – As would be expected given the scale and duration of the investment, there is little evidence at present that CDKN India has contributed directly to enhancing the quality of life for the people most challenged by the effects of climate change.

Lessons and recommendations

### ***Lessons for the Country Programme***

Three closely related key lessons with associated recommendations emerge from the India country study:

**Lesson 1:** The main lesson is about how to build on the success of projects and ensure replication and scale up of demonstration models. Results to date have contributed to the establishment of evidence-based planning products. These projects are now ready to begin Phase 2. While there is a great value in demonstrating pilot projects, CDKN India needs to start placing more emphasis on methods for replication and scale up to ensure that its small island of successful projects contribute to long-term change.

**Recommendation:** There has not been an obvious effort made to influence or leverage additional funds into the existing projects in India. While in India, CDKN is supporting the replication of the Gorakhpur DRM plan and the Ahmedabad Heat action plan. CDKN India needs to start thinking about how results are communicated strategically to the actors who can make the investments to support implementation. These efforts would begin to build the foundations for implementation and trajectory towards impact.

CDKN India needs to start engaging strategically with development agencies (for example, UNDP or GIZ) and to support municipalities and States to develop bankable projects. This should be a priority for the next 2 years. To do so, it will require more explicit positioning of the results and achievements as well as more time invested in policy advocacy.

**Lesson 2: More and more strategic communications are needed.** External stakeholders interviewed were not aware of CDKN as an interesting new actor on the scene. Some were aware of specific projects, but not beyond that. Most were very interested in the integration of CC considerations into DRM and felt that it should have a higher profile in India to ensure that learning from projects’ approaches and outputs is shared.

**Recommendation:** The programme needs to build more strategically on its comparative advantage acting as an independent knowledge network in the country. With the State Action plans now under development in most States (with the support from different agencies, i.e. UNDP, GIZ, SDC) there is a great opportunity to become a proactive knowledge network.

**Lesson 3:** There is a need now to address other issues of climate compatible development beyond DRM. For example, India now has important opportunities through its state and city level work to integrate DRM and CC considerations into broader planning processes. If not addressed, then the trajectory towards achieving

the desired impact will be constrained. A pragmatic approach is required which shows how climate compatible development can be both consistent with and a driver for rapid growth in India.

**Recommendation: An updated CDKN ToC should be used to structure and guide programming.** CDKN India needs to further unpack (or modify if necessary) its country programme ToC to help guide strategic and practical thinking about how to support a systematic consideration of CCD, building on DRM as an entry point. In addition, given the importance of scale in India, the ToC should describe the scale of change so that the significance of results can be interpreted.

Addressing wider CCD issues will also require building new partnerships with agencies and the private sector addressing low carbon development in the country.

### Lessons for CDKN

**Lesson 1:** The main lesson for CDKN from India's experience is that CDKN's potential for policy impact highly depends on its partnerships strategy and therefore it cannot be underestimated. Most successful projects have one common denominator. That is, projects build on previous high quality and highly visible research work. CDKN's added value and comparative advantage is not about producing research, but about supporting researchers to improve ongoing research from a policy and implementation perspective.

**Lesson 2:** In a large country like India, DEC requires significant investment in a visible and proactive presence in country. A good set of suppliers, overseen by a country programme manager and a part-time Country Engagement Lead (CEL) *do not* constitute a country programme. A small in-country team does not provide enough institutional presence. At the moment CDKN does not have an identity that goes beyond individual projects and builds its credibility as an influencer in the climate change area. The lesson from India is that in-country teams need sufficient resources to not only effectively manage CDKN investments but also to strategically engage with key CC funders and players.

The India team has one full-time staff and one part-time CEL. The country programme manager is in almost daily contact with government stakeholders across three states, DFID, 10 suppliers, and she is also responsible for knowledge management and communication efforts. The team is over-stretched for the number of partners and stakeholders and the wide geographical coverage and the need for strategic engagement with development partners. A two-person team (one of them part time) is not a large enough level of investment and level of effort to add value to the project-level investments. Looking at the India experience, the evaluation considers that CDKN should reconsider the level of necessary investment in in-country teams for effective DECs.

Lesson 3: Investing *at scale* might be beyond the scope of CDKN's time and resources. Evidence from the India case study illustrates the value of using pilot projects, often at a sub-national level, which can be subsequently replicated and scaled up. Nonetheless, the evidence also suggests that stakeholders saw the pilots as being very limited in scale and scope. India's results represent proven experiences that could be directly connected to other ongoing programmes funded by other bilateral and multilateral development agencies, national governments and regional initiatives.

### Lessons for DFID

**The main lesson for others, such as DFID, is to understand that internationally, CDKN may be better known as a research entity, but in the country setting, its innovative contribution is the combination of evidence-based and policy-focused research and technical assistance for implementation.** It is at the country level where tangible gains have been made, at least in India. This suggests that countries should be at the forefront of the change process. It is important to be clear about the level of resources that are needed for effective engagement at country and sub-national level. The results from India, although limited in scale, are impressive and represent an important added value to the existing set of projects in the country.

## 5.5 Colombia

The Colombia country programme has been active since October 2010. The GBP £1.4 million programme has been comprised of 4 work streams:

- Sectorial expertise for key sectors – Housing and Transport (2013-14)
- Supporting technical expertise for the national institute of hydro- meteorological information – IDEAM (2010-14)
- Pilot projects to support integration of climate change adaptation into local planning processes – AVA/Upper Cauca and Cartagena (2010-14)
- Policy research – short-term projects to support the environment ministry

These work streams have been delivered through six projects, some of which are in their second phase, plus the investment into a three-person country engagement team, provided by a locally based consultancy firm.

The Colombia country programme functions as a programme in that the country engagement team provides a focal point for CDKN in the country to manage a portfolio of projects and add value to these through communications, convening and policy-influencing activities.

The Government of Colombia (GoC) is a hands-on government partner and endorser of the Colombia programme but the ownership of the programme rests with CDKN. The country team make independent decisions on the projects, in close collaboration with GoC, but the final approval comes from CDKN London.

This approach can be seen with the Ministry of Agriculture who would like to do more projects with CDKN with the AVA tool, but the decision has been made to focus elsewhere due to the existence of IDB resources in the ministry.

The overall long-term goal of CDKN in Colombia is: “Colombia is embarked on a CCD pathway, with more resilient sectors and territories that contribute to reduce the vulnerability of the population to climate change, and shares its knowledge and expertise with other countries and regions.”

The choice of Colombia as a DEC is justified by the evidence of impressive progress since the MTR in sectoral and territorial climate change plans. The programme team is reporting important changes at the medium-term level in its impact pathway. These can be validated by the evaluation team, and are endorsed by the stakeholders interviewed.

This progress is the result of the CDKN country engagement team that has invested considerable effort in engaging stakeholders and developing the institutional processes to support the take-up of the project results. Project suppliers have delivered good quality products, but the country team have provided the strategic leadership, communications and achieved the political/institutional buy-in that is making the difference.

There is strong evidence that the results of the CDKN projects are considered **important** and **significant** at a national level. They represent **real, effective demonstrations** of the processes and products required to get to a practical, finance-ready plan in Colombia’s sectors and territories, plans which have the commitment of governance, public and private actors (stakeholders 023-038, 40-43, 69).

CDKN’s results are described by informants as not only technical achievements but significant political achievements – the difficulties of making inter-institutional and multi-actor collaboration work in Colombia, especially in territories and regions, is highlighted by all stakeholders. Recognition and endorsement is given to CDKN Colombia’s success in this area. Additionally, informants highlight that actors have learned by doing

through the CDKN projects, so capacities have been built and institutional capacities to work together have been strengthened (stakeholders 023-038, 40-43, 69).

### Summary of judgements against Evaluation Questions

There is **strong evidence** that CDKN has considered the critical drivers and challenges that shape and inform policies and institutions for CCD in the country, within the adaptation mandate that GoC has set. There is **strong evidence** that CDKN's strategy and role is considered highly relevant within the wider country context, bringing approaches and capacities that are unusual and needed in the country context, with the caveat that more visibility of results and what they demonstrate (not necessarily CDKN branding) and outreach is required to reach Colombia's political mainstream and the most influential ministries of Finance and Treasury (Hacienda).

There is **only partial evidence** to support the view that CDKN acted as a global network in the Colombia country programme. In Colombia, CDKN is known as an independent and international programme, but the CEL is the critical success factor, providing local knowledge of the Colombian institutional and sectoral dynamics. The global network does not seem to have been systematically leveraged for its knowledge and experience, apart from in Transport, when Ali Cambry provided inputs to the project, which helped to move it forward. The Richmond meeting was also mentioned by the country team as a useful input.

However, the potential of CDKN's global network to i) provide technical inputs and proven experiences from elsewhere to country initiatives; and ii) act as a global amplifier of country successes is beginning to be seen. To truly leverage this advantage requires further investment into the proactive curation and mobilisation of strategic learning about CCD within and across the CDKN network, and in international spaces to support CDKN's country partners' international and regional efforts to spread innovative and effective practices.

There is **strong evidence** that CDKN has delivered significant results through its strategies. CDKN's interventions combine in the project to create deliverables, which add significant value (e.g. socio-economic indicators plus ecological ones, to municipal scale; risk maps; implementable plans), as well as allowing stakeholders to experience institutional arrangements which are effective and can deliver coordinated actions. There is **partial evidence** that the strategies have worked together as a package. Only some informants are aware of the portfolio. The **contribution analysis** shows that CDKN has contributed to medium-term changes that are of **medium or high significance to its impact pathway**. This is a strong position to be in with two years remaining on the project. It is evident that new projects have been guided by the impact pathway, as they are likely to make further important contributions to the changes sought. There are **limits to these results**, which could act as constraints to CDKN's impact trajectory if not addressed, in order of priority:

1. **Lower profile of poverty, gender and social exclusion dimensions of 'climate compatible development'**. None of the CDKN projects appears to have directly confronted the issues of inequality and power, opting as an effective tactic to work within the status quo to achieve a consensus-based plan, supported by the powerful actors who are able to drive change. Continuing to working on the 'inside track', without confronting the issues of inequality and social exclusion, and seeking ways to integrate this positively into projects, will constrain the potential for 'transformational change' in Colombia. CDKN Colombia now has important opportunities through its work in territories and municipalities to integrate the issues of social inclusion to create a framework for inclusive green development that improves the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable. This is not an ideological point, but reflects the impact objective of improving the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable, the 'Development' in CCD.
2. **Visibility of achievements and their relevance to mainstream sectors and politics**. CDKN has the credibility to influence the political discourse, and should therefore move to be less 'climate-centric' in

order to broaden out to influence mainstream political decision-making – CCD rather than just CC. It would be well worth increasing the visibility, relevance and applicability of what has been achieved nationally, especially now that there is a window of opportunity with the drafting of the 2014-18 National Development Plan.

- 3. Problems with procurement and management of suppliers.** It would be worth investigating the options for packaging up projects so that the CDKN team can contract different suppliers to work in combination or in consortia to the best of their competencies and reduce the pressure. There is a need to develop contractual tools, such as contingency lines or explicit engagement budget lines in order to accommodate the unpredictable needs that arise out of working in multi-stakeholder processes.

There is **strong evidence** of high- and medium-rated, positive contributions to the Dimensions of Change 2-7, and potential to contribute positively to DoC 1: “Changes in the quality of life of people most challenged by climate change” by Year 7 if Cartagena pilots are implemented. New projects also have good potential to contribute to **Outcome-level** results by Year 7, given their focus on sub-national and municipal-level actions, although these are likely to be early-stage contributions.

There is **little evidence** that CDKN Colombia has contributed directly to enhancing the quality of life for the people most challenged by the effects of climate change. People from vulnerable communities, small coffee producers and women’s groups have been involved in projects, likely influencing project-scale effects such as greater awareness and understanding, and possibly new relationships with neighbours and other stakeholders. However, if the prioritised pilots of the ‘Adapted Neighbourhood’ in the Cartagena Plan 4C are implemented as envisioned over Years 6-7, then this will be the start of a direct contribution to improving the quality of life and generate benefits for several tens of thousands of highly vulnerable, poor and marginalised people in Cartagena. Similarly, if the Green Growth project can make rapid progress and include poor communities, then there is potential for direct contributions there. However, in this new work, it will be necessary to support the capacities of municipalities to understand, design and implement CCD projects, and what capacities CDKN is in a position to support is not yet clear.

## Key lessons

### *Lessons for the country programme*

The main lesson is about how to build on the success of projects and ensure that results are communicated strategically to the actors who can make the investments to support implementation. CDKN itself is not in a position to implement; its contribution is as a catalyst funding demonstrator pilots. The team recognise this and in Cartagena, for example, are now profiling the results to actors who are in a position to invest in implementation, for example the Port Authority. These efforts would begin to build the foundations for implementation and trajectory towards impact (Judgements 4 and 5).

**Recommendations:** This could be tackled in a more systematic and strategic way; there has not been an obvious effort made to leverage additional funds into the existing projects in Colombia. There are two main routes to take-up and investment: i) from territory to territory, and engaging municipalities, sectors and the key ministries through sub-national work; ii) engaging the international development entities (for example, IDB) and potential national investors to invest in proven and bankable projects emerging from Cartagena, Transport and Agriculture.

In support of i) it will be important to clarify what municipal-level capacities CDKN can support, or work with others to support, as part of the design of the coming phases. Capturing learning from Cartagena and Huila, how smaller municipalities can be supported to develop bankable projects.

To develop ii) will require more explicit positioning of the results and achievements to the mainstream sectors and ministries, as well as their development agency partners.

**Second lesson:** There is a need now to include the social exclusion and inclusion aspects of climate compatible development. Colombia now has important opportunities through its work in territories and municipalities to integrate the issues of social inclusion to create a framework for inclusive green development that improves the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable. This is not an ideological point, but reflects the impact objective of improving the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable, the 'Development' in CCD.

These are issues of specific interest at the municipal level. If not addressed, then the trajectory towards achieving the desired impact will be constrained (Judgement 3).

**Recommendations:** There are two recommendations: i) put back into the overall goal the focus on improving the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable; this was removed at the last revision; ii) develop a gender and social inclusion framework to help guide practical thinking about how to support a systematic consideration of gender, social identity and income levels, and how these affect access to resources and influence within climate change action planning, implementation and evaluation. There are many models and toolkits available that are practical and applicable, especially from the humanitarian sector.

### Lessons for CDKN

The main lesson for CDKN from Colombia's experience is that a DEC requires significant investment in a visible and proactive presence in country that can provide partnership and follow-up to the processes initiated at project level. A good set of suppliers, overseen by a part-time Country Engagement Lead (CEL) does not constitute a country programme.

The Colombian country team represents an institutional presence of CDKN in country. This gives CDKN an identity that transcends the individual projects and builds its credibility as an influencer in the climate change area. CDKN, through its CEL, can therefore engage in related initiatives and represent the CDKN view, for example, the contribution of CCD concepts to the presidential campaign.

The lesson from Colombia is that CELs need sufficient resources to function as entities at country level. CDKN success at country level (Colombia example) requires a combination of:

- adequate resources
- capacity of team – both political and technical
- opportunity or space to engage in country context

The Colombian team has the highest level of resource amongst all the DECs. The Colombia team has three staff, working full-time (probably more hours in reality). The team is in almost daily contact with their government stakeholders (a minimum of twice-weekly), across three project sites, five government institutions, two bilateral donors, three suppliers and three communication strands, including the Action Lab network of 50 individuals. Even with three staff, they are overstretched for the number of opportunities and requests that are now coming their way.

Looked at another way, a three-person team seems a minimum level of investment and effort to add value to the project-level investments. Looking at the Colombia experience, the evaluation considers this to be a worthwhile and necessary investment for effective DECs.

The second lesson builds on the first. Given the level of resources required to maintain engagement at a country level, this suggests that resourcing implementation is likely to be beyond the scope of CDKN's resources.

Colombia's results represent proven experiences that could be directly connected to international development 'investors' to take to the next level. CDKN could think of itself as an innovation manager with a portfolio of demonstrated implementation pilots from a number of countries and diverse institutional and geographical challenges at national and sub-national level. Many of these are now ready to show-cased to "next-stage" investors – bilateral and multilateral development agencies, national governments, regional initiatives – who could take up and invest in the models and solutions coming out of the country experience.

This could be an effective way to structure and amplify the lessons and experience from successful deep engagement countries like Colombia.

### Lessons for others

The main lesson for others such as DFID is to understand and be clear about the level of resources that is needed for effective engagement at country and sub-national level. The results from Colombia are impressive and represent an important added value to the existing set of projects for a relatively small extra cost. It would be worth reflecting on future models, for example, fewer deep engagement or a rebalancing of resources from the global to the country level; the spend on countries is currently very small relative to overall spend on CDKN.

## 6 Progress towards impact: outcome and research case studies

### 6.1 Policy and Practice (P&P)

#### Background

P&P is consistently the largest outcome area of spend both in single outcome projects and multiple outcome projects. This perhaps reflects that higher-order outcome priority assigned to P&P in CDKN strategy documents whereby P&P can be referred to simultaneously to a CDKN goal, outcome and one of the seven dimensions of change (DoCs).

The CDKN P&P Outcome Theory of Change (ToC) sets out two overall objectives:

1. CCD policies and practice developed that impact those most affected by climate change, with a particular focus on water, food, energy and cities.
2. Improved understanding of the drivers and challenges of CCD policies and practices in particular around the political economy, institutional, social and economic dimensions.

There are two standout points that underlie and explain CDKN programming under the P&P outcome:

1. Shift in emphasis from planning to practice – at the beginning of Year 5, the P&P Outcome proposed that it should now reflect the maturity of the CDKN programme by replacing Policy and Planning with the title Policy and Practice, thus signalling the change to support countries and best practice around implementation as well as design of policies and plans.
2. Renewed emphasis on learning – until after the MTR, the emphasis CDKN placed on learning was perhaps implicit. In response to an MTR recommendation that CDKN was not adequately and systematically generating, synthesising and disseminating learning as a 'learning programme', learning has been more explicitly stated as a P&P outcome-level objective.

#### Key findings

The P&P Outcome case study found that **overall CDKN's P&P Outcome results reporting is accurate and the results claims presented in CDKN Annual M&E reports are substantiated by the evaluator.** This is particularly the case when assessing P&P results on a project-by-project basis.

Similarly, the reporting of P&P results at the level of CDKN DECs is also found to be generally relevant, balanced and accurate. However, there remains a **lack of clarity on how 'with significant input of the CDKN' is defined and assessed in CDKN's P&P reporting** against Outcome Indicator 1.1. At present the statement is not formally defined and hence claiming results/changes under the outcome indicator can be assessed and claimed openly and broadly. This is a reporting grey area that CDKN should address as it leaves CDKN open to allegations of 'oversimplification' and 'over-claiming' of their role in what are inherently complex and contested change processes.

There are similar **methodological weaknesses when it comes to the process by which CDKN reports against Outcome Indicators 1.3 and 1.4 – cases**. CDKN, adopting a more established, recognised and robust case study design and set of methods against which they could explicitly set out the criteria for case selection, validation and quality assurance, would assist in enhancing the credibility of the results claimed through case studies.

Based on an assessment of the performance of the P&P project sample as well as the wider findings relevant to the P&P Outcome generated through the Country Studies, **CDKN P&P projects are delivering impressive and tangible outcome-level results**.

This is a good result, suggesting that **CDKN has been effective in its selection of projects, partners and suppliers, as well as in its design and management of those suppliers**. There is also evidence that CDKN funding in the broader field of climate change policy and practice, although small relative to other development partners, has been catalytic and responded to explicit and well-articulated demand. There are several examples of this: the EIA in Nepal; the coordination of the Kenya NCCRS Action Plan; the support to integrating CC into local planning in Cartagena; the combined support to Rwanda's National Climate Change Strategy and subsequently to FONERWA; as well as several more 'stand-alone' projects including Heat-Health in India and the multi-country research programme Sheltering From a Gathering Storm.

**CDKN has also worked efficiently and seamlessly across different stakeholder groups**, combining national and sub-national government officials in various line ministries with broad groups of stakeholders and suppliers consisting of academic institutions, NGOs and think tanks. **Expert CELs frequently play a catalytic role around these projects (although the effective absence of CELs more broadly is highlighted in both the Kenya and Rwanda country studies)**, building the relationships through which recipients can express demand, and acting as entry points for broader discussions to ensure projects are based on broad buy-in, and findings and recommendations are disseminated as widely as possible.

**Yet CDKN does not systematically leverage the comparative advantage and added value of the global alliance**. Rather, CDKN results and successes are primarily driven by project funding frequently supported by project-level added value from a CEL and/or programme manager. This lends weight to the idea that CDKN's projects and programmes are well designed, managed and delivered but they do not necessarily depend on CDKN's input as being critical to their success.

As with most institutional results reporting processes, **CDKN as an institution tends to put itself at the centre of broader key change processes** at the expense of other key stakeholders involved in a change process and at the risk of over-claiming their relative contribution to what are generally complex higher-order outcomes. Although generally CDKN results reporting under the CCD outcome has been found to be balanced and valid, **often the underlying complexity of external factors (critical risks and assumptions) and contributions can be missing, leading to relatively simple claims about results pathways from CDKN P&P projects, through the support of a country programme, leading to outcome-level results**.

CCD P&P is viewed as a CDKN-owned and **created concept but CDKN as an institution is not yet perceived as the CCD P&P global ‘thought leader’ and knowledge broker**. Rather, CDKN is perceived as a P&P strategic funder. This is despite considerable expressed demand internally within CDKN, externally with suppliers and more broadly through CDKN key stakeholders/service recipients for CDKN to play a more substantive role as a knowledge broker and thought lead on CCD P&P. Initial signs are that CDKN recognises this demand and is placing more emphasis and resources on developing a P&P learning programme as the way to achieve this.

**CDKN has brought its attention to the learning aspects of its programme, including the P&P Outcome, relatively late**. In terms of implementing P&P learning CDKN has commissioned three learning projects referred to earlier in this report, two of which have already delivered impressive knowledge products as Working Papers. These projects and their associated knowledge products represent a strong, demand-led emerging work stream. However, a concern remains that the nature by which CDKN is structured and funded may mean that this learning work stream will be projectised and outsourced to external service providers rather than resourced as a genuine internal knowledge brokering function that should lie at the heart of CDKN’s added value.

### Conclusions and lessons

**1 – P&P project portfolio results** – CDKN has a portfolio of projects which demonstrates some impressive CCD P&P outcome-level results. There is a set of DECs that can demonstrate a credible and coherent set of P&P outcome-level results. Within the EYE5 country sample Rwanda and Colombia (and, to some extent, Kenya) fall into this category. These countries are characterised by a relatively deep and mature CDKN engagement.

However, CDKN’s P&P outcome-level results tend to be project-based. There is much less evidence of coherent sets of P&P outcome-level results at the DEC portfolio level. For example, this P&P outcome study and the Kenya country study conclude that whilst CDKN’s support to the NCCAP is coherent, the broader Kenya country programme as a whole probably isn’t. Similarly, the Rwanda country study finds that the portfolio has grown organically in response to demand. This means that the largest CDKN projects are coherent in terms of combining to deliver P&P outcome-level results but the entire portfolio is not.

**2 – From plans to practice/from national to sub-national** – The shift from CCD plans to practice has allowed CDKN to focus on and claim results at the sub-national or sector level which go beyond facilitating national CC policy frameworks. However, this study has identified a number of interlinked challenges which CDKN will need to overcome in order to successfully deliver results in terms of ‘practice’.

Shifting from policy frameworks to practice requires CDKN to work in even more complex and contested contexts, with a greater range of stakeholders, and where clarity and understanding of the key risks and assumptions that might constrain the delivery of results is even more critical.

The evaluation team recognises that sub-national work will be critical for CDKN, particularly in contexts where CDKN has developed relatively mature DECs. Shifting from the national policy to sub-national policy and practice opens up a much larger ‘menu’ of potential project options across sectors and sub-sectors. Yet CDKN project resourcing is insufficient to cover all the sub-national/sub-sector investment options. CDKN needs to develop a clear strategy on how it allocates resources when shifting focus from policy to practice and from national to sub-national.

One standout lesson from Kenya is the need for more detailed analysis of the key stakeholders, risks and assumptions CDKN will be reliant on before project investment decisions are made.

**3 – Initiating the P&P learning programme** – The Sub-national Learning Project demonstrates that CDKN is sitting on a body of knowledge and evidence on sub-national CCD processes. It is only relatively recently that

CDKN recognised and begun to resource a CDKN 'learning programme'. The sub-national learning programme demonstrates the power and potential of cross-programme synergies to support CCD P&P learning. This learning programme should not be entirely 'projectised' and outsourced to external suppliers. CDKN should aim to ensure sufficient resources can be allocated internally to properly and effectively mobilise the P&P learning function.

In addition to adequately resourcing internal P&P learning, CDKN should also make more explicit the process or pathway by which it sees P&P learning and uptake informing direct P&P results either at the national or sub-national level. Presently this is implicit and the links between the original P&P outcome objective and the new objective around P&P learning have not been spelled out.

## 6.2 Negotiations support (NS)

### Background

The CDKN Negotiation Support (NS) stream of work is estimated to account for £3.8m of projects that are NS-specific plus £1.2m of projects that are joint Climate Finance (CF) and NS.

Negotiations support differs from the other CDKN outcomes as work in this area – via the Advocacy Fund (AF) – began in 2011, a year after CDKN began operating. It also differs in using an outcome map to conceptualise and monitor changes across four dimensions of change (DoC) that are seen as necessary to deliver DoC 1: "Changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations". This is illustrated in the Figure below.

The DoC used in other outcome areas are re-phrased to make them specific to NS e.g. "Changes in coordination, collaboration and mobilisation amongst key CCD stakeholders" becomes "Changes in the coordination, collaboration and mobilisation of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in negotiations". Moreover, unlike other outcome areas in which the Logframe outcome contributes to a number of broader DoC, there is a very close match between the NS DoC and the NS Outcome goal of: "Poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have improved influence over international climate change negotiations".

The Outcome map is a key tool for the NS team, was reviewed and substantially revised in 2014 and has effectively replaced the original AF ToC. The outcome map is well suited to capturing various aspects of increased negotiating capacity of poor and vulnerable countries on route to the Paris COP that cannot be predicted in advance and that depend on political factors outside CDKN control.

Our initial intention was to treat NS project reviews in the same way as the other outcomes although this has been modified in practice. The interviews ultimately secured relate to 11 of the originally proposed sample projects and five others. However, when interviewed, negotiators and government Ministers were clearly considering all the CDKN support they had received from the full range of NS projects.

### Key findings

Given the consistency between CDKN, supplier and recipient assessment of progress for the key NS DoC - DoC1 – our judgement is that NS has achieved (and very likely exceeded) the expected progress towards outcomes. This is also consistent with overachievement relative to milestones of love to see and like to see progress markers.

Interviews with recipients of support and stakeholders (070, 138, 139, 144 and 158) provide direct evidence of a CDKN contribution at the DoC level – principally for DoC 1. As there are relatively few donors active in the NS arena and there is an unusually short path between policy making recipients and suppliers, it is possible to largely rule out alternative explanations.

One concern over reported progress we have is that the contribution of some CDKN NS suppliers (IIED and Climate Analytics) who have been supporting the LDC group for many years prior to the CDKN NS work may not be fully reflected by progress markers. While changes are reported relative to the start of NS in 2011, the relationship of trust built up previously has been identified as an important success factor (Ricardo-AEA review). Accepting the importance of building on an existing relationship, there is strong evidence that CDKN funding and demand-led engagement has made a significant contribution to progress.

Recipients of CDKN support and review of project and programme documents suggests that CDKN does have a niche in providing NS reflecting:

- Demand-led support;
- Being one of only two major donors in this area (German Government being the other);
- Being able to call on a mix and occasionally a combination of relevant, trusted specialist suppliers;
- Continuity of support;
- Close engagement with the issues (not simply a managing agent);
- Some knowledge sharing and networking; and
- Some synergy with the CF outcome, particularly the GCF (PIR ADGL-0010a-c)

These findings holds true despite recipients knowing and occasionally raising concerns that CDKN is funded by the UK Government. Some suppliers felt that CDKN had been damaged by funding and then backing away from Loss and Damage findings but this issue was only raised by a minority of recipient and supplier interviewees.

In principle the Outcome mapping approach is well suited to tracking NS progress and reasonable progress markers have been specified. In practice, CDKN has not made this approach work as well as it should. This partly reflects a lack of resourcing and CDKN is addressing this for NS M&E in 2015. In addition, although many progress markers are inherently subjective, CDKN could do more to evidence and report these in a more neutral way. At the same time the learning case study of support to LDC and AGN negotiation groups illustrates the value that can be added to monitoring progress markers by case studies that seek to learn what support works most effectively in what context.

The capacity of developing countries to produce negotiators with relevant legal training is an important contextual issue as it affects the ability of CDKN to add value with short-term project-based support. Getting this broader “enabling environment” in place needs a longer-term strategy and work with stakeholders such as Bar associations and academia as well as government. Interviewees have also highlighted the potential for regional hubs with centres of excellence and regional networks of lawyers (158). This is beyond the remit of CDKN but CDKN should use its convening power to engage other development partners interesting in supporting broader capacity building in this area.

The importance of the enabling environment means that outcome mapping needs a strong contextual analysis with assumptions and stakeholder engagement required to move towards impact (e.g. role of capacity building) – even if it does not have a specific impact pathway. Although a 10 year programme of capacity building was beyond the remit of CDKN, a stronger contextual analysis could have led (and may still lead) CDKN to convene development partners around this issue.

NS is a specialist area and it takes time for CDKN staff to gain an effective understanding of international negotiations. Although suppliers were positive about CDKN as a funder, they felt that the relatively high turnover of CDKN staff required frequent re-investment of time to bring them up to speed and this raised

the cost of doing business (interviews 157, 158). CDKN should consider if there is a realistic way of addressing this issue.

There is a significant demand for generalizable learning but the most effective NS learning has been context-specific rather than pulling out generic lessons. As with other outcome areas, CDKN staff would like to do more reflective learning but accept that this gets pushed out by daily business.

There is an opportunity for CDKN to be more transparent with suppliers to enable suppliers to coordinate e.g. NS and CF suppliers to encourage synergies between suppliers with CDKN funding working on similar issues to avoid duplication as well. This would also help suppliers to understand how they fit in the overall strategy.

CDKN has established a good working relationship with DECC since the MTR. DECC believe there may be an opportunity for CDKN to add further value to DECC work by communicating and synthesizing learning. In particular for NS, DECC suggest that if CDKN was able to draw lessons for them this would help DECC work more effectively with CDKN-supported nations.

The “Mount Everest” progress indicators relate to securing an international climate agreement that is supported by PMV countries. The NS contribution is clearly a very small part of this big picture and we don’t yet have an agreement. Nonetheless, it would be useful to have some assessment of the type of agreement that was likely without the increased capacity of PMV (to which NS has contributed) as a form of baseline. When (we hope) an agreement is achieved having this “baseline” will help trace NS impact. As of now, it would be very useful to identify the magnitude of the difference that NS could make and to whom i.e. “what is at stake” in terms of size of funding, allocation of funding and nature of funding.

### **Recommendations for CDKN**

1. Strengthen M&E for NS in terms of better evidencing of progress markers and reporting on them in a more neutral way.
2. CDKN to undertake additional learning case studies.
3. CDKN should use its convening power to engage and potentially form strategic partnerships with larger development partners interesting in supporting broader capacity building in this area.
4. CDKN to strengthen the contextual analysis that accompanies NS Outcome mapping
5. CDKN to consider how they can reduce staff turnover and consequent loss of specialist knowledge in the NS team
6. CDKN to provide suppliers with a bigger picture of how they fit into the ToC and ways of facilitating learning between suppliers working on related issues and CDKN
7. CDKN to consider if there is scope to draw lessons for DECC that would help DECC work more effectively with CDKN-supported nations
8. CDKN to undertake assessment of the magnitude of economic benefits and likely recipients from NS work.

## **6.3 Climate finance (CF)**

### **Background**

Over 2013-14, the CDKN Climate Finance (CF) stream of work accounted for approximately GBP 1.7 million of project spend plus GBP 1.5 million for joint CF and Policy & Practice (P&P) or Negotiation Support (NS) projects. The CF outcome is based on three broad strategies (supporting the international climate finance architecture, improving national and sub-national systems for CCD investment and creating an enabling

environment for non-state actors to invest in CCD). Progress towards impact is captured by three dimensions of change (DoC) and outcome logframe indicators. Although the CDKN CF strategies are broad, the first two logframe indicators for this outcome area are both highly specific in terms of where to look for change (the GCF, national CF readiness and private sector engagement in all CDKN activity) and ambitious (requiring significant contributions from CDKN). The third is quite general (“investment grade” policy) but equally ambitious (achieving inclusion in national, regional and international CCD policy processes).

In order to assess the claims at the outcome level made by CDKN we have reviewed 11 broadly representative CF projects (using document reviews and stakeholder interviews).

### Findings and associated recommendations

1. The CDKN CF portfolio has not yet achieved the outcome level on the pathway to impact. On the basis of (admittedly unrealistic) LF indicators we judge 5/11 sample projects to be at this level and 7/11 on a broader DoC basis. In addition, the Adaptation Fund NIEs project shows considerable promise of contributing at the outcome level but it is at an early stage. Overall, CF is a “work in progress” and is particularly dependent on the external political and institutional context. Private sector engagement has been weak.
2. The ambition of the CF logframe outcome indicators is much greater than the CDKN resources and mandate in this area can realistically deliver. CDKN and DFID have avoided addressing this problem by relying on the vague definition of the indicators, e.g. “significant input of CDKN”. However, this has helped maintain unrealistic expectations of what CDKN can achieve, encouraged over-claiming of CDKN’s role in high-level changes and made honest reflection and learning by CDKN more difficult.

**Recommendation:** CDKN and DFID should review the CF indicators. These should be realistic and relate to CF Strategies and ToC.

1. There is evidence of synergies from joint CF and NS projects. CDKN has drawn on experience and suppliers from NS work, for example. There is much less evidence of synergy between CF and research projects and a lack of analysis to situate research projects within the CF theory of change. P&P implementation will be significantly strengthened if international CF is mobilised within our case study sample – and we hope to see this in Rwanda by Year 7.
2. We understand that the CDKN CF team has been working hard over the past year to build a more coherent and strategic CF portfolio. The outcome lens has been applied to country programmes over this period. We expect to see benefits from this in terms of increased synergy and lesson learning in Years 6 and 7. This was not generally evident in the sample projects – that admittedly were commissioned prior to an outcome focus.
3. The three CF strategies are very broad (especially given the small CF spend) and there is risk of losing focus. There is a need to situate and focus on projects within the CF ToC that are going to make a big difference. The CCD objective in the CF strategies should help ensure this difference is made to the poor and vulnerable but the “D” seems to have been accidentally dropped in the latest CF ToC strategy 2<sup>34</sup>. CDKN will generally not have the capacity or mandate to deliver its CF strategy 3 objective of “creating an enabling environment”. A more realistic objective is to *contribute to* creating an enabling environment.

**Recommendation:** CDKN should situate and focus on strategic projects within the CF ToC. Revise strategy 3 so the objective is “to *contribute to* creating an enabling environment”.

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<sup>34</sup> CDKN confirm this is a typing error

1. The Kenya and Rwanda case study projects illustrate the critical role of political commitment and institutional capacity to delivering CF readiness and the limited ability of CDKN to influence the political and institutional context.

**Recommendation:** CDKN should make the external political and institutional context more explicit in the CF ToC assumptions.

1. Across the project sample there has been virtually no involvement of the private sector (as businesses or potential CF investors). The 2015 M&E report recognises that progress in this area has been limited. Our country case studies illustrate the very different context for private sector involvement across DEC – from Rwanda (with limited opportunities to engage until private sector capacity grows) to Kenya (with a sophisticated and dynamic private sector that can struggle to see the value of engagement) to Colombia (with a complex mix of industrial, mining and small-scale business interests). CDKN needs to do considerably more in this area but, given the very different DEC contexts and relatively limited resources available, we doubt that it is realistic to achieve the milestone “private sector engagement included in all CDKN activities in CCD planning and climate finance readiness”.

**Recommendation:** We recommend a strategic review of the likely opportunities and constraints to leveraging public-private and private-private investment across the CF portfolio. This should identify a set of challenging but realistic “best bets” and draw on the CDKN niche. In a number of countries this may involve brokering and convening partnerships with CSOs, academia and government. However, in some countries it might be most effective for CDKN to work with CSOs but to incentivise CSOs to partner with private sector businesses.

1. The outcome mapping approach with “expect to see” through to “love to see” used for the negotiation support is likely to be more useful than the current number of countries meeting a broad “national climate finance readiness” CF indicator milestone. It is probably too late for CDKN to add outcome mapping for CF M&E but DFID may be able to use this approach for ICF M&E.

**Recommendation:** CDKN and DFID should consider the scope for using outcome mapping for the CF outcome. If the current LF indicator is retained our refinement of what “significant input” means should be used.

1. The M&E and learning around ADGL-0018 – The Climate Finance Advisory Service (CFAS) – provides a good example of how honest M&E can be used to strengthen delivery.
2. A review of one joint research/CF project suggests CDKN should be more careful to distinguish project partner advocacy and research findings when drawing on project reporting for M&E. This is likely to require more involvement of subject matter specialists and senior staff in the review process.
3. A lesson from the RSAF-001 project was that having senior participants from the Adaptation Fund and NIEs in the workshop was a success factor, and CDKN stakeholder identification and convening played a credible role in achieving this. In this case CDKN built on their earlier work to add value beyond simply financing the supplier delivering this project. This is also an example of CDKN using its niche convening role within a knowledge network and one that we hope to see more evidence of going forward.
4. Suppliers from both the CF and NS outcome samples suggested that they would be able to work and share learning more effectively if CDKN informed them about other CDKN-funded suppliers working in this area.

**Recommendation:** CDKN should consider how to facilitate supplier communities of practice. At a minimum CDKN should inform each supplier which other CDKN suppliers are involved in delivering in the same or related outcome areas in a given country and possibly region.

1. The CDKN commissioning model is project-based with learning projects used to capture learning from country or regional experience. The NIE project suggests that this traditional approach can work well where there are three ingredients: 1) Substantive, user-relevant and clearly presented evidence (e.g. the workshop presentations and research report); 2) Incentives to make use of the evidence (e.g. improved access to CF); and 3) Pathways to practice (e.g. convening AF and NIE representatives). CDKN can directly influence 1) and 3) and increase awareness of 2). It is interesting to compare this with the MTR finding that an earlier project which sought to share the early Rwandan experience of developing a national climate strategy was far less successful as it had limited substantive evidence to present and the audience was not specifically convened. However, this approach cannot substitute for internal learning from CDKN teams. For example, a weakness of the “projectised learning” approach is evident from the failure of CDKN to share learning from Ethiopia to Rwanda on the critical importance of building capacity to access national climate funds.

**Recommendation:** It would be useful for CDKN to document whether and how CCD for food security (RSGL-0018b) findings have been taken up in CDKN DECs.

1. Although the Rwanda sub-national capacity building work has been successful, CDKN does not have a comparative advantage in institutional capacity building more generally. There is potentially very significant demand for CDKN support in this area (e.g. at county level in Kenya) that far exceeds CDKN’s capacity to deliver.

**Recommendation:** CDKN should seek to establish a strategic partnership with a suitable development partner to take forward sub-national CF capacity building.

## 6.4 Disaster risk management (DRM)

### Background

The GBP 17 million CDKN DRM stream of work has focused on enhancing national and sub-national approaches to tackling the risk associated with climatic hazards. Examples of the breadth of projects reviewed relating to disaster risk management include: a series of policy outreach events and regional briefings to bring key messages from the IPCC’s Special Report on Extreme Events to policy and practice audiences; a research project working with the Ahmedabad municipal government in India to reduce the health impacts of extreme heat events, resulting in the government’s launch of a Heat Action Plan; and supporting the Implementation plan of the Caribbean Climate Risk Management Framework and its associated Caribbean Climate Online Risk Assessment Tool.

This report examines CDKN’s DRM outcome area results, as part of the CDKN Year 5 Evaluation. There is **strong evidence** that the DRM outcome:

- has largely followed a *demand-led* approach, responding to requests and needs from countries and partners.
- is ahead of its targets as is able to provide more examples of countries and cities exhibiting change than required at this stage – in particular in relation to the provision and improved access to risk information.
- has a clear niche and added value in bringing a climate lens to DRM work.
- has accomplished impressive work across scales in a very short period of time – from IPCC down to community work. Most CDKN flagships projects are related to the DRM outcome. A key success factor of the DRM outcome is that CDKN has strategically and effectively leveraged ODI resources.

### Results

An important caveat of this review is that the DRM outcome area has been in operation for less than four years and the projects in the sample are on different timelines. This overview should be treated as indicative rather than conclusive.

The DRM outcome has been **very successful** in increasing and improving the accessibility of information on climate-related disaster risk to policymakers and practitioners. Yet, there is **limited evidence**, however, as to what extent improved access has led to the use of such information in planning or policy. This is particularly the case at the national level.

At the sub-national level, there is **strong evidence** that CDKN has worked with a number of cities in Asia, Africa and LAC on elements of climate-related DRM where work has resulted in these cities having seen a significant change in the approach to tackling extreme events.

However, in relation to the outcome statement – to improve the effectiveness and integration of disaster risk management in climate-compatible development policies and practices at national and sub national levels – there is piecemeal evidence of achievements in relation to small sub-national-level projects, and CDKN still does not have examples at national level. In short, sub-national projects have been highly successful but CDKN has not yet achieved its DRM outcome at national level.

Most effective and successful projects are those that do not strategically position DRM as a starting point but address it as an integrated component of the programme. Available evidence suggests that DRM projects are operating “in parallel” to the overall CDKN CCD narrative. This raises questions around the extent to which the DRM outcome is operating as a peripheral issue within the CDKN impact pathway. This is reflected in the fact that, in most country-specific projects, impact is limited to DRM sector stakeholders and policies at sub-national level.

Available evidence also suggests that response to demand has led to lack of a coherent portfolio and financing in this outcome area, that is, there are few funds available for a high volume of demand. As a result, funding is spread too thin between TA and research, and results seem ad-hoc and independent from each other (they were not packaged as a programme although they were operating under the DRM outcome area).

The landmark global agreements on international development and disaster risk reduction – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), respectively – are due to end in 2015. This presents an opportunity for CDKN to lock in the international policy landscape for tackling disaster risk worldwide. CDKN, with its DRM experience and global reach, is in a unique position to influence the integration of these agendas.

### Lessons from this outcome area

- 1 Capturing the reality of the DRM outcome area – what CDKN has achieved.** The current DRM outcome indicators may not appropriately reflect and capture the nature of the strategy CDKN is endeavouring to deliver under the DRM outcome, as these are currently set at too high a level. CDKN provides grants to generate knowledge, build capacity and influence policy. In other words, CDKN seeks to positively influence *processes*. Furthermore, there is a need to better elucidate how CDKN’s DRM projects contribute to the outcome through a coherent set of results chains.

**Recommendation:** CDKN contributions to DRM at sub-national, national and international level would be better reflected by intermediate outcomes, which could be incorporated into the theory of change. These would show the casual chain that links project activities and the ultimate outcomes these seek to influence.

- 2 Need to move beyond the ambit of DRM and towards a more coherent programme.** Mainstreaming DRM into key sectors does not happen in a vacuum but evidence suggests that potential for impact increases when CDKN works closely with mainstream sectors in areas that require or benefit from DRM-related inputs. The DRM outcome area should continue to follow a demand-led approach, responding to requests and needs. Yet, there needs to be a shift in CDKN's tendency to be reactive, and to respond by doing activities.

**Recommendation:** More thinking needs to happen about how best to build a coherent programme. The CDKN DRM outcome needs to be more strategic regarding projects aiming to influence key sectors/stakeholders at the international and national level. This requires finding the right balance between impact pathways and the demand-led nature of CDKN. Moving beyond DRM also requires engaging with new actors and partners. The DRM outcome area should explore new opportunities for directly engaging with mainstream sectors.

- 3 Project entry point is a major determinant of the operational approach to CCD and the mainstreaming of DRM.** The DRM outcome has been playing out differently in different regions and countries. As this report highlights, how "CDKN tells the story" has (amongst others) a major impact on the success and impact of its projects. This is not surprising as CCD and DRM-related work is highly context specific. Yet, this clearly affects both the role that the DRM outcome plays in different countries and what they actually need to do in order to achieve their goal. The overarching objective of the DRM outcome is to *improve the effectiveness and integration of disaster risk management in climate-compatible development policies and practices at national and sub-national levels*. However, evidence suggests that there remains a lack of a coherent understanding of what climate-compatible development policies are amongst CDKN and its stakeholders.

**Recommendations:** There are three recommendations.

1. develop a robust theory of change that articulates how DRM-related work contributes to the CCD impact pathway;
2. ensure that DRM projects address the overall goal of improving the effectiveness and integration of disaster risk management in climate-compatible development; and
3. develop a more detailed elaboration of the DRM impact pathway and where it fits within/contributes to the overall CDKN ToC. In this regard, CDKN should capitalise on lessons learnt between different regions. There is a need to analyse and reflect about regional differences and ask what was it that made it work.

#### Lessons for CDKN

- 1 Scaling up strategy and fewer but bigger projects.** CDKN is a highly projectised programme, but at the same time this allows CDKN to experiment and implement faster than others. CDKN should not lose this niche of work. However, projects remain too small to generate the level of impact expected in CDKN's theory of change and level of ambition is too high for the level of funding. Whilst there is no doubt that CDKN should continue to promote demonstration models, CDKN needs bigger programmes that are more coherent and harmonised. CDKN DRM results represent proven experiences that could be directly connected to international development 'investors' to take to the next level.

**Recommendations:** There are two recommendations:

- CDKN should continue to test out new approaches and abandon poorly performing projects to concentrate on the successful ones; and

- CDKN should be more proactive in partnering with other funding agencies and finding a “marketplace” for its successful models. It would be also worth reflecting on future models, for example, less deep engagement or a rebalancing of resources from the global to the country level.

**2 Longer-term projects.** This second lesson builds on the first. CDKN cannot only have significant impact with more resources but also with more time. CDKN investments have time periods for implementation and quite often involve too many activities. As a result, suppliers (and CDKN staff) struggle to deliver on ToR and there is not much space for experimentation and innovation.

**Recommendation:** CDKN should consider changing its investment strategy and practice. For example, a phased approach based on achievements and impact could be followed.

**3 Learning to learn.** There are different levels of learning within CDKN: at the project, as a programme as a region and at the outcome level. More efforts need to be put into ensuring that outcome-level lessons are more shared and discussed. A rigorous, systematic process for learning needs to be incorporated as a core part of CDKN’s work. Turning learning into a formal CDKN project has been a significant driver of success for the DRM outcome. After 5 years, CDKN now has enough experience to foster learning internally, across the regions and at the international level.

**Recommendation:** CDKN should put in place a more consistent approach to work with country and regional teams on learning, focusing on gathering and aggregating lessons from countries and regions, and feeding back to these. A question perhaps remains as to how CDKN can share learning and experiences with external audiences beyond the publication of policy briefs.

## 6.5 Research

### Background

CDKN has spent GBP 14.3 million on research from 2010-2014, with around GBP 10 million direct spend on commissioned research projects. The research portfolio spans diverse themes, topics and regions, focusing on aspects of climate-compatible development, both adaptation and mitigation.

Research has been commissioned through a number of different commissioning approaches, for example, open global and regional calls, as well as more targeted and directed commissioning. Over time, the overall commissioning approach has evolved from more open calls to more strategic and structured ones, for reasons to do with the funding profile for research.

There is a strong emphasis on applied research for climate and development policymaking and public goods, globally, regionally and nationally. Therefore, the research portfolio represents a range of types of research, from the development of evidence-based policy approaches to testing practical tools and products.

CDKN has recently (2014) articulated the description of its three main research types within an Impact Pathway framework as: ‘global thought-leadership’, ‘policy research’ and ‘practice-oriented research’.

This component of the evaluation was undertaken based on interviews with CDKN stakeholders, suppliers and key informants, as well as a desk review of documents relating to a sample of 16 research projects (of different types, values and timeframes) and the research activity.

### Findings

The evaluation found that 10 of the 16 projects are producing evidence of tangible outcomes, with a further 4 beginning to see outcomes, having completed delivery and dissemination of the expected outputs. Two projects did not deliver as expected and have been refocused.

In terms of quality, CDKN research products are perceived by interviewees to be of good quality and credible. They are accessible and easy to find, well communicated (interviewees 134, 135, 159). Many people appreciate the policy briefs and grey literature more than “peer-reviewed articles that no-one can afford to download” (key informant 159).

### ***Strengths***

Overall, CDKN’s research is not seen as a coherent body of work, but is understood to focus more on funding applications of research and tool development, through shorter, more flexible funding than traditional research funds.

Contributing flexible, catalytic research funding to accelerate and extend the policy and practice outreach of programmes is CDKN’s strength. The smaller and medium-sized application focused projects, where suppliers are well networked into national and sub-national policy communities, are the strong performers. By coincidence (at the start) and over time, by design, these are what CDKN have spent the most research funds on, with good results.

### ***Weaknesses***

Weaknesses include a lack of initiatives to link between research projects nationally, regionally or thematically. There is little evidence of CDKN facilitating access to policymakers nationally, although there is some regional facilitation. ‘Thought leadership’ is also weak. A future focus on thematic research and synthesis to articulate the gender, social inclusion and power relations aspects of CCD would have strong ‘thought leadership’ potential.

### **Lessons for CDKN work in the research area**

The lessons from previous rounds of commissioning have mainly been learned and fed into the design of the recent Climate Change Research Impact Fund (CRIF). However, a few lessons are documented here for wider learning.

### ***Developing the values base and ethical frame for CCD projects***

There is a gap in the portfolio on research that focuses on gender and social inclusion/exclusion and power, as there is an absence of an institutional lens on this. Empirical work on these themes would help to establish the pathways within CCD to equitable or inclusive social development. This means that there is a weaker understanding of practical mechanisms to ensure that CDKN’s research projects, and climate projects more broadly, benefit poor and vulnerable groups.

### ***Lessons on drivers and pathways of research-led change***

The successful projects in the sample all have in common features including a base in sub-national policy networks.

The CRIF is a much more focused and strategic in its design – but it still requires investment from CDKN Global to support and partner suppliers in doing the uptake and accessing policy and planning.

### ***Global Synthesis for ‘thought leadership’***

CDKN Global has started to synthesise learning across the portfolio in some outcome areas. For example, Climate Finance and DRM have synthesis products, lessons learned and position papers. The Policy & Practice Outcome does not. CDKN Global and Regional could do more to synthesise research findings around CCD research questions, outcomes and key themes for the international community in order to get their knowledge into use.

## Lessons for DFID

There are three main lessons for DFID from the CDKN experience:

1. **Adjust profile of research funding for application-oriented funds:** A more gradual ramping up of spend, with a peak in commissioning around mid-term, tailing off again in Years 4-5 would have been a more appropriate funding profile for a strategic and policy applications-oriented research fund.
2. **Ensure commissioning approach is appropriate:** The 12-month, “fully-engineered” science council commissioning process was clearly not appropriate for applied research projects of 3 years or less, and for a programme where research is meant to work alongside other interventions. Whilst maintaining quality and ethical standards, a more bespoke process could have been designed for CDKN to reflect the purpose, role and type of research it was intended to produce.
3. **Build on the CRIF model for strategic and policy-oriented research:** The latest CRIF seems an effective strategy to address the objectives for this type of research. The CRIF seems to offer a model that combines two forms of commissioning: thematically guided research around high-level research questions that still allows space for applicants to innovate projects, with a shorter but still rigorous selection process.

## 7 Conclusions

This theory-based evaluation has used two types of case studies to test the CDKN theory of change. CDKN interventions based on various combinations of strategic themes in five Deep Engagement Countries are considered in Annex 2 with findings summarised in Section 5 above. As each CDKN strategic theme or outcome and the research portfolio has a global reach, we have also produced case studies based on a range of projects within each outcome area and for research. These form the five components of Annex 3 and findings have been summarised in Section 6 above. In both types of case study contribution analysis has been used to test claims made by CDKN. Although both country and outcome case studies inform our assessment of the CDKN niche, we have also undertaken institutional interviews and document reviews. These have been important in assessing the value for money provided by the CDKN management model.

As an important section of our audience is concerned with high-level findings we have presented these in advance of the case study discussion. Hence we have drawn together findings on progress towards impact from the case studies and document review in Section 3 of the report and have used these and the institutional interviews in our assessment of the CDKN institutional model in Section 4. The key conclusions presented below have been drawn from these sections of the report.

### Overarching impact:

- The evidence from the country and outcome case studies is that CDKN has made a credible contribution to the impact indicator ‘Developing countries’ policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020’.
- At the Outcome level, CDKN has achieved its 2015 logframe indicator milestones related to supporting CCD policies and practices although we have some concerns about particular indicators. Moreover, for each impact pathway we identify constraints to further progress towards impact that will need to be tackled. The recommendations brought together below aim to address these constraints. These draw on more detailed, Outcome-specific recommendations given in Annex 2.

### Progress towards impact within Outcome & Research theories of change (ToCs) and impact trajectories:

- **Negotiation Support (NS)** – £3.8m spend since 2013 plus £1.2m shared with the Climate Finance outcome – has achieved very good progress. Given the consistency between CDKN, supplier and recipient assessment of progress for the key dimension of change (“Changes in the influence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have over international climate change negotiations”) –

our judgement is that NS has achieved (and very likely exceeded) the expected progress towards outcomes. This is consistent with the reported overachievement relative to milestones of “love to see” and “like to see” outcome map progress markers.

- **Climate Finance (CF)** has accounted for £1.7m of outsourced spend plus £3m shared with other outcomes since 2013. The CDKN CF portfolio is “work in progress” has not yet achieved the outcome level on the pathway to impact. On the basis of (admittedly unrealistic) logframe indicators we judge 5/11 sample projects to be at this level and 7/11 on a broader dimension of change basis. We expect some improvement in years 6 and 7 as the Adaptation Fund NIEs project shows considerable promise but fundamentally, the ambition of the CF logframe outcome indicators is greater than the CDKN resources and mandate in this area can realistically deliver.
- **Disaster Risk Management (DRM)** – £3.4m of spend since 2013 plus £14m shared with the Policy & Practice outcome – has been in operation for less than four years and the projects in our sample are on different timelines. Nonetheless, we find evidence that the DRM outcome has been very successful in increasing and improving the accessibility of information on climate-related disaster risk to policy-makers and practitioners. There is some evidence of use of this information for policy and planning at a sub-national level but, at the time of the evaluation, there were no examples at the national level. The outcome theory of change projects impact at both sub-national and national levels and significant scaling up will be needed to secure outcomes at the national level in years 6 and 7.
- **Policies and Practice (P&P)** – £5.1m since 2013 plus £16m shared with other outcomes. Our case study project sample evaluation broadly substantiates the CDKN claim that targets have been met for the P&P outcome on numbers of countries with national, regional and/or subnational CCD policies and practices that have been developed with the significant input of the CDKN. However, we believe there is a lack of clarity on how ‘with significant input of the CDKN’ is defined and this has impeded honest reflection and learning. More progress has been made against “CCD policies and practice developed that impact those most affected by climate change” than the second P&P theory of change objective of “understanding drivers and challenges of CCD policies and practices” (which is also not well reflected in the logframe). Based on the sample of P&P projects we have reviewed, the trajectory towards impact for years 6 and 7 looks positive but depends on processes being in place to translate learning on P&P into practice.
- **Research** – is technically a CDKN output feeding into the outcomes above. Yet CDKN has spent £14.3 million on research from 2010-2014 and we were asked to consider Research as if it were a CDKN Outcome and have used a sample of 16 Research case study projects. We find evidence that 10/16 sample projects are producing tangible outcomes (linking directly to P&P and DRM outcomes and dimensions of change) which explains our judgement that Research has made less progress than expected. Our assessment suggests that a further 4 projects will produce the expected results in time. Contributing flexible, catalytic research funding to accelerate and extend the policy and practice outreach of programmes is CDKN’s strength. The smaller and medium-sized application focused projects, where suppliers are well-networked into national and sub-national policy communities, are the strong performers. A majority of research funds have been spent on these projects. Weaknesses include a lack of initiatives to link between research projects nationally, regionally or thematically. There is little evidence of CDKN facilitating access to policymakers nationally, although there is some regional facilitation. ‘Thought leadership’ is also weak. The impact trajectory for projects we have reviewed is good but programme gains depend on prioritising a global and cross-regional synthesis and creation of global public goods from the research portfolio.

#### The CDKN Institutional model:

The country and outcome case studies allowed a systematic assessment of the CDKN niche. Findings are summarised in Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 with the following conclusions:

- CDKN has been able to add some value in every deep engagement country we looked at by responding to government demand and contracting and managing suppliers effectively. But it has added significant value and demonstrated a clear niche in Colombia and India by using the country engagement team to convene and communicate with stakeholders – facilitating the effective uptake of evidence to practice and greater progress than other donors in the same space.
- The work by CDKN country teams in Nepal, Colombia and India to support local uptake of research or piloting has also been important. This may not be highly visible at a global scale but it is difficult to get right and has required significant investment by CDKN. Donors such as DFID have rarely been successful in using country offices to route external research in a usable form to decision takers.
- We found little evidence of the role and importance of global networking and partnerships in our sample of deep engagement countries but more evidence at the outcome level (with the exception of Policies & Practice). There is clear evidence of how this adds value for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Negotiation Support (NS) and also for Research (through brokering). There is emerging evidence that a combination of networking, technical skills and demand-led legitimacy can drive effective convening for Climate Finance (CF). There is some evidence of synergies across outcome areas (NS/CF) and of research being translated into practice (DRM, CF and to some extent P&P).
- Both CDKN NS and DRM have a niche as leaders in their global areas. For NS, this builds on a combination of: demand-led support; being one of only two major donors in this area; a mix of relevant, trusted specialist suppliers; continuity; close engagement of the NS team with the issues and some knowledge sharing and networking. There has been an effort to distil and transfer lessons but support has been largely tailored to negotiating groups. In the case of DRM, the niche reflects demand-led, translation of scientific research for innovative practice and policy and strategically and effectively leveraging ODI resources to add value to in-country teams. There are also few others translating the science from IPCC findings into practical learning for policy and practice.

Key informants with an overview of climate compatible development (Section 4.1.2) felt that CDKN gained a niche as a result of:

- Responding to demand (interviews 137, 097, 068);
- Skills and experience of the consortium (098, 068, 063); and
- Networks and partnerships (098, 096, 097, 068, 065).

Considering the latter point, the three major CDKN partnerships we looked at in Section 4.1.1 (the Low Emissions Development Strategies Global Partnership, the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative and Climate Knowledge Brokers Group) suggest that CDKN investment in partnerships has produced value beyond that seen through the lens of projects in Outcome areas. It is beyond our terms of reference to compare this with the partnerships formed by other organisations but discussion with CDKN's partners highlighted the value of CDKN as a:

- Knowledge manager and knowledge broker;
- Knowledge generator;
- Convener of climate compatible development stakeholders and donors; and
- Strategic partner and funder.

#### **Value for money:**

We have been able to compare total administration costs for CDKN with those proposed for the Adaptation Fund derived from costs charged by various UN agencies working on climate change (see Section 4.2). On a

like for like basis, CDKN would have an administration cost of 13% relative to the proposed Adaptation Fund administration cost of 17.5% - 18.5%. These comparative figures are approximate but they do suggest that CDKN administration costs are lower than comparable UN agencies. Moreover, the increase in CDKN spend since the mid-term review is likely to have slightly increased this advantage.

### **Gender mainstreaming:**

CDKN has committed to strengthening the mainstreaming of gender within its programme to support action to achieve gender equality. It has developed a gender strategy (mainstreaming plan), but the main investments only started in 2014. Although gender was not included in our terms of reference, we have attempted to meet CDKN and DFID requests to provide a broad assessment of the likely progress of the CDKN gender strategy, and highlight areas for improvement (in Section 4.3). In summary, we find that a fuller understanding is needed amongst senior management of what a commitment to gender mainstreaming involves institutionally and the level of investment required to develop staff capacities to integrate it into their day-to-day work. CDKN gender indicators and gender-related knowledge products provide a good starting point for developing a theme on gender and climate. However, to make a real contribution to equity and social inclusion CDKN will need to develop:

- A strategic understanding of gender and climate issues in terms of what needs to change in climate policies and practices to improve gender equity and social inclusion, and what aspects it will target through its programmes;
- an internal understanding of what its capacities are and potential contributions as a climate knowledge and practice programme; and
- Practical guidance for CDKN staff in applying gender and social inclusion analysis to their projects.

## **8 High-Level Recommendations**

We have synthesised high-level recommendations from the detailed recommendations in the country and outcome case studies. These high-level recommendations are shown below with the sub-headings from the main report that they refer to. Recommendations that relate to specific country and outcomes are given in Section 5 and 6 of this report and elaborated in each of the reports in Annex 3 and Annex 4.

### **3.5.1 Increase strategic focus**

#### **Recommendation for CDKN**

Work with fewer Deep Engagement Countries (certainly no increase on the current number) and ensure coherent programmes and country teams that have the required capacity and investment and situate projects in Outcome and Country theories of change.

#### **Recommendation for DFID**

Use scenario analysis to review political risks for major programmes and consider how these can be mitigated

### **3.5.2 Match logframe ambition to resources**

#### **Recommendation for DFID**

Revise outcome indicators in the light of new evidence to keep them realistic even if this means a reduction rather than relying on vague wording such as “significant contributions”.

### **3.5.3 Convene and partner to build capacity and scale**

#### **Recommendation for CDKN**

Identify opportunities to convene donor partners and develop a strategic partnership with UNDP or others for CCD capacity building and to reflect on what role CDKN will play in capacity building for CCD in the future.

#### **Recommendation for CDKN**

Prioritise working with national Ministries and other funders to take successful projects to scale.

### **3.5.4 Clarify where results can be generalised**

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should set out where general results matter and can be expected. These can be seen as “learning questions” and could be derived by Outcome/Research and from a discussion between regional teams.

### **3.5.5 Strengthen learning**

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should build on existing plans for reflective learning and ensure there is sufficient institutional support to implement this at outcome and deep engagement country level.

### **3.5.6 Safeguard the Climate Compatible Development (CCD) focus**

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

Put in place a light-touch quality assurance process to ensure a systematic focus on CCD.

#### **Recommendation to DFID**

Use engagement with CDKN in years 6, 7 and beyond to encourage a systematic focus on CCD

### **3.5.7 More effective private sector engagement**

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should set out a strategy for private sector engagement that is going to make the most difference in the Climate Finance and Policy & Practice Outcome pathways. In doing so CDKN should engage with DFID to draw on the considerable experience that DFID has in supporting private sector development.

### **4.1.1 Evidence from CDKN key partners / knowledge networks interviews**

#### **Recommendation for CDKN and DFID**

CDKN should discuss with the DFID how both organisations can play a more involved, informed and mutually supportive role when it comes to catalysing headline CCD partnerships and jointly convening partners.

#### **Recommendation for CDKN**

Emulating the three successful partnerships examples illustrated above, CDKN should look to more broadly and systematically build on its strengths in terms of CDKN’s role, added value and niche in CCD partnerships and knowledge networks, by creating a broader set of partnerships at the regional and national level.

### **4.1.2 Evidence from institutional interviews**

#### **Recommendation to CDKN and DFID**

CDKN should discuss with the DFID ICF team how CDKN can package learning so it is most useful to them.

#### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should strengthen reporting that allows easier aggregation of impacts on ultimate beneficiaries. This is likely to require increasing CDKN capacity for economic analysis.

#### **4.2.1 Cost-benefit analysis**

##### **Recommendation to CDKN**

Undertake indicative cost-benefit analysis by Outcome area.

#### **4.2.2 Cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency comparisons**

##### **Recommendation to DFID**

If it is not already done, DFID should undertake an analysis of administration costs by service provider to allow analysis of indicators such as elasticity of administration fees to total spend and average managed contract size.

#### **4.2.3 The cost of doing business with CDKN**

##### **Recommendation to CDKN**

CDKN should produce its own conflict of interest guidance. This should include a minimum time gap (of at least 6 months) for consortium member staff leaving CDKN and going back into consortium organisations in a closely related area.

##### **Recommendation to DFID**

DFID should require contractors managing programmes that are likely to provide a commercial advantage to produce a conflict of interest policy and show how it has been implemented.

#### **4.2.4 Financial management and project information systems**

##### **Recommendation to DFID**

The financial management and project information systems for contracted programmes must be fit for the specific programme purpose. Just because a service provider such as PwC has very strong systems in its major business areas, it does not mean that tailored software and systems for a particular contracted development programme will be available. DFID must have the capacity to specify what *reasonably* needs to be in place and ensure these systems are operational. A low cost solution should be used when it is fit for purpose. For a consortium such as CDKN with multiple partners and regional offices this solution should include establishing that processes exist to train relevant staff on how to use the system.

#### **4.3.5 Recommendations for CDKN's gender strategy**

**1. Develop a more informed understanding among senior management of what a commitment to gender mainstreaming involves** institutionally and the level of investment required to develop staff capacities to integrate it into their day-to-day work. There are many gender mainstreaming toolkits and frameworks available. One that we have drawn on is Levy's Web of Institutionalisation as a thorough, accessible and practical resource.

**2. Develop a gender and social inclusion framework** to help guide practical thinking about how to support a systematic consideration of gender, social identity and income levels, and how these affect access to resources and influence within climate change action planning, implementation and evaluation. There are

many models and toolkits available that are practical and applicable, especially from the humanitarian sector. This frame needs to include ethical and normative dimensions – what does CDKN think *needs to be changed* to make progress on equality and inclusion?

**3. Recruit additional specialist gender staff at global and regional levels** to provide technical support to project leads from within the regions. To meet the objectives that CDKN have set themselves, as a minimum, there should be one full-time post at global level and Gender Champions need to receive training if they are to provide technical support (see below).

**4. Invest systematically in internal capacity building** on gender and social inclusion for all staff involved in designing and commissioning projects. The aim of this programme should be to build general confidence and understanding in assessing gender, social inclusion and climate in projects. This can be supported by specialist advice from global and regional gender staff. Capacity building is not only training – it should also include mechanisms for staff to keep up with current debates and have the opportunity to debate and reflect on practice.

**4. CDKN staff responsible for gender, for example the Gender Champions, should be given a higher level of technical training** and clear guidance on applying the gender framework. The aim of this programme should be to create confidence and skills in gender, social inclusion and climate so that advice, challenge and support can be given to colleagues. This programme should include opportunities to access and debate current information on gender and climate.

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