

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

**CDKN Project Ref: AAGL-0020 CDKN
External Evaluation Review**

FINAL REPORT

Submitted by



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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	VII
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. METHODOLOGY USED FOR THIS MTR	2
3. IS CDKN NEEDED?	4
3.1. A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE	4
3.2. THE CDKN NICHE: EVIDENCE ON RELEVANCE FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES	5
4. THE EXTENT TO WHICH CDKN IS PERFORMING AGAINST ITS LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME TO DATE WITHIN CDKN'S DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE	6
4.1. INTRODUCTION.....	6
4.2. PROGRESS AGAINST OUTPUTS.....	6
4.3. EVIDENCE OF CDKN OUTCOMES.....	19
4.4. EVIDENCE OF IMPACT AND TRAJECTORY TOWARDS IMPACT - SUMMARY OF CDKN'S RESULTS PERFORMANCE.....	33
5. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CDKN APPROACH AND DESIGN ENSURES IMPACT AND VALUE FOR MONEY	34
5.1. EFFICIENCY METRICS	34
5.2. INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY THE CDKN DESIGN	38
5.3. EVIDENCE ON EFFICIENCY AND VFM TO DATE	39
5.4. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES.....	44
5.5. EVIDENCE FROM A SYSTEMATIC DOCUMENT REVIEW	45
5.6. KEY FINDINGS	45
5.7. M&E SYSTEMS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.....	49
6. THEORY OF CHANGE, THE RELEVANCE OF CDKN'S ORIGINAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE TOC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR M&E AND LEARNING	52
6.1. BACKGROUND TO THE THEORY OF CHANGE.....	52
6.2. ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF CHANGE.....	52
6.3. THE RELEVANCE OF CDKN'S ORIGINAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE TOC	58
6.4. HOW THE TOC SHOULD BE IMPROVED FOR IMPROVED M&E.....	62
6.5. HOW THE THEORY OF CHANGE COULD BE IMPROVED TO STRENGTHEN LEARNING	64
7. RECOMMENDATIONS ON OPERATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY	68
ANNEX 1 – STUDY TERMS OF REFERENCE	73
ANNEX 2 – STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	69
ANNEX 3 – LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED	74
ANNEX 4 – COUNTRY VISIT REPORTS	82
ANNEX 5 – SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM ADDITIONAL OUTPUT REVIEWS	142

Figures

FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY	2
FIGURE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF THE CDKN NICHE FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDY STAKEHOLDERS.....	5
FIGURE 3: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES - YEAR 3	15
FIGURE 4: CDKN ADMINISTRATION COSTS	34
FIGURE 5: ADAPTATION FUND CATEGORISATION OF ADMINISTRATION CHARGES	35
FIGURE 6: CDKN ORGANOGRAM.....	44
FIGURE 7: SCALED CHANGES WITHIN DOC.....	63
FIGURE 8: USING THEORY OF CHANGE AND DOC TO STRUCTURE LEARNING QUESTIONS AND INFORM STRATEGIES.....	67
FIGURE 9: CDKN CURRENT SPEND PROFILE	68
FIGURE 10: CDKN SCENARIO 2 PROPOSAL TO ICF.....	69

Tables

Table 1: Project Administration and Management Costs in Comparator Funds	37
Table 3: Scores relating to Monitoring and Evaluation.....	48
Table 4: Scores related to lesson learning and knowledge sharing.....	49
Table 5: RAG Rating of CDKN’s current version of its Theory of Change.....	53
Table 6: Critical appraisal of assumptions	60
Table 7: Extract from the CDKN Rwanda Country Programme Report, September 2012.....	91

Recommendations

Recommendation 1 - KM Impact Pathway.....	10
Recommendation 2 – KM and Country/Regional Teams.....	10
Recommendation 3 – KM separation of functions.....	10
Recommendation 4 – COP side events.....	23
Recommendation 5 – AF publications.....	24
Recommendation 6 – AF and middle-income countries.....	24
Recommendation 7 – AF arrangements with DECC.....	24
Recommendation 8 – Greater use of the 75%.....	39
Recommendation 9 – Reducing conflict of interest.....	39
Recommendation 10 – DFID country climate change advisor role.....	41
Recommendation 11 – Particular CDKN emphasis on deep engagement countries.....	41
Recommendation 12 – Greater opportunities for joining up at the country level.....	41
Recommendation 13 – Give more flexibility to successful country programmes.....	41
Recommendation 14 - CDKN & DFID to reduce the cost of doing business with CDKN.....	43
Recommendation 15 – CDKN to speed up contracting of individuals.....	43
Recommendation 16 - The Network Council should become a strategic advisory board.....	44
Recommendation 17 –Project Impact Reviews and external independent verification.....	50
Recommendation 18 - Additional resources required for CDKN to undertake effective evaluation.....	50
Recommendation 19 – Strengthening the CDKN MIS.....	50
Recommendation 20 - Improving the incentives for critical reflection and honest reporting.....	51
Recommendation 21 – Refresh the theory of change and Dimensions of Change, at global and country level.....	53
Recommendation 22 – CDKN to check critical assumptions are up to date.....	58
Recommendation 23 – Provide a scale of changes for each dimension of change.....	62
Recommendation 24: CDKN should develop Learning Questions from the DOC.....	63
Recommendation 25: CDKN to ensure suppliers are consistently reporting on lessons.....	63
Recommendation 26:CDKN should develop a country impact pathway/theory of change at the outset.....	63
Recommendation 27:CDKN should follow-up on reviews and updating of the country impact pathway in the light of learning.....	64
Recommendation 28: DFID to provide additional funding to COP 2015.....	71
Recommendation 29: Timing of decision on future CDKN structure.....	72

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACCRA	African Climate Change Resilience Alliance
AF	Advocacy Fund
AL	Action Lab
ARCAB	Action Research on Community-Based Adaptation (Bangladesh)
BGD	Bangladesh
CC	Climate Change
CCD	Climate Compatible Development
CCS	Climate Change Secretariat
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CEL	Country Engagement Leader
CIM	Climate-induced migration project, or “Adaptation Policy Options and Interventions for Climate Change Induced Displaced People of Bangladesh”
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DECC	Department of Energy and Climate Change
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGIS	Directorate-General for International Cooperation (Netherlands)
DoC	Dimensions of Change
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDPRS	Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy
EPA	Environmental Protection Authority
ESMAP	Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
FONERWA	Rwanda National Climate and Environment Fund (French acronym)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGCR	Green Growth and Climate Resilience
GGGI	Global Green Growth Initiative
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
GoC	Government of Colombia
IDEAM	Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies (Colombia)
ICF	International Climate Fund
INVEMAR	Institute of Marine and Coastal Research (Colombia)
KM	Knowledge Management
L&D	Loss and damage project, or “Work Programme for Bangladesh on Loss and Damage”
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LEDS	Low Emissions Development Strategy
LEDS GP	Low Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS) Global Partnership
Logframe	DFID Logical Framework
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MADS	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Colombia)
MEMR	Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (Kenya)

MINERENA	Ministry of Natural Resources (Rwanda)
MoC	Management Oversight Committee
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MTP	Medium-Term Plan
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NC	Network Council
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NCCRS	National Climate Change Response Strategy
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PS	Permanent Secretary
QA	Quality Assurance
RCC	CDKN Rwanda Country Report
REMA	Rwanda Environment Management Institute
RO	Research Output
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute
SRM	Sectoral Reduction Mechanism
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VFM	Value for money

Executive Summary

The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) is now in its third year of operation although the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund (AF) – one of the five CDKN Outputs - started in mid-2011. This Report presents the findings of a mid-term review (MTR) of the CDKN programme and is based on an extensive document review and well over 100 interviews undertaken by the MTR team. In addition to interviews undertaken from the UK, Rwanda, Bangladesh and Colombia were selected for country reviews as examples of CDKN deep engagement countries. Shorter visits to Kenya (a deep engagement country) and Ethiopia (a medium engagement country) were undertaken to provide additional information on projects, a regional perspective and an opportunity to see the early stages of practical CDKN-GGGI (Global Green Growth Initiative) cooperation (in Ethiopia). At the request of CDKN, the team leader attended the eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18) in order to meet recipients of AF support, CDKN regional staff and suppliers.

Despite a demanding timeframe for this MTR we believe the approach taken has given us a fair view of CDKN. As deep engagement countries and Technical Assistance (TA) projects were over-represented in the country visits, core team members each took responsibility for reviewing progress on other Outputs (Knowledge Management (KM), Research, Partnerships and AF) beyond the case study countries (summarised in Annex 5).

Here we provide key findings and recommendations that relate to CDKN as a whole. Country-specific recommendations that flow from MTR country visits are given in the relevant country report in Annex 4.

Before addressing each of the headline evaluation questions in turn, our overall assessment is that CDKN is well within the range that the Department for International Development (DFID) could expect at this point in the programme. There is evidence of strong results delivery in the field of Climate Compatible Development (CCD), and clear signs that the programme has evolved in response to changes in context, and has responded to lessons and stakeholder feedback to endeavour to become a more relevant, effective and efficient CCD institution.

Is CDKN still needed?

Although a global Climate deal has not materialised, the logic for CDKN remains strong. The costs of climate change borne by least developed countries have been revised upwards and the scale of the challenge to the international community is enormous.

CDKN has also evolved in the past two and a half years. It started out with the intention of addressing 'demand' in some 60 countries almost to the exclusion of a strategic approach. As we approach the mid-term, there has been a clear shift to focusing on a smaller number of countries, a greater emphasis on deep engagement, appreciating the need to be a "critical friend" to countries expressing demand and recognition of the need to balance demand with a more strategic approach. All of this has taken some time and considerable effort to negotiate.

CDKN has demonstrated that it can help developing countries put in place and start to implement national climate strategies. The GGGI does have potential overlap with CDKN as a result of the GGGI definition of Green Growth. This overlap is only partial firstly, because CDKN focuses on CCD and the centrality of development to adaptation and mitigation. Secondly, CDKN has been demand-led from technical assistance all the way through to research. GGGI also lays particular emphasis on the green growth experience of the Republic of Korea and targets both emerging and developing countries. As GGGI is currently working in a handful of developing countries and CDKN aims to concentrate on up to 14 deep engagement countries the need for both organisations vastly outweighs their combined capacities.

The view that CDKN is still needed is confirmed by a wide range of stakeholders and key informants.

What is the CDKN niche?

In the first two years of operation CDKN has rapidly established a global presence and is currently disbursing £20m per year and managing 260 contracts with different suppliers. While this is an achievement the main claim to adding value is that CDKN occupies a particular niche.

CDKN defines their niche in terms of: their focus on climate compatible development; being responsive to developing country demand; producing synergy across Outputs; providing thought leadership; the breadth and depth of the north-south alliance partnership; and the quality of delivery. The country case studies undertaken as part of this MTR provide an opportunity to assess the extent to which this holds true. These are reported in full in Annex 4 – Country Visit Reports with a country by country summary in Section 4.3.

These findings are illustrated in Figure E1 below and confirm that CDKN has a niche in delivering high-quality support for climate compatible development that responds to recipient government demand. However, the CDKN niche varies from being narrow and technical assistance-focussed in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda to meeting a much wider set of needs in Colombia and, to some extent, in Bangladesh.

	Focus on CCD	Responds to Gov't demand	Cross-output synergy	Thought leadership on themes	Deep & broad north-south partnership	Fast, flexible high-quality delivery	
Ethiopia	Dark Green	Dark Green	Light Green	White	White	White	
Kenya	Dark Green	Dark Green	Light Green	White	White	Dark Green	
Rwanda	Dark Green	Dark Green	Light Green	White	White	White	
Bangladesh	Dark Green	Dark Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	
Colombia	Dark Green	Dark Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	
	Both CDKN & stakeholders confirm this dimension of "the niche"						
	Stakeholders provide a mixed picture on this dimension of "the niche"						
	No convincing evidence seen on this dimension of "the niche"						

Figure E1: Perceptions of the CDKN niche from country case study stakeholders

Progress towards impact

Identifying systematic evidence of impact is beyond the scope of the MTR and will be addressed in more detail in the Final Evaluation. Nonetheless, the country case studies provide some evidence of progress along impact pathways – a richer and more useful source than the logframe indicators. The best progress has been seen where there has been strategic regional and country engagement supported by a suitable country engagement leader (in Colombia). CDKN recognise that this approach would ideally have been used in Rwanda. The Bangladesh case study illustrates potential to progress towards impact that may not be realised due to limited consultation and a need for additional field research. In Rwanda, a strategy is in place that has the potential to deliver significant benefits to communities but lack of capacity across government currently threatens to prevent CCD guidelines becoming CCD investments in priority sectors. In Kenya there has certainly been progress along the impact pathway but less than that claimed by CDKN: specifically, it is too soon to claim that support to the Climate Change Secretariat has been achieved and CDKN’s focus should shift to the private sector and civil society.

Recommendations for improvements to delivery, impact and performance

We have drawn on country case studies (Section 4.3 and Annex 4) and Output reviews (summarised in Annex 5) to produce recommendations by Output area. These are as follows:

Knowledge management

Recommendation 1

KM should develop an impact pathway and structured learning questions, especially about the role of an ‘enabling environment for CCD’ to make a stronger contribution to CDKN’s body of learning.

Recommendation 2

KM needs a more consistent approach to work with country and regional teams on learning, focusing on gathering and aggregating lessons from countries and regions, and feeding back to these.

Recommendation 3

KM needs to ensure a separation between its three functions of corporate communications, strategic communications for the sector and communicating learning on CCD.

Research

CDKN should use deep country engagement as an opportunity to draw in world-leading researchers on key CCD issues. While CDKN is not well placed to commission large, high-profile research projects, it could engage leading researchers to develop country-based applications of their research that are funded by other larger and longer-term research programmes.

Take more time for project design and research commissioning. Ideally this should be done collaboratively by diverse local and overseas partners, in order to capture the most innovative ideas and ensure that project design reflects local demand and realities. While CDKN’s current procedures for commissioning global and regional research have many merits, they could also clearly be improved.

CDKN research commissioning is not currently an efficient or effective way of building southern capacity. If this is an objective, it would be better to approach it as a separate exercise.

TA and cross-cutting

CDKN recognise that investing in deep engagement countries is an effective strategy. As our Country reviews show (see Section 4.3 and Annex 4) investing in understanding and engaging deeply in a country using a country engagement leader (CEL) is a critical success factor and will drive value for money going forward.

Recommendation 11

CDKN should place particular emphasis on a limited number of countries where it has a CEL. The CEL should be put in place early on in the country programme. This person should be able to work at a senior, strategic level and be based in-country unless CDKN can clearly demonstrate this is not required. Where there are small, regionally-integrated countries it may be feasible to have a regional engagement leader instead e.g. the Caribbean. Conversely, working in a number of Indian States is likely to require multiple engagement leaders. Where CDKN partners an organisation such as GGGI that has their own CEL and strategy that CDKN can support (e.g. in Ethiopia) it is very unlikely that a separate CDKN CEL will provide value for money.

Recommendation 13

Where deep engagement country programmes such as Colombia have put in place a CEL, have a Theory of Change (ToC), demonstrate strategic engagement and produce synergies by combining multiple outputs (TA, research etc.), they should be given flexible funding to achieve outcomes and impact. In this case the country ToC would be the key monitoring tool.

Partnerships

In the latest CDKN Business Plan, 'Partnerships' was changed to a cross-cutting rather than stand-alone output. Although the management team made a case for this shift to the Network Council (NC) and then to the (Management Oversight Committee (MoC)) to gain approval, the rationale and implications of this shift have not been explicitly elaborated. CDKN should explain the rationale behind this shift as well as detail how this will deliver additional value. This should include:

- a. An overall partnerships strategy detailing the processes and mechanisms for operationalising Partnerships as a cross-cutting theme with the smallest output area budget and which is now entirely spent or committed;*
- b. An explanation of how Partnerships as a cross-cutting theme will systematically enhance synergies across the other outputs, particularly identifying opportunities to integrate with the predominantly TA-led country programmes, in order to deliver a CDKN programme that is 'greater than the sum of its parts'.*

Advocacy Fund

Recommendation 4

CDKN should use their COP side events more strategically. Rather than using short presentations of existing material from panel members they should use the opportunity to present significant CDKN research or KM results and change the way that listeners look at a particular CCD issue.

Recommendation 5

CDKN should formalise a quality assurance process to review relevant publications in order to confirm these cannot be easily misinterpreted as endorsing a particular negotiating position.

Recommendation 6

DFID should consider how best to contribute to meeting the demand for negotiations support from middle income countries that share a progressive agenda. DFID should consider whether it is possible to do this by expanding the AF, looking for additional donor support and aligning the AF scope of work with the rest of CDKN. If not, lessons from the AF could be used in establishing a separate, potentially multi-donor version of the AF for middle income countries.

Recommendation 7

In order to improve CDKN communications with the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), CDKN should establish regular systematic discussion in place of ad hoc discussion.

The extent to which the CDKN approach and design ensures impact and value for money

Efficiency metrics

We have undertaken a fairly detailed comparison of CDKN administration costs against data generated on UN climate organisations (for the Adaptation Fund) and data provided by CDKN on Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) charges. This analysis suggests that total administration charges for CDKN are likely to be lower than for Global Environment Facility or the Adaptation Fund – up to 5% lower. Likewise, CDKN appears relatively cost-efficient when the comparison is between narrow CDKN administration charges and those levied by ESMAP.

Piloting and scaling up

Evidence from the Colombia case study illustrates the value of using pilot projects, often at a sub-national level, which can be subsequently replicated and scaled up using a country engagement leader and a deep engagement process. CDKN argue that piloting has been important in a number of countries – “Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh (Loss & Damage) being good examples”. Nonetheless, the evidence from Bangladesh case study (see Annex 4) suggests that stakeholders saw the pilots as being very limited in scale and scope.

Incentives provided by the CDKN design

In practice, the 25:75 arrangement has resulted in some frustration for both CDKN and suppliers. This partly reflects the choice of what to outsource but there are also some inherent problems with this design (leading to more potential conflicts of interest than the standard manager/supplier split in responsibilities).

Our interviews suggest that CDKN has chosen to interpret what can be contracted out more narrowly than DFID originally intended. Strategic thinking, in particular, has not been outsourced and is likely to reflect management desire to keep control of the agenda and a desire to avoid giving competitors an advantage.

Recommendation 8

We do recognise that it is not always easy to get time from leading thinkers in competitor institutions but we believe more could be done by offering larger and longer-term contracts that made it more attractive for these individuals to commit to CDKN.

Recommendation 9

There are things that can be done to reduce conflict of interest within the 25:75 model. For example, CDKN should ensure that Country and Regional Engagement Leaders are hired from the 75% budget and are not Alliance member staff.

Forging a cross-cultural institutional alliance

The CDKN Alliance has brought together private sector, think tank and non-governmental organisations with a wide range of expertise on climate change and development. The downside of assembling an Alliance of many different institutions has been an institutional culture clash that has limited communication and reduced effectiveness. This challenge has been recognised and, although it has taken some time, there are signs of improvement. However, reflecting on the design of CDKN, the costs of institutional culture clash were almost certainly underestimated by DFID when this model was adopted. It also suggests that there will be significant non-financial costs where re-tendering involves constructing a new complex institutional alliance.

Working with DFID country offices

Problems have arisen where country programmes co-fund projects with CDKN and Advisors found it very difficult to know “who had funded what”. There is also a risk that DFID is paying twice for managing interventions if both country offices and CDKN work on the same issue. As DFID country climate programmes tend to be much larger than CDKN projects in these countries (e.g. in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda) we recommend the following.

Recommendation 10

In countries with DFID climate change programmes it is important that the advisor has oversight of CDKN projects – even if this is simply to confirm consistency with the country strategy and that there are good reasons for not managing it “in-house”. Given the requirement for independence this should not apply to the AF.

Cross-output synergies

The Country Visits uncovered several examples of synergies across CDKN output areas delivering outcomes that were more than the sum of their parts. However, this was only occurring systematically in Colombia – reflecting a strong and strategic country and regional programme. The Colombia case illustrates the potential to use the country strategy and CEL to combine Outputs. Partners in the CDKN Colombia projects also welcomed the access to international research expertise and new ideas as well as access to international platforms for knowledge sharing. This supports CDKN’s role as a global public goods programme.

Recommendation 12

CDKN should place greater focus on country strategy and CEL to combine Outputs:

i) Countries should drive the combination of deep engagement, a CEL and strategic engagement. Country programmes should draw on combinations of Technical Assistance (TA), national and international research, communications and knowledge management and partnerships to ensure a multi-channel strategy at the country level (for example, supporting technical assistance with strategic communications to widen public understanding of climate and development as a mainstream issue).

ii) CDKN’s Outputs should be better grounded in the strategy, activities and lessons at the country level – responding to priorities as they emerge, applying lessons learned through working with priority audience and stakeholders in deep engagement countries and then transferring these activities and lessons elsewhere.

Design issues affecting CDKN programme delivery

CDKN project procurement is widely regarded as sophisticated, innovative and efficient. This is most evident for technical assistance projects. Nonetheless, by attempting to pass on all risks and implementing DFID’s terms and conditions of the head contract to the letter, CDKN has imposed significant costs on suppliers. This threatens effectiveness and hence value for money (VFM): one supplier who has produced one of CDKN’s most highly regarded products told us he “will never work with CDKN again.” There is clearly a need to reduce the cost of doing business with CDKN. The MTR team received many complaints that fall into two categories: i) PwC contracting took no account of developing country realities; and ii) Contracts have been specified in excessive detail and the burden of reporting is much higher than for other donors.

We recognise the logic of commissioning a good part of the research portfolio fairly early in the life of the project. However, pressure to spend rapidly has been counterproductive in a number of cases – this was most evident in the Bangladesh case study.

Recommendation 14

There is a need to lower the costs of doing business with CDKN. CDKN and DFID should set up a senior task force to examine and quickly report on how they can reduce the cost of doing business with CDKN. Supplier feedback on time to get contracts in place and transactions costs should be monitored and reported.

Recommendation 15

It is essential for CDKN to speed up the contracting of individuals. If PwC cannot manage the associated risks through individual professional indemnity insurance, CDKN regional offices should develop the capacity to help critical individuals establish limited companies in their home countries. DFID should consider making the ability to contract individuals a requirement for programme management contracts.

Governance structures and practice

In principle, the MoC should provide detailed management oversight for DFID and the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) and the NC should lead visioning and strategy (supported by external advisors who meet twice a year). In practice, there is overlap in the functions of the MoC and NC, with the NC being used to address management issues. This results in: inefficient use of NC member skills, ineffective use of NC time, inefficient use of CDKN management time and a potentially weaker strategic focus.

Recommendation 16

The NC should become a strategic advisory board and avoid duplicating management oversight provided by the MoC.

Evidence from a systematic document review

The MTR team conducted a comprehensive document review of 13 projects at the deliver stage in country case studies using evidence taken from the CDKN document database (Huddle).

The findings of the documents reviews confirm our findings from elsewhere – that CDKN projects are well-designed and impact potential is explicitly focused on at the design stage. This supports the observed successes in delivery.

However, much weaker monitoring and evaluation (M&E, including reporting of M&E) means that it is difficult to track through how this design translates to sustainable changes and impact in practice. Importantly, it also means that important lessons are not being captured, either as a way of improving and adapting strategies or as an input to the broader learning about CCD that CDKN is generating.

Performance against the logframe – progress against outputs

The MTR team made detailed assessments of each of the CDKN output areas combining interviews with CDKN output area staff in London and through the country visits, document review of key output area projects, and a more formal proforma-based desk review of a sample of output project documents. Overall, the MTR notes good progress. We find that CDKN is progressing in line with the output indicators defined in the logframe across all five output areas. Evidence of outputs witnessed through the country visits as well as interviews with CDKN output team members supports this progress.

The MTR team found one or two small examples of potentially weak or flawed data generation processes or assumptions which may over-estimate the extent of CDKN output-level success but these are not expected to be significant and can be relatively easily addressed.

Across all five outputs, it is apparent that the primarily quantitative logframe indicators are limited and may not fully capture the nature of the role that output plays within CDKN's overall strategy and theory of change. One reason for this is that the CDKN logframe at the output level is pitched too low. In relation to CDKN's overall results framework, the outputs defined and discussed above are actually activities. This means in practice that CDKN are tracking too many indicators, which tend to be overly quantitative in nature and hence tend not to be the right ones in terms of describing the lower levels of trajectory towards impact, and how and why activities and outputs support CDKN as first steps on the trajectory.

Performance against the logframe – progress against outcomes

The MTR team approached the assessment of progress from outputs to outcomes through CDKN's Dimensions of Change (DoC) in three ways: i) By triangulating evidence and experience generated across the MTR with CDKN progress against outcomes as defined in the Annual M&E Report 2012-2013; ii) By searching for systematic examples of CDKN output areas delivering outcomes, particularly through Country Programmes, which contribute to, or are delivered through, DoC; and iii) By identifying cross-output area synergies that offer evidence of delivering 'multiplier' type outcomes indicating that the CDKN programme is 'greater than the sum of their parts'.

In summary, there are promising results being generated through CDKN's efforts against the outcomes, so good progress is being made. The MTR has focused on CDKN's outputs and countries. There is evidence that in combination, these initiatives are supporting CDKN's position as a global public goods programme that influences internationally as well as within countries and regions. This is a good achievement. Evidence generated across the MTR generally endorses that described in CDKN's annual M&E report at the outcome levels. In some case significant gains have been made, in others, smaller 'steps' have been taken, but in the right direction.

However, the M&E evidence that is being reported does not always home in on the causal link, and at times draws the wrong conclusion, and so CDKN's contribution is not always correctly identified. This has led to some instances where CDKN has over-claimed success or claimed success that is largely due to others.

Recommendation 17

A representative sample of project impact reviews (PIRs) should be subject to external independent verification.

Recommendation 18

Additional resources are needed to enable CDKN to undertake effective evaluation. Some of this can be contracted in (e.g. for external independent verification of PIRs) but the in-house team will also need additional resources to implement our recommendations on strengthening analysis of causal linkages.

Lack of a real-time project management information system

CDKN is a large and complex programme currently managing approximately £20 million a year and 260 contracts. Yet there is no real-time project management information system that enables data on spend to be brought together with basic performance monitoring data.

Recommendation 19

At a very minimum, the "Compass" project management system should have real time data on project funding, start dates and linkages with Clusters. If the PwC procurement tracker is used it should allow CDKN TA projects to be easily distinguished from catering provided by PwC to CDKN.

Incentives for critical reflection and honest attribution

The MTR team has identified combination of institutional incentives and reporting requirements that have led to i) a failure to learn from experience; ii) a tendency to confuse public relations and M&E; and iii) over-claiming of CDKN success. The problems appear to result from the **combination** of the following factors:

1. MoC requests for impact stories;
2. A laudable PwC focus on delivery and ensuring client satisfaction (but if MoC require impact stories that is exactly what they get);
3. Unrealistic expectations of the time taken to achieve a global presence; and
4. The requirement to report quarterly on project impact when it is very difficult to observe changing impact on a quarterly basis.

Recommendation 20

Improve the incentives for critical reflection and honest reporting by making the following changes:

- *The MoC should rely on fewer CDKN impact stories but with more in-depth coverage;*
- *Change the format of quarterly reports so these cover monitoring of activities, spend and issues that need to be brought to the attention of the MoC and introduce separate, six-monthly evaluation progress reports to the MoC.*
- *Evaluation progress reports should be prepared independently by the CDKN M&E team;*
- *Make more extensive use of contribution analysis in CDKN M&E. This can simply involve publishing the CDKN share of funding to a project or programme but can also include testable arguments for why CDKN is claiming a greater share of total impact than its share of total project funding; and*
- *Strengthen opportunities for reflective learning within CDKN*

Theory of Change, the Relevance of CDKN's Original Assumptions for the ToC and Implications for M&E and learning

It is to CDKN's credit that a ToC was developed at the outset. The ToC and DoC are strongly integrated into CDKN's systems and ways of thinking, so we are not recommending a wholesale revision. Rather, we recommend that refinements are now made to reflect learning and bring it up to date with CDKN's task now.

Strengths

The CDKN ToC is well-embedded in the systems and procedures of the programme: the DoC are well integrated into the formats used for design and commissioning of projects, monitoring and evaluation, and project impact reviews. CDKN teams refer to the DoC regularly when describing their work.

Weaknesses

The ToC documentation explains to some degree the thinking that has informed CDKN's approach. It is reasonably clear on the 'what' and 'how', but does not explain the 'why'. This means that the ToC has been effective at guiding strategies, but it is not now reflecting important insights from the first two years. This means that is not currently an effective framework for interpreting results and providing a strategic steer for the coming period.

The most significant gaps in the current version of the ToC are:

- i) no assumptions have been documented at the global level apart from in the logical framework (and many of these are now out of date)
- ii) no explanations linking short-term changes to longer-term ones, expressed by the DoC
- iii) no descriptors of different stages of within the DoC.

At the global level, it would be useful to document the assumptions that explain cause-effect linkages, of course non-linear, behind how changes at the DoC link to the CDKN outcomes.

This would strengthen the ToC as a framework for interpreting the results of M&E, and interpreting the degree of change which has been achieved at this stage in the programme.

The Country Programme documents are strong on an analysis of the context, factors and actors. The formats and key questions used to frame country strategies are strong on eliciting contextual analysis and contextualising the proposed strategy and projects. There are specific questions about facilitating factors and barriers. It is possible to read the country programme as a strategic response to these. Links are also made back to the overall theory of change through links with the DoC. There is also an Impact Pathway described. However, this is not done systematically across each country, nor each DoC.

Theory of Change and Learning

An out-of-date ToC means that the quality of what is actually learned from experience about what is required to implement CCD might be affected. At the MTR stage, learning does not appear to be being guided by a theory of change about CCD or impact pathways thinking.

By not having this framing, the opportunity to bring together a holistic view of what it takes to design and deliver CCD could become fragmented. Certainly our review suggests that important *process* and *capacity* questions and learning arising from practical experience in countries and regions could easily be missed, due to the focus on products and themes.

An updated CDKN ToC and DoC should be used to structure and guide learning. There seems to be strong potential for learning, and learning groups are already forming. There are two main strategies for strategic learning:

- Commissioning Group - meeting quarterly to provide strategic guidance on what should be commissioned in KM and Research.
- Cluster Strategy - a platform for thought leadership, looking across all the outputs – TA, KM, Research, Partnerships and Advocacy – to synthesise, see gaps and commission work. It covers operational, ‘experience’ and research-based knowledge, increasingly from CDKN-supported sources, but also from other relevant sources.

However, M&E does not appear to be so explicitly linked in, but should also make its contribution to CDKN learning, alongside KM, Research, the Cluster Strategy and country and regional-based learning.

Recommendations 21-23

CDKN should refresh its ToC and DoC, paying particular attention to drawing out the impact pathways at the global level and some of the key cause-effect assumptions; as well as finding a way of describing a scale of change within the DoC so that the significance of results to date can be interpreted

Recommendation 24

CDKN should develop Learning Questions from the cause-effect 'links' between and within the DoC, and address these through multiple lenses, including M&E

Recommendation 25

CDKN should find appropriate ways to ensure that suppliers are consistently reporting on lessons and results, as well as delivery.

Recommendation 26

CDKN should develop a country impact pathway/theory of change at the outset that explicitly identifies assumptions that need to be met to progress along the results chain. This would help achieve VFM, as CDKN management can then regularly monitor progress by country teams against a ToC-based results framework and will be in a stronger position to know if failure to achieve a particular milestone is a threat to success of the project.

Recommendation 27

CDKN should follow-up on reviews and updating of the country impact pathway in the light of learning, with previous versions kept as a record of the evolving strategic learning and responses of the country teams. There should be some appraisal and feedback given to ensure that the country programmes apply the Impact Pathway consistently, that it is logical and meets quality criteria.

Operational sustainability

Medium term – to COP 2015

Our assessment is that the current spending profile does not leave sufficient time to realise the benefits of successful CDKN investment in deep engagement, partnerships, research findings and lessons or relationships critical for the AF. It has also taken more than two years to build some coherence between very different institutional cultures within the CDKN Alliance. In the case of the AF, the current contract will terminate six months before COP 2015, removing support to negotiators in a critical period.

Recommendation 28

We suggest that DFID look to providing additional funding to enable effective operation of CDKN at the current scale until COP 2015. One suitable option of achieving this is the CDKN Scenario 2 proposal put to DFID for International Climate Fund support.

Recommendation 29

We also recommend leaving the decision on future organisational structure until sometime after the MTR – to allow for the other MTR recommendations to be implemented. If CDKN is extended as proposed above, this would allow a more detailed assessment of longer-term funding options to be undertaken. However, if the recommendation to consider turning CDKN into an international organisation is taken up (see below) this assessment will need to be undertaken well in advance of mid-2015.

Longer term – post COP 2015

We have identified that CDKN will be needed after 2015 but there are a number of reasons why new institutional arrangements should be considered. Ideally we would be making recommendations on future

organisational structure sometime after the MTR. Nonetheless, we set out various options that DFID should start to consider at this stage.

Given the reporting deadline for this MTR it has simply not been possible to develop and discuss alternative models with potential donors. In practice, DFID will need to take the lead on this issue and the responses received will play an important part in determining the best option. We also note that if our recommendations are followed on expanding successful country programmes this is likely to provide opportunities for additional donor funding at the country level.

Option 1: Current model, re-tender in 2015

Pros

- Relatively low risk – weaknesses have been identified and many can be addressed.
- Relatively cost-efficient compared to international organisations.

Cons

- Having an institution subject to national law (e.g. UK) will preclude UN funding and may discourage some donors.
- There are fundamental incentive-compatibility problems with the 25:75 model that cannot easily be addressed e.g. conflict of interest.
- A re-tender before COP 2015 would be a serious distraction for CDKN management.
- Financial and non-financial costs of a re-tender every five years are significant.

Option 2: Current model, re-tender in 2016

We understand that DFID could choose to extend the current PwC contract provided the total contract value was no more than 150% of the original contract value. It would have the advantage over Option 1 of delaying a re-tender until after COP 2015 and spreading the re-tender cost over a longer-period. This is likely to outweigh the concerns of competitors who would have to wait another year *if* a re-tender of the current model is the selected option.

Option 3: Release restriction on in-house share (IGC type model), tender in 2016

In this case, the in-house share of spend would be significantly higher than 25%.

Pros

- This could produce a broader alliance than is currently the case e.g. by bringing in academic institutions.
- Likely to produce efficiency gains in some areas (where CDKN has demonstrated it could undertake work in-house at lower cost than by outsourcing).

Cons

- CCD is a very diverse area (much more so than for research on growth) and no alliance will have all the skills needed. Evidence from this MTR is that the 75% outsourcing requirement cannot ensure that “strategic thinking” is bought in. With a lower outsourcing requirement there would be more incentive to use winning team members rather than finding the best person for the job.
- Likely to produce efficiency losses in some areas (where in-house resources are a more expensive option).
- If contract holders are suppliers outside of this contract there would be the same type of conflict of interest issues that apply to Option 2 but the scale of the problem would be greater.

- As this model has not been tested in the CCD space we should anticipate risks in addition to those associated with Option 2.

We therefore suggest that option 3 is less attractive than option 2 and should be rejected.

Option 4: Manager/supplier split (increase restriction on in-house share), tender in 2016

Pros

- Likely to reduce conflict of interest
- Well tested delivery model
- Can draw on the best supplier for a particular task
- Best practices (such as use of CELs) carry over
- Current alliance partners can focus on being suppliers

Cons

- Likely to have less southern engagement
- Loss of some cross-output synergy (as some of this is within the Option 2 25% but some is within country)
- Would lose any cross-alliance culture that is developed in Option 2
- Suppliers have less stake in CDKN than they would if they are in the 25%
- Could require an administration fee of up to 20% to invest in country and regional management

Our assessment in this MTR is that a large proportion of cross-output synergy is developed around deep country engagement facilitated by country-engagement leaders. This would continue under Option 4. In practice, any contract manager would need to buy in regional expertise and it is likely that contractual arrangements would start to replicate those currently used in Option 2. The difference would be that a higher proportion of the cost would be charged to administration as there would be no in-house spend.

The trade-off is therefore principally between reduced conflict of interest and some loss of synergy between outputs. Our assessment is that the disruption and cost of changing managers following a re-tender would be significantly greater than that produced from shifting from Option 2 to Option 4. However, Option 4 is no more likely to be attractive to a wider set of donors than Option 2.

Option 5: Establish CDKN as a new international organisation in 2016

Pros

- Likely to attract a wider range of donors
- No disruption and cost of periodic re-tendering
- It is easier for an international organisation to put the case for international public goods than one led by a private UK company
- Potential for southern engagement

Cons

- Risk of being drawn into politics and losing focus
- Loss of efficiency – United Nations and multilateral climate organisation administration costs are up to 5% higher than CDKN
- Loss of flexibility and speed would remove a crucial CDKN niche
- GGGI is already in this space. There may not be appetite for another new player.

There is no doubt that Option 5 is the most ambitious and risky of those we have proposed. Whether it is viable depends on whether the “cons” identified above can be mitigated. This would be more likely if:

1. The CDKN mandate is very clearly articulated in organisational objectives;
2. A strong country focus based around outsourced CELs is developed by CDKN; and
3. There is innovative use of private-sector procurement as well as delivery.

An option that would undoubtedly be interesting for donors is a joint CDKN-GGGI institution. There is sufficient overlap in areas of interest and a common focus on having deep engagement countries for this to be a possibility. However, the methods of working (in terms of being demand-led, approach to research etc) and institutional cultures are very different. It would require a determined commitment to find a common vision but we suggest this is an option worth further consideration.

It would be better to make recommendations on the future organisational structure sometime after the MTR when we could observe the extent to which the MTR recommendations have been implemented. If we are denied this luxury we are inclined to recommend the manager/supplier split (Option 4) marginally ahead of Option 2 as the low-risk option but recommend that DFID/DGIS actively consider the potential for CDKN to become an international organisation (Option 5), particularly if a CDKN-GGGI merger that preserves fundamental CDKN values is a realistic possibility.

1. Introduction

This Report presents the findings of a mid-term review (MTR) of the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) programme that has been undertaken between November 2012 and February 2013. The terms of reference (TOR) for our work can be found in Annex 1.

CDKN is now in its third year of operation although the Climate Window of the Advocacy Fund (AF) – one of the five CDKN Outputs - started in mid-2011. This MTR has been brought forward by some six months to meet operational constraints faced by DFID. Consequently, it is too early to say if logframe milestones for 2013 have been achieved. Nonetheless, we have been able to draw on a great deal of reporting from the CDKN Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system up to January 2013, an extensive review of project and programme documents and country visits. We have also significantly exceeded the requirements of the TOR to make three country visits by undertaking interviews in Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Colombia, Bangladesh and in Doha at the eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18).

The TOR state the purpose of the MTR is to:

1. Provide an external and independent assessment of:
 - The extent to which CDKN is performing against its logical framework;
 - The impact of the programme to date within CDKN’s Dimensions of Change (DoC); and
 - The extent to which the CDKN approach and design ensures impact.
2. Analyse the assumptions that underpin the design of CDKN and CDKN’s TOR, and assess the continued relevance of the original assumptions.
3. Provide recommendations for improvements to delivery, impact and performance, if any, throughout the remainder of the current phase.
4. Provide recommendations on operational sustainability for CDKN beyond present financing commitments.


In addition, the TOR also recognises that the MTR will need to effectively answer questions such as “Is CDKN needed”?

The remainder of this report addresses these questions. Section 2 sets out the methodology we have used and how this incorporates the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria. In Section 3 we look at the *relevance* of CDKN (globally and using country case study evidence) under the question “Is CDKN needed?” Section 4 is concerned primarily with the OECD-DAC criteria of *results* and *effectiveness* as we examine the extent to which CDKN is performing against its logical framework and the impact of the programme to date within CDKN’s DoC. In Section 5, we consider *efficiency* alongside effectiveness and results under the question of “the extent to which the CDKN approach and design ensures impact and value for money”. Governance structures, M&E systems and reporting requirements are also covered in this part of the report. Section 6 focuses on the CDKN theory of change (ToC) and opportunities for learning in order to address the extent to which the original assumptions that underpin the design of CDKN and CDKN’s TOR remains relevant. Recommendations for improvements to delivery, impact and performance and recommendations on operational sustainability for CDKN beyond present financing commitments are provided within the Executive Summary. Country visit reports are contained in Annex 4.

2. Methodology used for this MTR

The evidence collected by this MTR is derived from an extensive document review and well over 100 interviews and is illustrated in the Figure below. Despite a demanding timeframe for this MTR we believe the approach taken has given us a fair view of CDKN. As deep engagement countries and TA projects were over-represented in the country visits, core team members each took responsibility for reviewing progress on other Outputs (KM, Research, Partnerships and AF) beyond the case study countries.

Figure 1: Overview of methodology



Specifically our approach has involved:

Document review

- Major strategy and M&E documents covering the programme were provided by CDKN in a newly-created space on the “Huddle” system.
- We have undertaken a systematic review of all completed project design and delivery reports for Bangladesh, Colombia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Rwanda against a consistent set of performance criteria. Team members were able to access these reports on the “Compass” system.

Stakeholder interviews and discussion

- We have undertaken interviews with more than 100 stakeholders for this MTR. The majority of these have been individual interviews and have been on an anonymous basis to encourage open and free discussion.
- Prior to starting our interviews we developed a set of questions against the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria. These can be found in Annex 2 – Structured interview questions. In practice, these were used to guide interviews and only certain questions were used in any particular interview.
- The collated list of individuals and organisations interviewed is given in Annex 3 and includes donors (DFID and DGIS), recipients, suppliers, independent sector experts and CDKN staff.

Attending COP 18 in Doha

- CDKN argued that it would be very useful for the team leader to attend the COP. Although this was not part of the TOR or our bid (and so we had to fund this from our existing budget) it did provide a unique opportunity to interview recipients of AF support, meet CDKN regional staff, talk to suppliers and potential users of CDKN products and attend side-events organised by CDKN. This was made possible by excellent facilitation by CDKN staff in a chaotic environment.

Country reviews

- Rwanda, Bangladesh and Colombia were selected for country reviews as examples of CDKN deep engagement countries. Shorter visits to Kenya (a deep engagement country) and Ethiopia (a medium engagement country) were undertaken to provide additional information on projects, a regional perspective and an opportunity to see the early stages of practical CDKN-GGGI cooperation (in Ethiopia). Country reviews have been written up individually and form the country visit report in Annex 4.
- Stakeholder interviews were undertaken with recipients, suppliers, independent key informants, and CDKN regional/country staff. We also spoke to a number of DFID country office staff – including those currently in post and those who had been involved when the relevant CDKN projects had started.
- Although the large majority of 20 projects reviewed were TA projects, the country reviews provided some opportunity to identify cross-output working and, to a limited extent, regional linkages. In Bangladesh the review focussed on the three major pieces of work funded by CDKN (from a total of seven projects completed or underway). In Rwanda, interviews covered all three completed projects but most attention was given to the large strategy and climate finance projects. In Kenya the review focussed on six completed projects and looked at the emerging work in Ethiopia.

Detailed output reviews

- Although a number of the projects labelled TA in our review countries have research components we were concerned at the preponderance of TA projects in our country reviews (17 out of 20) and want to ensure adequate attention to other areas of CDKN operations. Hence, team members have also led additional reviews on each output against the OECD-DAC criteria and these are used to inform this report.

3. Is CDKN needed?

3.1. A Global Perspective

In some important respects the challenge now facing CDKN is greater than when it was first conceived. A global deal has not materialised and the costs of climate change borne by least developed countries have been revised upwards.¹

It is true that a number of developing countries have put in place climate strategies (some with support from CDKN) but in all cases these need to be turned into plans that meet the needs of the poor and will have to be financed. The vast majority of countries eligible for official development assistance have yet to produce comprehensive national climate strategies. The scale of the challenge to the international community let alone CDKN remains enormous.

Nonetheless, there are some new donor-supported actors in the climate compatible development (CCD_ space. Of these, the only one with a significant potential overlap with CDKN in terms of focus issues is the Global Green Growth Initiative (GGGI). The GGGI does have potential overlap with CDKN as a result of the broad GGGI definition of Green Growth² with the main overlap being in supporting green growth, climate resilient strategies for developing countries³. This constitutes one of the three pillars of GGGI and 55%-60% of the current CDKN project portfolio. There is also a convergence between the CDKN approach of deep engagement using a CEL and the GGGI “full service engagement”.

Nonetheless, this overlap is only partial firstly, because CDKN focuses on CCD and the centrality of development and poverty reduction to adaptation and mitigation. Secondly, CDKN has been demand-led from technical assistance all the way through to research.⁴ GGGI also lays particular emphasis on the green growth experience of the Republic of Korea and targets emerging as well as developing countries. As GGGI is currently working in a handful of developing countries and CDKN aims to concentrate on up to 14 deep engagement countries the need for both organisations vastly outweighs their combined capacities. While there is more than enough work to go around, there will be increasing opportunities for CDKN to add value through partnerships (with GGGI, the World Bank, UN agencies and other actors).

The view that CDKN is still needed is confirmed by a wide range of stakeholders and key informants the MTR team has consulted.

¹ <http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/climate-vulnerability-monitor-2012/> and Nicholas Stern discussing this issue at Davos 2013: 'I got it wrong on climate change – it's far, far worse'
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/27/nicholas-stern-climate-change-davos?INTCMP=SRCH>

² The GGGI Mission is to pioneer and diffuse “a new model of economic growth, known as “green growth,” that simultaneously targets key aspects of economic performance, such as poverty reduction, job creation and social inclusion, and those of environmental sustainability, such as mitigation of climate change and biodiversity loss and security of access to clean energy and water”.

³ GGGI do not use the term climate resilience but highlight sustainability and resource access.

⁴ Lord Nicholas Stern is a co-Vice Chair of GGGI and a Strategic Advisor to CDKN. Unfortunately, he was not available for interview during the MTR period.

3.2. The CDKN Niche: Evidence on Relevance from Country Case Studies

CDKN have recently⁵ identified their niche as the following:

- We focus on climate compatible development, integrating climate and development challenges into sustainable solutions.
- We are demand-led, committed to a partnership model which responds to demand at country level, but also from regional and global networks.
- We combine technical assistance, research, partnerships, knowledge management, and negotiations support to deliver practical solutions. We do so at the sub-national, national, regional and global levels.
- We focus on learning and thought leadership around four thematic areas: climate compatible development planning; climate finance; disaster risk management; and support for climate negotiations. These are supported by sectoral clusters of work on climate-smart agriculture, energy, water security, coastal zones, and urban and sub-national areas.
- We are global network both South and North led: our regional leadership and hubs are in Cape Town, Quito, Islamabad, and the global hub in London. Our regional hubs oversee country-based partners so that we are as close as possible to our clients and the need. The CDKN alliance of PwC, ODI, SSN, FFLA, LEAD and INTRAC represents a public-private sector partnership unprecedented in breadth and depth of expertise on climate change and development.
- Our commercial model means we procure and bring together the best global and local experts and institutions to deliver research, technical assistance, knowledge products and capacity support. This provides flexibility in response to demand and value for money (VFM).
- We have a proven record of delivering change on the ground: after two years of operation we are working in over 40 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean with public and private sector, civil society and international institutions. We are currently disbursing £20m per year, managing 260 contracts with different suppliers through state of the art procurement and supervision practice.

The country case studies undertaken as part of this MTR provide an opportunity to assess the extent to which this holds true. Figure 2 summarises our findings and confirms that CDKN has a niche in delivering high-quality support for climate compatible development that responds to recipient government demand. However, this niche varies from being primarily technical assistance-led in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda to meeting a much wider set of needs in Colombia and, to some extent, in Bangladesh.

Figure 2: Perceptions of the CDKN niche from country case study stakeholders

	Focus on CCD	Responds to Gov't demand	Cross-output synergy	Thought leadership on themes	Deep & broad north-south partnership	Fast, flexible high-quality delivery
Ethiopia	Green	Green				
Kenya	Green	Green	Green			Green
Rwanda	Green	Green				
Bangladesh	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Colombia	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
	Both CDKN & stakeholders confirm this dimension of "the niche"					
	Stakeholders provide a mixed picture on this dimension of "the niche"					
	No convincing evidence seen on this dimension of "the niche"					

The full country case studies on which this assessment is based can be found in Annex 4 to this report.

⁵ CDKN Draft Strategy for MoC Review, January 2013

4. The extent to which CDKN is performing against its logical framework and the impact of the programme to date within CDKN's Dimensions of Change

4.1. Introduction

This section provides an assessment of the first headline question in the TORs:

- The extent to which CDKN is performing against its logical framework
- The impact of the programme to date within CDKN's DoC

Our approach to answering this question is to assess CDKN's results on three levels:

1. Progress against CDKN's outputs as defined in the logframe
2. Evidence of CDKN outcomes
3. Implications for impact and trajectory towards impact

In order to ensure the brevity and focus of the analysis, our approach is to supplement CDKN's results reporting with evidence generated under the MTR to highlight particular successes and challenges to CDKN's results performance.

This section primarily draws on the following key CDKN results reporting documents:

- CDKN Annual M&E Report 2012-2013
- CDKN Logframe
- CDKN Results Framework
- CDKN Country Programme documents
- CDKN Project Impact Reviews

Evidence generated under the MTR is presented through a synthesis of the following sources:

- CDKN MTR Country Visit reports
- CDKN MTR Output Area reports
- CDKN MTR desk review assessment and analysis – see Section 5 for a more detailed discussion of the desk review.

4.2. Progress against outputs

For the purpose of brevity it is assumed under this section that the reader is familiar with and can refer to the CDKN output indicators presented in the logframe and the assessment of progress against the output indicators presented in the CDKN Annual M&E Report 2012-2013.

The MTR team made detailed assessments of each of the CDKN output areas combining interviews with CDKN output area staff in London and through the country visits, document review of key output area projects, and a more formal proforma-based desk review of a sample of output project documents. The CDKN output areas are:

- Knowledge Management (KM);
- Research;

- Partnerships;
- The AF; and
- Technical Assistance (TA).

A synthesis of these assessments is presented below according to each output.

Output 1 - Knowledge management output analysis

In strategy documents, the KM output is described as working in multiple ways. Strategies are broadly divided between:

- CDKN’s own messages and ‘thought leadership’;
- Stakeholder engagement, with a particular focus on policy engagement;
- Improving access to CCD knowledge broadly, as a global public good, through media work and knowledge brokers; and
- Supporting networking and debate.

The activities that deliver this include:

- Website
- Publications
- Knowledge brokering
- Capacity building of knowledge brokers and media
- Mix of global, regional, national, sub-national activities, with regional KM coordinators on the ground

The KM team also has oversight of internal communications and to some degree, support to learning, through producing the Insight newsletter. The KM output therefore has a broad remit encompassing knowledge brokering, capacity building and global public good roles.

Knowledge management forms Output 1 under the most recent CDKN Logframe (2012):

OUTPUT 1	Output Indicator 1.1
Knowledge Management Quality assured knowledge on climate change, its impacts and solutions synthesised, disseminated to and used by policy makers, researchers and civil society in developing countries	Proportion of knowledge products rated good or above by independent quality assessors, disaggregated by product type: 1. CDKN publications (policy briefings, Annual Review of Research, etc.) 2. Media articles commissioned by CDKN 3. Online resources commissioned by CDKN
	Output Indicator 1.2 Proportion of knowledge products rated useful or better by a diverse range of clients / customers, disaggregated by product type: 1. CDKN publications (policy briefings, Annual Review of Research, etc.) 2. CDKN website (measured as % of users rating website as useful or better) 3. Online resources commissioned by CDKN
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	Output Indicator 1.3
10%	Number of stakeholders requesting and accessing particular knowledge products, disaggregated by geography, type of stakeholders, etc., disaggregated by product type: 1. CDKN e-mail newsletter subscribers 2. CDKN website unique visitors (per month) 3. Citations of CDKN-sponsored media articles on CCD 4. Monthly visitors to CDKN sponsored online resources on partner websites

It is recognised that the logframe indicators are limited and do not capture the multiple roles that KM plays both external and internal to CDKN. Neither do the indicators track use.

The Logframe assesses the performance of the KM Output on the basis of limited indicators of quality and usefulness of products. These are assessed on an annual basis by an exercise involving an independent review panel and a user survey, respectively. The wider results framework tracks additional indicators, discussed below.

Quality - CDKN Output 1 indicator 1 – ‘Proportion of knowledge products rated good or above by independent quality assessors’. An expert panel of ten Climate Compatible Development (CCD) subject-matter specialists assesses the quality of the CDKN publications made available online since the 2011 assessment. In 2012, the sample of publications for review covered a range of topics and regions and the experts were chosen to reflect this, with publications deployed to them selectively so that they each rated products upon which they had relevant subject knowledge and experience.

An online questionnaire is used, based around multiple dimensions of quality and an overall quality rating for each of the scale (Poor, Adequate, Good, Excellent). The experts' panel also provided comments to support their overall ratings and other aspects of the publications.⁶

Usefulness - CDKN Output 1 indicator 2 – ‘Proportion of knowledge products rated useful or better by a diverse range of clients / customers.’ Actual and potential CDKN KP users were invited to take part in an online survey to give feedback on the CDKN website and a set of online CDKN publications that had not been included in previous assessments. The questionnaire used the logframe defined four point rating scale (Very Useful, Useful, Somewhat Useful, Not Useful) and gave users the opportunity to give qualitative feedback on aspects of the publications and website.

The Knowledge Management Output is performing reasonably well against the logframe indicators, within the acknowledged limitations of these indicators.

The quality and usefulness rating exercise faces a number of methodological challenges, mainly to do with the difficulties of avoiding subjectivity, which will not be described here. Suffice to say, that on the first indicator, the logframe target is just missed, while on the second indicator, the logframe target is exceeded. The report highlights a number of themes emerging from the qualitative responses provided, which provide more nuanced information on the CDKN products reviewed:

1. Publications are in a format that is useful for people with little time available, such as policy-makers: well-written, clearly presenting the key messages, use of boxes and figures, etc.
2. Publications often fill an information gap, either covering an overlooked issue or making new connections
3. Many publications were praised for including practical case studies and examples.
4. A key criticism was over-simplification: neglecting certain aspects of the topic, or failing to provide enough detail or background sources.
5. There was concern about the lack of criticism or caveats within the “success stories” in some of the publications.
6. Some publications could be too conceptual or lack enough practical implications to be relevant for policy-makers.

The CDKN Results Framework tracks additional indicators that aim to reflect KM’s broader role and track resulting applications and actions of KM products rather than just production:

⁶ Source: Draft Report of the Annual Assessment of the Quality and Usefulness of CDKN Knowledge Products - 2012

- # and description of cases where different actors have taken actions based on CDKN knowledge products
- # of knowledge products published, disaggregated by type of product
- # and description of events where KM has had significant involvement
- # and range of KM partnerships developed
- Level and quality of participation in CDKN online workspaces
- % of respondents to annual partner survey that sometimes or frequently use the CDKN website
- % of respondents to annual partner survey that describe the website as good or excellent

These indicators could be considered to map more closely onto the different focuses of the KM output. However, there have been changes in how the wider results indicators are reported on in the annual M&E Report. The indicator about participation in the online workspaces was dropped, as that activity proved to be unsuccessful. The indicator on number and description of events where KM has had a significant involvement is reported on in 2012 but not in 2013's report, the same for the number and range of KM partnerships developed. No explanation has been found for the change, but it may reflect a changing concept of the KM strategy.

The 2013 M&E Report presents a number of case studies in response to the indicator, number and cases where different actors have taken action. The case studies were:

- CASE STUDY: Support to Climate Knowledge Brokers
- CASE STUDY: CDKN Project Profile: Expanding the power of Reegle as a climate search tool
- CASE STUDY: Reframing Rio: catalysing new debates around climate compatible development for a global media audience

Examples of other actors, for example, in policy and practice, taking action, have been presented under the Research Output in the M&E report.

KM's main links to the DoC is to 'Changes in the usability of the evidence base', closer to outputs than outcome. The M&E report recognises that 'use' is not being tracked for KM projects, although our assessment shows that evidence of 'reach' is being tracked, which could be a useful progress marker to track more systematically.

The results that are being reported are focused mainly on the knowledge broker support, and the projects focused on online information. However, there are no clear indicators for 'capacity', which is the focus of the knowledge broker and journalist support work.

The examples and descriptions of other actions being taken are not categorised according to, for example, the intervention areas outlined in the Yr 3 Business Plan. This type of mapping would have helped to clarify what results KM was influencing according to which of its roles. This general difficulty arises because the KM output lacks an explicit theory of change or 'impact pathway', so it is not possible to understand how the results are progressing towards change, nor interpret how and why change might be occurring as a result of KM activities.

Knowledge management output assessment summary - Generally, the KM products and events are of good quality, evidenced by the ratings received and feedback from seen by the reviewer. The events and media work is also delivered on time and to budget.

The KM output is meeting its objectives and producing good quality work. Its contribution in combination with other outputs such as Research and Technical Assistance can be seen in events such as the S-REX events and country activities such as Kenya.

However, the KM output is stretched by having a very broad mandate and multiple roles internally and externally. KM activities are also working at a global level, which brings the challenge of interpreting abstract, de-contextualised results. Where KM has worked within a country setting, in combination with other outputs, its contribution is more tangible, especially in the area of supporting an *enabling environment* for CCD. This is an outcome area that would merit further exploration.

Recommendations

KM has evolved as CDKN has evolved. Now that the programme is maturing and has a better understanding of its drivers of effectiveness, KM has a strong contribution to make to CDKN's emerging strategic learning agenda. To strengthen this potential, the KM output would benefit from developing some definitions of its KM -specific impact areas and its impact pathway, or theory of change. In addition, developing structured learning questions that encompass *process*, *capacity* and *enabling environment*, as well as thematic issues would gather important strategic learning.

The lack of an impact pathway makes it difficult to interpret KM's different contributions and the outcomes it supports. This can be seen in the assumptions made about 'use' of CDKN information when activities are mainly geared to support 'access to information', not 'use'. (This is a common challenge for knowledge programmes.)

KM has a lot overlap with aspects of the Research output, for example in policy influencing and supporting research use and uptake. In recognition of this, KM and Research have been brought together under the Director of Policy and Programmes to coordinate between the two and to link to the new Clusters. This coordination could be further improved by developing a theory of change that makes explicit assumptions about impact pathways for the combined functions of Research and KM.

Recommendation 1 - KM Impact Pathway.

KM should develop an impact pathway and structured learning questions, especially about the role of an 'enabling environment for CCD' to make a stronger contribution to CDKN's body of learning.

KM has an explicit aim to work closely with country and regional teams on learning, and there is evidence that is in place in some countries, e.g. Kenya. This could be strengthened. Structured learning questions and an impact pathway would strengthen KM's ability to make strategic choices about where and how it links with other Deep Engagement countries, for example Colombia.

Recommendation 2 – KM and Country/Regional Teams

KM needs a more consistent approach to work with country and regional teams on learning, focusing on gathering and aggregating lessons from countries and regions, and feeding back to these.

Finally, KM sits at the nexus of corporate communications, strategic communications for the sector and communication about learning. This means that the reporting of 'stories of change' could be prey to capture by PR-style reporting of successes, rather than more challenging 'stories of results and learning'.

To ensure a clear separation of these messages, 'results and learning stories' should be framed by the impact pathway and learning questions, and use a format that includes reference to context and other actors, descriptions of the challenge and task at hand, critical reflection on unintended results, and the contribution CDKN made in context. A similar model to the STAR interview technique could be developed (see the Colombia country report for a more detailed explanation).

Recommendation 3 – KM separation of functions

KM needs to ensure a separation between its three functions of corporate communications, strategic communications for the sector and communicating learning on CCD. Important reporting on more challenging 'stories of results, failures and learning' could be prey to being overtaken by PR-style reporting of successes. To ensure a clear separation of these messages, 'results, failures and learning stories' should be framed by the impact pathway and learning questions, and use a format that talks about context, challenge and other stakeholders.

Output 2 - Research output analysis

The overriding objective of CDKN’s research output (RO) is to commission high quality applied research that is demand-led, and that this research achieves a strong policy impacts vis-a-vis climate compatible development (CCD). During years 1 and 2, CDKN’s RO work focused on identifying demand and commissioning research. But its focus is now shifting to quality assurance, monitoring, learning, and generating research-based knowledge products.

OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1
Research High priority development-relevant Climate Change research and analysis undertaken and/or commissioned by CDKN or its partners	# of quality controlled research publications produced annually, disaggregated by categories: 1. Academic articles 2. CDKN policy briefs 3. Policy briefs
	Output Indicator 2.2
	# of citations of research outputs in academic or policy literature
	Output Indicator 2.3
	# (and description) of case studies illustrating contribution to climate compatible development (e.g. policy change, capacity building, new knowledge contribution)
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	Output Indicator 2.4
25%	Involvement of southern suppliers in research projects as expressed by: 1. % of suppliers on all research projects that are Southern-based 2. % of projects led by Southern based organisations

Output indicator 2.1 relates to “*the number of quality controlled research publications produced, disaggregated by categories: Academic articles; CDKN policy briefs; and Policy briefs.*” Overall, CDKN is on track to deliver the number of quality-controlled research publications by April 2013 as well as a range of other publications which do not fit neatly into the defined categories. These include a total of 73 reports, case studies, working papers and presentations.

Output indicator 2.2 relates to the “*number of citations of research outputs in academic or policy literature.*” CDKN identifies this as the hardest indicator to track due to the lead times involved in citations materialising and also the difficulty in tracking policy literature citations which tend not to be picked up by more formal academic citation analysis methods.

More broadly it is also possible to question the appropriateness of both these outputs indicators given the nature of CDKN’s primary target audience (developing country policy makers) and nature of the research/new knowledge they demand.

In this respect output indicator 2.3 is likely to be more useful and appropriate. The indicator relates to “*the number (and description) of case studies illustrating contribution to climate compatible development (e.g. policy change, capacity building, new knowledge contribution).*” The CDKN research team is developing a series of in-depth case studies of particular projects to report against this indicator. INTRAC and the ODI Research and Development programme (RAPID) have developed a questionnaire that each of these case-study projects have completed, detailing their M&E plans, their ToC, and what support CDKN might be able to give in closely monitoring these projects for impact. The results of this analysis will inform how CDKN will report against this indicator going forward. Before this approach and questionnaire have been fully implemented, the CDKN team have produced six short case studies illustrating the different contributions to CCD. These and the wider questionnaire will need to acknowledge and build in processes to ensure that the cases presented are representative of overall change delivered by the research output and avoid ‘cherry picking’ successes stories.

Output indicator 2.4 relates to “*Involvement of southern suppliers in research projects as expressed by: 1% of suppliers on all research projects that are Southern-based, and 2% of projects led by Southern based organisations.*” This is a useful metric of CDKN’s Southern focus and also reflects a wider issue of the

balance (and sometime inherent tension) between often more practical, and applied Southern research which is tailored to contexts and local needs (and which often implicitly includes a research capacity building element) and more tradition ‘gold standard’ Western research which may have more ‘impact’ in terms of citations but less practical utility. CDKN’s annual M&E report results indicate that CDKN has exceeded its Southern focus milestones in both expressions of the indicator with about 65% of primary investigators (PIs) were based in the South. About 72% of all project partners were also based in the South.

Research output assessment summary – The MTR team endorses CDKN’s progress against the Research Output (RO) indicators to date and expects progress to against these indicators to further improve beyond the milestones as the research commissioned increasingly delivers in terms of outputs and new knowledge. CDKN should be clear about what each indicator is designed to show and how much can be interpreted from quantitative indicators of number of research products produced and number of citations achieved / how these indicators fit within the research output’s overall impact pathway. In terms of the quality and utility of new knowledge produced under CDKN, reflecting the research output’s broader role, these indicators could be considered to map more closely onto the combined change anticipated with the KM output.

Output 3 - Technical assistance output analysis

Technical Assistance (TA) forms Output 3 under the most recent CDKN Logframe (2012):

OUTPUT 3	Output Indicator 3.1
Technical Assistance Demand-led tailored assistance and advice provided to developing country governments and others in developing countries	Proportion of TA projects where: 1. clients are ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ 2. suppliers/clients feel immediate objectives of TA projects have been ‘mostly’ or ‘fully’ met
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	Output Indicator 3.2
40%	# and diversity of stakeholders accessing technical assistance projects

The responsibility for CDKN results assessment under the TA output was shared across the team through a sample of CDKN TA projects investigated through the country visits. Systematic review of CDKN’s TA output at the level of the two logframe output indicators is deemed to be less significant and important for this output given the scale and size of the output and its integration across the Region and Country Programmes.

Nevertheless, progress against output indicator 3.1 is reported as follows in the Annual M&E report:

With respect to suppliers:

- *“Supplier reports have been received for 20 of the 27 TA projects completed up until December 2012.*
- *If the reports not received are ignored, 100% of reports showed the suppliers felt that the short-term objectives of the projects had been fully or mostly met. If the reports not received are taken into account then this figure drops to 74%.*
- *The position is similar on satisfaction. The results show 100% achievement of the logframe milestone targets, if the ‘N/A’ figure is ignored. “*

With respect to service recipients:

- *“Producing reports from service recipients – many of whom are high-profile and busy people - is more difficult, and CDKN has to-date received service recipient reports in only 15 out of the 27 completed projects.*

- *The results show that all service recipients that completed the reports felt that the short-term objectives had been fully or mostly met. However, a lower proportion of these (53%) said ‘fully’ compared to suppliers where 75% rated their projects as fully meeting their short-term objectives.”*

CDKN analysis of performance against Output indicator 3.1 is based on responses received to questionnaires on satisfaction sent out to suppliers and recipients. More than a quarter of suppliers and 44% of recipients have not provided an answer to this question and so CDKN have based their assessment on responses received.

The MTR team is concerned that this assessment is based on self-selected data. We suspect that clients who see objectives as being partly met will simply not bother to reply. If, for example, just half of those in the N/A category actually believed objectives had been partly met CDKN would fail to meet this milestone. We therefore recommend the M&E team make a recorded Skype call to recipients who do not return a questionnaire to complete missing data.

Progress against output indicator 3.2 is reported as follows in the Annual M&E report:

“This indicator has been split into two parts: 1) the number and diversity of service recipients; and 2) the number and diversity of stakeholders engaged or consulted in different projects.”

With respect to service recipients:

- *“The results show that of the 62 TA projects completed or started to-date, 57 service recipients were in the public sector, and 37 of these were Ministries. Of the remainder, one group includes stakeholders engaged in the production, distribution, dissemination, and consumption of clean cooking solutions, one is a group of International NGOs concerned with action-research on community adaptation in Bangladesh, and the other three are unspecified.*
- *The total of 62 service recipients compares to a milestone figure of 40 stakeholders for April 2013, and represents an increase of 25 over last years’ figures. Note however that there may be some double counting where repeat assistance has been provided (as in Mozambique) or parallel projects are being implemented within a country (such as Kenya).*

With respect to stakeholders:

- *The results show that across the 62 current or completed projects, a total of 342 organisations were recorded (compared to 189 in last year’s report) showing a high degree of involvement of different groups. The breakdown is as follows:”*

Type of organisation	Number	%	Type of organisation	Number	%
Inter / intra-governmental body	18	5.3	International NGO	22	6.4
Multilateral institution	13	3.8	Southern NGO	18	5.3
Government Ministry	52	15.2	Research institute	31	9.1
Local government	24	7.0	Academic institute	30	8.8
Donors	14	4.1	Media organisation	12	3.5
Private sector organisation	26	7.6	Network	4	1.2
Civil society group (national)	27	7.9	Informal group	3	0.9
Civil society group (local)	20	5.8	Individual consultant	17	5.0
Faith-based group	8	2.3	Other	3	0.9
Total				342	100.0

The number and diversity of stakeholders accessing TA projects (Output indicator 3.2) provides a useful reflection of the reach of TA projects. However, the MTR Bangladesh country visit illustrates the value of supplementing this with qualitative feedback. In this case, local stakeholders raised concerns that narrow consultation at the design stage had limited the range of stakeholders subsequently involved.

The CDKN Results Framework tracks four additional indicators that aim to reflect the TA output’s broader role within the programme. Indicator A reflects the *number and description of incidences where clients (service recipients) request further TA work*.

CDKN’s M&E report finds that: “Almost all of CDKN’s deep engagements in countries have led to further requests for work (which is also an additional indication of satisfaction). Several examples were provided in last year’s report. Some new examples since then are as follows: “

Original project	Led to ...
Colombia	Building on its original two medium-sized projects in Cartagena and in Cauca Basin for agriculture, CDKN has been asked to support a range of follow-up projects on adaptation and climate compatible development. CDKN has started phase 2 projects in Cartagena and the Cauca Basin, and has also moved into a new sector – working with the Ministry of Transport to support mainstreaming of adaptation into road building programmes.
Bangladesh Loss & Damage	CDKN’s flagship programme of work on Loss and Damage, which fed into the CoP 18 negotiations on this issue, has raised its profile in this area and it has been asked to consider further follow-up work.
Kenya	As CDKN’s large programme of work on the National Climate Change Action Plan comes to an end, it has been asked by the Government to support next steps up to and after the next election in early 2013. This is still in development but is expected to include specific support to help application at the county level under the new constitution. CDKN has also scoped a broader follow on programme with civil society and the private sector.

The examples presented above correspond to the countries visited by the MTR team. Overall the MTR team agree with these statements which were validated during the country visits. The nature of any outcomes associated with longer term deep engagements is considered in the following section.

Technical assistance output assessment summary – Overall, CDKN’s TA outputs is delivering in line with its logframe indicators. The MTR team has a small concern that the data supporting indicators 3.1 and 3.2 is based on self-selected data which potentially excludes the feedback of less satisfied service providers and clients and favourably presents CDKN’s progress against these milestones.

Output 4 - Partnerships output analysis

Partnerships forms Output 4 under the most recent CDKN Logframe (2012):

OUTPUT 4	Output Indicator 4.1
Partnerships CDKN facilitates increased cooperation and collaboration between key stakeholders on climate compatible development	# (and description) of brokering activities / events facilitated or supported by CDKN
	Output Indicator 4.2
	# of collaborative activities resulting from CDKN brokering and facilitation
	Output Indicator 4.3
	# of organisations engaging with the CDKN network at progressive levels of engagement (Note that engagement levels are defined in the separate tab)
	Output Indicator 4.4
	# (and description) of engagement activities in multi stakeholder national and international fora (e.g. LEDES Global Partnership, GGBPI) in which CDKN demonstrates leadership

CDKN’s Annual M&E Report 2012-13 indicates that, against the set of primarily quantitative indicators, the Partnerships output has met or (greatly) exceeded the 2012 and 2013 milestones. For example, output 4 indicator 4.1 refers to the number of brokering events / activities facilitated or supported by CDKN and sets a milestone for 2013 of 20. In fact, the total number of activities / events facilitated or supported by CDKN to-date is 73 and the report goes on to state ‘*The figures show the extent of CDKN’s brokering work is far, far higher than was originally anticipated.*’⁷ A similar picture emerges across the output indicators with following implications

1. CDKN’s Partnerships Output has performed very well against its output indicators.
2. This reflects the progress the organisation has made as a networking and collaborating organisation.
3. The primarily simplistic and quantitative nature of the Partnerships output indicators (based on the self-reported aggregation of activities) may not appropriately reflect and capture the nature of the strategy and outcomes CDKN is endeavouring to deliver under the output.
4. Based on this, there is a need to revise and enhance both the Partnerships output strategy and the logframe to more explicitly set out the strategy and more appropriately capture the outcomes.

Towards this end, there is evidence that CDKN have recognised these potential shortcomings with the Partnerships strategy and results focus and have attempted to revise both under the 2012-13 CDKN Business Plan when they state on page 15 that ‘*CDKN has evolved its Partnerships output into a cross-cutting function to better reflect its objectives and relative size. In year 3 CDKN will focus on promoting leadership on Climate Compatible Development (CCD) and fostering partnership building, capacity building, leadership and innovation, and drawing on the lessons learned from years 1 and 2.*’ The Business Plan goes on to present a new set of strategic objectives and focus for year 3 as set out in the table below:

Figure 3: Strategic Objectives - Year 3

	Key Strategic Objective	Expected Pathway to Change	Expected Result/Impact in Yr 3
1	Integrate developing country voices into key CCD policy processes	Ensure adequate representation of developing countries in related processes and forums/workshops etc.	Developing countries are incorporated into policy processes, specifically LEDES and GGBPI processes.
2	More effective developing countries CCD leadership.	Build regional capacity and leadership through facilitated workshops and other key activities (regional work programmes, LEDES, GGBPI and CDKN Innovation Fund).	A more inclusive policy process is enabled through better southern leadership.
3	Catalyse innovative solutions to CCD problems.	Support collaborative partnerships with new ideas and propositions (pilots) through the mechanism of the CDKN Innovation Fund.	Innovative solutions to CCD challenges are piloted and funded.

Whilst these revised set of objectives go some way to better reflecting the way CDKN envisages Partnerships should operate (1-integrating developing country voices, 2-more effective developing country leadership, and 3-catalysing innovative solutions) as well as setting out some anticipated pathways to change, a number of areas remain under-developed and which require further elaboration:

1. A simple explanation of how the shift from a stand-alone output to a cross-cutting output will be operationalised in practice – what will be done differently and what benefits will this deliver? Complementing a consistent finding across the research and KM outputs, it would be instructive to have a clear statement explaining how the Partnerships output systematically engages, integrates

⁷ CDKN Annual M&E Report 2012-2013, Draft, p. 82.

and responds to CDKN's regional and country level programmes, projects and activities. This explicit integration needs to combine both systematic / planned synergies as well as the ability to flexibly respond to opportunities as they arise.

2. A more detailed elaboration of the Partnerships impact pathway and where this fits within / contributes to the overall CDKN ToC – specifically setting out how Partnerships activities and projects feed into CDKN's four outcome areas through the DoC, as well as more broadly, how the Partnerships output is geared to supporting CDKN change overall. Further details on the need to better elucidate how CDKN's outputs contribute to outcomes through coherent set of results chains is provided in Section 6. A number of 'lenses / approaches' that may support this are mentioned within a number of Partnerships documents reviewed by the MTR team but these approaches are not set out in sufficient detail to merit being called a Partnerships strategy or approach.⁸
3. A revision of the logframe indicators to reflect both the shift to a cross-cutting theme and Partnership's place within the overall CDKN ToC. In particular, the revision should focus on dropping most (if not all) of the current and virtually meaningless quantitative output indicators in favour of a more qualitative set of indicators that better reflect the nature of the partnerships CDKN has brokered / facilitated / convened in terms of their quality and value – indicators which capture the change that the partnerships have enabled.

The CDKN Results Framework tracks two additional Partnerships output indicators:

- Indicator a): Number and description of cases where different actors have taken actions based on CDKN partnership products.
- Indicator b): Number and percentage of people on Roster of experts that have been involved in CDKN as suppliers or in other capacities.

Responding to indicator a), two of the Partnerships team's most important and influential pieces of work to-date have involved the Action Lab and the Low Emissions Development Strategy (LEDS) Global Partnership. The MTR team's assessment of these projects found them both to have produced valuable sets of outputs and outcomes.

The Action Lab successfully brought together a dynamic and innovative group of CCD experts across government, academia, the NGO sector, and the private sector. It 'announced' CDKN's arrival on the scene as an organisation that is willing:

- To be demand-led with the CCD marketplace;
- To both work in, and convene, partnerships across a wide spectrum of stakeholders;
- To invest in innovate but risky concepts and ideas that have the potential to deliver impressive outcomes and impact; and,
- To build relationships over time and through multiple stages as demonstrated by the Research Innovation Fund that came out of the Action Lab, and the two subsequent Innovation Fund Rounds which have supported partnerships established and catalysed at the Action Lab.

CDKN have also added considerable value to the LEDS GP:

- The LEDS Global Partnership is effectively convened. The LEDS Global Partnership has subsequently instituted a steering committee and CDKN was elected as its chair.

⁸ The 2012-13 Business Plan, CDKN Logframe, and Annual M&E Report 2012-13 variously identify the following as possible organising frameworks: To be, to do, to relate; Voices, leadership, innovation

- The makeup of the LEDS Global Partnership is substantially different following a membership drive through the LEDS Collaboration in Action workshop and the resulting regional LEDS network events. There has been a shift to much larger developing country membership and participation.
- The LEDS Global Partnership work programme was developed building on the outputs of the workshop. The work programme includes more than 10 topical working groups.
- The LEDS regional networks were effectively convened and formed at the LEDS Collaboration workshop.
- The workshop and engagement approach (interactive and action and learning focused) which CDKN had promoted was appreciated and embraced by the LEDS Global Partnership and the format has been replicated and built upon for the regional workshops.

The outcomes and impact stemming from these key two key Partnerships programmes is considered in the next section of the report.

Partnerships output assessment summary - the Partnerships output has largely and fairly impressively delivered against the relevant logframe objectives and indicators. However, the primarily simplistic and quantitative nature of the Partnerships output indicators (based on the self-reported aggregation of activities) may not appropriately reflect and capture the nature of the strategy and outcomes CDKN is endeavouring to deliver under the output. There is a need to revise and enhance both the Partnerships output strategy and the logframe to more explicitly set out the strategy and more appropriately capture the outcomes.

Output 5 - Advocacy fund output analysis

The AF forms Output 5 under the most recent CDKN Logframe (2012):

OUTPUT 5	Output Indicator 5.1
Advocacy Fund The provision of support to inform group and national negotiating positions and enhance coordination of eligible countries and their positions within regional and international climate processes; a stronger evidence base on the barriers to effective participation in international climate negotiations; and limited logistical support to enable groups or countries to field strong delegations to international climate change negotiations	# of individuals trained by the AF, disaggregated by country and group
	Output Indicator 5.2
	1. # (and description) of cases where legal, technical and climate finance advice has been provided; and 2. percentage where service recipients are 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the project
	Output Indicator 5.3
	# (and description) of lessons generated and disseminated concerning effective models of donor support to build the capacity of developing countries to participate in international negotiations (disaggregated by reports, briefs, presentations etc)
	Output Indicator 5.4
	# of negotiators supported to attend international climate change meetings (and number of meetings attended)

CDKN’s Annual M&E Report 2012-13 indicates that, against the set of primarily quantitative indicators, the AF has met or has made significant progress towards the 2012 and 2013 milestones. The MTR team concur with the reported output indicator results as follows:

- *Logframe Output Indicator 5.1 - 261 negotiators from the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have been trained by CDKN, compared to a milestone target of 100 by April 2013.*

- *Logframe Output Indicator 5.2 - There were 462 documented instances of legal, technical and climate advice supported by CDKN among the 12 projects covered to-date, compared to a milestone of 200 for April 2013.*
- *Logframe Output Indicator 5.3 - As yet, no formal lessons have been generated from the first 12 projects about effective models of donor support to build the capacity of developing countries to participate in international negotiations. This is perhaps not surprising, given the relatively early stage of the programme that this review covers, and might suggest that the milestone for April 2013 - 3 lessons generated - was over-ambitious.*
- *Logframe Output Indicator 5.4 - 146 negotiators were supported to attend international climate change meetings from the 12 projects included in this review (73% of the 2013 milestone).*
- *Logframe Output Indicator 5.5 - 88 submissions were made to the UNFCCC process as a result of the 12 projects in this review (mostly written submissions but also including declarations during formal sessions to which CDKN support contributed); more than twice the April 2013 milestone for this indicator.*

The CDKN Results Framework also attempts to track a wider set of six AF indicators:

- *Indicator a): Percentage of delegates trained who consider training has improved their ability to participate in negotiation*
- *Indicator b): Number (and description) of instances where support has resulted in enhanced coordination of eligible countries and their positions within regional and international climate processes*
- *Indicator c): Number (and %) of requests for logistical support serviced, disaggregated by country and region*
- *Indicator d): Quality of evidence base on the barriers to effective participation in international climate negotiations; factors contributing to success and effective models of donor support; monitoring and evaluation of capacity building to negotiations*
- *Indicator e): Percentage total budget spent supporting logistics costs*
- *Indicator f): Number and percentage of projects where suppliers feel that immediate objectives have been 'mostly' or 'fully' met*

For a number of reasons (recipient surveys still pending, indicators being developed prior to the finalisation of the AF outcome map, and lack of formalised monitoring system to monitor requests for logistical support) it has not yet been possible for CDKN to generate data to report progress against these wider indicators.

This is not deemed to be too significant by the MTR team as many of these indicators point towards AF outcomes which can be assessed through the very useful “outcome mapping-inspired” approach CDKN have developed and as set out in the Annual M&E Report.

Advocacy fund output assessment summary – The CDKN MTR team broadly supports the output-level assessment of AF progress as presented in the Annual M&E report. This demonstrates a high demand for the services of the more recently established CDKN output both in terms of training climate negotiators and the provision of legal, technical and climate finance advice. The short-term outcomes to have emerged from AF outputs support are examined in the following section.

Summary – CDKN progress against outputs

Overall the MTR finds that CDKN is progressing in line with the output indicators defined in the logframe across all five output areas. Evidence of outputs witnessed through the country visits as well as interviews with CDKN output team members supports this progress.

The MTR team found one or two small examples of potentially weak or flawed data generation processes or assumptions which may over-estimate the extent of CDKN output-level success. For example, CDKN analysis of performance against Output 3 Technical Assistance indicator 1 is based on responses received to questionnaires on satisfaction sent out to suppliers and recipients. More than a quarter of suppliers and 44% of recipients have not provided an answer to this question and so CDKN have based their assessment on responses received. Overall however, these are not significant and can be relatively easily addressed.

Across all five outputs, it is apparent that the primarily quantitative logframe indicators are limited and may not fully capture the nature of the role that output plays within CDKN's overall strategy and ToC. One reason explaining this is that the CDKN logframe at the output level is pitched too low. In relation to CDKN's overall results framework, the outputs defined and discussed above are actually activities. This means in practice that CDKN are tracking too many indicators, which tend to be overly quantitative in nature and hence inappropriate in terms of describing the lower levels of trajectory towards impact, and how and why activities and outputs support CDKN as first steps on the trajectory.

4.3. Evidence of CDKN outcomes

The MTR team approached assessing progress from outputs to outcomes through CDKN's DoC in three ways:

- By triangulating evidence and experience generated across the MTR with CDKN progress against outcomes as defined in the Annual M&E Report 2012-2013 – section 1.3.1.
- By searching for systematic examples of CDKN output areas delivering outcomes, particularly through Country Programmes, which contribute to, or are delivered through, DoC – Section 1.3.2.
- By identifying cross-output area synergies that offer evidence of delivering 'multiplier' type outcomes indicating that the CDKN programme is 'greater than the sum of their parts' – Section 1.3.3.

As well as referring to the Annual M&E Report 2012-2013 as a central reference point, this section of the report draws on evidence generated from three sources:

- The CDKN document review exercise
- The set of MTR Country Visit reports
- The MTR assessments of outputs

CDKN's outcomes – comments on progress against the Annual Report

CDKN's outcomes

There are four CDKN outcomes, all of which are included within the CDKN logical framework, reflecting CDKN's four thematic programmes. These are:

- Climate Compatible Development (CCD) - *"Climate compatible development (CCD) policies and practices are developed that impact those most affected by climate change"*

- Climate finance - *“Increased and effective access by developing countries to financing for climate compatible development action, through an equitable international climate finance architecture and related support services”*
- Disaster Risk Management (DRM) - *“Improved effectiveness and integration of disaster risk management in climate compatible development policies and practices at national level”*
- Negotiations support - *“Poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have improved influence over international climate change negotiations”*

Section 2 of the Annual M&E Report 2012-2013 reports against CDKN’s outcomes. We use the following sub-sections to verify CDKN progress against outcomes as well as make some critical observations based on the evidence generated across the country studies and output assessments.

Outcome 1: Climate Compatible Development

Outcome Indicator 1.1 relates to the *“number of countries with national, regional and/or sub national CCD policies and practices that have been developed with the significant input of the CDKN.”* This is the main CCD indicator and as CDKN points out, *“The bulk of this evidence comes through three different sources – country impact monitoring reports and project impact reviews (which are the result of quality assured processes) and country reports (which are not). As is usually the case with the monitoring and evaluation of policy influencing work, it is easier to identify where policies have changed than it is to establish one agency’s contribution to those changes. CDKN seeks to be as honest as possible, but is also open to its analyses being disputed or contested.”*

Overall, CDKN’s claims, as made in the M&E report, to have contributed to the development of CCD policies in 28 countries are substantiated by the MTR experience from the country visits. CDKN support to the NCCAP in Kenya is accurately reported and similarly, claims of contributions to outcomes in Rwanda in terms of mainstreaming CCD are suitably caveated as *“short term changes are being seen it is too early to state with any confidence whether or not these mainstreaming processes will be successful or not.”*

However, the MTR also revealed a number of observations relevant to CDKN’s claiming and reporting of CCD outcomes:

- Evidence of over-claiming: findings on CDKN support to the African Climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) justifies including Ethiopia in the milestone for: *“Countries that have developed CCD policies and programmes with the significant input of CDKN”*. However, this is misleading because:
 - The first phase of ACCRA ran from November 2009 to November 2011 but CDKN funding was only for January – November 2011;
 - The independent evaluation of ACCRA does not claim to find significant input to CCD policies and programmes. It finds (our emphasis is added) *“Through the research process, capacity building and influencing strategies, ACCRA has influenced to some extent relevant policies and processes at the national level and is well positioned to exert influence in the future. More significant than policy influence at this stage has been ACCRA’s role in bringing together the different key government institutions responsible for DRR and climate change”*.
 - The indirect influence of CDKN support to ACCRA in Ethiopia is not on the same scale as the direct input of CDKN to CCD policy development in Kenya or Rwanda. A clear definition of significant input is needed.

These points are actually disclosed in the text but the wrong conclusion is drawn for the indicator milestone – i.e. CDKN go on to claim that they have contributed to the development of CCD policies through ACCRA.

Outcome indicator 1.2 relates to the *“number of countries including climate change in national development planning documents.”* This indicator is narrower than outcome indicator 1.1, and is focused specifically on mainstreaming CCD into national development planning documents. The purpose is to help demonstrate where climate change has made the leap into national planning authorities and budgetary processes as a key part of mainstreaming investments and future economic development.

CDKN has set a target to see change in five countries by the end of 2015 and claims have some evidence of change in four countries – Gambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Rwanda. CDKN correctly cautions that *“some of this change is emergent, and more time will be needed to assess whether plans come to fruition, whether the national development planning documents are effectively implemented, and whether they are of sufficient quality.”*

The nature and extent of CDKN’s claims in Rwanda and Kenya are broadly in line with findings identified and triangulated with key stakeholders during the MTR country visits. There is strong evidence that climate change will be integrated as a cross-cutting issue in Kenya’s Medium Term Plan (MTP) (2013-2017) and that CDKN has played a critical role in this outcome. However, CDKN is right to highlight that integrating CC into planning represents an emergent change or short term outcome rather than a more significant and long term CCD outcome.

Outcome 2: Climate finance

CDKN presents less evidence in the Annual M&E Report to support progress against outcome 2: climate finance.

Outcome 2 indicator 2.2 relates to the *“number of countries in which national climate finance readiness has been built with the significant input of the CDKN.”* CDKN’s support to operationalise FONERWA in Rwanda as a credible contribution to national climate finance readiness is supported by the findings from the MTR. Similarly in Kenya CDKN have facilitated the design of a national climate finance mechanism under one of the components supporting the development of the NCCAP. However, CDKN need to be explicit that facilitating the design of a mechanisms represents only one aspect of what will be a complex, multi-factorial change process, and that *‘some evidence to indicate movement towards this change’* is likely to be the result of the interaction of multiple exogenous factors beyond CDKN and their sphere of influence.

Outcome indicator 2.3 relates to *“the engagements of, and financing by, the private sector indicated by the incorporation of more ‘investment grade’ policy (frameworks, regulations, public finance mechanisms and public-private partnerships) into national, regional and international CCD policy processes.”*

In the Annual M&E report, CDKN claim that *“In Kenya, private sector actors have been included in all key consultations in the CDKN-funded support to the Kenya national climate change action plan process.”* However, this relates more to best practice in inclusive stakeholder consultation than to any form of contribution to private sector engagement and financing as an outcome.

Outcome 3: Disaster Risk Management (DRM)

This outcome explicitly looks for a close integration of development and climate disaster risk management. CDKN intends to use stories of change and case studies to report in this area, which is to be encouraged.

Outcome indicator 3.1 relates to the *“number of countries using the latest science and social science information on changing disaster risks in climate risk assessments to shape their development investments.”*

The main case study reported for this year is partially funded by CDKN – *“Operationalising Climate Science.”* This case study provides a good example of the type of project that CDKN will need to consider to ensure that research is taken up and applied in the design and implementation of development interventions.

However, the milestone of two case studies is not met, due to a lack of good examples to enable reporting against this indicator. Some examples of ‘smaller steps’ towards this indicator are reported. These include an example from Colombia where the findings from the research project *Growing up in adversity: Resilience in families affected by the winter* supported decisions to construct a new building near the temporary shelter to support the health and well-being of children. This is an interesting example because the picture that the MTR evaluator saw was more complicated and the link between the result and CDKN’s support was less clear-cut. In fact, there is even a potentially more interesting story from CDKN’s point of view in relation to this outcome.

The project supported by CDKN was a new departure for the Uninorte team who had been working on individual and community resilience for a number of years from a health and mental health perspective, but not from a climate disaster perspective. The university students were involved in the emergency relief effort and saw the opportunity to apply their knowledge of personal and community mental health to issues of resilience to a climate-related disaster. This was then funded through a successful application to a CDKN Innovation Fund call. In parallel, the governor of the region, an alumnus of the universities social science programme, observed the project and that the university team was the only agency still working in the temporary shelter two years on. He requested that the university lead the establishment of the children’s shelter. The picture that emerged was of a serendipitous confluence of factors, not necessarily a direct consequence of the project findings.

However, during the MTR visit, the CDKN team themselves initiated contact between the Uninorte team and the Cartagena municipality which is grappling with issues of how to re-house people away from vulnerable areas, and could see the relevance of the research to help them understand the social issues. The Uninorte team is also making links of their own to ensure that their research on community resilience informs the local governor’s efforts to permanently re-house the disaster-affected community. The Uninorte team were excited that their work should have such direct relevance to climate-related work. So the CDKN support can be viewed as supporting an innovative application of psychology to disaster risk preparedness and resilience, and building the capacity of the university team to connect their work much more directly to this area.

This illustrates that the case study approach is the right way to go, involving perhaps a direct sampling and careful interviewing of suppliers to tease out the CDKN contribution story and the new ‘chapters’ that may be unfolding.

Outcome indicator 3.2 relates to “*the number of developing countries including climate-related disaster risk management actions in high profile national policy documents, such as development, sectoral or growth plans.*”

The case main study for this indicator – CDKN support to ACCRA - is the same as proposed under outcome indicator 1.1 on developing national CCD policies and programming. And the MTR findings are the same – in particular, CDKN should exercise caution in order to avoid over-claiming. CDKN’s support to ACCRA does not extend over the entire period defined for the change (2009-12) in the story presented. More broadly, the story as its presented does not explicitly link to including disaster risk management action in policy, but rather relates to bringing together institutions responsible for DRR and DRM, which is obviously only an output or lower order outcome with a broader DRM impact pathway.

A similar issue relates to one of the wider examples of successful integration of DRM cited under the Kenya Programme. The example cited relates to the provision of technical inputs from the Adaptation component to inform a final set of prioritised actions within a broader document of the National Climate Change Action Plan several of which included disaster risk management. Although this may in the future contribute to a significant outcome, it is challenging for CDKN to claim this as a meaningful and credible contribution at the DRM outcome level. The example cited is simply too small and too far down the implicit DRM policy and practice impact pathway, especially without both an explicit explanation of the anticipated pathway and a

more rigorous and detailed explanation of how the technical inputs contributed to DRM policy and practice.

Outcome 4: Advocacy Fund negotiations support

CDKN have developed a very useful “outcome mapping-inspired” approach for identifying progress towards the negotiations support outcome: *“Poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have improved influence over international climate change negotiations”*. The “Expect to see”, “Like to see” and “Love to see” indicators do a good job of allowing for multiple impact pathways in a stochastic environment. It is anticipated that CDKN will robustly generate evidence for these indicators through a Contribution Analysis-type approach.

Outcome indicator 4.1 relates to the *“percentage of outcomes (at expect to see, like to see and love to see levels) realised, as expressed in advocacy fund outcome map.”* In terms of moving from Output to Outcome (via the DoC) the MTR team concur with the following key findings reported by the Annual M&E Report:

- Most change was observed amongst groups of negotiators from the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries in their capacity to influence negotiations. Evidence included making a greater number of relevant interventions, and agreeing priorities for desired outcomes in advance of meetings.
- Significant changes were also observed in groups’ coordination, collaboration and mobilisation. Evidence included meeting in advance of negotiations to discuss strategy, and joining appropriate groups and cross-group coalitions based on shared progressive interests.
- There was also evidence that this increased capacity to influence and to coordinate with other like-minded groups is already helping these groups influence final decision texts as well as increasing their press coverage during negotiations.
- So far there is little evidence of changes in the quality of knowledge and skills to support negotiators beyond fundamental support, such as technical briefing of delegates before and during negotiations, and little evidence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries are better able to leverage and channel climate change-related resources, such as international climate finance, strategically.

Further observations and suggestions from the MTR team include that it is very difficult to capture behavioural outcomes in quantitative terms. Interviews at COP18 support the impression of good progress in terms of building capacity and potential influence (where CDKN has control) and some evidence of actual influence (dependent on an external environment in which CDKN has almost no control). Hence it is very important to triangulate these indicators with more detailed case studies.

The CDKN internal mid-term high level analysis meeting highlighted the investment of time across the programme required to support CDKN at a COP and asked if it was an effective use of everyone’s time. In this context, the MTR assessment of two CDKN side events held at COP 18 was that while these provided good networking they represented a lost opportunity in terms of thought leadership. Our view was that a greater return on this investment could be obtained if COP side events were used to present significant CDKN research or KM results.

Recommendation 4 – COP side events

CDKN should use their COP side events more strategically. Rather than using short presentations of existing material from panel members they should use the opportunity to present significant CDKN research or KM results and change the way that listeners look at a particular CCD issue.

The objectives of the AF require CDKN to make a great effort to restrict their claims to building developing country capacity in negotiations as distinct from the results of that negotiating capacity. For example, the

Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) believe that CDKN has become too closely associated with Loss and Damage and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group felt that one publication suggested adoption of the 2C position. Whether or not these are actually true is debatable. However, CDKN can and should take measures to ensure that statements in this area are as accurate as they can be.

Recommendation 5 – AF publications

We therefore suggest that CDKN formalise a quality assurance process by which relevant publications are reviewed to confirm this could not be easily misinterpreted as endorsing a particular negotiating position.

Interviews undertaken by the MTR team indicate that there is considerable demand for negotiations support from middle income countries that share a progressive agenda. There is certainly a case for the UK along with other donors to support this.

Recommendation 6 – AF and middle-income countries

DFID should consider whether it is possible to do this by expanding the AF, looking for additional donor support and aligning the AF scope of work with the rest of CDKN. If not, lessons from the AF could be used in establishing a separate, potentially multi-donor version of the AF for middle income countries.

The MTR team interview with DECC (subsequently confirmed by CDKN) suggests that CDKN-DECC discussions on the AF have been productive but *ad hoc* and that there would be a benefit to having these discussions on a regular basis.

Recommendation 7 – AF arrangements with DECC

In order to improve CDKN communications with DECC, CDKN should establish regular systematic discussion in place of ad hoc discussion.

CDKN’s outcomes – evidence generated from the country studies

In the absence of a set of DoC baselines, milestones, targets or indicators, as well as an absence of a more general elucidation of the anticipated DoC pathways/stages/processes, this section provides a synthesis of the evidence uncovered by the team which supports outcomes being delivered through, or contributing to, DoC.

CDKN country programme needs to contribute to delivering the overall CDKN programme Outputs and Outcomes through the DoC. However, the country-specific strategy, theory of change and impact pathway provides a better lens through which to assess progress in a country-review with the proviso that country impact pathways support regional and global theories of change.

Evidence from Rwanda

The three projects reviewed were:

National strategy on climate change and low carbon development in Rwanda	Technical Assistance	20/09/2010	11/11/2011	Smith School & Environmental Education Media Project for China
Design of the Rwandan Climate Change and Environmental Fund (FONERWA)	Technical Assistance	10/02/2012	31/07/2012	University of Wolverhampton
Documentary film on climate change and development in Rwanda	Knowledge Management	07/09/2011	31/03/2012	Smith School & Environmental Education Media Project for China

Progress along the impact pathway is generally accurately described in relation to support for the GGCR and FONERWA. However, while the need for “Capacity building of Government officials and planners to implement climate policy, increase access to climate finance and to climate proof investment decisions” is recognised, the critical threat that it poses is not adequately recognised.

In some respects the contribution of CDKN is understated as no attempt is made to assess “what would have happened without CDKN support” (the counterfactual). Both in the work to support the Strategy and to establish FONERWA we find there are areas in which CDKN has demonstrated its niche.

Overall, there are a number of **positive** findings to report:

1. CDKN responded quickly and flexibly to Government of Rwanda (GoR) demand for a national Green Growth and Climate Resilience strategy (GGCR).⁹ In order to influence the vitally important new Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2), the GGCR had to be produced in 9 months. At the time DFID did not have a CC programme in place or the capacity to manage this directly and probably no other donor partners (DPs) could have mobilised support sufficiently quickly.
2. CDKN helped to strengthen the GGCR by skilfully managing tensions between the Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA) and the Ministry of Natural Resources (MINERENA) on one hand, and Sir David King on the other. This involved a combination of technical knowledge (to rapidly contract a specialist external review) and the ability to quickly focus management time on the problem.
3. FONERWA is a critical instrument to implement the GGCR and the GoR feels that CDKN support for FONERWA design closely reflects their demand and thinking. CDKN can take credit for:
 - Sufficient “deep engagement” to understand this demand;
 - Moving from a sole source supplier (GGCR) to competitive tender for FONERWA;
 - Learning from managing the GGCR work and enabling CIDT to report directly to GoR;
 - Being “flexible and listening” managers; and
 - Choosing consultants who could build on close working relationships with environment *and* finance ministries. Getting “buy-in” from the Ministry of Finance is an important success factor.

There have also been some **negative** findings. These are:

1. CDKN failed to engage *strategically* early on with GoR to produce a ToC that takes into account “Changes in institutions and institutional capacity to respond appropriately to CCD needs and demands” – one of the five CDKN DoC¹⁰. The failure to address this dimension of change will limit the extent and quality of mainstreaming of the GGCR into the EDPRS2. For example, sectors (agriculture, transport etc.) have been provided with guidance on how to make their submissions to the EDPRS2 compatible with the GGCR. However, without additional capacity within sectors it will be extremely difficult to turn high-level guidance into practical plans, to avoid maladaptation and for ministries of planning and finance to prioritise investments based on environmental, economic and social criteria.

⁹ Originally known as the National strategy on climate change and low carbon development in Rwanda

¹⁰ CDKN argue that it was understood that other donors would focus on building institutional capacity but that this support has not materialised. Our view is that having a CEL and greater strategic engagement would have helped to identify the specific institutional capacity that was needed to add value to existing interventions and to secure specific funding commitments. That is to say “being closer to the action” could have produced a better outcome.

2. We were not able to rigorously track who had seen the documentary film and the influence it had had on them. However, no one we spoke to in Rwanda mentioned the film as an influence and although both the Minister of MINERENA and DG of REMA reported significant outside interest in the experience of Rwanda, neither could attribute this to the film.
3. There is an understandable tension between the need for CDKN to report success to DFID and build the CDKN brand on one hand and to learn from self-critical reflection on the other. However, the evidence from Rwanda suggests that CDKN is confusing PR with M&E and is both over-claiming successes achieved so far and the contribution of CDKN. So, for example, the Africa Strategy claims:

The MTR team shares the view of the DG REMA that it is “early days” in terms of implementation. In addition, the political commitment to and awareness of CCD comes from GoR (with the 2008 Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) adaptation report and DFID support to the sector helping to raise awareness and the fortuitous timing of the EDPRS2 providing a great opportunity for mainstreaming). CDKN has provided timely funding and effective technical assistance but must avoid giving the impression that it is taking credit for the work of others.

Evidence from Kenya

Based on the need and demand expressed by the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, CDKN TA-support in Kenya comprises the following six components:

	Project code	Title	Start Date	End Date
1	TAAF-0027a	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 9 - Coordination	Aug 2011	31 March 2013
2	TAAF-0027b	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 4: Mitigation action	Aug 2011	31-Jul-12
3	TAAF-0027c	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 1: Long-term National Low Carbon Development Pathway	April 2012	31-Oct-12 (likely to extend to end Dec 12)
4	TAAF-0027d	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 2 - Enabling Policy and Regulatory Framework	Sept 2011	30-Sep-12
5	TAAF-0027e	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 3 – Preparing for a National Adaption Plan	Sept 2011	19-Oct-12
6	TAAF-0027f	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 8 - Finance	Sept 2011	30-Sep-12

In terms of activities and outputs CDKN have successfully delivered the six components on time and as budgeted. As a whole these components have contributed to the delivery of a draft National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) document. The process of producing this document has been largely led, managed and delivered by CDKN and their sub-contracted service providers.

The key short term outcome is significant contribution to / progress towards mainstreaming climate change into national planning processes. CC will feature in next Medium Term Plan and in overall Vision 2030. The MTR country visit has been able to verify this claim.

In terms of trajectory towards medium and long term outcomes / impact - CDKN have successfully delivered their central short term objective to establish the Climate Change Secretariat (CCS) in the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR) and to deliver the NCCAP recommendations into the five year Medium Term Plan (MTP). But impact depends on concrete implementation on the ground as a result of mainstreaming climate change. As CDKN note:

“Now that the plan has been validated, Kenya will be proud to share a summary of the Action Plan and their experience of its development at an official side event at the international climate talks in Doha this week. This will build international recognition of Kenya and implementation will get underway ahead of national elections to be held in March 2013. This quick start to implementation will focus on embedding climate change into planning processes and will help support sustainability of the Plan throughout the period of changing government.” CDKN website, 04 February 2013.

It is too soon to claim that support to the CCS has been achieved and CDKN’s focus should shift to the private sector and civil society. Rather, CDKN need to continue to work with MEMR to bring in these groups to ensure medium term changes such as mechanisms to promote leadership and coordination and coherence of response to climate change are sustainably embedded in key institutions and processes. Similarly, it is too early on the trajectory of a complex change pathway to define CDKN’s role and contribution to ensuring that key counterparts (the private sector and civil society) and mechanisms (climate finance) play a role in delivering a meaningful response to climate change.

Evidence from Ethiopia

CDKN has only been working in Ethiopia since June 2012 and this has been limited to a three person CDKN team placed in the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) – the institution that leads on the response to Climate Change in Ethiopia - to scope the procurement support and needs required to translate the Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (CRGE) into an action plan entitled iPlan24 and now called Sectoral Reduction Mechanism (SRM).

Despite being at an early stage, Ethiopia provides an interesting case study because it is one of the first Global Green Growth Initiative (GGGI) focus countries as well as being a medium or future deep engagement country for CDKN. So, while it is simply too early to report on impact, the MTR was able to ascertain that:

- CDKN seem to have accepted and responded to the change in EPA demand and focus well but are still pushing the EPA to realise the value of an overall coordination role for them.
- EPA is a challenging client to work with – with a very strong sense of their own needs and where they invite outside support. The nature of the demand and their overall strategy is subject to change as their own understanding evolves. Very recently, there was a major and last minute shift in the nature of the engagement CDKN envisaged. The nature of the demand from EPA is much smaller, and less strategic than CDKN proposed. CDKN have been able to respond flexibly to change their support to meet this need by focussing on identifying the key risks to the EPA strategy. The final agreement of the nature of CDKN’s involvement is yet to be formalised.
- CDKN support in Ethiopia relates only to the provision of TA to the EPA. No other outputs have been involved /engaged. Based on this, CDKN will not be able to claim contribution to CCD in Ethiopia beyond output level. The most ambitious claim they can make is likely to relate to building and strengthening the capacity of the EPA to implement the SRM.
- CDKN appear likely to play a role that relates only to the provision of niche TA to transfer capacity to EPA staff and where their ability to work strategically with the EPA is limited. In contrast, GGGI have permanent technical staff based in country and have strategic engagement with the EPA. It will be important to maintain a partnership arrangement and it might provide a model for low-cost expansion of reach in countries without a CEL.

Evidence from Colombia - The seven projects reviewed were:

Colombia Country Programme Yr 3-5: Mainstreaming Climate Change	Technical Assistance TALA 0028	June 13, 2012	December 12, 2014	Grupo E3, Colombia
Integrating adaptation to climate change into local planning and sectoral management in Cartagena Phase 1	Technical Assistance TALA 0006	20/06/2011	30/06/2011	Institute of Marine and Coastal Research (INVEMAR), Colombia
Integrating adaptation to climate change into local planning and sectoral management in Cartagena: PHASE II “ADAPTATION PLAN AND NATIONAL GUIDELINES”	Technical Assistance TALA 0028b	17/09/2012	31/03/2014	INVEMAR, Colombia
An inter-institutional, multi-sectoral analysis of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for the agricultural sector in the upper Cauca valley river basin impacting adaptation policies (AVA)	Technical Assistance TALA 0009	26/09/2011	31/12/2012, Extended to 31/03/2013	Universidad del Cauca, CENICAFE, Universidad de Caldas, CIAT, Colombia
Amazonia: The Security Agenda. Responding to imminent threats	TALA -0025	01/07/2012	31/12/2012	CIAT /Green Canopy, Colombia
Growing up in Adversity: resilience in families affected by the winter	AAGL -0009h	15/04/2012	15/10/2012	Universidad del Norte, Colombia
Mainstreaming Climate Change into the Transport Sector in Colombia	TALA 002a	11/2012	21/06/2014.	International Climate Fund

Overall, the CDKN Colombia Country programme is a successful programme. There is strong evidence that the country engagement approach, plus strategic projects is effective at producing both the product and process results that are required. The MTR assessment is that performance in Phase 1 has been impressive, with tangible results achieved during the lifetime of the projects, and with projects with relatively small budgets.

Most of the results achieved have been in the pilot projects TALA 0006 and TALA 0009. These components have contributed to the establishment of evidence-based and multi-stakeholder endorsed planning products and process for the two main areas of CDKN’s intervention in Colombia. These projects are now ready to begin Phase 2. They represent important results in that they are ‘proof of concept’ of not only research-based products that support implementation planning, but also of multi-stakeholder processes that are able to transcend institutional, public and private, and local/national boundaries.

The projects demonstrate that - given the spaces and on-going accompaniment from CDKN as a trusted broker and source of support – stakeholders are able to find ways to collaborate to address climate change adaptation, ecosystem management and related issues as mainstream issues affecting economic competitiveness and national development.

While the overall picture is positive in terms of outcomes there are some areas that can be strengthened:

- Synergies across outputs - There is a missed opportunity in that the Colombia projects are coded as TA, whereas they combine national and international science and research in practical applications of decision-making tools and inputs to institutional planning, supported by multi-stakeholder engagement and dialogue. However, learning from this synergistic approach is currently not being captured, for reasons to do with:
 - How the impact pathway is conceptualised; and,
 - A lack of focus on capturing intermediate results rather than deliverables within the M&E system.
- Impact pathway - As an example, CDKN Colombia’s impact pathway is missing a key pathway: political and institutional development. In practical terms, this is precisely where their multi-stakeholder processes are focused and is one of the drivers of change. Similarly, valuable learning opportunities are being missed because the impact pathway does not incorporate any learning questions or assumptions to monitor.
- M&E and results reporting - There is a general issue in that the CDKN reporting system favours reporting of deliverables at the immediate end of projects, and a generic aggregation at the top level of the DoC. Results reporting is brought together better at the country programme level, but there are two issues here:
 - These results are self-reported by the team without verification;
 - The structure of the reports mean that the evolving ‘impact story’ is presented in different sections: contextual and institutional challenges are presented as risks, CDKN’s response and contribution are presented as risk mitigation, and any resulting changes are reported in a de-contextualised way, often as PR stories, with risks about over-claiming CDKN’s contribution to a wider process. This makes it difficult to read across the significance and track how small changes build up into big ones, and obscures how CDKN may be responding strategically and adaptively to these. The risk is that results are reported as PR rather than M&E and valuable learning about ‘change stories with chapters’ is not captured.

Evidence from Bangladesh

The MTR reviewed the three key CDKN projects to date in Bangladesh, as listed below.

Project code	Title	Start Date	End Date
1	RSAS-0014	Adaptation policy options and interventions for the climate change induced displaced people of Bangladesh	Feb 2012 Jul 2013
2	TAAS-0026	Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Country Initiative	Nov 2011 Mar 2013
3	TAAS-0008	Action Research on Community Based Adaptation in Bangladesh (ARCAB)	June 2011 October 2012

The present evaluation found that the CDKN Bangladesh country programme was indeed active in all the various ‘areas of intervention’ listed in its anticipated impact pathways, and that it had made good progress towards delivering target outputs in all these areas. Yet the evaluation also raised several important

questions about the current trajectory of the country programme, and whether it was really leading towards the changes anticipated.

Key positive findings of the MTR include:

- CDKN’s willingness to address critical yet risky issues is widely appreciated by stakeholders in Bangladesh.
- CDKN staff maintain ongoing engagement with service providers.
- CDKN has successfully delivered its immediate target outputs within a tight timeframe.
- CDKN’s focus on partnerships with key stakeholders create scope for “over delivering.”

Key negative findings of the MTR include:

- CDKN’s strong emphasis on rapid delivery of tangible outputs (e.g., reports, workshops) is problematic. Potentially, it could lead to outputs that are ill-equipped to deliver outcomes and lasting results, since key considerations that are complex or time-consuming may be downplayed or circumvented. This tendency follows from an emphasis on VFM that focuses mostly on reducing costs rather than on ensuring the delivery of lasting value.
- Understandably, CDKN emphasises its successes. Yet this tendency sometimes seems to obstruct its capacity for self-critical reflection and receptivity to constructive criticism, which raises genuine concerns. When the MTR staff shared key constructive criticisms voiced by stakeholders with CDKN staff, too often the response was simply to defend and justify, instead of embracing this feedback as an opportunity to learn and strengthen its capacity to deliver useful and lasting outcomes. Two examples are CDKN’s response to the MTR sharing concerns that CDKN Bangladesh was not sufficiently consultative in how it approached project design and that key aspects of its work were not well grounded in empirical data.

In sum, progress along the anticipated impact pathway is generally positive, with clear evidence that target activities and outputs are being successfully delivered. Moreover, CDKN’s projects in the country clearly reflect demand in Bangladesh and have the potential to be genuinely significant to addressing pressing problems caused by climate change. Nonetheless, key questions remain. Notably, are these activities and outputs truly leading towards delivering the outcomes anticipated in the logframe for the country programme? As things stand, there is a danger that this potential for genuinely significant impacts could be squandered by weaknesses within the country programme. In order to avoid this outcome, it is essential that the CDKN management acknowledges and responds to the issues raised by key stakeholders.

Cross-output area synergies delivering outcomes

Illustrative examples of programme synergies across output areas

The Country Visits uncovered several examples of synergies across CDKN output areas delivering outcomes. These outcomes are deemed significant because they point to a programme which is potentially ‘greater than the sum of its parts’. This goes to the heart of CDKN’s niche and purpose as an institution championing CCD outcomes and impact.

A ‘classic’ example of CDKN operating in this way was presented to the MTR during the Kenya country visit and is elaborated in the box below:

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE of CDKN synergies across outputs – TA and Partnerships

The National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) Coordinator from the Kenya Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR) was invited to attend the LEADS Global Partnership meeting in London in 2011 based on a suggestion by the CDKN Kenya TA Programme Manager to the CDKN Partnerships lead. CDKN managed to mobilise an advisor each from the MEMR and Ministry of Planning (MoP) as well as both respective Permanent Secretaries (PS). MEMR approached CDKN as they saw a strategic opportunity to influence the Ministry of Planning through his attendance. All four travelled together and presented on mainstreaming CC into national planning processes. According to Stephen this experience was key to the Minister of Planning. The outcome was a significant and immediate change in attitude from the MoP to better engage with MEMR in terms of the importance of CC mainstreaming in planning processes. A wider benefit of the LEADS GP exposure (Stephen now sits on the LEADS GP steering committee) is that he has been exposed to a wide range of potential Development Partners who are interested in contributing development assistance to the implementation of the NCCAP in particular sectors of interest – e.g. Germans now funding development of a Nationally-Appropriate Mitigation Action for Kenya’s energy sector based on discussion at LEADS GP meeting.

In Kenya this seems to be a relatively isolated example of synergy across outputs rather than a systematic approach to working employed by CDKN. Little further evidence was presented in the country of systematic integration / synergy across CDKN outputs – TA, KM, research, partnerships, and advocacy. CDKN strategy and activities in both countries are heavily TA-led with little evidence of systematic input from the other CDKN outputs. However, this is an example of how CDKN can work across outputs to add value contribute to a programme that is ‘greater than the sum of its parts.’

In Columbia, cross-output synergies were found to be more systematic. The overall portfolio of projects reviewed represents quite a high degree of synergy between TA, research and knowledge management. Both the flagship projects are research-driven and led by research institutions and consortia (as suppliers), although with a TA objective. The two other projects being brought into the portfolio are also research projects. One of three main Government of Colombia (GoC) stakeholders is the national environmental research institute, the Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (IDEAM).

Partners in the CDKN projects have welcomed the access to international research expertise and new ideas, signalled as one of the drivers of effectiveness in many cases. Access to international platforms for knowledge sharing was also welcomed as an important benefit of involvement with a CDKN project. The case study below, taken from CDKN’s One Programme document, illustrates this.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE of CDKN synergies across outputs – the Columbia country programme

CDKN Country Programme documentation for Colombia demonstrates the strategic approach to engagement and relationship building with local and national government bodies in Colombia right from the start, through an effective Country Engagement Lead and in-country programme management team. CDKN quickly established a niche, complementary to other donor programmes, focused on mainstreaming climate change adaptation in sub-national and sectoral processes. The approach has always been an integrated approach closely linked to the CDKN ToC and what a policy process requires i.e. ongoing TA engagement support that extends to inter-ministerial coordination and donor coordination; the design of an applied research programme to support the development of innovative methodology for adaptation planning in agriculture and the updating of vulnerability study for the flagship urban city of Cartagena; together with the need to translate the results of this work into a readable format for decision-makers and politicians, as well as an ongoing communication strategy that keeps the policy issues in the limelight and helps to maintain awareness and commitment levels during repeated periods of electoral transition and changes of policy planning team members. Although the majority of the work undertaken in Colombia, this is, therefore, a cross-output team that includes specific KM/Comms support and coordinates with the RS team. Through its close links with the policy research institute working on the agricultural adaptation methodology, the Colombia team also feeds into the Amazon Climate Security project that is co-led by the same partner, CIAT.

However, as with Kenya, the Columbia example is not representative of wider and systematic cross-output working / synergies across CDKN. What both cases illustrate is the potential of cross output synergies to

deliver a programme that is greater than the sum of its parts and that this is both a niche and potential strategy that CDKN should more explicitly and actively support in order to deliver higher order outcomes.

Summary of document review findings – sample of TA projects in countries visited

The CDKN document review (See Section 5 for a more detailed elaboration of the methodology and the findings) also provided some interesting insights into CDKN's results reporting, particularly in terms of how CDKN defines, presents and differentiates between short, medium and long term outcomes.

The Desk review used a four point rating system from Highly Satisfactory (HS) to Highly Unsatisfactory (HU) to rate project documentation across a sample of 13 CDKN projects selected according to the MTR country visits.

In terms project design, question A3 asked *“Is a set of program outcomes clearly presented? Do these link to the overarching ToC/Dimensions of Change framing?”* and found that 62% of projects are either Highly Satisfactory or Satisfactory (S) in terms of presenting a set of outcomes and linking them to CDKN's DoC.

In terms of results reporting, question B2 asked *“Are the project outcomes presented, in relation to the CDKN DoC, Output Areas, and results areas presented in the country and/or regional strategy?”* and found a similar percentage of 62% are HS/S in terms outcome results reporting. However, the desk review analysis also finds that *“This is variable, although KM projects were more consistent than TA. It's rarely possible to see from the country level M&E reporting (as presented in the Country Reports) if the project outcomes have been achieved and what (if any) impact this has had on contributed to achieving the country-level or regional-level goals.”*

In terms of CDKN M&E, question C3 asked *“Does the results framework differentiate between short, medium and long term outcomes and when these results are expected to materialize?”* and found that only 23% of projects explicitly make this differentiation. The desk review analysis for these questions goes on to state *“The main issue here is the lack of timeframes for outcomes to materialise. In one or two cases timeframes are mentioned in country reports but they are almost always entirely or mostly missing from project-level documents (including evaluation documents). TALA 0006 is the only project where all outcome and outputs had timeframes provided.”*

Overall, the desk review reflects the wider MTR findings observed in this chapter – that outcomes are generally clearly presented and that results reporting at the outcome level is relatively consistent and reliable. However, there is less clarity in terms of differentiating between lower and higher order outcomes, and the precise extent / nature of CDKN's credible contribution.

Summary – Evidence of CDKN's outcomes

In summary, there are promising results being generated through CDKN's efforts against the outcomes, so good progress is being made. Evidence generated across the MTR generally endorses that described in CDKN's annual M&E report at both the output and outcome levels. In some case significant gains have been made, in others, smaller 'steps' have been taken, but in the right direction.

However, the M&E evidence that is being reported does not always home in on the causal link, and at times draws the wrong conclusion, and so CDKN's contribution is not always correctly identified. This could be addressed through the development of explicit impact pathways through the DoC which would enable more analysis of the results being seen. See Section 6 on Theory of Change for more discussion on this.

4.4. Evidence of impact and trajectory towards impact - Summary of CDKN's results performance

This chapter has highlighted and verified that:

- CDKN is fairly systematically delivering at output level in the logframe.
- In general, there is evidence of good short-term results in the outcome areas, pointing to good delivery and a promising trajectory towards impact.

Identifying systematic evidence of impact is beyond the scope of the MTR and will be addressed in more detail in the Final Evaluation.

However, maintaining this trajectory depends on making well-targeted strategic decisions in the next period, for example, targeting institutional capacity as well as planning and strengthening the synergy between outputs for specific outcomes. The question is whether the programme has the right tools for interpreting what has happened so far to inform those next decisions.

The MTR team's assessment is that there are many good practices in terms of being able to count and aggregate results, but that the tools for interpreting these are weak. For example, evidence of changed policies in 28 countries is a good achievement, but is it possible to analyse what this means for sustainable impact and therefore what should be the targets to build on this in the remaining term?

Our assessment is that there is good potential for addressing this relative weakness through refinements of existing processes, as our recommendations make clear. For example, there is a need for more resource for M&E but focusing on impact trajectory issues, rather than quantitative measures of delivery.

Note on the CDKN Annual M&E Report – The Annual M&E Report is CDKN's central document for reporting against CDKN's results framework. The document is structured to report at the goal, outcome and output levels and is cumulative in that it reports on results throughout the life of the programme. At the lowest level, outputs, the report is logframe-driven, reporting progress directly against the various output indicators. These are reported robustly and present an accurate picture of how CDKN is performing across its output areas. The weakness at this level is the primarily quantitative output indicators as defined in the logframe tend not to fully capture the essence of the output and the role it plays within CDKN's overall strategy and theory of change. Hence there appears a big jump or gap between CDKN's results as reported against the logframe, and CDKN's higher order results defined as outcomes.

At the outcome-level the major weakness of the Annual M&E report is different, and relates to the process by which the outcomes are identified and reported. Although the report is facilitated and quality assured by CDKN's M&E team, much of the content is provided by the various outcome leads across the programme and there is limited external evaluation. Hence, despite the efforts of the M&E team, there is a significant risk that the underlying reporting is skewed towards 'success stories'. The danger is that these may not be representative of systematic change at the outcome level and may lead to CDKN over-claiming success or failing to identify and report key lessons derived from failure which be as instructive as the successes. The point is not so much that CDKN is over-claiming success. Rather that the report needs to rely on more externally-evaluated project impact reports and be more explicit about how success has been robustly identified through the use of methods such as contribution analysis.

5. The extent to which the CDKN approach and design ensures impact and value for money

5.1. Efficiency metrics

A robust assessment of the efficiency of CDKN management arrangements requires cost data to allow comparison with broadly similar programmes. Unfortunately, DFID procurement department were unable to provide comparable data on administration costs given the unique nature of CDKN. To facilitate this comparison we have drawn on the following sources:

- A 2011 review of international climate fund administration costs produced by the Adaptation Fund;¹¹
- Literature on World Bank trust fund administration costs and payments to the Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP);
- ESMAP by CDKN; and
- Evidence provided by CDKN in response to our request.

Total CDKN administration costs comprise: procurement fees (levied on outsourced procurement); management fees (paid annually, comprising a fixed and spend-related component); and an establishment fee (paid at the start of the programme). Based on the CDKN Financial Statement to November 30th 2012 the contribution of each of these elements to date is as follows:

Procurement fees	1.9%
Management fees	9.9%
Establishment fees	1.1%
Total CDKN administration cost	12.9%

As shown below, this administration cost has a fairly significant variable component and consequently has fallen to an average of 12.9% over the programme to date as spend has risen. For this reason it will rise to 13.6% over the entire five year programme as programme spend is run down in year 5 as currently contracted.

Figure 4: CDKN Administration Costs

Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Programme to 30 Nov 2012	5 year forecast
25.1%	11.6%	9.6%	12.9%	13.6%

Comparison of the CDKN administration charge with that in other programmes is complicated by:


- Variation in what is included in the administration charge – typically including elements of programme management and execution charges. There is a great danger of comparing “apples and pears” unless the elements of alternative administration charges are clearly defined.

¹¹ Adaptation fund (2011), ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXECUTION COSTS: ANALYSIS OF CURRENT RULES AND COMPARISON OF PRACTICES WITH OTHER FUNDS, Adaptation Fund Board Ethics and Finance Committee Fourth Meeting Bonn, March 16, 2011

- b) Variation in the nature of the programme and hence in the cost of administering it. For example, while the IFC charges a standard administrative fee of 5% of trust funds set up for advisory services, the administration charge for IDA Financial Intermediary Funds is negotiated on a case by case basis¹² and CDKN has in fact paid ESMAP a 7% administration fee.¹³

For these reasons the analysis by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC Adaptation Fund to establish a benchmark for their administration charges is particularly relevant. The categories they have used are shown below in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Adaptation Fund categorisation of administration charges



Source: Adaptation Fund (2011) Figure 2

At our request, CDKN have calculated narrow administrative *project-cycle management fees* of 5.6% that should be comparable to the project cycle management fee paid to ESMAP i.e. 5.6% = 12.9% less 1.1% establishment fee less Network Chair and Council costs less CEO costs less Management team costs less M&E management time costs.

CDKN *project execution costs* are then the difference between 12.9% and 5.6% less the 1.1% establishment fee plus CDKN M&E costs (0.4% of programme cost to date). This gives a total of 6.6%. However, the 25% spend on in-house procurement also generates overheads that should be included to be fully comparable. So, in the Table below, we have also estimated CDKN project execution costs *as if* the procurement fee applied to the in-house as well as outsourced spend. This provides an upper bound of 14.4% total administration costs for comparison purposes only.

Based on analysis of administration costs of the first five organisations in Table 1, the Adaptation Fund Board Secretariat recommended to their Ethics and Finance Committee a cap of 8.5% cap on implementing agency fees (the first three columns of Table 1) and a cap of 9-10% of project budget for project execution costs. This would give a total cap of 17.5 – 18.5%.

In this context, a comparable upper bound of 14.4% for CDKN spend to date (15% if the five-year forecast spend holds) certainly does not appear excessive. These figures suggest that total administration charges

¹² World Bank 2010 Trust Fund Annual Report, Chapter 6, : <http://go.worldbank.org/CTK2YW4I0>

¹³ After waiving any CDKN administration charge on these funds.

for CDKN are likely to be lower than for Global Environment Facility (GEF) or the Adaptation Fund. Likewise, CDKN appears relatively cost-efficient when the comparison is between narrow CDKN administration charges and those levied by ESMAP.

Table 1: Project Administration and Management Costs in Comparator Funds

Funds	Types of costs supported			
	Corporate Activity Fees	Core Unit Budget	Project Cycle Management Fees	Project Execution Costs
GEF	1% of project grant	N/A	9% of project grant	Up to 10% of project budget
MLF (2010)	N/A	UNDP: USD 1,913,365; UNIDO USD 1,913,365; World Bank USD 1,701,466	<u>Implementing Agencies:</u> 7.5% for projects with a project cost at or above USD 250,000; 9% for projects with a project cost below USD 250,000 <u>Bilateral Agencies:</u> 13% for projects below USD 500,000 and 9% for projects above that amount	Costs to establish a Project Management Unit provided exceptionally. Usually estimated between 5% and 10% of the implementation cost. Negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
Global Fund	N/A	LFA fees for grant management monitoring Up to USD 50,000/year for basic CCM funding, may exceed USD 50,000/year for expanded CCM funding	PR fees and negotiable	No specific rule
GAVI	N/A	N/A		CSO support: CSOP execution costs (less than 10%) SS: HSCC support costs (less than 10% of the total cost) ISS, INS, and NVS: Operational costs (less than 5%)
Strategic Climate Fund	Administrative budget for corporate services	USD 388,000 for country programming support		Flexible, no specific cap
ESMAP	N/A	N/A	7%	Less than 20% ¹⁴
CDKN (actual)	1.10%	N/A	5.60%	6.6% ¹⁵ + overheads within the 25% in-house spend
CDKN (for comparison)	1.10%	N/A	5.60%	7.30%
Advocacy Fund Proposal	N/A	N/A	8.50%	9-10%

Source: Adaptation Fund (2011) and Author's calculations

¹⁴ ESMAP requested a 20% "supervision" fee in the project budget (in addition to the 7%) to cover the World Bank time on 'content' project management and QA etc of the projects. It is important to note this was specific to a particular project and was subsequently, negotiated down.

¹⁵ Calculated as Network Chair and Council costs + CEO costs + Management team costs + M&E management time costs + M&E - 1.1% of total programme cost charged as establishment fee

5.2. Incentives provided by the CDKN design

One of the innovative features of the design of CDKN is the contractual requirement for a 25%:75% in-house to outsourced split in spend over the life of the programme. This was intended to incentivise the alliance to outsource where possible and rely on alliance partners where they added greatest value.

In practice, the 25:75 arrangement has resulted in some frustration for both CDKN and suppliers. This partly reflects the choice of what to outsource but there are also some inherent problems with this design.

CDKN argue that the 25% restriction leads to inefficiency and cite a number of examples where tenders by suppliers were far more expensive than the cost of delivering the work in-house. This is likely to reflect:

1. Previous investment by CDKN in knowledge or systems that allow them to do related work more cheaply;
2. The need for bidders to cover transactions costs and uncertainties (this will always be the case); and
3. Inadequate information available to bidders or an inadequate supply of bidders for a particular tender.

Our assessment of project documentation (see Evidence from a systematic document review below) suggests that project design has been a strong point and information is clearly presented. CDKN has also undertaken a large number of meetings to introduce potential suppliers to the programme. So, although we have not been able to investigate the specific circumstances of why particular bids were more expensive than in-house alternatives, it seems likely that these reflect points 1 and 2 above rather than 3.

Our interviews suggest that CDKN has chosen to interpret what can be contracted out more narrowly than DFID originally intended. Strategic thinking, in particular, has not been outsourced and is likely to reflect management desire to keep control of the agenda and a desire to avoid giving competitors an advantage.

Some suppliers active in developing countries have argued that the 25:75 model has provided the major Alliance partners with an unfair competitive advantage by:

- Giving CDKN staff who have institutional allegiance access to senior officials in developing countries and information that makes it easier to bid for non-CDKN work in these countries, although may apply to whomever held a similar contract; and
- Providing information and cost details on competitors who are also suppliers in bids.

It is important to highlight that Alliance partners have put ethical walls in place and that we have observed high levels of integrity and exceptional commitment among the CDKN staff we have dealt with. With the time and resources available to this MTR it has not been possible for us to rigorously test the effectiveness of these ethical walls. However, we can say that the 25:75 model produces more potential conflicts of interest than the standard manager/supplier split in responsibilities.

ODI, for example, undertakes climate finance work for CDKN and directly for DFID. DFID have been concerned that there could be dual spend on same activity. A full ODI internal audit shows this has not happened but the current model allows for DFID country offices to ask for ODI support while and DFID centrally asks for CDKN work.

It is also worth noting that, if PwC, for example, was only running procurement for an international climate organisation it would face some of the same conflict of interest issues facing CDKN but not all. In-country organisation staff would only have the international organisation affiliation and ethical walls would only be

needed to limit information flows from procurement to operations (who talk relatively little) rather than operations to operations staff (who have to talk a lot).

The design of the CDKN budget (with spend targets by pillar and region) initially proved restrictive and threatened effectiveness. The problems appear to have resulted from CDKN rigorously implementing the letter of the head contract with DFID perhaps inadvertently signalling this was required when in fact that was not the intention. DFID assumed that the principle of some flexibility in being able to vire between budgets was understood, when in reality it took until year 2 to establish this and put in train a process to have relevant language inserted in the head contract.

Recommendation 8 – Greater use of the 75%

While we recognise that it is not always easy to get time from leading thinkers in competitor institutions we believe more could be done by offering larger and longer-term contracts that made it more attractive for these individuals to commit to CDKN.

Recommendation 9 – Reducing conflict of interest

There are things that can be done to reduce conflict of interest within the 25:75 model. For example, CDKN should ensure that Country and Regional Engagement Leaders are hired from the 75% budget and are not Alliance member staff.

5.3. Evidence on efficiency and VFM to date

CDKN programme design

Deep engagement with a country engagement leader

CDKN recognise that investing in deep engagement countries is an effective strategy. As our Country reviews show (see Section 4.3 and Annex 4) investing in understanding and engaging deeply in a country using a country engagement leader (CEL) is a critical success factor and will drive VFM going forward. This has two important implications:

1. CDKN should place particular emphasis on a limited number of countries where it has a country engagement leader. This person should be based in-country unless CDKN can clearly demonstrate this is not required. Where there are small, regionally-integrated countries it may be feasible to have a regional engagement leader instead e.g. the Caribbean. Conversely, working in a number of Indian States is likely to require multiple engagement leaders.
2. Where CDKN partners an organisation such as GGGI that has their own CEL and strategy that CDKN can support (e.g. in Ethiopia) it is very unlikely that a separate CDKN CEL will provide VFM. In such cases, the key issue is whether CDKN can see their input into their partner's strategy delivering against the CDKN logframe and DoC.

Investment in building partnerships like country deep engagement takes time and involves fixed costs. Like all investments there will be occasions where the information initially available or assumptions made were wrong and the best strategy is to treat investments as sunk costs and walk away. The CDKN mid-term high level analysis meeting suggested that Zimbabwe provided an example of “not having the right champions or quality partners”. To help achieve VFM it is important that CDKN develop a country ToC *at the outset* that explicitly identifies assumptions that need to be met to progress along the results chain. CDKN management can then regularly monitor progress by country teams against a ToC-based results framework and will be in a stronger position to know if failure to achieve a particular milestone is a threat to success of the project.

It is important to highlight that MTR country findings from Colombia, Kenya, Bangladesh and Rwanda support the CDKN strategy of investing in deep engagement. Likewise, we are starting to see the returns to building complex partnerships (LEDs) and longer-term relationships (in the AF) where trust has to be built over time and is critical to success. These are examples of successful CDKN investments where VFM would not be delivered by exiting investments early. In the case of the AF, the current contract will terminate six months before COP 2015, removing support to negotiators in a critical period.

Piloting and scaling up

Evidence from the Colombia case study illustrates the value of using pilot projects, often at a sub-national level, which can be subsequently replicated and scaled up using a country engagement leader and a deep engagement process. Piloting has been important for CDKN in a number of countries - Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh (Loss & Damage) being good examples.

The evidence from Bangladesh suggests that the strategy of piloting has not always been effectively communicated to suppliers and recipients. This may explain the reported frustration at seeing short successful projects that have the potential to produce bigger results with a longer-term investment.

Forging a cross-cultural institutional alliance

The CDKN Alliance has brought together private sector, think tank and non-governmental organisations with a wide range of expertise on climate change and development. The downside of assembling an Alliance of many different institutions has been an institutional culture clash that has limited communication and reduced effectiveness. This challenge has been recognised and, although it has taken some time, there are signs of improvement. It seems very likely that this is an inherent feature of choosing a private-public partnership that builds on pre-existing global, regional and country networks. Indeed it has some similarity with a commercial cross-border merger and the literature tells us that there is a failure rate of up to 70% in cross-border mergers and acquisitions.¹⁶ This makes the successes achieved by CDKN to date even more striking. However, reflecting on the design of CDKN, the costs of institutional culture clash were almost certainly underestimated by DFID when this model was adopted. It also suggests that there will be significant non-financial costs where re-tendering involves constructing a new complex institutional alliance.

Working with DFID country offices

Where DFID country offices have a climate change programme and climate advisor, CDKN typically works closely with them and has sometimes relied on them as a country engagement leader. At the same time, CDKN needs to demonstrate a link to country demand and (particularly for the AF) to maintain critical distance from DFID. The relationship has also changed over the life of CDKN as a number of country offices (including some of those visited in our MTR) started engagement with CDKN when they had very limited climate change programme capacity but are now much stronger.

Problems have arisen where country programmes co-fund projects with CDKN and Advisors found it very difficult to know “who had funded what”. There is also a risk that DFID is paying twice for managing interventions if both country offices and CDKN work on the same issue. As DFID country climate programmes tend to be much larger than CDKN projects in these countries (e.g. in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda) we recommend the following.

¹⁶ http://www.communicaid.com/access/pdf/library/culture/Cross-Border%20Mergers%20&%20Acquisitions_Reducing%20the%20Risk%20of%20Failure.pdf

Recommendation 10 – DFID country climate change advisor role

In countries with DFID climate change programmes it is important that the advisor has oversight of CDKN projects – even if this is simply to confirm consistency with the country strategy and that there are good reasons for not managing it “in-house”. Given the requirement for independence this should not apply to the AF.

Recommendation 11 – Particular CDKN emphasis on deep engagement countries

CDKN should place particular emphasis on a limited number of deep engagement countries where it has a country engagement leader. The CEL should be put in place early on in the country programme. This person should be able to work at a senior, strategic level and be based in-country unless CDKN can clearly demonstrate this is not required. Where there are small, regionally-integrated countries it may be feasible to have a regional engagement leader instead e.g. the Caribbean. Conversely, working in a number of Indian States is likely to require multiple engagement leaders. Where CDKN partners an organisation such as GGGI that has their own CEL and strategy that CDKN can support (e.g. in Ethiopia) it is very unlikely that a separate CDKN CEL will provide VFM.

Recommendation 12 – Greater opportunities for joining up at the country level

CDKN should place greater focus on country strategy and CEL to combine Outputs:

- i) Countries should drive the combination of deep engagement, a CEL and strategic engagement. Country programmes should draw on combinations of Technical Assistance (TA), national and international research, communications and knowledge management and partnerships to ensure a multi-channel strategy at the country level (for example, supporting technical assistance with strategic communications to widen public understanding of climate and development as a mainstream issue).
- ii) CDKN’s Outputs should be better grounded in the strategy, activities and lessons at the country level – responding to priorities as they emerge, applying lessons learned through working with priority audience and stakeholders in deep engagement countries and then transferring these activities and lessons elsewhere.

Recommendation 13 – Give more flexibility to successful country programmes

Where deep engagement country programmes such as Colombia have put in place a CEL, have a ToC, demonstrate strategic engagement and produce synergies by combining multiple outputs (TA, research etc.), they should be given flexible funding to achieve outcomes and impact. In this case the country ToC would be the key monitoring tool.

CDKN programme delivery – positive findings

CDKN project procurement is widely regarded as sophisticated, innovative and efficient. This is most evident for technical assistance projects with suppliers and recipients highlighting:

- *Speed.* For example, in Rwanda, the Government set an extremely challenging timetable for developing a National Climate Strategy that CDKN supported where other donors could not have moved fast enough. More generally, CDKN has tried to design in contract reviews at the same time as technical reviews to speed up the process.
- *Facilitating recipients to effectively express demand.* For example, the Global Water Partnership did not have sufficient capacity to contract and manage the many consultants required to support AMCOW member states water for CCD work. CDKN helped GWP develop the concept note through to ToR for consultants and to engage and supervise the work of a big international company.

- *Flexibility.* There are many examples where clients have modified their demand as their understanding develops and have requested suppliers to change track. CDKN has worked with suppliers to modify TOR to enable this without introducing significant delays. Kenya was one of the first countries to produce a National Climate Strategy and there was inevitably some “learning by doing” and subsequent revisions to supplier TORs.
- *Management investment in quality assurance* – it is in the nature of development projects that things sometimes go wrong and but donors often find it difficult to devote management time to solve problems. We were given a number of examples where CDKN had invested time to solve problems where clients thought that most other donors would have simply cancelled contracts.

CDKN has also demonstrated learning from experience to reduce administration costs. Initially, supplier invoices were processed in regional offices on the assumption that this would reduce costs. However, CDKN found that using skilled local accounting staff to meet international standards was significantly more expensive than outsourcing invoice processing to a PwC back office in Docklands. The annual saving from this change is £327,360. Other restructuring in the light of experience has been the merger of Knowledge Management and Research representation to the management team and the turning of partnerships into a cross-cutting work stream. The combined administrative and management saving for April 2012- February 2013 is 32.29% of the total CDKN administrative cost. This is an annual saving.

CDKN programme delivery – negative findings

Although CDKN project delivery has been efficient, it has imposed significant costs on suppliers. This threatens effectiveness and hence VFM: one supplier who has produced one of CDKN’s most highly regarded products says he “will never work with CDKN again”. **There is clearly a need to reduce the cost of doing business with CDKN.** The MTR team received many complaints that fall into two categories:

1. PwC contracting took no account of developing country realities. Three examples illustrate the problem:
 - Firstly, there was a requirement for small southern suppliers to take out professional indemnity insurance in the UK;
 - Secondly, some African delegates to conferences have found it very difficult to pay costs up front and reclaim these; and
 - Thirdly, it has been very time consuming and difficult for CDKN to contract individuals (as opposed to companies) as suppliers.

In the case of the first example, CDKN has learned and found ways to mitigate this problem (paying for this insurance in some instances). In the second example, the problem seems to be that PwC is interpreting DFID contract conditions more strictly than DFID itself. There needs to be flexibility to run imprest accounts, for example, but this probably requires DFID revision of the head contract. DFID Procurement staff and CDKN will need to jointly look at the scope for making these revisions. In the third example, CDKN has sometimes been able to work around the problem by hiring corporate suppliers who can then take on individual experts. However, if an individual needs to be hired for a critical post such as a CEL, the inability of CDKN to contract them directly will result in delays and, potentially, this individual taking another job.

2. Contracts have been specified in excessive detail (down to activity level in some cases) and the burden of reporting is much higher than for other donors. To some extent this is an inevitable consequence of transferring the risk of delivery to the private sector and has to be set against the efficiency benefits noted previously. Nonetheless, our impression is that there is scope to reduce the transactions costs faced by suppliers – particularly when they have a demonstrated a track record with CDKN.

By placing too much emphasis on rapid delivery of results the quality of consultation or results themselves have sometimes suffered (see Box 1)

Box 1: A short timeframe can be counter-productive

The L&D project has an unrealistically short timeframe to obtain solid results. Notably, gathering empirical evidence on vulnerable communities was seemingly not possible, and the project had to rely on key informant interviews with experts in the capital instead. These interviews allowed the project to frame key issues and raise relevant questions, but could not provide evidence-based answers. Yet at the same time CDKN is pushing for using this project to influence the international negotiations and policy. Several stakeholders cautioned that while it is exciting for the country to have this opportunity for high-level engagement and leadership, doing this without firm evidence is worrisome. Other stakeholders noted that the work on L&D is still at an early stage, with different key stakeholders in Bangladesh having very different understandings of this term. While these stakeholders applauded CDKN's willingness to take on this difficult topic, they worried about it proceeding without addressing the problem of missing empirical evidence.

In Bangladesh, many interviewees felt that *consulting with a broader set of field-level (rather than high-level) partners could add significant value*. One manifestation of this is that a number of practitioners have discovered and started to use CDKN products (which is very positive) but that **with broader consultation CDKN could have facilitated these linkages earlier**. For instance, the L&D project is serving as an input to important new work on harmonising DRR and CC adaptation in BNG. Another example is how ARCAB partnered with ActionAid to field test its new M&E tool for community-based adaptation in a vulnerable region of Bangladesh.

Recommendation 14 - CDKN & DFID to reduce the cost of doing business with CDKN

CDKN together with DFID should set up a senior task force to examine and quickly report on how they can reduce the cost of doing business with CDKN. Supplier feedback on transactions costs should be monitored and reported.


Recommendation 15 – CDKN to speed up contracting of individuals

It is essential for CDKN to speed up the contracting of individuals. If PwC cannot manage the associated risks through individual professional indemnity insurance, CDKN regional offices should develop the capacity to help critical individuals establish limited companies in their home countries. DFID should consider making the ability to contract individuals a requirement for programme management contracts.

5.4. Governance structures

The CDKN Organogram is shown in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: CDKN Organogram



Source: CDKN

Currently, CDKN has two main governance bodies:

- The Management Oversight Committee (MoC); and
- The Network Council (NC).

The CDKN management team report both to the MoC and the NC, each of which meets quarterly. In principle, the MoC should provide detailed management oversight for DFID and DGIS and the NC should lead visioning and strategy (supported by external advisors who meet twice a year). In practice, there is overlap in the functions of the MoC and NC, with the NC being used to address management issues. This results in:

- Inefficient use of NC member skills (who are best suited to set strategy);
- Ineffective use of NC time (when representatives are not the best people within their organisation to address management issues as they do not have day-to-day involvement with CDKN);
- Inefficient use of CDKN management time (who have duplicated reporting requirements); and
- A potentially weaker strategic focus (by substituting management for NC input on strategy development).

Recommendation 16 - The Network Council should become a strategic advisory board

The Network Council should become a strategic advisory board and avoid duplicating management oversight provided by the MoC. It is possible that with a focus on strategy the NC should meet six monthly rather than quarterly.

5.5. Evidence from a systematic document review

The MTR team conducted a comprehensive document review of selected projects in the CDKN portfolio. The purpose of the document review was to support the empirical country and project-level analysis being delivered by the review team.

Thirteen projects were reviewed from countries including Colombia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal & Kenya. Only projects that had reached the 'deliver' stage of the project cycle were selected for review, and this was done to ensure that all aspects of the project – from design to M&E – would be captured by the review.

The review is based entirely on documents made available to the ITAD review team via Huddle during January 1st and January 30th 2013. All documentation was treated as final and it was assumed that all available/relevant documentation was made available through Huddle. Therefore where documents were missing or incomplete it was been assumed that this reflected the project management situation accurately (i.e. it has not been assumed that incomplete or missing documents existed somewhere else within CDKN files and as such no attempt was made to track down such documents).

The document review process involved assessing each project using a proforma consisting of 13 questions. Questions fell under four headings: **Project Design and Strategy, Project Results Reporting, Monitoring & Evaluation and Lesson Learning & Knowledge Sharing**. The same proforma was used for reviewing each project. A four point rating scale was used.¹⁷

See Tables 2-4 below for a summary of the aggregate scores against the questions in the proforma.

The documents review was complemented by a comparison of the M&E reports from 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. This looked specifically for evidence that lesson learning was taking place and to what extent this had informed the adaptation of CDKN strategies in the following year.

5.6. Key Findings

Design and strategy are normally relatively strong

The impression gained was that project outcomes are normally well-thought out and their function in achieving country programme goals is usually clear and logical. The DoCs are usually considered. So the potential for impact is designed in.

M&E and reporting is weak

However, in most projects M&E and reporting is weak. This limits the ability to assess how design feeds through to impact and the potential is realised.

Sometimes indicators are poor or incomplete and all monitoring seems to be self-reported with no verification. Project-level and country-level M&E systems seem very separate and it is difficult to see how one feeds into the other.

¹⁷ *Four point rating HS – Highly satisfactory where the issue is dealt with in exemplary detail fully in line with good practice; S – Satisfactory where it meets good practice or guidelines minimally; U – Unsatisfactory where some aspect of good practice or guidelines are met but not in full; HU – Highly unsatisfactory where the topics is neglected completely or the treatment is considerably different from good practice or guidelines. N was used where for valid reason the question is not relevant or where a lack of information means that a reliable assessment cannot be made.

Lesson learning is weak

The document review highlights that lesson learning is also consistently weak. While lessons learned are normally documented this is normally quite superficial and the impression gained is that this is a 'box-ticking' process. There is almost nothing to illustrate that lessons learned are feeding back into higher-level processes such as project design or country programme direction. Colombia is probably the strongest in this regard. Few projects or programmes have any evidence to show that they have shared any of their own experiences with others, nor that they have drawn on experience from elsewhere.

From the M&E reports comparison, there is stronger evidence to say that lesson learning is occurring. There is a specific lesson learning report mentioned, and this is used to justify why there is little lesson learning mentioned in the M&E reports. However, the MTR team did see a specific lesson learning report.

Some lesson learning is documented, and this is much more common in the 2012/13 report than in the previous (see 2012/13 pg 37, 59, 87 & 90). In particular, there is reference to:

- The need to improve M&E systems for some outcomes/outputs (see 2012/13 page 66 & page 35).
- The potential need to adjust milestones in the face of higher-than-expected performance (2012/13 page 85)
- What the Innovation Fund has learned from early progress (2012/13 page 87)
- Plans for greater lesson learning in capacity building (2012/13 page 90 – although this is an output as well, so would be considered anyway)
- Plans to document and learn lessons from the Action Lab experience (2011/12 pg 40)

There is very little mention overall of disappointments or projects not having done as well as hoped, although some are mentioned (see 2011/12 page 20 and 12/13 page 37). Mostly, the M&E reports seem focused on showing that CDKN is doing well, rather than a more objective analysis and identification of areas for improvement.

Application of learning to strengthen approach/results/reporting systems weak

From both the document review and the M&E reports comparison, there is very little mention of any changes being made as a result of lessons learned. Because of this, it is difficult to say without reviewing all the projects/programmes to see if original designs have changed. The impression given is that this is not happening very often. One telling example of this is a recommendation made by the TA team regarding tracking systems for TA requests is repeated almost word-for-word in both reports, indicating that the recommendation has not been acted on (2011/12 page 55 and 2012/13 page 78).

Some examples where suggestions for change were made in the M&E reports include:

- Some suggestion that the Innovation Fund has changed as lessons have been learned (2012/13 page 87)
- The way subscriptions are secured for the CDKN newsletter seems to have changed in the face of disappointing results (2012/13 page 56)
- Ongoing improvements to the CDKN website based on user feedback (2011/12 page 38)

Conclusions from the systematic review

The findings of the documents reviews confirm our findings from elsewhere – that CDKN projects are well-designed and impact potential is explicitly focused on at the design stage. This supports the observed successes in delivery.

However, the weaker M&E means that it is difficult to track through how this design translates to sustainable changes and impact in practice. Importantly, it also means that important lessons are not being captured, either as a way of improving and adapting strategies or as an input to the broader learning about CCD that CDKN is generating.

		All Projects
		Comments & Observations
Review criteria and specific questions	SUM % HS/S Green: > 67% HS/S; Amber: 34-66% HS/S; Red: <33% HS/S	
A. Project Design and Strategy		Most projects are strong in this area. Bangladesh in particular has problems with different project documents stating different DoC will be affected. There is rarely mention of wider objectives (other than DoC) in project documents. TAAF 0027 especially weak on defining outcomes.
Is a program purpose correctly presented?	61.53846154	This is generally satisfactory or better in the TA projects but was let down by KM. Most TA projects have a clearly defined purpose which fits with the country programme goals. Improvements could be made in the case of Colombia TALA 0009, Bangladesh TAAS 0008
A1. Does the program design include a clear, well-articulated intervention logic ?	92.30769231	The intervention logic is normally clear. This use of diagrams in TAAS 0008, Kenya TAAF 0027 was a helpful addition that improved clarity.
A2. Do the project objectives link explicitly to named CDKN Dimensions of Change, Output Areas, and results areas presented in the country and/or regional strategy?	53.84615385	Generally this is good in the TA projects although there is rarely mention in the project documents of how country programme outputs/outcomes or results areas will be affected. In projects RSAS 0014, TAAS 0008, TAAS 0026 and TAAF 0027 there is confusion regarding which DoC will be affected, with different project documents stating different DoC. KM projects scored poorly on these due to failure to link to DoC.
A7. Is a set of program outcomes clearly presented? Do these link to the overarching ToC/Dimensions of Change framing?	61.53846154	This is often satisfactory but there are some issues. In TAAS 0008 Outcomes on different project documents do not match. In TALA 0006 some outputs are described as outcomes. In TAAF 0027 the way in which outcomes is presented for the subcomponents is confusing and outcomes are not described for all the subcomponents. KMAS 0001 failed to set out a coherent set of outcomes.
B. Project Results Reporting		This is generally satisfactory but reporting of actual results is an issue. Most projects have the Outcomes Forms but these have not been completed. It's rarely possible to see if delivery or non-delivery of outcomes affects country-level or regional-level goals.
B1. Are the project results (outputs) presented (rather than activities)?	76.92307692	This is normally satisfactory although it is common that progress against outputs is not reported. For example In TALA 0009 no progress is given despite the project having ended. TAAS 0008 has two Objectives Forms (normally there should be one), and one Project Detail Form. Different outputs/deliverables are listed on each. KMAS 0001 fails to differentiate clearly between outcomes, outputs & deliverables.
B2. Are the project outcomes presented , in relation to the CDKN Dimensions of Change, Output Areas, and results areas presented in the country and/or regional strategy?	61.53846154	This is variable, although KM projects were more consistent than TA. It's rarely possible to see from the country level M&E reporting (as presented in the Country Reports) if the project outcomes have been achieved and what (if any) impact this has had on contributed to achieving the country-level or regional-level goals. In TAAS 0008 Outcomes on different project documents do not match. In TALA 0006 some outputs are described as outcomes. In TAAF 0027 the way in which outcomes is presented for the subcomponents is confusing and outcomes are not described for all the subcomponents.

Table 2: Scores relating to Monitoring and Evaluation

C. Program Monitoring & Evaluation									One of the weakest areas. TAAS 0026 and TAAF 0027 the projects that seem to have the most comprehensive systems. No regular monitoring information is published for most projects, which gives the impression that no monitoring is occurring. Where progress reports are provided, these are often weak. Baselines sometimes neglected. M&E seems to be done by the supplier with little verification. It's also difficult to see how project-level and Country-level M&E systems communicate, because country reports rarely reference specific projects.	
C1. To what extent has the program been designed and managed to support results-based reporting, monitoring and evaluation ?	3		5			8	62.5	0	61.53846154	This is often weak. Most projects have some kind of final evaluation of achievement of outputs but evidence for regular monitoring is often absent. In case where it is present, it is often unclear how the reports can be used to measure progress. RSAS 0014 in particular showed a very weak M&E system design. TAAS 0026 and TAAF 0027 had the strongest body of evidence to show that M&E had been considered and was occurring.
C2. Are performance indicators clear and suitable for measuring results and achievements?	1	3	1	3		8	12.5	37.5	30.76923077	This is variable. Indicators are normally suitable but baselines are sometimes neglected. TAAF 0027 lacks baselines for some components and TALA 0009 shows no evidence of baselines.
C3. Does the results framework differentiate between short, medium and long term outcomes and when these results are expected to materialize?	1	6		1		8	0	12.5	23.07692308	The main issue here is the lack of timeframes for outcomes to materialise. In one or two cases timeframes are mentioned in country reports but they are almost always entirely or mostly missing from project-level documents (including evaluation documents). TALA 0006 is the only project where all outcome and outputs had timeframes provided. TALA 0009 does not provide information on measuring project-level outcomes and only lists programme-level outcomes in the country report so it's difficult to say whether these have been achieved or not.
	C4. What role do the CDKN cross-cutting issues play in results-based system?	1	1	5		1	8	62.5	0	38.46153846
C5. To what extent does the current monitoring and reporting produce representative evidence for qualitative and quantitative results?	2	6				8	0	0	7.692307692	Although representative evidence is not normally provided, many project Outcomes Forms give the source of information used to assess achievement, so this could be verified if necessary. In no cases is there any evidence of 3rd part verification occurring, or even of verification by CDKN Country Offices. Most reporting seems to be self-reported by supplier and not verified. TALA 0009 Outcomes Form fails to provide any details on the source of information used to set baselines or measure outcomes.

Table 3: Scores related to lesson learning and knowledge sharing

D. Program lessons learning and knowledge sharing		Very weak generally, although TALA 0009 seemed to be dedicating real effort to this (there is a whole document dedicated to lessons learned), and Colombia seemed to be the most active in this area generally, with several tools mentioned in the country report as well. It's often difficult to see from the Country Reports whether this has happened or not.
D1. What is done in terms of identifying and sharing positive experiences /best practices and new knowledge?	46.15384615	In most cases there is a standard Supplier Form and Service Recipient Form completed at project end which contains space for these parties to consider lessons learned. However this comes across as a formality rather than a real effort to document lessons learned. For example, RSAS 0014 no evidence of this being done at project level. TALA 0009 lacks the standard documents but did deliver a whole lessons learned document. Colombia seems the most organised in regard to dissemination. The Colombia Country Report mentions several solid tools and a plan to disseminate lessons learned. This is also the case in the Bangladesh Country Programme Report. However it's usually unclear whether this has actually happened or not. At project-level, it's also unclear how lessons learned will be shared with wider stakeholders. Although country reports have space to document lessons learned, these are either incomplete or do not specify the source of the lessons (meaning it's impossible to track them back to see if lessons are feeding upwards).
D2. Is there evidence that lesson learning has been fed back into program design and implementation in order to improve effectiveness or maintain and enhance relevance?	53.84615385	The Country Programme Reports show that there are mechanisms to allow this to happen. The problem in almost all cases is that there is no evidence that project lessons-learned are feeding upwards, although in some cases (TALA 0006, TAAF 0008) it seems reasonable to assume that this is happening.

5.7. M&E systems and reporting requirements

Increasing CDKN focus on causal linkages

The evolution of CDKN from being set up to address “demand” in some 60 countries to a greater emphasis on deep engagement in 14 countries and a re-balancing of demand with a more strategic approach has implications for M&E. In the initial design, the large number of expected recipients and uncertainty over who they would be and what they would need meant that cost-effective project M&E would have to rely on a mix of recipient, supplier and self-reporting against simple templates with some limited independent evaluation. Given these constraints, it was a good idea to design ex-post project impact reviews (PIR). These have often uncovered weaknesses and lessons but these have not been adequately reported. For example, these findings have only been reported in one quarterly report and only then in an annex.

As CDKN has evolved, deep engagement provides a greater opportunity to look in more depth at the causes of change using, for example, the output pathways (results chains) introduced into Country Programme Reports. This is in addition to the expected increase in emphasis on documenting and explaining progress towards logframe outcomes in addition to outputs as the programme matures.

These changes have implications for the M&E tools that are used and suggestions for introducing scales within DoC are discussed in Section 6.3 below. There are also implications for M&E processes. In particular, there is both scope and greater need for case studies and for independent evaluation. This will increase the time and cost required for M&E.

Recommendation 17 – Project Impact Reviews and external independent verification

A representative sample of project impact reviews (PIRs) should be subject to external independent verification.

Recommendation 18 - Additional resources required for CDKN to undertake effective evaluation

Additional resources are needed to enable CDKN to undertake effective evaluation. Some of this can be contracted in (e.g. for external independent verification of PIRs) but the in-house team will also need additional resources to implement our recommendations on strengthening analysis of causal linkages.

Lack of a real-time project management information system

CDKN is a large and complex programme currently managing approximately £20 million a year and 260 contracts. Yet there is no real-time project management information system that enables data on spend to be brought together with basic performance monitoring data (e.g. on project status, activities and constraints) that should certainly be available monthly and must be reported to DFID quarterly.

The MTR team understand that it was the original intention of the Alliance partners (and part of the consortium bid) to design an IT system that would provide this data but that crucial partners (Microsoft and Infosys) subsequently decided not to participate.

Recommendation 19 – Strengthening the CDKN MIS

As a very minimum, the “Compass” project management system should have real time data on project funding, start dates and linkages with Clusters. If the PwC procurement tracker is used it should allow CDKN TA projects to be easily distinguished from catering provided by PwC to CDKN.

Incentives for critical reflection and honest attribution

We do recognise there is an important role for impact or success stories. This sub-section is concerned with ensuring that firstly: impact stories reflect reality and acknowledge the contribution of others alongside CDKN; and secondly, that producing impact stories does not impede critical reflection and learning.

The MTR team has identified combination of institutional incentives and reporting requirements that have a serious detrimental effect on CDKN M&E and learning. There are three types of negative outcome:

1. Failure to learn. CDKN is required to innovate in order to succeed. Almost by definition, innovation results in interventions that do not always go as expected and will sometimes fail. We would expect CDKN to learn from this to strengthen support for CCD and, ideally, for DFID to draw lessons into other programmes. **This can only happen if there is a culture of critical reflection and an opportunity to report failure – both for suppliers and for CDKN. Unfortunately, this currently does not exist within CDKN.** This is the conclusion reached by the MTR team on the basis of extensive interviews and document review.
2. Confusing PR and M&E. There is a tendency to confuse public relations “PR” and M&E (particularly in Quarterly Reports). As a result, successes are spun and failures (that may be learning opportunities) are either not reported or are tucked away deep inside reports or annexes.
3. Over-claiming success. There is evidence of CDKN claiming a major share of success from projects or processes in which they are just one of many contributors. For example, CDKN funding started during the third year of the ACCRA project (and as only one source of funding) but ACCRA success is reported as CDKN success. Many contractors have an incentive to over-claim success to their funding body and we do not want to single out CDKN unfairly. However, various people we spoke to who were aware of this general issue were concerned about CDKN “self-importance bias”.

The problems appear to result from a combination of the following factors:

1. An MoC requirement for impact stories (that is entirely reasonable but can only be one way of documenting the impact of CDKN);
2. A laudable PwC focus on delivery and ensuring client satisfaction (but if the MoC requires impact stories that is exactly what they get);
3. Unrealistic expectations of the time taken to achieve a global presence; and
4. The requirement to report quarterly on project impact when it is very difficult to observe changing impact on a quarterly basis.

We believe that it is possible to improve the incentives for critical reflection and honest reporting by implementing the following recommendation:

Recommendation 20 - Improving the incentives for critical reflection and honest reporting

- *The MoC should rely on fewer but more in-depth coverage of CDKN impact stories*
- *Quarterly reports that cover monitoring of activities, spend and issues that need to be brought to the attention of the MoC with six monthly evaluation progress reports to the MoC. Evaluation progress reports should be prepared independently by the CDKN M&E team.*
- *Strengthening opportunities for reflective learning within CDKN – see Section 6.*
- *More extensive use of contribution analysis in CDKN M&E. This can simply involve publishing the CDKN share of funding to a project or programme but can also include testable arguments for why CDKN is claiming a greater share of total impact than its share of total project funding.*

6. Theory of Change, the Relevance of CDKN's Original Assumptions for the ToC and Implications for M&E and learning

6.1. Background to the Theory of Change

CDKN's Theory of Change is explained in its ToC document and also implicit in other documents, such as the results framework, the Logical Framework and the country programme impact pathways. These have all been reviewed for this document.

There are different approaches to ToC. The choice should be guided by a clear purpose. The CDKN ToC is being used for both support programme design and programme evaluation.

There is consensus in international development on the basic elements that make up a ToC approach (Vogel 2012). As a minimum, developing a programme's theory (or theories) of change is considered to encompass a discussion and documentation of the following elements:

- **Context** for the initiative, including social, political and environmental conditions, the current state of the problem the project is seeking to influence and other actors able to influence change
- **Long-term change** that the initiative seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit
- **Process/sequence of change** anticipated to lead to the desired long-term outcome
- **Assumptions** about how these changes might happen, as a check on whether the activities and outputs are appropriate for influencing change in the desired direction in this context.
- **Diagram and narrative summary** that captures the outcomes of the discussion.

6.2. Assessment of the Theory of Change

The CDKN ToC was assessed using a combination of criteria developed from two current efforts to systematise theories of change – criteria developed with DFID's Evaluation Division as part of training on developing theories of change for DFID Business Cases and Hivos' guidance on the markers of quality in a theory of change¹⁸.

Practice is evolving rapidly, so theories of change that were developed some time ago are unlikely to meet all of the criteria. The point is that these criteria represent the factors that are currently understood to make ToC useful frameworks to guide strategy, help interpret M&E, and capture learning. The CDKN ToC is assessed against these criteria to highlight where and how it could be strengthened to better perform these functions for the programme. It is not intended as a critique of the original ToC process.

Overall assessment:

Strengths

The CDKN ToC is well-embedded in the systems and procedures of the programme; the DoC are well integrated into the formats used for design and commissioning of projects, M&E, and project impact reviews. CDKN teams refer to the DoC regularly when describing their work.

¹⁸ <http://www.hivos.net/Hivos-Knowledge-Programme/Themes/Theory-of-Change/Resources/8.-How-can-I-recognise-good-quality-ToC>
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/Appendix_3_ToC_Examples.pdf

Weaknesses

The ToC documentation explains to some degree the thinking that has informed CDKN’s approach. It is reasonably clear on the ‘what’ and ‘how’, but does not explain the ‘why’. This means that the ToC has been effective at guiding strategies, but it is not now reflecting important insights from the first two years. This means that is not currently an effective framework for interpreting results and providing a strategic steer for the coming period.

The theory of change is not fully explained, it would benefit from a narrative explanation and definitions of key concepts. The aspects that are most meaningful are:

- i) the problems and underlying causes
- ii) the DoC

The most significant gaps in the current version of the ToC are:

- i) no assumptions have been documented at the global level apart from in the logical framework (and many of these are now out of date)
- ii) no explanations linking short-term changes to longer-term ones, expressed by the DoC
- iii) no descriptors of different stages of within the DoC.

Table 4: RAG Rating of CDKN’s current version of its Theory of Change

Theory of Change Quality Markers	RAG Rating
1. Clear analysis of the context and wider change process sought	Yellow
2. Clearly articulated vision of change and staged process of change sought	Red
3. Assumptions are made explicit, categorised and linked to specific aspects	Red
4. Assessment of external and internal learning and evidence for key change drivers and cause-effect links	Red
5. Documentation, communication and wide ownership	Green
6. Active use of ToC in planning, M&E and management processes	Yellow

Recommendation 21 – Refresh the theory of change and Dimensions of Change, at global and country level

CDKN should refresh its theory of change and Dimensions of Change, paying particular attention to drawing out the impact pathways at the global level and some of the key cause-effect assumptions; as well as finding a way of describing a scale of change within the DoC so that the significance of results to date can be interpreted

CDKN should follow-up on reviews and updating of the country impact pathway in the light of learning, with previous versions kept as a record of the evolving strategic learning and responses of the country teams. There should be some appraisal and feedback given to ensure that the country programmes apply the Impact Pathway consistently, that it is logical and meets quality criteria.

Detailed assessment against criteria

1. Clear analysis of the context and wider change process sought

Is there a clear ‘story’ about the actors, factors and stakeholders at play in a specific context and on a specific issue?

Is it a strategic response to a contextual analysis and assessment of external and internal learning?

Is there a discussion on how power relations exist and how these might shift for the most vulnerable or excluded groups?

Is it clear on how systemic changes are expected to emerge as a result of the actions of the intervention (ToA) and other actors and factors in the system (ToC)?

Assessment: Medium (based on the documents made available to the MTR team) 

Some of the key elements of CDKN's mapping of the context can be seen in the Theory of Change Power Point, but a more detailed narrative is now needed to bring this analysis up to date to reflect learning from the first two years.

From the descriptions of the problems and underlying causes, it is possible to infer links to the principles of engagement, the groups targeted and the strategies, but these connections are not made explicit. Although the overall theory of change is by its global nature more conceptual and abstract, some reference to examples of contextual conditions in countries and regions, would help to make this a more grounded analysis.

The overall theory of change would be improved by making explicit in a narrative how CDKN understands its context, task, contribution and connections with other climate change initiative.

The Country Programme documents are stronger on this criterion. They are strong on an analysis of the context, factors and actors. It is possible to read the country programme as a strategic response to these. Links are also made back to the overall theory of change through links with the DoC.

However, because of timing, many of the Country Programmes have retro-fitted an Impact Pathway around their activities. It is recommended that the Impact Pathway and ToC be developed early on. As in the case of Rwanda, developing the theory of change first would have generated stronger strategic engagement with the GoR around supporting institutional capacity for mainstreaming.


However, while this contextual analysis is strong at the design stage, a general weakness seen in the reporting is the lack of reference to contextual conditions. A stronger link back to the context in reports would help to make these less prey to PR and more evaluative. CDKN has clearly learned much more about the contexts it is working in, key actors at local, regional and international arenas and the combinations of strategies that have been effective in different settings.

2. Clearly articulated vision of change and process of change sought

Is the vision conceptually clear and specific?

Is the change process conceptually clear, logical but with non-linearity expressed?

Are the hypothetical causal pathways mapped, with no missing links, specific to the programme in its context, and not a generic response?

Assessment: Weak (based on the documents made available to the MTR team) 

Vision: CDKN has several 'visions', some of which also appear in the logframe and wider results-table, so it is hard to assess which one is driving the theory of change. Each one speaks to a different level in the hierarchy:

- At the level of the programme is the CDKN Vision presented in the Theory of Change document: 'A global community which designs and delivers effective climate compatible development.'

- At the level of the ‘goal’: *‘Responsive and resilient CCD policies and programmes are delivered effectively by governments’*
- At the level of the Logframe Impact: *‘Developing countries’ policies and programmes are resilient and responsive to climate change implications by 2020’*
- At the level of the ‘supergoal’: *‘The quality of life for people most challenged by the effects of climate change is enhanced.’*
- The ‘supergoal’ change also appears as a Dimension of Change’ in itself.

Having a number of ‘visions’ and ‘goals’ is common in development programmes working at scale. It is always challenging to establish amongst all the stakeholders which is the long-term change that the programme is seeking to support. However, there is a lot of potential for confusion unless the explanations and assumptions underpinning them are at least made explicit and examined critically in the light of M&E and learning.

Good practice in formulating goal or impact statements is that they have an active agent, rather than being abstract. From that perspective, and tracking forwards from CDKN’s activities, the statement that seems closest to describing CDKN’s potential impact is,

‘Responsive and resilient CCD policies and programmes are delivered effectively by governments’,
i.e. (policies, programmes and institutional capacity)

This could be further strengthened by adding: *‘that take account of the quality of life of the most vulnerable affected by climate change’.*

Change process:

It is understood that CDKN sees the change it is supporting as non-linear, and uses DoC to describe changes at the intermediate level between outputs and longer-term outcomes. The DoC are a useful way of creating a ‘bridge’ between the outputs in the logframe and the higher level outcomes. This ‘leap of faith’ from outputs to outcomes is a challenge when using the logframes.

The DoC describe the types of changes in the contextual problems that CDKN aims to address and represent the non-linearity of change, especially at the level of the aggregate programme. However, the DoC now need to be enhanced in order to capture a sense of progression or hierarchy between them.

The placing of the DoC as occurring at the same level of change means that the CDKN theory of change lacks a sense of sequential progression. The DoCs may all be essential ingredients but without at least a hypothesis of how they fit together, then the experience from country and regional programmes cannot be analysed and learning captured.

Although change is of course, non-linear, programmes still require a way of interpreting whereabouts on the trajectory of change they are. For example, a conventional logic would sequence changes in attitude, knowledge and skills as preconditions for changes in declarations, strategies, which in turn could precede substantive changes in policies, investments and budget allocations. This is not intended as a *literal* representation of how change works, but a *hypothetical* one to guide an interpretation of whether conditions around that change have shifted sufficiently to support the longer-term changes sought.

Therefore, assumptions or ‘pathways’ linking the DoC to output and outcome level are needed to provide explanation of ‘how’ or ‘why’ changes at the DoC link to the higher levels, and what the causal assumptions are (other than it being non-linear).

In the original concept of the DoC appear to be presented as changes at different stages. However, in CDKN’s design and reporting formats, the DoC have become placed at the same level. This does not seem to be logically quite correct, for example, ‘changes in the quality, relevance and usability of the evidence

base’ cannot be change at the same level as ‘changes in the understanding and commitment of decision-makers around CCD issues’.

The lack of a change progression or hierarchy means that CDKN may be missing crucial learning about the process and institutional changes that are required to implement CCD. The fact that change happens in a different order – for example, implementation is possible *before* a strategy or policy – is exactly the learning that is important to capture for adjusting the hypothetical model to better reflect reality and to guide better-targeted strategies. A strategic question such as ‘Under what conditions can implementation be supported before a policy is in place?’ can then start to be understood.

This learning could also be used to refine the concepts on the DoC as understanding about what they mean in practice emerges from CDKN’s experience. This would also help to strengthen CDKN’s targeting and strategy in the remaining term.

3. Assumptions are made explicit, categorised and linked to specific aspects

Have the assumptions been made explicit, in relation to different aspects of the theory of change:

- *about how change is understood to happen - paradigms and worldviews informing this*
- *the enabling and constraining factors –*
- *the contextual conditions*
- *other actors, stakeholders and beneficiaries*
- *strategy and implementation options?*

Does the narrative describe key 'pathways' (i.e. the hypothetical sequences of change, sometimes called results or outcomes chains)?

Does the programme make explicit its 'drivers of change' (i.e. how its interventions interact with the context to influence change)

Are the strategic options described in relation to the drivers of change?

Assessment: Weak *(based on the documents made available to the MTR team)*

This is the most significant gap in CDKN’s theory of change. There are no assumptions explicitly documented, apart from the ones in the Logical Framework. Some connections between these and the Theory of Change can be inferred. The Log Frame assumptions are critically assessed in their own section.

Working with assumptions is the most difficult aspect of theory of change. Current practice recommends categorising them into the different aspects that they relate to, for example:


- cause/effect assumptions;
- paradigms & worldviews;
- context, actors and conditions;
- strategy & implementation.

An important assumption to document is the ‘driver of change’ i.e. how the programmes interventions interact with the context to influence change. This sits in a similar space to the programme’s ‘niche’. CDKN’s drivers of change can be inferred from the documents, but there is no explicit mention. If the driver of change is not made explicit, as a hypothesis, then it cannot be tested against experience, and the learning and relevance for other settings drawn out. For example, the driver of change in the Colombia country programme seems to be:

- *If the...CDKN project provides a neutral space around which institutional, public, private and research stakeholders can come together to observe, participate and model collaborative approaches in a low-risk setting;*
- *And research is used to produce decision-making tools that support practical policy development and implementation actions that stakeholders need to make;*
- *And projects are accompanied with multi-stakeholder dialogues and engagement to create awareness and momentum around the issues then...*
- *CDKN will contribute to...*
 - i) influencing political will to address climate change as a transversal priority in sectors and regions;
 - ii) supporting the public and decision-makers to have access to and use good quality evidence;
 - iii) building the skills, decision-making frameworks, coordination protocols and spaces to build the capacity of institutions, agencies, partnerships to respond to appropriately to CCD demands.

4. Assessment of external learning and evidence for key change drivers and cause-effect links

Is there a narrative assessment of learning / evidence for key assumptions and change pathways? Is the strength of the evidence assessed? Are the aspects that are poorly understood flagged? Does the assessment make sense given the sources referred to?

Assessment: Weak (based on the documents made available to the MTR team) 

In the documentation made available to the MTR team, there was no reference made to external or internal research and learning. It is likely that a number of background papers were produced at the start of the programme, it is just that these have not been referred to explicitly.

For the next period, it would be helpful if the refinement of CDKN's theory of change takes account of M&E and learning, not only about themes but also process issues merging from experience and research to date. This should be triangulated with learning from other sources, for example other initiatives in the CCD space.

5. Documentation, communication and wide ownership


Is the ToC used regularly in discussion and communication both internally as well as externally?

Can it be easily summarised verbally by a wide range of stakeholders?

Is the ToC documentation available, describing different stages of ToC development and use (ToC visual summary, ToC paper, etc.)?

Are there different products tailored for different stakeholders and uses?

Are changes in the ToC over time captured and documented?

Assessment: Strong (based on the documents made available to the MTR team) 

Integrating theory of change into a programme's systems and culture is one of the most challenging aspects. In this respect, the CDKN Theory of Change is strong and the programme is doing well. The DoC are well integrated into the formats used for design and commissioning of projects, monitoring and evaluation, and project impact reviews. CDKN teams refer to the DoC regularly when describing their work.

There is strong reporting against the DoC at all levels of the programme – project, output, country, region. The annual monitoring report reports against the wider results framework, including the DoC.


This means that the channels for refining the Theory of Change for the next stages of the programme are already in place, and CDKN is in a good position to really benefit from this process.

6. Active use of ToC in planning, M&E and management processes

Is the ToC explicitly used in strategic planning and in the design and practice of M&E?

Do monitoring and/or evaluation questions pick up on where cause-effect links are poorly understood?

Are regular reviews and adaptation of the ToC integrated into management process and reviews planned in, at least once a year?

Assessment: Medium <i>(based on the documents made available to the MTR team)</i>	
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As discussed above, the DoC are actively used in design, planning and M&E. The amber rating has been given because review and adaptation of the ToC does not seem to be explicitly planned in as an annual process, although the first Analysis Meeting was held in January, with a view to reflecting on how the ToC should be adapted.

In addition, M&E is not currently informed by questions about *process* or linkages. These aspects are becoming more relevant now as CDKN seeks to capture and structure learning about ‘what it takes’ to implement CCD, where questions about the change process, effective interventions as well as more issue-specific questions will come to the fore. M&E should make its contribution to regional and cluster-based learning processes.

6.3. The Relevance of CDKN’s Original Assumptions for the ToC

A key part of theory of change is the monitoring and updating of the assumptions that underpin it and inform the design of the programme. Assumptions by their nature are subjective: they are a documentation of the teams’ and stakeholders’ perceptions of conditions and factors within and around the programme. Therefore, the real-life conditions they aim to describe are likely to change frequently.

Making assumptions explicit has a number of functions in the programme, including:

- documenting the parameters that have been used in the design of the programme
- documenting how these parameters have been interpreted by the different stakeholders at a given point in time, in order to critically assess them and check that they are still relevant.

CDKN’s main assumptions are documented in the Logframe. However, there are multiple assumptions implied throughout the programme that are informing the approach, the choice of strategies and how results and outcomes are interpreted. If these are out of date, the design and implementation of activities, and the perceived learning opportunities are likely to be out of step with what the programme is doing and achieving in the real world. This risks incoherence and can fuel unproductive internal debates.

Recommendation 22 – CDKN to check critical assumptions are up to date

We recommend that CDKN look at its assumptions again, in the light of its experience and learning to ensure that the assumptions are valid and up to date, and that their definitions have been documented.

Table 5 illustrates how this might be approached.

Table 5: Critical appraisal of assumptions

Outcome level assumption	Analysis	Recommended action
<i>Global agreement reached on climate change and necessary resources and support made available by the global North</i>	<p>Contextual assumption.</p> <p>This assumption was critical to the design of the original programme. It was assumed that a global deal would trigger a well-articulated demand from developing country governments to which CDKN would respond. The ‘Global Deal’ has not happened, and CDKN has responded with a combination of strategic intervention, facilitating and stimulating demand, as well as direct response to demand. The most effective combination appears to be when there is a process of co-learning about what is needed between CDKN and its ‘clients’.</p>	<p>Revise this assumption as it is very out of date and is obscuring the real gains that CDKN is making through its combined strategic and demand-responsive approach</p>
<i>A core group of political leaders perceives the need for action on climate change</i>	<p>Cause-effect assumption? The implication is that leadership is needed to create platforms for action globally. If this is the case, then CDKN needs to decide how critical it is to achieve this outcome – will platforms for action form otherwise? Decision on interventions need to be made accordingly.</p>	<p>Decide how critical this is to success and the implications for interventions.</p>
<i>Global warming or other aspects of climate change do not exceed current expectations</i>	<p>Contextual assumption.</p> <p>This assumption is important but ambiguous – CDKN needs to decide what the implications are for the programme if expectations are exceeded, or if the opposite happens, and take appropriate action.</p>	<p>Decide what this assumption is about, and the implications of it coming to pass.</p>
Output 1: Example Assumption		
<p>Global knowledge sharing and engagement can have an influence over national level actions and change</p>	<p>Cause-effect assumption.</p> <p>This is quite a critical one to assess in the light of experience. If global knowledge-sharing does not have an influence, then what should be the strategy? If it does have an influence, then what can be learned about the connections, to better inform strategies at both global and national levels</p>	
Output 2: Example Assumption		
<p><i>Decision-makers are willing to make decisions based on scientific research and not purely on political imperatives</i></p>	<p>Paradigm assumptions.</p> <p>This seems quite a critical assumption, as it speaks to the core cause-effect assumption at the heart of CDKN – that CCD policies and programmes are more effective if informed by scientific research [than those that are not]. There is a lot of learning already on this question, so it would be timely to critically</p>	<p>Consider how to reframe this assumption so that it offers a focal collective learning point to steer strategies by.</p>

Outcome level assumption	Analysis	Recommended action
	reflect on key learning questions such as: under what conditions are decision-makers motivated to consider scientific research alongside political imperatives? This would be a good input to future CDKN strategies.	
Output 3: Example Assumption		
<i>Political buy in, leadership and momentum is sustained in the countries we are working in (i.e. future elections don't wipe the slate clean again)</i>	Contextual assumption: This is a critical assumption to monitor as it has a high impact on the programme. However, after two years, CDKN is learning that this is a fact of life. Many country teams have learned or are trying out ways to sustain momentum despite these changes. So it would be good to explore how it could be re-phrased to provide a shared learning point, for example 'If CDKN regional and country team are able to share learning and innovate approaches to sustain momentum and buy-in...'	Consider how to reframe this assumption so that it offers a focal collective learning point to steer strategies by.
Output 4: Example Assumption		
<i>Usefulness of brokering activities not hampered by politics, lack of data, lack of a global deal or lack of scientific knowledge</i>	Cause-effect assumption? This assumption seems ambiguous. It is not clear whether it is pointing to how partnership activities could be successful without any of these conditional aspects.	Consider unpicking this to understand what it is speaking to and how critical to success this factor is.
Output 5: Example Assumption		
<i>It is possible for negotiators from poorest and most climate vulnerable countries to influence dominant forces in international climate negotiations</i>	Cause-effect assumption. This assumption appeared to be flagging the untried nature of the interventions in negotiation support. This assumption is now out of date, as experience has demonstrated that it is possible, or at least there are some promising leads suggesting how and under what circumstances it is possible.	Consider how to update this assumption based on learning, so that it is providing a useful steer and inspiration for future strategies.

6.4. How the ToC should be improved for improved M&E

We recommend looking afresh at the DoCs from two levels, using the findings from M&E.

1. Are they still the *right* Dimensions?

The concepts expressed in the DoC relate to the initial problems identified at the start of the theory of change document. This initial analysis represents some of the assumptions made at the start of the programme about what the problems were. CDKN now has much more specific and contextualised insight into these from country programmes. It should now be possible to check whether the DoC are the right ‘ingredients’ needed for change and update them if necessary with nuances emerging from CDKN’s own experience.

2. What is the *degree* of change occurring within each Dimension, and how significant is this?

It has already been discussed that the DoCs offer a framework for categorising and counting outcomes, but not for interpreting their significance. CDKN needs some way of tracking results chains within countries, but also at an aggregate level. The purpose of this is to understand CDKN’s progression along a trajectory towards impact and sustainability, with a view to focusing subsequent responses and projects so that they target the critical factors that will maintain this trajectory. It is a way of building an ‘Impact Pathway’ at the level of the programme as a whole.

Recommendation 23 – Provide a scale of changes for each dimension of change

We recommend that CDKN develop some way of scaling changes within the DoC to enable tracking of results chains towards sustainable impact, as a way of interpreting the intensity and significance of results seen to date, as a guide for strategies and also as a framework for learning.


In Figure 5, we offer an illustration of how this could work. Please note that this is an illustration – we recommend that CDKN review its own M&E and learning to design an appropriate scale of change. Figure 6 in the next section illustrates how this could be developed further as a framework for learning.

In the illustration, we suggest three levels of change within each Dimension of Change. These describe a scale of behaviour changes by stakeholders to suggest the intensity of the change:

- Level 1: describes behaviour changes where stakeholders **participate** in a new way of working, relating or conceptualising, and **endorse** the approach
- Level 2: describes behaviour changes where stakeholders **invest** their time and/or resources into establishing the necessary coordination structures, decision-making frameworks or approaches to design initiatives
- Level 3: describes changes where stakeholders **implement** the projects, evidence-based tools or coordination mechanisms.

Figure 7 has been developed as an illustration. The Levels have been drawn from looking across selected ‘deep engagement’ country programme’s Impact Pathways to identify common types and levels of change. Only three DoC have been broken out into levels in the illustration – we recommend doing this for all of them.

Figure 7: Scaled Changes within DoC



Recommendation 24: CDKN should develop Learning Questions from the DoC

CDKN should develop Learning Questions from the cause-effect 'links' between and within the DoC,

Recommendation 25: CDKN to ensure suppliers are consistently reporting on lessons

CDKN should find appropriate ways to ensure that suppliers are consistently reporting on lessons and results, as well as delivery.

Recommendation 26: CDKN should develop a country impact pathway/theory of change at the outset

CDKN should develop a country impact pathway/theory of change at the outset that explicitly identifies assumptions that need to be met to progress along the results chain. This would help achieve VFM, as CDKN management can then regularly monitor progress by country teams against a ToC-based results framework and will be in a stronger position to know if failure to achieve a particular milestone is a threat to success of the project.

Recommendation 27: CDKN should follow-up on reviews and updating of the country impact pathway in the light of learning

CDKN should follow-up on reviews and updating of the country impact pathway in the light of learning, with previous versions kept as a record of the evolving strategic learning and responses of the country teams. There should be some appraisal and feedback given to ensure that the country programmes apply the Impact Pathway consistently, that it is logical and meets quality criteria.

6.5. How the Theory of Change could be improved to strengthen Learning

After interpreting the degree and significance of change, the CDKN ToC and DoCs should be used to structure and guide learning. M&E should make its contribution to CDKN learning, alongside Knowledge Management, Research, the Cluster Strategy and country and regional-based learning.

This strategic learning has both a ‘real-time’ and a future purpose. It can be used to focus subsequent responses and projects so that they target the critical factors that will maintain the impact trajectory, particularly supporting learning about the *process* of change.

There are two main strategies for strategic learning:

- Commissioning Group - meeting quarterly to provide strategic guidance on what should be commissioned in KM and Research.
- Cluster Strategy - a platform for thought leadership, looking across all the outputs – TA, KM, Research, Partnerships and Advocacy – to synthesise, see gaps and commission work. It covers operational, ‘experience’ and research-based knowledge, increasingly from CDKN-supported sources, but also from other relevant sources.

There seems to be strong potential for learning, and learning groups are already forming. For example, the TA teams met to share learning from different countries, both cross-country and cross-regional to identify commonalities. There is also a subnational learning programme, bringing people together across outputs, with further groups in Loss and Damage.

However, this learning does not appear to be being guided by a theory of change about CCD or impact pathways thinking. By not doing so, the opportunity to bring together a holistic view of what it takes to design and deliver CCD could become fragmented. Certainly our review suggests that important *process* and *capacity* questions and learning arising from practical experience in countries and regions could easily be missed, due to the focus on products and themes.

From our country case studies, reviews of outputs and the findings from CDKN’s M&E, it is clear that CDKN’s experience is generating valuable learning about ‘what it takes’ to design and implement CCD. There is a definite sense of evolving ‘stories with chapters’.

However, we found a number of issues that if not addressed could constrain CDKN’s potential for learning:

- **M&E for critical reflection could be improved by stronger emphasis on results as well as delivery:**
There is a general issue in that the CDKN reporting system favours reporting of deliverables at the immediate end of projects, and a generic aggregation at the top level of the DoC.
- This is not true across the board – some projects have process or behaviour change short-term results indicators in their objectives, but not others. It is not consistent.
- A stronger emphasis on results as well as delivery would strengthen the capture of learning. Especially if suppliers are given a follow-on phase, or are leading a major country initiative, for example, ICF in the

new transport sector project in Colombia, it would be opportune to require some behaviour change and results tracking as part of the project. This has implications for budget and support from CDKN regional or country teams, but would be worth the investment in these situations.

- **Results-reporting and analysis is better at country level, but could be improved:** Results reporting is brought together better at the country programme level, but there are two issues here:
 - i) these results are self-reported by the team without verification;
 - ii) the structure of the reports mean that the evolving ‘impact story’ is presented in different sections: contextual and institutional challenges are presented as risks, CDKN’s response and contribution are presented as risk mitigation, and any resulting changes are reported in a de-contextualised way, with risks about over-claiming CDKN’s contribution to a wider process.
- This makes it difficult to read across the significance and track how small changes build up into big ones, and obscures how CDKN may be responding strategically and adaptively to these.
- **Lack of structured learning questions:** We understand that the Cluster Learning Strategies are framed by learning/research questions. CDKN is also learning important lessons about how to facilitate and support change, particularly from its deep engagement countries. This learning is linked to assumptions about cause and effect i.e. it lies ‘behind the arrows’ in the ToC, and so needs to be explicitly drawn out.

Example 1: Mechanisms for learning lessons were weak in Bangladesh

Stakeholders suggested that mechanisms for learning lessons – whether by staff or others – were not a strong point of the three Bangladesh projects, and didn’t seem to be a key focus of CDKN. One key informant reflected, “It’s not clear who the project is sharing lessons with and why”. For instance, the learning mechanism currently used by the L&D project focuses on conducting surveys among participants at workshops. This is an important weakness, since projects need evaluation mechanisms to ensure they learn from their mistakes.

Example 2: While lessons from CDKN Colombia’s experience are clearly being learned, this is an area that can be strengthened

Some key lessons have been documented, for example, starting with small-scale, practical projects, building up in stages to larger scale interventions. The accompanying consultation and engagement processes also help to move the actors together. A key lesson has been to establish relationships with the permanent staff at different level to manage the impact of ever-changing leaders.

However, there are learning opportunities that are not being capitalised on due to a lack of linking learning questions to the Impact Pathway. CDKN Colombia’s projects are producing valuable learning about both CCD themes and uptake processes – these could potentially not be captured and documented (although this is an issue across CDKN, not only for Colombia). Strategic learning questions that could be explicitly formulated to focus learning include:

- How do we manage the trade-offs between implementing adaptation + competitiveness and how will we know it is working? (E.g. Cartagena)
- What is the minimum information needed for a multi-dimensional vulnerability analysis? (E.g. AVA)

- What processes help to sustain focus and coordination under institutional instability? (E.g. focus on permanent middle management staff)

Example 3: In Rwanda, there is evidence that CDKN has learned from its experience to improve the TA it delivers but there do not appear to be processes in place to learn systematically from the programme. The film made about the production of the national climate strategy focuses on raising awareness of climate change and Rwanda's policy response rather than lessons learned from developing the strategy.

CDKN project management quality assurance processes helped to get the supplier for the GGCR strategy to address a number of weaknesses. A "hands-on" management approach identified concerns, CDKN commissioned an external review of the draft Strategy and the Smith School revised the Strategy as a result.

The CDKN Rwanda programme seems to have learned from its engagement in Rwanda. For the FONERWA contract, DFID and CDKN managed to insist on competitive contracting although this would take more time (delay being anathema to GoR).

Example 4: Lesson learning in Kenya and Ethiopia is limited

CDKN's Kenya Country Programme is almost entirely TA-led. This is also the case for the proposed support to the EPA in Ethiopia. However because of the lack of other CDKN output integration, CDKN is unlikely to systematically document lessons learned.


A potentially key missed opportunity relates to failing to systematically document the lessons learned, methods deployed and tools created through the NCCAP development process that CDKN has support. This could and should be a key CDKN knowledge product and a potentially significant global public good. There is no evidence that CDKN recognises this and no evidence the other outputs are systematically engaged to realise this and take advantage of the opportunity. In response to this issue, CDKN feels that more systematic extracting of learning from sub-national projects across all three regions is also in its early stages. CDKN believe that these learning processes will assist them in more strategic engagement at COPs around lessons from our programme.

A wider implication is that CDKN's outputs could be better grounded in the strategy, activities and lessons at the country level – to respond to priorities as they emerge and apply lessons learned through working with priority audience and stakeholders in deep engagement countries and then transferring these activities and lessons elsewhere.

Learning questions could be formulated to encourage critical reflection about both CCD thematic issues – e.g. LEDS - and how to support change – e.g. multi-stakeholder processes that engage private sector actors as well as institutional ones. This would encourage critical thinking about what is happening 'behind the arrows' in the Impact Pathway and provide meeting points with Regional learning and Cluster-based learning.

Figure 8 illustrates this by building on the *Levels within DoC* discussed previously.

Figure 8: Using theory of change and DoC to structure Learning Questions and inform strategies




7. Recommendations on operational sustainability

Medium term – to COP 2015

Our assessment is that the current spending profile (see Figure 9) does not leave sufficient time to realise the benefits of successful CDKN investment in deep engagement, partnerships, research findings and lessons or relationships critical for the Advocacy Fund. It has also taken more than two years to build some coherence between very different institutional cultures within the CDKN Alliance. In the case of the Advocacy Fund, the current contract will terminate six months before COP 2015, removing support to negotiators in a critical period.

Figure 9: CDKN current spend profile




Source: CDKN

The projected spend under the current spend profile is some £20 million lower than that envisaged in the original CDKN Terms of Reference. Given the argument above this would support DFID's application to the ICF for the CDKN Scenario 2 proposal. That is to say a spending envelope that is based on the current distribution of spend by Outputs (technical assistance 40%, research 24%, knowledge management 15%, partnerships 5%, and negotiations support 14%). Although we have not looked in detail at the different scenarios put forward to the MoC for ICF funding we note that:

1. The 2015 COP provides an important opportunity for CDKN to bring together programme learning and this is a justification for the additional £1m expense of scenario 2 than scenario 1. Clearly, this would need to be carefully planned and used effectively.
2. CDKN argue that the additional cost of scenario 3 over scenario 2 would enable 'eye-catching'/'ground-breaking' research to be commissioned. However, the findings of this MTR suggest that CDKN is best placed to look for applications of research from leading climate research programmes rather than to commission very large programmes themselves.
3. Spend in deep engagement countries accounted for 32.6% of total spend to January 2013. Given the recommendations of this MTR we would expect this to increase and, indeed, CDKN do foresee an increase in deep engagement countries under scenario 2. However, CDKN will need to consider whether this can be further increased in the light of our recommendations.

Figure 10: CDKN Scenario 2 proposal to ICF



Source: CDKN

Longer term – post COP 2015

We have identified that CDKN will be needed after 2015 but there are a number of reasons why new institutional arrangements should be considered. These include the ability to attract new sources of funding as well as efficiency and effectiveness of alternative structures. In making recommendations for longer term institutional arrangements at this early stage we recognise there are many uncertainties and therefore discuss a number of alternative possible models with the following criteria in mind:

1. Ability to attract multi-donor funding;
2. Realise the intended CDKN niche (CCD focus, demand-led, synergy, thought leadership, north-south partnership; high-quality delivery);
3. Efficiency;
4. Avoid conflict of interest
5. Risks

Given the reporting deadline for this MTR it has simply not been possible to develop and discuss alternative models with potential donors. In practice, DFID will need to take the lead on this issue and the responses received will play an important part in determining the best option.

Option 1: Current model, re-tender in 2015

Pros

- Relatively low risk – weaknesses have been identified and many can be addressed.
- Relatively cost-efficient compared to international organisations.

Cons

- Having an institution subject to national law (e.g. UK) will preclude UN funding and may discourage some donors.
- There are fundamental incentive-compatibility problems with the 25:75 model that cannot easily be addressed e.g. conflict of interest.
- A re-tender before COP 2015 would be a serious distraction for CDKN management.
- Financial and non-financial costs of a re-tender every five years are significant.

Option 2: Current model, re-tender in 2016

We understand that DFID could choose to extend the current PwC contract provided the total contract value was no more than 150% of the original contract value. It would have the advantage over option 1 of delaying a re-tender until after COP 2015 and spreading the re-tender cost over a longer-period. This is likely to outweigh the concerns of competitors who would have to wait another year *if* a re-tender of the current model is the selected option.

Option 3: Release restriction on in-house share (IGC type model), tender in 2016

Pros

- This could produce a broader alliance than is currently the case e.g. by bringing in academic institutions.
- Likely to produce efficiency gains in some areas (where CDKN has demonstrated it could undertake work in-house at lower cost than by outsourcing).

Cons

- CCD is a very diverse area (much more so than for research on growth) and no alliance will have all the skills needed. Evidence from this MTR is that the 75% outsourcing requirement cannot ensure that “strategic thinking” is bought in. With a lower outsourcing requirement there would be more incentive to use winning team members rather than finding the best person for the job.
- Likely to produce efficiency losses in some areas (where in-house resources are a more expensive option).
- If contract holders are suppliers outside of this contract there would be the same type of conflict of interest issues that apply to Option 2 but the scale of the problem would be greater.
- As this model has not been tested in the CCD space we should anticipate risks in addition to those associated with option 2.

We therefore suggest that option 3 is less attractive than option 2 and should be rejected.

Option 4: Manager/supplier split (increase restriction on in-house share), tender in 2016

Pros

- Likely to reduce conflict of interest
- Well tested delivery model
- Can draw on the best supplier for a particular task
- Best practices (such as use of CELs) carry over
- Current alliance partners can focus on being suppliers

Cons

- Likely to have less southern engagement
- Loss of some cross-output synergy (as some of this is within the option 2 25% but some is within country)
- Would lose any cross-alliance culture that is developed in option 2
- Suppliers have less stake in CDKN than they would if they are in the 25%
- Could require an administration fee of up to 20% to invest in country and regional management

Our assessment in this MTR is that a large proportion of cross-output synergy is developed around deep country engagement facilitated by country-engagement leaders. This would continue under option 4. In practice, any contract manager would need to buy in regional expertise and it is likely that contractual

arrangements would start to replicate those currently used in Option 2. The difference would be that a higher proportion of the cost would be charged to administration as there would be no in-house spend.

The trade-off is therefore principally between reduced conflict of interest and some loss of synergy between outputs. Our assessment is that the disruption and cost of changing managers following a re-tender would be significantly greater than that produced from shifting from option 2 to option 4. However, option 4 is no more likely to be attractive to a wider set of donors than option 2.

Option 5: Establish CDKN as a new international organisation in 2016

Pros

- Likely to attract a wider range of donors
- No disruption and cost of periodic re-tendering
- It is easier for an international organisation to put the case for international public goods than one led by a private UK company
- Potential for southern engagement

Cons

- Risk of being drawn into politics and losing focus
- Loss of efficiency – UN & multilateral climate organisation administration costs are up to 5% higher than CDKN
- Loss of flexibility and speed would remove a crucial CDKN niche
- GGGI is already in this space. There may not be appetite for another new player.

There is no doubt that option 5 is the most ambitious and risky of those we have proposed. Whether it is viable depends on whether the “cons” identified above can be mitigated. This would be more likely if:

1. The CDKN mandate is very clearly articulated in organisational objectives;
2. A strong country focus based around outsourced CELs is developed by CDKN; and
3. There is innovative use of private-sector procurement as well as delivery.

An option that would undoubtedly be interesting for donors is a joint CDKN-GGGI institution. There is sufficient overlap in areas of interest and a common focus on having deep engagement countries for this to be a possibility. However, the methods of working (in terms of being demand-led, approach to research etc) and institutional cultures are very different. It would require a determined commitment to find a common vision but we suggest this is an option worth further consideration.

Ideally we would be making recommendations on future organisational structure sometime after the MTR when we could observe the extent to which the MTR recommendations have been implemented. As we do not have this luxury we are inclined to recommend the manager/supplier split (option 4) as the low-risk option but recommend that DFID/DGIS actively consider the potential for CDKN to become an international organisation (option 5), particularly if a CDKN-GGGI merger that preserves fundamental CDKN values is a realistic possibility.

Recommendation 28: DFID to provide additional funding to COP 2015

We suggest that DFID look to providing additional funding to enable effective operation of CDKN at the current scale until COP 2015. One suitable option of achieving this is the CDKN Scenario 2 proposal put to DFID for ICF support.

Recommendation 29: Timing of decision on future CDKN structure

We also recommend leaving the decision on future organisational structure until sometime after the MTR – to allow for the other MTR recommendations to be implemented. If CDKN is extended as proposed above, this would allow a more detailed assessment of longer-term funding options to be undertaken. However, if the recommendation to consider turning CDKN into an international organisation is taken up this assessment will need to be undertaken well in advance of mid-2015.

Annex 1 – Study Terms of Reference

2. Terms of reference

Please note that these terms of reference will be finalised during contracting, but ITT responses should produce responses based on the terms of reference set out in this document.

2.1 Project Objectives

In agreement with DFID, the purpose of the MTR is to:

1. Provide an external and independent assessment of:
 - the extent to which CDKN is performing against its logical framework
 - the impact of the programme to date within CDKN's Dimensions of Change
 - the extent to which the CDKN approach and design ensures impact.
2. Analyse the assumptions that underpin the design of CDKN and CDKN's Terms of Reference, and assess the continued relevance of the original assumptions.
3. Provide recommendations for improvements to delivery, impact and performance, if any, throughout the remainder of the current phase.
4. Provide recommendations on operational sustainability for CDKN beyond present financing commitments.

The MTR will comply with all DFID requirements and will conform to OECD standards. Relevant questions for the MTR are likely to include those listed below. They will be refined and further developed in consultation with the successful consultants.

Relevance

- Do the planned interventions, outcomes and targeting continue to be relevant to the needs of the target population? Does the targeting strategy continue to be appropriate?
- Is the current level and focus of investment appropriate?
- To what extent does CDKN's Theory of Change hold true?
- Which original assumptions are not (or are no longer) valid and what does this mean for the remaining years of the programme?

Efficiency

- To what extent is CDKN cost effective? Does it demonstrate an understanding of its costs, the factors that drive them, the linkages to its performance and an ability to achieve efficiency gains?

Effectiveness

- What is the distinctive offering of CDKN and how does it complement or add value to DFID's and DGIS' own CCD portfolio?

Results

- To what extent is CDKN achieving (or progressing towards) its intended outcomes?
- What changes are these outcomes making for CDKN's primary target groups? Which groups of people are being affected? How significant are these changes?
- What conditions (either external or internal) have led to the success or failure of CDKN's efforts to date?
- What unexpected or unintended changes have been noted as a result of CDKN's efforts? Who have they affected and how?

Sustainability

- To what extent are results achieved by CDKN likely to be sustainable?

Learning and innovation

- To what extent has CDKN learned from its work and incorporated the lessons into improved performance?

- To what extent has CDKN produced learning that has been shared with others?

2.2 Terms of Reference

CDKN would like to jointly develop the methodology with the selected consultant based on their proposal, and discussions on what is the most appropriate, proportional and sound methodology for the MTR in relation to CDKN's work. Key features of the MTR will include:

- A background literature review.
- A robust interrogation of information that has been gathered through CDKN's existing systems and processes.
- A combination of targeted review and random review of individual projects or programmes, to ensure independence whilst also covering key aspects of CDKN's portfolio. In consultation with the reviewers, this portfolio might be use the following criteria:
 - Level of investment
 - Size and level of risk
 - Demand led versus targeted projects
- Country visits to at least one country per region.
- Quantitative and qualitative assessment approaches which will enable a reliable overview and assessment of progress whilst offering in depth detail as to how a selected number of countries and target groups have changed in relation to CDKN's efforts. In consultation with the consultants some of the following methods are likely to be used - surveys, questionnaires, in depth interviews, focus group discussions, media tracking, and tracing specific target groups

CDKN believes that the MTR will provide an important opportunity for joint reflection with an external consultant about the programme's strengths and weaknesses; and lessons that can be incorporated into future planning and implementation

Timeframe and resources

The MTR is to be carried out between November 2012 and February 2013. The following time line is envisaged. Due to financial implications, the deadline is hard. Failure to comply with the deadline will lead to a penalty (to be contractually codified in advance).

Output	Date
ToR published	30 July 2012
Receipt of Expressions of Interest	01 August – 31 August 2012
Short- list shared with interested bidders	Early September
Pre- bid meeting with short- listed bidders	11 September 2012
Proposals submission	01 October 2012
Selection of consultants	Early October 2012
Contract in place	End October
MTR	1 November 2012 – 7 February 2013
1 st Draft of review sent to CDKN and DFID	7 February 2013
Final Draft of review submitted to CDKN and DFID	28 February 2013

Budget and payment

The budget for this MTR and the End of Programme evaluation is maximum GBP300,000. Bidders are expected to propose a distribution based on the proposed methodology. The timeline for the End of Programme review will be agreed closer to the programme end in 2015.

This includes consultancy days, preparation and site visits. Travel and accommodation expenses will be reimbursed (economy class airfares, mid-class hotel) and facilitated by CDKN UK and Country Office staff. All travel and expenses will be reimbursed according to the relevant DFID policies (e.g. per diems are not allowed).

Selection Criteria

The MTR shall be carried out by a suitably-qualified and experienced consultant. The successful consultant will be a team of specialists with substantial experience in evaluations of programme/project delivery in an international development context, and have a solid track record on the criteria below, with examples of evidence for each.

- a. Demonstrable expertise on climate change and development
- b. Geographic expertise, at least in three: Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Caribbean, Colombia, El Salvador and Peru.
- c. Track record in developing and conducting various types of evaluation and impact assessments
- d. Evidence of experience in assessing value for money
- e. Evidence of client responsiveness, creativity and flexibility of approaches towards clients' needs and/or challenges in evaluation implementation.
- f. Strategic understanding of knowledge management and learning processes
- g. Experience of engaging with DFID/DGIS and conducting evaluations for DFID/DGIS projects.

Project outputs

Specific outputs (deliverables) are listed below. Suppliers should, as part of their proposal, provide a work plan outlining activities and expected deliverables.

1. An inception meeting in which the successful consultants will present an initial plan to a small group of CDKN staff members who have been selected to support and inform the process. This plan will be discussed and further refined in the meeting
2. Detailed draft methodology (tools, plan for analysis): Informed by the inception meeting and initial reading, the consultants will produce a detailed plan itemising methodology: how it will be used and the rationale for selecting each method
3. Detailed implementation plan: this will include dates, timeline and those involved
4. Country visit and Head Office feedback reports: these short reports (not more than 20 pages each) will summarise findings from countries and Head Office
5. Initial findings presentation/workshop: this will provide an overview of the findings to key CDKN staff members and stakeholders for their comment and questions
6. Draft report: The report should be no longer than 50 pages (excluding annexes) and should be presented to CDKN for comment and factual verification by 7th February 2013
7. Final report: This should be presented to CDKN by 28th February, including a log of comments provided to the first draft and relevant responses and revisions. This will then be submitted to DFID with CDKN's management comments.

Annex 2 – Structured interview questions

Criteria	Original OECD DAC Criteria	Key questions for the MTR
Impact	<p>The positive and negative changes produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Analysis must also include the impact of external factors, e.g., changes in terms of trade or financial conditions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What happened as a result of the programme/project? • What difference has the activity made to beneficiaries? • How many people have been affected? 	<p><u>To what extent is CDKN achieving (or progressing towards) its intended outcomes?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What has happened as a result of CDKN projects? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Have its projects had unintended effects, whether positive and negative? • What do we expect to happen in future as a result of CDKN’s current investments, and when? • Which groups have been (or will be) affected, and what difference has it made to them? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How have the target groups been affected? ○ Is there evidence of behaviour change that suggests potential for positive impact on the ultimate beneficiaries, i.e., climate vulnerable individuals and communities? ○ Since “new policy words are not enough”, are there reasons for confidence that outputs will deliver outcomes? • How much of the impact can be attributed directly to CDKN? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How can we be confident that CDKN is not claiming credit for interventions by others? ○ Do other stakeholders involved recognise CDKN’s contribution to key impacts? ○ To what extent can this contribution be verified by external players? ○ Where CDKN is claiming a contribution, what alternative explanations are there? • Are there areas of CDKN’s support that are not currently captured in the logframe and that should be? <p><u>For each project reviewed what is the counterfactual (no project, same/different project with someone else, delay etc.)?</u></p>
Relevance	The extent to which the activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and	<u>Are CDKN operations and services appropriate for supporting elaboration of CCD policies and practices in developing countries?</u>

Criteria	Original OECD DAC Criteria	Key questions for the MTR
	<p>donor.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent are the original objectives still valid? • Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and attaining its objectives? • Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are CDKN’s interventions suited to addressing the needs of its target population? • Is CDKN’s targeting strategy appropriate, in light of its lessons learned and the evolving climate change context? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <u>‘Appropriate’</u>: Is it ‘smart’ – e.g. recognising political economy; working with both inside and outside track actors; targeting the appropriate range of actors; not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ in response to context; are the strategies for supporting the range of actors appropriate? • Is there evidence that CDKN has made changes to its design and implementation in order to maximise its relevance in a rapidly evolving international climate change context? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Have any critical assumptions underpinning the original CDKN design been updated? • What other platforms and initiatives are working to deliver the CCD outcomes targeted by CDKN? • What is the distinctive offering of CDKN and how does it complement or add value to DFID’s and DGIS’ own CCD portfolio? • How does CDKN affect and how it is affected by other climate finance initiatives?
Effectiveness	<p>Measures extent to which an activity attains objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent were the objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved? • What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? 	<p><u>How do observed CDKN outcomes relate to target objectives?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what degree has CDKN delivered on its target objectives? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Total number of service recipients, partnerships created, etc. • Has it either exceeded or missed any objectives? • Where it hasn’t yet achieved its objectives, to what extent is CDKN progressing towards doing so? • What factors have led to the success or failure of CDKN initiatives to date? • To what extent has CDKN been effective at being greater than the sum of its parts? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Are these synergies over-served throughout its results chain? ○ To what extent do we observe synergies between TA, R, KM and P in the focus countries?

Criteria	Original OECD DAC Criteria	Key questions for the MTR
		<p><u>Has CDKN’s focus on the demand-led delivery model been effective?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How is the balance between “encouraging” and “responding to” demand struck? Is it right? • Will the investment in deep engagement be sufficient for future CDKN work? Is it an appropriate strategy for other countries? • Are CDKN partnerships with agencies (e.g. ESMAP) a reflection of demand from these agencies? • Does frequently missing service recipient feedback indicate dissatisfaction? (This would change LF RAG results)
Efficiency	<p>Efficiency measures the qualitative and quantitative outputs in relation to inputs. Goal is to use the fewest resources possible to achieve desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving outputs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were activities cost-efficient? • Were objectives achieved on time? • Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives? 	<p><u>To what extent is CDKN cost effective?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does CDKN demonstrate an understanding of its costs, the factors that drive them, the linkages to its performance and an ability to achieve efficiency gains? • How do the costs of CDKN outputs compare to benchmarks, e.g. other DFID research funds? • Does CDKN have in place appropriate systems and structures to support efficiency? • Does CDKN have the appropriate governance structures to support efficiency? • Does the current level and focus of CDKN investments foster efficiency? • How are coordination, cooperation and leveraging of other CC programmes and funds captured? • Has CDKN assessed where it can complement (rather than duplicate) other CC programmes?

Criteria	Original OECD DAC Criteria	Key questions for the MTR
Sustainability	<p>Sustainability measures whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. It includes both environmental and financial aspects.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent do benefits continue after donor funding ceased? • What were the major factors determining achievement or non-achievement of sustainability outcomes? 	<p><u>To what extent are results achieved by CDKN across all the outputs likely to be sustainable?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What aspects of the programme most support the sustainability of outcomes? Do any aspects undermine sustainability of outcomes? • In what ways does CDKN define / understand sustainability in terms of its ‘legacy’, rather than within the framework of the current programme? • What are the critical assumptions in CDKN’s sustainability strategy? Are they explicitly recognised and critically examined? • Could anything be done to increase the likelihood that outcomes will be sustainable? • Does CDKN have a credible exit strategy?
Learning	N.A	<p><u>To what degree has CDKN learned from its work and used these lessons to improve performance?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In what ways has CDKN learned from its work and used these lessons to improve performance? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ E.g. in Rwanda “problems were experienced but solved” – what lessons were learned? • To what extent has CDKN produced learning that has been shared with others? • Has programme implementation to date yielded lessons about ways to improve VFM? • Is strategic learning what makes the sum greater than its parts within CDKN? If so, are investments in learning developed strategically (e.g. using a ToC) or have they evolved over time? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strategic learning includes mobilising a holistic body of knowledge and understanding of ‘what it takes’ to deliver CCD and learning across the ‘system’ by identifying policy drivers, implementation infrastructure, key variables, systems, different actors, financing and costs, etc. • What models of knowledge brokering, strategic learning, and policy development are CDKN adopting in different contexts and with its different stakeholders? • Are the links between knowledge brokering strategies and the higher level outcomes sought sufficiently

Criteria	Original OECD DAC Criteria	Key questions for the MTR
		<p>understood, e.g. inside track vs. outside track; ‘thought leadership’ in research vs. operational knowledge co-produced and applied with clients and stakeholders?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is CDKN only sharing knowledge from its own projects, or is it also sharing knowledge from other sources to support overall CCD goals? • Are M&E procedures within CDKN ‘proportional’ to spend on delivering outputs? If not, what could be done to improve this balance? • How robust are CDKN's M&E processes at tracking and providing evidence of change and results at project, country strategy, regional strategy and overall programme level? • To what extent do CDKN's processes encourage critical reflection on results reported, CDKN's contribution to change and the assumed change pathways/outcome chains underpinning the country, project or programme area?
ToC	N.A	<p><u>How should CDKN’s Theory of Change be updated and enhanced?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who should have a shared understanding of the overall ToC? • Senior management at CDKN, but also key points in the fund management chain, e.g. Country Programme Heads, so that they understand the breadth of portfolio and strategies they need to support; • What should suppliers/partners understand about the overall ToC? <p>Important so that they understand where they fit in the overall CDKN change model/strategies, what their M&E feeds into and what they ought to be able to get out of the CDKN system themselves in terms of strategic learning and feedback as an input into their capacity [relates to procurement and sustainability questions].</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which critical assumptions and pathways of change should be updated in the light of the MTR evidence? • What specific changes to the CDKN ToC would be recommended? What would be the implications of these?

Annex 3 – List of persons interviewed

Name	Position/Organisation	Email
Simon Anderson	IIED	
Dinesh Devkota	Former Secretary, Government of Nepal. Now a supplier to CDKN	
David Wei	Independent Diplomat	
Dean Bialek	Independent Diplomat	
Christoph Schwarte	Legal Response Initiative	
Andrew Takawira	GWP support for WACDEP, AMCOW programme	A.Takawira@cgiar.org
Rob Bryne	IDS/SPRU	
Achala Abeysinghe	IIED Legal Advisor to LDC Group	
Sandra Freitas	LDC Support, Climate analytics	
Pa Ousman	Chair, LDC negotiating team	
Ron Benioff	NREL - LEDS GP	
Farrukh Khan	Lead negotiator Pakistan and supplier to CDKN	
Dr Koko Warner	UNU	warner@ehs.unu.edu
Sönke Kreft	Germanwatch	
Adao Soares Barbosa	Spokesperson for L&D	
Ali Sheikh	CDKN Asia Director	
Teall Crossen	Legal Advisor, Nauru Mission	
Dr Maarten K van Aalst	Director, Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre	vanaalst@climatecentre.org
Saleem Ulhaque	IIED, Strategic Advisor to CDKN	
Eduardo Durand	Peru	
Emmanuel Dlamini	Negotiator Swaziland and LDC Chair, Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs, Swaziland	ed_dlamini@yahoo.com
Robert van den Boom	DGIS	
Judith Rees	Co-chair Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics, Strategic Advisor	j.rees@lse.ac.uk

	to CDKN	
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Sarah Schwarzer	START Secretariat	
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CDKN

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Rwanda

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Ethiopia

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Colombia

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With Francisco Castillo, Representatives of the project stakeholders convened under the auspices of the Cartagena Chamber of Commerce: President - Contralmirante Jose Alfonso Díaz, Advisor Regional Development - Adriana Ramos	Planning Advisor, Municipality of Cartagena	
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institute attached to the coffee producers' association), Julio Vargas Uni de Caldas, Carolina Navarrete, CIAT		
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Bangladesh

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Annex 4 – Country Visit Reports

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

**CDKN Project Ref: AAGL-0020 CDKN
External Evaluation Review**

COUNTRY VISIT REPORTS

Submitted by



15 March 2013

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

CDKN Project Ref: AAGL-0020 CDKN External Evaluation Review

Rwanda

Submitted by



15 March 2013

Acknowledgements

This report has been written by Gil Yaron (team leader), Robbie Gregorowski, Isabel Vogel and Jules Siedenburg with inputs from Reuben Blackie. The CDKN team has assisted our work by ensuring efficient access to information.

Key Findings

Projects reviewed:

National strategy on climate change and low carbon development in Rwanda (GGCR)	Technical Assistance	20/09/2010	11/11/2011	Smith School & Environmental Education Media Project for China
Design of the Rwandan Climate Change and Environmental Fund (FONERWA)	Technical Assistance	10/02/2012	31/07/2012	University of Wolverhampton
Documentary film on climate change and development in Rwanda	Knowledge Management	07/09/2011	31/03/2012	Smith School & Environmental Education Media Project for China

Progress along the impact pathway is generally accurately described in relation to support for the GGCR and FONERWA. However, while the need for “Capacity building of Government officials and planners to implement climate policy, increase access to climate finance and to climate proof investment decisions” is recognised, the critical threat that it poses is not adequately recognised.

In some respects the contribution of CDKN is understated as no attempt is made to assess “what would have happened without CDKN support” (the counterfactual). There are areas in which CDKN has demonstrated its niche.

Overall, there are a number of **positive** findings to report:

1. CDKN responded quickly and flexibly to Government of Rwanda (GoR) demand for a national Green Growth and Climate Resilience strategy (GGCR)¹⁹. In order to influence the vitally important new Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2), the GGCR had to be produced in 9 months. At the time DFID did not have a CC programme in place or the capacity to manage this directly and probably no other donor partners (DPs) could have mobilised support sufficiently quickly.
2. CDKN helped to strengthen the GGCR by skilfully managing tensions between REMA/MINERENA on one hand and Sir David King on the other. This involved a combination of technical knowledge (to rapidly contract a specialist external review) and the ability to quickly focus management time on the problem.
3. FONERWA is a critical instrument to implement the GGCR and the GoR feels that CDKN support for FONERWA design closely reflects their demand and thinking. CDKN can take credit for:
 - Sufficient “deep engagement” to understand this demand;
 - Moving from a sole source (GGCR) to competitive tender for FONERWA;

¹⁹ Originally known as the National strategy on climate change and low carbon development in Rwanda

- Learning from managing the GGCR work and enabling CIDT to report directly to GoR;
- Being “flexible and listening” managers; and
- Choosing consultants who could build on close working relationships with environment *and* finance ministries. Getting “buy-in” from finance is an important success factor.

There have also been some **negative** findings. These are:

4. CDKN failed to engage *strategically* with GoR to produce a theory of change (ToC) that takes into account “Changes in institutions and institutional capacity to respond appropriately to CCD needs and demands” – one of the five CDKN DoC. The failure to address this dimension of change will limit the extent and quality of mainstreaming of the GGCR into the EDPRS2. For example, sectors (agriculture, transport etc.) have been provided with guidance on how to make their submissions to the EDPRS2 compatible with the GGCR. However, without additional capacity within sectors it will be extremely difficult to turn high-level guidance into practical plans, to avoid maladaptation and for ministries of planning and finance to prioritise investments based on environmental, economic and social criteria.
5. We were not able to rigorously track who had seen the documentary film and the influence it had had on them. However, no one we spoke to in Rwanda mentioned the film as an influence and although both the Minister of MINERENA and DG of REMA reported significant outside interest in the experience of Rwanda, neither could attribute this to the film.
6. There is an understandable tension between the need for CDKN to report success to DFID and build the CDKN brand on one hand and to learn from self-critical reflection on the other. However, the evidence from Rwanda suggests that CDKN is confusing PR with M&E and is both over-claiming successes achieved so far and the contribution of CDKN. So, for example, the Africa Strategy claims:

“CDKN has and is currently supporting policy and programmatic change, research, and knowledge processes in ten countries in Africa. We have already delivered substantial results in Rwanda and Kenya and we are advancing towards impact and results in a number of other countries.” p7

And the Rwanda Country Programme document says “The Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy was approved and adopted by Cabinet in October 2011.²⁰ This new piece of climate change policy allows for direct action on implementing climate compatible development across the Rwandan economy, in a coordinated manner. The year-long process included consultation with over 300 stakeholders, and was overseen by a governmental Steering Committee comprising high level representatives from nine Rwandan Ministries. As such, there has been significant awareness-raising around both the Strategy and more broadly around climate compatible development, with government, business and civil society in Rwanda. CDKN co-funded the Strategy with DFID therefore can attribute a direct role in this change”. p33

However, the back to office report (BTOR) from the Africa Deputy Director and TA Senior Project Manager, referencing the DG of REMA states:

“Rose did not receive the proposal for Rwanda’s participation in a regional learning project enthusiastically. She does not believe that Rwanda has achieved anything yet, as the Strategy is not yet implemented and FONERWA has not been launched. Rose’s main concern is how to move from policy to practice and this is where she would like to see CDKN support.” P4

The MTR team shares the view of the DG REMA that it is “early days” in terms of implementation. In addition, the political commitment to and awareness of CCD comes from GoR (with the 2008 SEI adaptation report and DFID support to the sector helping to raise awareness and the fortuitous timing of the EDPRS2 providing a great opportunity for mainstreaming). CDKN has provided timely funding and effective technical assistance but must avoid giving the impression that it is taking credit for the work of others.

²⁰ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/rwanda-2011.pdf>

Recommendations

1. CDKN needs to get a country engagement leader in place early in the process of deep engagement who can work at a *strategic* level (even if this means working in fewer countries).
2. CDKN should work with the recipient government and DPs to map out their ToC at the *outset* and to identify how they can best contribute. The Rwanda Country Programme document has not played this role. Demand-led work needs to be part of a clear strategy – in the case of CDKN’s early work in Rwanda it wasn’t.
3. To avoid misleading readers it should be made clear where a theory of change is a new construct and did not exist at the time that projects were commissioned. Nonetheless, the impact pathway in the Rwanda Country Report is potentially a very useful tool to prioritise future CDKN support to Rwanda. Our assessment is that it could be strengthened by:
 - Embedding this within an explicit GoR ToC from which CDKN interventions are chosen to deliver critical intermediate outcomes or because CDKN has a comparative advantage in this area. Interviews with the Minister MINERENA and DG REMA suggest they have a ToC that is partly articulated in the GGCR strategy but has not been recorded as a ToC as such; and
 - Structuring the CDKN ToC to identify the most important intermediate outcomes on the pathway and associated critical assumptions that have to be addressed. This would give us a more strategic approach and identify where monitoring is a priority.
4. The combination of deep engagement, a CEL and strategic engagement should drive (push) linkages with regional TA, research and partnerships. In contrast, knowledge around Clusters will be drawn in (pull) from country, regional and global work.
5. CDKN must use M&E evidence for self-critical reflection to promote learning and avoid confusing M&E with PR functions. This will require a clearer separation of functions and reporting of M&E findings to the MoC using a reporting format that is better suited to this than the current quarterly report.
6. In countries with DFID climate change programmes it is important that the advisor has oversight of CDKN projects – even if this is simply to confirm consistency with the country strategy and that there are good reasons for not managing it “in-house”. Given the requirement for independence this should not apply to AF.

Introduction

This Country Report is based on and review of CDKN literature on the Rwanda country programme, projects within this programme and interviews with stakeholders, suppliers and CDKN staff in Rwanda and internationally.

The projects reviewed are:

National strategy on climate change and low carbon development in Rwanda	Technical Assistance	20/09/2010	11/11/2011	Smith School & Environmental Education Media Project for China
Design of the Rwandan Climate Change and Environmental Fund (FONERWA)	Technical Assistance	10/02/2012	31/07/2012	University of Wolverhampton
Documentary film on climate change and development in Rwanda	Knowledge Management	07/09/2011	31/03/2012	Smith School & Environmental Education Media Project for China

As set out in our Inception report we have used a standardised set of questions designed to address the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria. The remainder of this report uses the section headings set out in the Inception report but we have rearranged their order.

Theory of Change

At the outset of the CDKN Rwanda Country Programme (RCP) there was no DFID country climate change programme and no explicit GoR theory of change for CCD. In this context, the national strategy work can be seen as responding to GoR demand and the documentary film as being a KM idea proposed by CDKN.

Based on many stakeholder interviews our assessment is that *demand-led work needs to be part of a clear strategy and in the case of CDKN's early work in Rwanda it wasn't*. So, for example, we were told:

“Nowadays DFID has a CC strategy but the CDKN work has developed organically and you could not say that CDKN work is part of a broader strategy. CDKN outputs were much more reflective of demand and opportunistic”.

The GGGR strategy itself set out a vision for CCD in which climate finance plays an important role. So once this was in place CDKN support to establish FONERWA can be said to be part of the GoR ToC, as articulated in the strategy. However, CDKN involvement was demand-led rather than strategic. This matters because it has reduced the *effectiveness* of the CDKN programme of support to Rwanda. As one well-informed observer put it:

“EDPRS2 via sector planning strategies is going to drive priorities for FONERWA. CDKN did not do a ToC to work out how to influence EDPRS2 early (with assumption on capacity in sectors etc). They faced a lot of pressure to spend and deliver, for example, the deadline for the Strategy prevented forward thinking and reduced the focus on capacity building. It would have been helpful to stand back early on and develop a ToC”.

The RCC retrofits a problem statement and impact pathway (reproduced overleaf) to the projects funded i.e. after the projects were funded it says they fitted into a strategy. *To avoid misleading readers it should be made clear that the theory of change is a new construct and did not exist at the time that projects were commissioned*. Nonetheless, the impact pathway is potentially a very useful tool to prioritise future CDKN support to Rwanda. Our assessment is that it could be strengthened by:

1. Embedding this within an explicit GoR ToC from which CDKN interventions are chosen to deliver critical intermediate outcomes or because CDKN has a comparative advantage in this area. Interviews with the

Minister MINERENA and DG REMA suggest they have a ToC that is partly articulated in the GGCR strategy but has not been recorded as a ToC as such; and

2. Structuring the CDKN ToC to identify the most important intermediate outcomes on the pathway and associated critical assumptions that have to be addressed.²¹ This would give us a more strategic approach and identify where monitoring is a priority.


²¹ Assumptions are set out separately but this is not an ideal ToC approach in which we can see where they are most important for delivering progress.

Rwanda: CDKN Impact Pathway Diagram

Key:

Programme indirectly influences this short or medium term change

Programme directly contributes to the short or medium term change



Results

In general, the RCP report does a good job in presenting and interpreting the evidence on the emerging impact of CDKN support for the GGCR strategy and FONERWA. There are positive results to report. It is early days but the GGCR strategy is in place (even if imperfect), linkages with EDPRS2 are being made (despite lack of capacity) and support to FONERWA has increased the chance of securing international climate finance (even if private sector finance remains some way off). CDKN has undoubtedly contributed to this process. However, it is important to note that the GGCR built on Cost of Climate change (SEI) work. The SEI work influenced policy makers. DFID pushed the strategy development as a result of this opening and then sub-contracted CDKN. GoR (MINERENA) is very positive about CDKN despite challenges in developing the GGCR strategy.

The short-term and medium changes set out in the RCP report are reproduced in Table 6 below together with our assessment (in bold) of reported progress.

In order to understand the difference that CDKN support has made we need to have a counterfactual: what would have happened without this support? This is often a difficult question to answer but it would be worth CDKN asking it as part of project impact reviews. Very useful evidence is presented on the “situation at the start of the project” but this cannot tell us if there was anything special about CDKN support. So, for example, we find that CDKN responded quickly and flexibly to Government of Rwanda (GoR) demand for a national Green Growth and Climate Resilience strategy (GGCR)²². In order to influence the vitally important new Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2), the GGCR had to be produced in 9 months. At the time DFID did not have a CC programme in place or the capacity to manage this directly and probably no other donor partners (DPs) could have mobilised support sufficiently quickly. Thus CDKN was not simply another donor providing funding as speed and flexibility was critical at that point in time.

Progress along the impact pathway is generally accurately described in relation to support for the GGCR and FONERWA. The need for “Capacity building of Government officials and planners to implement climate policy, increase access to climate finance and to climate proof investment decisions” is recognised but the critical threat that it poses is not adequately recognised. For example, sectors (agriculture, transport etc.) have been provided with guidance on how to make their submissions to the EDPRS2 compatible with the GGCR. However, without additional capacity within sectors it will be extremely difficult to turn high-level guidance into practical plans, to avoid maladaptation and for ministries of planning and finance to prioritise investments based on environmental, economic and social criteria.

²² Originally known as the National strategy on climate change and low carbon development in Rwanda

Table 6: Extract from the CDKN Rwanda Country Programme Report, September 2012

<p>Green growth and climate resilience strategy is developed and adopted by government</p>	<p>The Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy was approved and adopted by Cabinet in October 2011.²³ This new piece of climate change policy allows for direct action on implementing climate compatible development across the Rwandan economy, in a coordinated manner. The year-long process included consultation with over 300 stakeholders, and was overseen by a governmental Steering Committee comprising high level representatives from nine Rwandan Ministries. As such, there has been significant awareness-raising around both the Strategy and more broadly around climate compatible development, with government, business and civil society in Rwanda. CDKN co-funded the Strategy with DFID therefore can attribute a direct role in this change.</p> <p>Subsequent to Strategy adoption, discussions were held with GoR regarding implementation planning. In order to ensure the Strategy is integrated into Rwanda's development vision at the highest level, GoR are currently working on integrating the policy options into the current drafting of EDPRS2 – the key document articulating Rwanda's development trajectory over the medium term (work on this is ongoing). They have chosen not to develop a standalone implementation plan for the Strategy itself.</p> <p>MTR comment – understates value of CDKN support by not considering the counterfactual</p>
<p>Government processes for mainstreaming CCD are developed and initial uptake is successful</p>	<p>As part of the GoR's mainstreaming programme, in Nov 2011 it published guidelines for mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation into key sectors, such as agriculture, energy, and infrastructure²⁴. These guidelines are designed to provide basic and flexible guidance on how to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conduct impact and vulnerability assessments in the sector; • identify opportunities and entry points for integration of climate change mitigation and adaptation (CCMA) measures; • identify, analyse and integrate options for CCMA into the sector's policy formulation, financing, implementation and evaluation at national, local and community levels. <p>In 2012 the GoR also began work to mainstream environment and climate considerations into its economy wide development planning, utilizing the timely opportunity of the revision of both Vision 2020 and the EDPRS. To facilitate such, REMA has delivered training workshops to ministry and district officials countrywide aiming to promote sustainable development based on mainstreaming environment and climate change in their activities and plans.</p>

²³ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/rwanda-2011.pdf>

²⁴ http://www.rema.gov.rw/rema_doc/IMCE_Doc/Guidelines%20-Agriculture.pdf

	<p>MTR comment – It is not clear what CDKN is claiming credit for but there is a big gap between producing guidelines (from the Strategy) and developing processes for mainstreaming CCD</p>
<p>The green growth and climate resilience strategy acts to demonstrate Rwanda’s leading work in this area in Africa, and increases domestic and international interest in implementation</p>	<p>The COP17 side event in December 2011 successfully provided a platform for the Ministry and REMA to publically present the strategy for the first time and screen the Film. Feedback was very positive – Jeremy Webb from ACPC commented that the strategy was one of the leading examples in Africa, that the ACPC fully endorsed, and support its implementation. .</p> <p>Rwanda is increasingly seen as an African leader in climate action, and it has particular leadership within the East African Community.</p> <p>The commitment of DPs to CCD has increased, e.g. DFID have committed GBP 1m / year from 2011 -2014²⁵</p> <p>MTR comment – No evidence is given that this specific CDKN support has produced increased interest in implementation</p>
<p>Capacity building of Government officials and planners to implement climate policy, increase access to climate finance and to climate proof investment decisions</p>	<p>Some small capacity development activities have occurred, yet this remains a key challenge to addressing climate change in Rwanda. As part of the Strategy development, 4 interns were selected to work shadow the consultant team. In addition, one official from each of the 9 ministries that were closely involved were partnered with one researcher from the consultant team. These mechanisms allowed capacity development both through the sharing of knowledge and information, but also on the process of policy development. However, feedback from the GoR indicated that there was not a high enough priority given to capacity development in the Strategy process, and this is still a key area of investment priority.</p> <p>MTR comment – This honest reflection is not adequately captured elsewhere in the Report</p>
<p>Successful establishment, initial operation and increasing capitalisation of FONERWA</p>	<p>Building upon the Organic Law passed in 2005, the FONERWA Law was drafted and consulted upon in 2011. Climate change was added to the mandate of Fonerwa, and the framework for the patrimony, functioning and responsibilities was formalised. It was passed by Cabinet in early 2012. Coupled with this, a concept note on for a climate change “basket fund” to finance the Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy was developed in late 2011. (See Huddle for the Bill and concept note).</p> <p>In 2012, the detailed design of Fonerwa was undertaken, supported by the CDKN. The design team undertook an</p>

²⁵ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/rwanda-2011.pdf>

	<p>extensive exercise to develop, consult upon and finalise the financing mechanism, financial structure, governance and institutional arrangements, M&E, procurement and financial procedures, applications process and capacity building characteristics of the fund. As part of the CDKN project, a ToR for the establishment and operation of Fonerwa was also produced. These were used by DFID to appoint a Fund Management Team, and early work to operationalise the fund has commenced in close collaboration with REMA, Rwanda Development Bank and Ministry of Finance</p> <p>MTR comment – Agreed</p>
<p>Domestic resource is committed to support CCD interventions</p>	<p>Domestic budget allocations to climate change – outside of MINIRENA – are very low, if at all. Fonerwa is the primary mechanism through which extra-budgetary funds will be managed. The main domestic sources of funds are proposed to be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the payment of EIA fee's for certain developments which will be allocated to enforce EIAs, • a 2% levy on Ministry budgets which will act as seed funding, and in turn they will have access to the fund in order to secure funding for CCD and environmental projects. • Other environment fines and fees, • The incorporation of the National Forestry Fund into Fonerwa • The establishment of a Water Fund and its management through Fonerwa <p>These options have been consulted upon and agreed in the Fonerwa design process, however the design will be subject to change throughout the establishment period, and the actual realisation of these pledges and fee's will be tested during FONERWA's early operation in 2013</p> <p>MTR comment – Agreed</p>
<p>UPDATE ON PLANNED MEDIUM TERM CHANGES - Describe the changes, if any, which have taken place since the baseline/programme impact monitoring report.</p>	
<p>Medium term change <i>Refer to the long term identified in the Impact Pathway CP 1.2, question 5</i></p>	<p>Changes against the baseline or last impact monitoring report <i>Please answer the bullet points above. Provide evidence and cite reference where possible. Please be as specific as you can.</i></p>
<p>Rwandans have a deeper understanding of their roles in delivering CCD and are mobilised to act</p>	<p>Climate change awareness, whilst still limited, is increasing. This has been facilitated by recent flooding and landslides, and an increasing presence of climate change in the national media. The film "Hope in a changing climate" which documents Rwanda's work on climate has been aired nationally. The follow-on CDKN supported film "Emerging in a changing climate" is planned for public dissemination nationally in 2013.</p> <p>MTR comment – No evidence is given that this specific CDKN support has produced any changes</p>

Mainstreaming of CCD into government policies and decisions is common practice, driven by planning and efficient implementation	<p>Whilst mainstreaming programmes are in place and short term changes are beginning seen (see above), it is too early to report on progress of this medium term change. ,</p> <p>MTR comment – Agreed</p>
Domestic and international funding for CCD action is mobilised, programmed, disbursed and managed	<p>Despite modest increased in budget allocations and DP support, the environment sub-sector remains grossly underfunded. Whilst some international funding for CCD is present from bi-laterals, multi-laterals and INGOs, it is not yet sustained or managed in a programmatic manner that aligns to Government priorities. Whilst DFID have committed GBP 1m / year from 2011 -2014 for Fonerwa operation, there is no resource committed for 2014/2015. Fonerwa is targeting funds from the UK's International Climate Fund, but at present there is no long term commitment to CCD.</p> <p>MTR comment – Agreed</p>

Including the Rwanda film as evidence that “The green growth and climate resilience strategy acts to demonstrate Rwanda’s leading work in this area in Africa, and increases domestic and international interest in implementation” is problematic. Firstly, although the film was shown at the Rwanda COP 18 side event, it simply describes an activity and we do not know whether it has actually helped progress along the impact pathway. Indeed, while we were not able to rigorously track who had seen the documentary film and the influence it had had on them, no one we spoke to in Rwanda mentioned the film as an influence and although both the Minister of MINERENA and DG of REMA reported significant outside interest in the experience of Rwanda, neither could attribute this to the film. The limited feedback we received on the value of the film was much less positive than of support to the Strategy or FONERWA. As one observer put it:

“The knowledge part of CDKN wanted to document the process of producing the Strategy and do the film and they recruited the film makers. People felt it didn’t really capture what was going on”.

There is an understandable tension between the need for CDKN to report success to DFID and build the CDKN brand on one hand and to learn from self-critical reflection on the other. However, the evidence from Rwanda suggests that CDKN is confusing PR with M&E and is both over-claiming successes achieved so far and the contribution of CDKN. So, for example, the Africa Strategy claims:

“CDKN has and is currently supporting policy and programmatic change, research, and knowledge processes in ten countries in Africa. We have already delivered substantial results in Rwanda and Kenya and we are advancing towards impact and results in a number of other countries.” p7

And the Rwanda Country Programme document says “The Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy was approved and adopted by Cabinet in October 2011”²⁶ This new piece of climate change policy allows for direct action on implementing climate compatible development across the Rwandan economy, in a coordinated manner. The year-long process included consultation with over 300 stakeholders, and was overseen by a governmental Steering Committee comprising high level representatives from 9 Rwandan Ministries. As such, there has been significant awareness-raising around both the Strategy and more broadly around climate compatible development, with government, business and civil society in Rwanda. CDKN co-funded the Strategy with DFID therefore can attribute a direct role in this change”. p33

However, the back to office report (BTOR) from the Africa Deputy Director and TA Senior Project Manager, referencing the DG of REMA states:

“Rose did not receive the proposal for Rwanda’s participation in a regional learning project enthusiastically. She does not believe that Rwanda has achieved anything yet, as the Strategy is not yet implemented and FONERWA has not been launched. Rose’s main concern is how to move from policy to practice and this is where she would like to see CDKN support.” P4

The MTR team shares the view of the DG REMA that it is “early days” in terms of implementation. In addition, the political commitment to and awareness of CCD comes from GoR (with the 2008 SEI adaptation report and DFID support to the sector helping to raise awareness and the fortuitous timing of the EDPRS2 providing a great opportunity for mainstreaming). CDKN has provided timely funding and competent technical assistance but must avoid giving the impression that it is taking credit for the work of others.

Relevance

Targeting has been good

The GGCR strategy is clearly owned by the GoR and, as noted in the RCC, the GoR established a Steering Committee comprising high level representatives from 9 Rwandan Ministries to lead a process of consultation on the strategy with over 300 stakeholders.

²⁶ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/rwanda-2011.pdf>

Concerning FONERWA, CDKN has done more than simply funding a relevant intervention and CDKN consultants have actively contributed to producing a relevant design. For example, we were told:

“They have used good stakeholder mapping and consultation – more than with other consultants”.

A number of stakeholders also appreciated that CDKN understood that having consultants able to communicate effectively with both MINECOFIN and MINERENA was critical to making FONERWA a success. CDKN were seen as selecting the best consultants for the job rather than giving in to pressure to have “big name” specialists on the private sector:

“The relationship with GoR is the critical success factor and explains why the CIDT team was chosen. GoR sees itself as leading the way on mobilising FONERWA projects and then bringing in the private sector. Given the GoR approach, getting outsiders with a better understanding of the private sector but no relationship with GoR would simply have produced reports rather than Government engagement”.

It is worth highlighting how important it was for the design of FONERWA to involve MINECOFIN and get their understanding. The Director-General of Budgets was involved in the process and has very high level of awareness of FONERWA. Strategic entry points were also identified at the outset. This model may well hold lessons for getting joined-up government involvement in climate finance in other countries.

Effectiveness

Demand-led work needs to be part of a clear strategy – in the case of CDKN’s early work in Rwanda it wasn’t.

As mentioned in section 0 above, CDKN did not develop a theory of change *before* implementing the projects in the Rwanda programme. A number of stakeholders argued that this had reduced the effectiveness of the programme. Reporting, for example:

“Nowadays DFID has a CC strategy but the CDKN work has developed organically and we could not say that CDKN work is part of a broader strategy. CDKN outputs were much more reflective of demand and opportunistic”.

And;

“EDPRS2 via sector planning strategies is going to drive priorities for FONERWA. CDKN did not do a ToC to work out how to influence EDPRS2 early. They faced a lot of pressure to spend and deliver and the deadline for the strategy prevented forward thinking and reduced quality of the work i.e. reducing the focus on capacity building. It would have been helpful to stand back early on and develop a ToC”.

It would have been a great help to have a country engagement leader right from the start of the programme who could engage at a senior level with Government

This was a commonly expressed view and is illustrated by the following quotes:

“CDKN not being in country has been a disadvantage”.

“They should have had a senior person in country like Trademark East Africa – face time makes this programme successful”.

“There are challenges around FONERWA design being based locally and meeting with GoR regularly while CDKN is based in London and so their comments were sometimes not seen as reflecting local realities and were rejected. CDKN didn’t have the information to decide whether this rejection was valid – they need a CEL”.

Both GoR and CDKN wanted the GGCR strategy contract to build GoR capacity in CCD but a number of factors prevented this (and, to some extent, could have been foreseen). These include:

- Not having capacity building as a major element of project design
- The very demanding timeline for delivering the strategy

- Supplier focus on delivering a strategy rather than training.

Interviewees put this in terms illustrated by the following quotes:

“Local interns were meant to learn holistically from involvement in Strategy but it didn’t work”.

“The interns were not trained because no time was available for proper training. But also Smith School were not focussed on training but on delivery of the strategy. Their performance indicators did not include training”.

Efficiency and broader VFM

The large majority of expenditure in Rwanda has been on externally commissioned technical assistance. CDKN uses a rigorous and robust procurement process and we can be confident that the unit costs for the Rwanda projects were in keeping with sector norms.

The main question relating to efficiency is:

Whether CDKN has provided a service that the existing DFID office could not or whether it has simply added an additional layer of management?

The evidence is clear that when CDKN began working in Rwanda that DFID Rwanda did not have the staff or time to manage the national climate strategy project. It would not have been possible to get another DFID CC advisor in time and, at that point, DFID tended to have CC advisors with specific skill sets whereas CDKN was able to offer the required wider range of skills and experience. Hence CDKN brought a technical advantage as well as speed of contracting.

This may not be true now as DFID has built technical capacity in this area and has a suitable country climate change programme in place. Consequently, in countries with DFID climate change programmes it is important that the advisor has oversight of CDKN projects – even if this is simply to confirm consistency with the country strategy and that there are good reasons for not managing it “in-house”. Given the requirement for independence this should not apply to AF. It should be noted that DFID Rwanda felt that there had been good coordination on strategy and technical issues with CDKN.

There also appears to be a question of how to manage the complexity of joint DFID and CDKN project funding.

As DFID accounting systems are not designed for this, staff find it difficult to know who has paid for what. There is then a risk of the same activity being funded twice. In these circumstances it is better to have all funding for a project managed by DFID or CDKN unless there are very clear activities that can be funded separately.

Sustainability

The GoR owns the GGCR strategy, EDPRS2 and FONERWA and so there is a good chance that CDKN inputs are part of a sustainable process.

The limitations to this are GoR dependence on DP funding and lack of GoR capacity to implement CCD. As one GoR official put it:

“The hope is that FONERWA will implement EDPRS2 objectives (although resources are very limited). FONERWA is the key tool for sustainability although we need technical inputs from districts and private sector”.

A combination of fortuitous timing for the new PRSP (EDPRS2), GoR commitment to the GGCR and rigorous mainstreaming presents a genuine opportunity to get line ministries to incorporate GGCR into sector plans with budget allocations. The critical constraint is a lack of capacity within line ministries and, while the CDKN RCC mentions capacity constraints, we believe it should have a higher profile at this point in time.

The process of developing EDPRS2 will integrate CC as a cross-cutting area with guidelines – with some general and some sector-specific elements. The guidance for line ministries is taken from the GGCR strategy (annexes for specific sectors). This guidance typically sets out principles that need to be taken on board but the Sectors need more capacity to turn principles into detailed plans that can be linked with the Sector budget. Some of this capacity is technical but the lack of economic capacity (to assess where benefits of CCD interventions outweigh costs) was emphasised by a number of interviewees.

Learning

There is evidence that CDKN has learned from its experience to improve the TA it delivers but there do not appear to be processes in place to learn systematically from the programme. The film made about the production of the national climate strategy focuses on raising awareness of climate change and Rwanda's policy response rather than lessons learned from developing the strategy.

CDKN project management quality assurance processes helped to get the supplier for the GGCR strategy to address a number of weaknesses. A "hands-on" management approach identified concerns, CDKN commissioned an external review of the draft Strategy and the Smith School revised the Strategy as a result.

The CDKN Rwanda programme seems to have learned from its engagement in Rwanda. For the FONERWA contract, DFID and CDKN managed to insist on competitive contracting although this would take more time (delay being anathema to GoR).

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

**CDKN Project Ref: AAGL-0020 CDKN
External Evaluation Review**

**COUNTRY VISIT REPORTS:
Kenya and Ethiopia**

Submitted by



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This report has been written by Robbie Gregorowski, Gil Yaron (team leader), Isabel Vogel and Jules Siedenburg. The CDKN team has assisted our work by ensuring efficient access to information.

Introduction

This Country Visit Report reflects the combined findings from a joint visit to Kenya and Ethiopia, reviewed as part of wider CDKN 'sub-regional hub that includes Rwanda (country visit undertaken by Gil Yaron in December 2012). More emphasis is placed on the results and findings relating to CDKN's engagement in Kenya as a Deep Engagement Country with its own Country Programme and duration of engagement that has started to deliver tangible results. Findings specific to Ethiopia, a more recent Medium Engagement country, are highlighted in the text.

Key Findings and Recommendations

- In terms of activities and outputs CDKN have successfully delivered the 6 components on time and as budgeted as set out above. As a whole these components have contributed to the delivery of a draft NCCAP document. The process of producing this document has been largely led, managed and delivered by CDKN and their sub-contracted service providers.
- The key short term outcome is significant contribution to / progress towards mainstreaming climate change into national planning processes. CC will feature in next Medium Term Plan and in overall Vision 2030.
- TA is where CDKN has greatest capacity to transform. Other CDKN output areas need to be tied to country led actions which are based around TA. In both the Kenya and Ethiopian contexts there needs to be better overall coherence of how each of the CDKN outputs support work in countries.
- The role of Country Engagement Leader (CEL), or similar, is critical if CDKN is to strategically inform CCD processes at the national and international level. This requires CDKN to have permanent staff based in country who are recognised as CCD experts and who are able to engage key counterparts through trusting relationships and informed dialogue.
- A potentially key missed opportunity relates to failing to systematically document the lessons learned, methods deployed and tools created through the NCCAP development process that CDKN has support. – This could and should be a key CDKN knowledge product and a potentially significant global public good. There is no evidence that CDKN recognises this and no evidence the other outputs are systematically engaged to realise this and take advantage of the opportunity.
- A wider implication is that CDKN's outputs could be better grounded in the strategy, activities and lessons at the country level – to respond to priorities as they emerge and apply lessons learned through working with priority audience and stakeholders in deep engagement countries and then transferring these activities and lessons elsewhere.
- CDKN's results focus needs to include more 'honest introspection' and self-questioning in order to learn lessons about what works and what doesn't. Pressure to report successful achievement of objectives to DFID needs to change to understand that failure is natural and can be accepted.

Results and Impact

Expected results

Based on the need and demand expressed by the MEMR, CDKN TA-support in Kenya comprises the following six components:

	Project code	Title	Start Date	End Date
1	TAAF-0027a	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 9 - Coordination	Aug 2011	31 March 2013
2	TAAF-0027b	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 4: Mitigation action	Aug 2011	31-Jul-12
3	TAAF-0027c	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 1: Long-term National Low Carbon Development Pathway	April 2012	31-Oct-12 (likely to extend to end Dec 12)
4	TAAF-0027d	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 2 - Enabling Policy and Regulatory Framework	Sept 2011	30-Sep-12
5	TAAF-0027e	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 3 – Preparing for a National Adaption Plan	Sept 2011	19-Oct-12
6	TAAF-0027f	Kenya's NCCRS - Subc 8 - Finance	Sept 2011	30-Sep-12

According to the CDKN Kenya Country Programme impact pathway, CDKN aims to deliver and contribute to:

CDKN areas of intervention: Evidence of results to date and trajectory towards impact based on evidence presented to the evaluation team member.

1. *Collated existing and new information as fresh evidence base for choosing future CCD priorities. Successfully delivered.*
2. *Support to MEMR and NCCAP process (scoping, procurement, project management, capacity building, process facilitation). Successfully delivered.*
3. *Improve understanding of climate change opportunities and costs for Kenya amongst key stakeholders. Successfully delivered.*
4. *Facilitation of stakeholder consultations (national, provincial and county levels) Successfully delivered.*
5. *Support to MTP process and screening of flagship projects. Partially delivered.*
6. *Development of tool, reports, systems to implement and inform the NCCAP and CCD in Kenya. Successfully delivered.*
7. *Options analysis produced to support identification of key NCCAP actions and other CCD priorities at different scales (e.g. Coastal zone, local, provincial, national). Partially delivered.*

Short term changes:

- 1) *NCCAP recommendations accepted and included in MTP/sector plans and budgets. Significant movement towards positive change.*
- 2) *When county plans are developed they are informed by NCCAP analysis/actions. Movement towards positive change.*
- 3) *Recommendations from NCCAP in terms of creation of institutional home for CC within new Government structures taken up (e.g. creation of CCD). Movement towards positive change.*
- 4) *Changes are made based on NCCAP to legal, policy and regulatory frameworks in Kenya that promotes CCD (e.g. climate change policy, climate change act). Movement towards positive change.*
- 5) *Tools to support climate proofing of development projects/programmes are available and used. Movement towards positive change.*
- 6) *NCCAP recommendations relating to climate finance are taken up and concrete proposal developed. Expected movement towards positive change.*
- 7) *Mechanisms are created that promote multi-stakeholder engagement in development of NCCAP and Government commits to providing ongoing opportunities for strategic discussions to drive implementation. (incl. media breakfast). Support planned but too soon to identify any significant movement towards positive change.*

Medium term changes

- 1) *Mainstreaming of CCD and NCCAP actions in Government Planning and Budgeting processes. Some evidence of contribution/progress towards positive change.*
- 2) *Mechanisms promote leadership, coordination and coherence of response to climate change. No evidence of contribution/progress towards positive change.*
- 3) *Financial mechanisms to support climate compatible development are in place and attract and provide sufficient investment. No evidence of contribution/progress towards positive change.*
- 4) *Private sector plays an active role in supporting increased resilience and response to low carbon development opportunities through investment and promoting access to technology. Support planned but no evidence of contribution/progress towards positive change.*

Evidence of results delivered

In terms of **activities and outputs** CDKN have successfully delivered the 6 components on time and as budgeted as set out above. As a whole these components have contributed to the delivery of a draft NCCAP document. The process of producing this document has been largely led, managed and delivered by CDKN and their sub-contracted service providers.

The key **short term outcome** is significant contribution to / progress towards mainstreaming climate change into national planning processes. CC will feature in next Medium Term Plan and in overall Vision 2030.

At the launch of the MTP process (28th August 2012) the Minister of Planning announced that climate change would be considered as a cross-cutting issue and that sector plans would be expected to identify climate related spending, climate proof their existing and plan for new activities

(potentially drawing on the NCCAP actions and analysis). CDKN Kenya Country Programme Impact Monitoring Form CP3, page 38 – verified during the Kenya country visit.

Trajectory towards **medium and long term outcomes / impact** - CDKN have successfully delivered their central short term objective to establish the CCS in the MEMR and to deliver the NCCAP recommendations into the MTP. But impact depends on concrete implementation on the ground as a result of CC mainstreaming. It is too soon to claim that support to the CCS has been achieved and CDKN's focus should shift to the private sector and civil society. Rather, CDKN need to continue to work with MEMR to bring in these groups to ensure medium term changes such as mechanisms promote leadership, coordination and coherence of response to climate change are sustainably embedded in key institutions and processes. Similarly, it is too early on the trajectory of a complex change pathway to define CDKN's role and contribution to ensuring that key counterparts (the private sector and civil society) and mechanisms (climate finance) play a role in delivering a meaningful response to climate change.

Results reporting / M&E

CDKN's results focus needs to include more 'honest introspection' and self-questioning in order to learn lessons about what works and what doesn't. Pressure to report successful achievement of objectives to DFID needs to change to understand that failure is natural and can be accepted.

Relevance

"DFID Kenya did not bring CDKN in – CDKN already in dialogue with MEMR and COMESA. DFID supported MEMR's aspiration to develop the NCCAP and felt that CDKN had already established good dialogue, relationships and entry points with MEMR. All three partners shared aspiration that concrete implementation was the ultimate outcome."

CDKN Kenya Country Engagement process

"CDKN support to the NCCAP process is extremely relevant to Kenya's CC priorities as it is the necessary and essential next step to go from a strategy to a costed and budgeted plan to support implementation."

In terms of relevance, CDKN's engagement in Kenya demonstrates a clear response to Kenyan-owned need and demand which is neatly summarised in the CDKN Kenya Country Programme document (October 2012):

The Government of Kenya published the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) in April 2010. This was a thorough and comprehensive assessment of Kenya's climate change issues and presented a detailed implementation and resource mobilisation plan, including the identification of adaptation and mitigation measures at an annual average cost of some US\$ 3bn over the next 20 years. The NCCRS did not establish a system for coordinated implementation of climate action in Kenya and following a process of inter-ministerial collaboration and stakeholder engagement, a vision for an ambitious Climate Change Action Plan was established in early 2011. Kenya's Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR) identified the need to make more specific recommendations for coordinated and practical progress under the NCCRS. The need was identified through discussions between a Climate Change Adviser from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Permanent Secretary in the MEMR. COMESA then approached CDKN and a number of other donors, including DFID Kenya and the French Development Agency to provide support to a few areas of technical input.

CDKN has sought to address the following challenges that exist in Kenya:

- 1) *The commitment and capacity of the Kenyan Government to lead and take action on climate change and move beyond development of strategies and planning to delivery and impact on poor people's lives.*
- 2) *Lack of country specific knowledge and evidence to support decision making about Kenya's options in terms of mitigation and adaptation actions.*
- 3) *Deeper engagement and action from a range of stakeholders, particularly civil society and the private sector, in order to support Government commitments and provide a wider enabling environment for climate action.*

CDKN's role in Ethiopia

Evolution of CDKN's role in Ethiopia and the need for a flexible response strategy

- Contracted by CDKN in June 2012 as part of 3-person CDKN team placed in the EPA to scope the procurement support and needs required to translate the CRGE into an action plan entitled iPlan24 and now called Sectoral Reduction Mechanism (SRM).
- Originally envisaged that the CDKN team would draft the TORs and manage the process of selecting the service provider to coordinate aspects of vulnerability and emissions reductions required under iPlan/SRM.
- CDKN began this work by starting to develop TORs for various service providers but recently and suddenly the nature of the work was changed when EPA decided that didn't want / need service providers to be procured and would manage the process themselves.
- Focus now is to support EPA through the provision of 3 individual technical experts covering MRV, KM, and climate finance to build EPA capacity over 6 months.
- GGGI will also have a complementary role to cover the climate baseline and green growth. It is not clear to what extent this is a more strategic advisory role to the EPA that CDKN aspires to.
- CDKN seem to have accepted and responded to the change in EPA demand and focus well but are still pushing the EPA to realise the value of an overall coordination role for them.
- EPA is a challenging client to work with – very strong sense of their own needs and where they invite outside support. The nature of the demand and their overall strategy is subject to change as their own understanding evolves. Very recently, there was a major and last minute shift in the nature of the engagement CDKN envisaged. The nature of the demand from EPA is much smaller, and less strategic than CDKN proposed. CDKN have been able to respond flexibly to change their support to meet this need by focussing on identifying the key risks to the EPA strategy. The final agreement of the nature of CDKN's involvement is yet to be formalised.
- CDKN support in Ethiopia relates primarily to the provision of TA to the EPA. Through the TA-component, CDKN have embedded staff within the EPA which has contributed to establishing relationships and building local capacity within the EPA and ensuring an effective (and co-ordinated) approach between different donors and GGGI through strong project management. However, this engagement looks set to be a single, projectised engagement and based on this CDKN will not be able to claim contribution to CC in Ethiopia beyond output level. Therefore, the most ambitious claim they can make is likely to relate to building and strengthening the capacity of the EPA to implement the SRM.
- More broadly it is too early to tell if CDKN are happy to play a role that relates only to the provision of niche TA to transfer capacity to EPA staff and where their ability to work strategically with the EPA is limited. GGGI play this role currently in Ethiopia both for the EPA and DFID, and do it better than CDKN can as they have permanent technical staff based in country.

Effectiveness

CDKN role

CDKN added value in Kenya relates to procurement, contracting, programme management and process quality assurance (QA). In Kenya, CDKN have facilitated a process of creating the CCS and delivering the Action Plan more effectively and efficiently than either DFID Kenya or the MEMR on their own could have done.

More significantly, several key informants summarised CDKN's effectiveness as:

- Process management and process QA – strong
- Technical content QA – mixed – trouble understanding nuanced and complex process and context from London. PM support in London is very junior. Tim Ash Vie – very good and should expand role as Country Engagement Leader.
- Development processes – don't understand the soft side of development – struggle to understand need to invest in developing and managing relationships – instead want to 'push' / 'force' process through according to own timetable

Structures and mechanisms to ensure effectiveness

The recently created position of Kenya Country Engagement Leader (CEL) looks to ensure that CDKN has permanent presence in Kenya and wider East Africa sub-regional hub. This role provides link between client (MEMR) and service providers and ensures that CDKN better understands and adapts to the complex political economy in Kenya and the region. The CEL is an innovation that CDKN should employ in all high engagement countries as it means that they are more likely to step beyond simple contracting, procurement and process management support to provide more meaningful support based on dialogue and relationship building.

CDKN added value as a programme that is greater than the sum of its parts – synergies across CDKN outputs

Little evidence was presented in Kenya or Ethiopia of systematic integration / synergy across CDKN outputs – TA, knowledge management (KM), research, partnerships, and advocacy. CDKN strategy and activities in both countries are heavily TA-led with little evidence of systematic input from the other CDKN outputs. CDKN have had very early conversations with the Government of Kenya regarding a project to enhance public engagement and understanding of climate compatible development to support Kenya's Climate Change Action Plan. CDKN are also scoping a joint research and knowledge management project which aims to support the communication and uptake of CDKN-commissioned research in Africa, through strengthening the ability of researchers in Africa to communicate their research findings to targeted audiences. Whilst these activities are laudable, they are in their infancy and cannot be considered representative of a systematically synergised approach across the country programme. The case study below illustrates the potential added value of a more synergised approach.

CASE STUDY / ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE of CDKN synergies across outputs – TA and Partnerships

Stephen was invited to attend the LEDS Global Partnership meeting in London in 2011 based on a suggestion by the CDKN PM to the CDKN Partnerships lead. CDKN managed to mobilise an advisor each from the MEMR and Ministry of Planning (MoP) as well as both respective Permanent Secretaries (PS). MEMR approached CDKN as they saw a strategic opportunity to influence the Ministry of Planning through his attendance. All four travelled together and presented on mainstreaming CC into national planning processes. According to Stephen this experience was key to the Minister of Planning. The outcome was a significant and immediate change in attitude from the MoP to better engage with MEMR in terms of the importance of CC mainstreaming in planning processes. A wider benefit of the LEDS GP exposure (Stephen now sits on the LEDS GP steering

committee) is that he has been exposed to a wide range of potential Development Partners who are interested in contributing development assistance to the implementation of the NCCAP in particular sectors of interest – e.g. Germans now funding development of a NAMA for Kenya’s energy sector based on discussion at LEDS GP meeting.

NOTE: this seems to be a relatively isolated example of synergy across outputs rather than a systematic approach to working employed by CDKN. Everyone else interviewed was unaware of the CDKN’s other outputs beyond the TA led support provided by CDKN in Kenya. But it is an example of how CDKN can work across outputs to add value and contribute to a programme that is ‘greater than the sum of its parts.’

Efficiency and wider VFM issues

CDKN’s added value to DFID Kenya is as a convenient procurement mechanism through which DFID could put its single biggest country office grant. CDKN provided a very efficient procurement process which resulted in the best technical experts. This is CDKN’s primary value to DFID for the country offices – DFID Kenya does not have the capacity to procure and manage the different sub-components involved in producing the MEMR.

“Because of this procurement and management ability CDKN was able to manage the complex NCCAP process within 12-18 months – a significant achievement.”

A potential downside of CDKN’s ‘projectised efficiency’ (characterised by a *technical assistance plus* approach which reflects PWC’s hard management practices and is very UK-centric in terms of (ODI-orientated) research, partnerships and knowledge management) is that it prevents the development of dialogue and relationships with government counterparts for meaningful long term change. In this way, an organisation such as CDKN may be less efficient than other organisations attempting to occupy the CC strategic advisory space. These two different approaches were clearly visible in Ethiopia where GGGI provides much more of a strategic advisory role to the Environmental Protection Authority due to their long term presence in the organisation as opposed to CDKN’s project team and a CEL based remotely in Nairobi.

CDKN have been engaged in Ethiopia in order to provide flexible and efficient TA funding through their procurement, management and QA expertise. Therefore, there is a disconnect between CDKN’s vision as a CCD ‘world authority’ and what they are used for in Ethiopia. The appropriate and most efficient role for CDKN may not be as simple as a dichotomy between a LT CCS institution vs. efficient procurement, management and QA mechanism. A potential 3rd option relates to providing a CC Resource Centre type vehicle to DFID and to developing countries (similar to DFID resource centre model open to DFID in the UK) where both DFID and developing countries could procure services across the CDKN outputs on demand.

Sustainability

Sustainable engagement with key stakeholders and counterparts

Sustainability of the engagement process with the MEMR after the support finishes in March is an issue for CDKN. CDKN support has helped establish the Climate Change Secretariat in the MEMR which should be sustainable but may require support in translating the Action Plan into meaningful implementation. This would require CDKN to have flexibility in revising their Kenya strategy – it is not clear that this flexibility is currently in place as CDKN are currently procuring contracts to raise the visibility of the NCCAP with the private sector and civil society, implicitly assuming support to the MEMR is complete. The last round of contract procurement was not developed through a process

and dialogue with MEMR but was developed unilaterally by CDKN as a component of their original strategy – this seems to suggest that CDKN struggles to flexibly change approach in order to react to context and maintain relevance.

Learning

CDKN research and knowledge management

CDKN's Kenya Country Programme is almost entirely TA-led. This is also the case for the proposed support to the EPA in Ethiopia. However because of the lack of other CDKN output integration, CDKN is unlikely to systematically document lessons learned.

A potentially key missed opportunity relates to failing to systematically document the lessons learned, methods deployed and tools created through the NCCAP development process that CDKN has support. – This could and should be a key CDKN knowledge product and a potentially significant global public good. There is no evidence that CDKN recognises this and no evidence the other outputs are systematically engaged to realise this and take advantage of the opportunity.

A wider implication is that CDKN's outputs could be better grounded in the strategy, activities and lessons at the country level – to respond to priorities as they emerge and apply lessons learned through working with priority audience and stakeholders in deep engagement countries and then transferring these activities and lessons elsewhere.

Theory of Change

Other issues

Conflict of interest

Role of PWC coordinating CDKN and being given complete access to Kenyan ministries as well as service provider details but then competing against these same service providers in other Kenyan tenders was seen as unfair, transparent and a serious conflict of interest.

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

CDKN Project Ref: AAGL-0020 CDKN External Evaluation Review

COUNTRY VISIT REPORTS: Colombia

Submitted by



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This report has been written by Isabel Vogel, Robbie Gregorowski, Gil Yaron (team leader), and Jules Siedenbug. The CDKN Colombia team, LAC Regional team and CDKN management team assisted our work by ensuring efficient access to information and full access to project stakeholders, peer organisations and comparators.

Introduction

This Country Visit Report describes the findings from a visit to Colombia, a CDKN Deep Engagement Country. Specific findings for Colombia are highlighted, with the implications for CDKN as a whole drawn out and recommendations made.

A selection of projects from the Colombia Country Programme portfolio were reviewed, and interviews held with project partners and stakeholders, project suppliers and independent peer organisations in Colombia. A key meeting with new institutional stakeholders for the Cartagena project was also observed.

The projects reviewed were:

Colombia Country Programme Yr 3-5: Mainstreaming Climate Change	Technical Assistance TALA 0028	June 13, 2012	December 12, 2014	Grupo E3, Colombia
Integrating adaptation to climate change into local planning and sectoral management in Cartagena Phase 1	Technical Assistance TALA 0006	20/06/2011	30/06/2011	INVEMAR, Colombia
Integrating adaptation to climate change into local planning and sectoral management in Cartagena: PHASE II “ADAPTATION PLAN AND NATIONAL GUIDELINES”	Technical Assistance TALA 0028b	17/09/2012	31/03/2014	INVEMAR, Colombia
An inter-institutional, multi- sectoral analysis of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for the agricultural sector in the upper Cauca valley river basin impacting adaptation policies (AVA)	Technical Assistance TALA 0009	26/09/2011	31/12/2012, Extended to 31/03/2013	Universidad del Cauca, CENICAFE, Universidad de Caldas, CIAT, Colombia
Amazonia: The Security Agenda. Responding to imminent threats	TALA -0025	01/07/2012	31/12/2012	CIAT /Green Canopy, Colombia

Growing up in Adversity: resilience in families affected by the winter	AAGL -0009h	15/04/2012	15/10/2012	Universidad del Norte, Colombia
Mainstreaming Climate Change into the Transport Sector in Colombia	TALA 002a	11/2012	21/06/2014.	ICF International

Key Findings and Recommendations

- In terms of activities and outputs CDKN have successfully delivered the project outputs detailed above, on time and to budget, apart from the TALA 0009 project which has been extended until March 2012, due to difficulties in obtaining information for the vulnerability model.
- Overall, the CDKN Colombia Country programme is a successful programme. There is strong evidence that the **country engagement approach, plus strategic projects** is effective at producing both the product and process results that are required.
- Performance in Phase 1 has been impressive, with tangible results achieved during the lifetime of the projects, and with projects with relatively small budgets.
- Projects represent efforts to apply climate science to the development of tools to support public policy development for adaptation in selected mainstream sectors such as agriculture and transport.
- CDKN Colombia have succeeded in engaging the key actors at the national level through the steering groups for the portfolio of projects. This includes the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, in charge of adaptation planning; the Department of Planning, in charge of planning and financing; as well as sectoral ministries, Agriculture and Transport. CDKN Colombia has also succeeded in engaging at the local and regional level, with city government in Cartagena, and with the autonomous regional environmental corporations which have influence over land use planning, among other areas.
- Interviewees consider this two-tier approach to be highly effective, because national engagement is needed to open the space for action, but the local level is where implementation needs to be tailored to the specific regional conditions.
- There is a confirmed match between how CDKN Colombia understand their niche and offering and how their partners and suppliers view it:
 - Having a holistic vision of climate change, adaptation and development
 - Bringing a combination of technical expertise, a focus on public policy and instruments and building a multi-stakeholder, consensus approach
 - Working at the nexus of science and policy – with very few comparators nationally.
- All interviewees considered that CDKN Colombia’s projects were relevant, strategic and innovative. Of particular interest were:
 - i) the linking of research and public policy instruments to produce tools to support highly tailored decision-making at different levels of decision – national, regional, locally at the municipal level. The focus on planning instruments such as Land Use

Plans was considered particularly strategic and likely to have sustainable impact, as regulations and norms flow from these plans.

ii) The focus on developing climate change adaptation decisions and planning on two axes: sectoral and territorial. The focus on major productive sectors such as agriculture, transport and large city governance was seen as having strong potential for demonstrating how mainstreaming of adaptation could work.

iii) CDKN's concept of climate compatible development and explorations of how to implement it within some of Colombia's most economically important sectors. This model was considered to be bringing something innovative and potentially new solutions within the current institutional framework.

- Most of the results achieved have been in the pilot projects TALA 0006 and TALA 0009. These components have contributed to the establishment of evidence-based and multi-stakeholder endorsed planning products and process for the two main areas of CDKN's intervention in Colombia
- These projects are now ready to begin Phase 2. They represent important results in that they are 'proof of concept' of not only research-based products that support implementation planning, but also of multi-stakeholder processes that are able to transcend institutional, public and private, and local/national boundaries.
- The projects demonstrate that - given the spaces and on-going accompaniment from CDKN as a trusted broker and source of support – stakeholders are able to find ways to collaborate to address climate change adaptation, ecosystem management and related issues as mainstream issues affecting economic competitiveness and national development.
- The other projects have been funded through Regional Research and Innovation Fund respectively. They are to be addressed under the Colombia portfolio because they are ready to be scaled up in a second Phase to support the Colombia Programme objectives.
- The project envisioned for Workstream 2, embedding a technical expert in IDEAM (the official institutional authority for producing meteorological, hydrological and environmental research in Colombia) had not yet started at the time of the mission.
- There are some caveats in the degree to which government and national institutional stakeholders are actually engaged. The AVA project especially has posed challenges to the institutions that are responsible for the generation of national information. The space that the AVA project has opened for multi-stakeholder dialogue and engagement needs to be carefully managed by CDKN to ensure practical government and institutional commitment to the process through into Phase 2.
- Although CDKN Colombia has undertaken communication activities, interviewees nevertheless consider that CDKN is not as visible nationally to other actors in the climate change area. Communication of CDKN's approach and lessons from the projects need to be communicated more widely for sustainability.

Implications for CDKN as a whole

- **Synergies across outputs** There is a missed opportunity in that the Colombia projects are coded as TA, whereas they combine national and international science and research in

practical applications of decision-making tools and inputs to institutional planning, supported by multi-stakeholder engagement and dialogue.

- Evidence from the visit suggests that the dialogue process is effective in balancing the instability of institutional personnel changes. Suppliers in all four main projects are research-based organisations with a policy development approach.
- However, learning from this synergistic approach is currently not being captured, for reasons to do with:
 - i) how the impact pathway is conceptualised
 - ii) a lack of focus on capturing intermediate results rather than deliverables within the M&E system.
- **Impact pathway** As an example, CDKN Colombia's impact pathway is missing a key pathway: political and institutional development. In practical terms, this is precisely where their multi-stakeholder processes are focused and is one of the drivers of change.
- In the 'Vision of Change', the outcome '*Decision makers at different levels have political will to address climate change as a transversal priority in sectors and regions, incorporating climate change considerations into development decisions and actions*' has been identified. However, this has been codified in the Vision as 'beyond the scope of the country programme', mainly for reasons of confidence in delivery.
- As the development of 'political will' – i.e. institutional, government and private actors seeing that it is in their interests and stakeholders' interests to address the issues – is where a lot of the project results are being seen (for example, in Cartagena), then missing this pathway means that there is no M&E process attached to this area of work.
- This makes it difficult to report important engagement results and to justify the investment in the multi-stakeholder engagement approach, as well as the public engagement communication interventions now being planned.
- Valuable learning opportunities are being missed because the impact pathway does not incorporate any learning questions or assumptions to monitor.
- **M&E and results reporting** There is a general issue in that the CDKN reporting system favours reporting of deliverables at the immediate end of projects, and a generic aggregation at the top level of the DoC.
- Results reporting is brought together better at the country programme level, but there are two issues here:
 - i) these results are self-reported by the team without verification;
 - ii) the structure of the reports mean that the evolving 'impact story' is presented in different sections: contextual and institutional challenges are presented as risks, CDKN's response and contribution are presented as risk mitigation, and any resulting changes are reported in a de-contextualised way, often as PR stories, with risks about over-claiming CDKN's contribution to a wider process.
- This makes it difficult to read across the significance and track how small changes build up into big ones, and obscures how CDKN may be responding strategically and adaptively to these.
- The risk is that results are reported as PR rather than M&E and valuable learning about 'change stories with chapters' is not captured.

Recommendations for CDKN as a whole

7. The Country Engagement Leader approach is effective in order to make projects more than stand-alone investments, and helps to build an uptake pathway for the results. The CEL should be in place early in the process of deep engagement so that investments are made at a *strategic* level (even if this means working in fewer countries).
8. Internationally, CDKN may be better known as a research entity, but in the country setting, its innovative contribution is the combination of research and public policy for implementation. It is at the country level where tangible gains have been made, at least in Colombia. This suggests that countries should be at the forefront of the change process.
9. Countries should drive the combination of deep engagement, a CEL and strategic engagement. Country programmes should draw on combinations of TA, national and international research, communications and knowledge management and partnerships to engage all the pathways for change at the country level.
10. CDKN should improve its use of M&E evidence for critical reflection to promote learning and avoid confusing M&E with PR functions. This could be supported by embedding well-structured learning questions (similar to action research questions) into the impact pathway. Learning questions could be formulated to encourage critical reflection about both CCD themes and the drivers of change (process). This would encourage critical thinking about what is happening ‘behind the arrows’ in the impact pathway and provide points of aggregation with Regional learning and Cluster-based learning.
11. This will require a clearer separation of functions and reporting of M&E findings to the MoC using a reporting format that is better suited to this than the current quarterly report.
12. It is recommended that the impact pathway is reviewed and updated in the light of learning, with previous versions kept as a record of the evolving strategic learning and responses of the country teams.

Theory of Change and Impact Pathway

The Country programme’s Theory of Change consists of the vision of Change and the Impact Pathway. In ToC practice, a theory of change ought to be revised. The CDKN M&E process asks for this.

Strengths of the ToC and Impact Pathway for Colombia

- Contextual analysis is thorough, baseline study in place.
- Projects follow the rationale laid out, and the results areas and DoC they contribute to can be tracked through.
- Generally a good, systematic design process has been followed, with the key DoC identified and links between these and projects.

Weaknesses of the ToC and Impact Pathway

- ‘Political will’ and ‘strong popular and political support for prioritising and implementing climate change adaptation’ are both elements identified in the Vision, but are placed out of scope. However, these are the areas that CDKN Colombia is influencing quite directly with its

multi-stakeholder approach, and has the potential to influence yet further with a change-oriented communications strategy that intends to work with media.

- The drivers of change and assumptions that lie ‘behind the arrows’ have not been made explicit, nor have the interventions been documented.
- In Colombia’s case, the driver of change seems to be a combination of:
 - project provides a neutral space around which institutional, public, private and research stakeholders can come together to observe, participate and model collaborative approaches in a low-risk setting;
 - using research to produce decision-making tools that support practical policy development and implementation actions that stakeholders need to make;
 - supporting these with multi-stakeholder dialogues and engagement to create awareness and momentum around the issues.

Implications

- By missing out this pathway, CDKN Colombia is not able to report effectively against the successes it is achieving in creating political and institutional momentum for change. Subsequently, the investment in engagement may become not possible to justify, when it seems clear that it is engagement to support institutional development, are driving the change in Colombia.
- By not making explicit the interventions and drivers of change, the opportunities for learning about what is effective are lost.
- There is also an issue in how results are reported. CDKN have good results to share but the focus on delivery rather than results or changes means that reporting over-emphasises products rather than process and misses important small changes that over time build into larger ones.

Recommendations

As recommendations, CDKN Colombia should:

- Tighten the logic of the impact pathway. Short-term changes do not always flow logically into medium term changes, and the cause-effect relationship unclear. For example, at the short-term level ‘*Accessible scientific information*’ sits at the same level as ‘*government institutions coordinate fluidly*.’ These seem to be changes of a different order. A change hierarchy should follow the logic similar to the CDKN DoC but be arranged in a sequence in the country context:
 - changes in knowledge, attitude, skills;
 - changes in behaviours, relationships, coalitions;
 - changes in practices, plans, strategies, programmes;
 - changes in institutions, financing and investments, implementation of actions.

Observations from the MTR mission suggest that ‘*government institutions coordinate fluidly*’ is a much more difficult goal to achieve, and is the focus of much of CDKN Colombia’s engagement work over the longer rather than short term. The Impact Pathway should be revised to reflect this.


- The descriptors should include some kind of change amongst or by a stakeholder, for example behaviour changes or actions. Also, the descriptors could be unpicked to be more precise – several mix a number of changes, for example: ‘*understanding implications*’ is together with ‘*participate in decision-making processes*’. ‘Understanding’ is usually a precursor to a behaviour change like ‘participation in decisions’.
- To strengthen the reporting of results in a contextualised way, it is recommended that the team develop a format similar to the competency-based interview technique known as STAR.²⁷ The acronym STAR stands for Situation, Task, Action, Result. The table below illustrates how this could be applied.

Step 1 – Situation	Describe the situation that was faced, the challenges that were present or the task that needed to be accomplished. The context is important.	<p>Example:</p> <p>S: In Cartagena, the Plan de Adaptacion was having to be designed by law, and also the statutory revision of the Land Use Plan was due. The then Secretary of Planning saw the opportunity to link the two plans to move the climate change adaptation agenda forward. However, there was no clear idea or consensus of how to do this in practice. Also, while there was awareness of a lot of scientific evidence on the issue, this was not accessible in a way that the planning officials could use.</p> <p>CDKN had also seen the opportunity that the convergence of these two plans offered. CDKN was aware of a number of studies by INVEMAR, including a diagnostic study of the impact of climate change on Cartagena, which presented three scenarios.</p> <p>T: The task was to present the diagnostic study so that it would make the case clearly to the senior decision-makers in the Cartagena city government to integrate adaptation in the principal planning instrument. This would be helped by strengthening INVEMAR’s role as the scientific authority, able to support implementation planning. The CEL’s experience indicated that support would stronger if a wider set of stakeholders, from public, private and civil society spheres, could also be engaged in a parallel dialogues and discussions to create consensus and a platform for implementation.</p> <p>Action: CDKN’s contribution was to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raise awareness of the climate change vulnerability issue, based on the INVEMAR study. Stakeholders reported that the INVEMAR study was lent additional credibility by the verification of CDKN. • CDKN facilitated the inter-institutional coordination – stakeholders confirmed that meetings were held that would never have been held otherwise. CDKN identified the owners of key decisions: the city government, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainability, the Chamber of
Step 2: Task	Explain what had to be achieved, and why it was significant.	
Step 3: Action	Describe the action that was taken demonstrates and highlights the particular contributions that CDKN made. It offers the opportunity to highlight what was done, how it was done and why it was done that way (a good link back to an understanding of the niche and offer and the theory of change).	
Step 4: Result	Explain what happened as a result, describe what was accomplished by CDKN, what was done by others, and what was learnt in that situation. It offers an opportunity to demonstrate that specific actions were taken to achieve a specific objective and not simply by chance.	

²⁷ For examples, see: <http://www.interview-skills.co.uk/competency-based-interviews-STAR.aspx>

		<p>Commerce, and the Regional Autonomous Environment and Development Corporation – who have authority over the Land Use Plan, and invited them to take part in workshops and roundtables.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders confirmed that the novel positioning of Cartagena as the first city to be able to adapt to the climate change threat attracted a lot of attention from the stakeholders. <p>INVEMAR produced a practical application of their diagnostic data that was validated by stakeholders. The Planning Department sponsored and represented the project within the city government and maintained the momentum through a number of set-backs.</p> <p>CDKN’s approach was informed by an understanding that convening around a project created a platform to raise awareness of the climate change issues and the implications for different stakeholders in a neutral way.</p> <p>CDKN then accompanied the inter-institutional process – closely over time – it is this committed accompaniment that was the key to the effectiveness and the sustainability of the process amongst the stakeholders. CDKN also supported the INVEMAR director to present the project to the different mayoral candidates during an election period helping to ensure continuity of engagement.</p> <p>Result: Despite changes in the city leadership, stakeholders confirm that the process has continued. The result to date is that the incoming Acting Mayor has commissioned a climate office to be set up in Planning, staffed by technical staff from INVEMAR, supported by CDKN.</p>
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- The diagram below illustrates how adding the ‘political will pathway’ shows an Impact Pathway that better reflects what CDKN Colombia is doing and has the potential to achieve: i) influencing the emergence of political will to address climate change as a transversal priority in sectors and regions; ii) ensuring that the public and decision-makers have access to and use good quality evidence; iii) institutions, agencies, partnerships have the capacity to respond to appropriately to CCD demands. (*Use* needs to be added to the long-term change, access alone would not be sufficient to achieve the change sought in the log-term; CDKN Colombia need to consider how they support ‘use’ through their emphasis on practical policy and planning tools)



- The recommendation is to include this ‘political will’ dimension in the Colombia Programme’s impact pathway, so that the three outcomes that create the pre-conditions for the overall vision of success become:
 - ‘Decision makers at different levels have political will to address climate change as a transversal priority in sectors and regions, incorporating climate change considerations into development decisions and actions’.*
 - The public and decision-makers have access to and use good quality evidence and knowledge of the potential effects of climate change and adaptation and LEDs options*
 - institutions, agencies and partnerships have the capacity to respond appropriately to CCD demands, including the ability to understand vulnerability, prioritise issues, draft policy, develop interventions and fund them.’*
- The short and medium-term stages within the ‘political will’ pathway will need to be developed by the team.

Results and Impact

According to the Colombia Country programme Impact Pathway, CDKN aims to contribute to:

Short and Medium term changes	Evidence of results to date and trajectory towards impact based on evidence presented to the evaluation team member.
Diverse productive, scientific, and community sectors have participated in	Successfully delivered in two projects, Cartagena and Cauca Valley.

<p>research and development and have greater understanding and recognition of climate change vulnerabilities and adaptation options.</p>	<p>Positive points to highlight:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In Cartagena, the process of engaging public and private sector actors in a multi-stakeholder process seems to have supported greater understanding of vulnerability and adaptation, and recognition of the implications for the economic competitiveness of the city. Around 64 different organisations were involved in consultation workshops in Phase 1. <p>The stakeholder groups convened by the Cartagena Chamber of Commerce made statements that suggested acknowledgement and recognition of the roles and responsibilities of different sectors, private as well as public. Enthusiasm and concrete actions to support Phase 2 were verified.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the Cauca project, the reach of the project activities has been considerable, reaching 600 people from communities as well as sectoral representatives. The reach may well extend further, as there is evidence that representatives of a membership association of women coffee producers shared new knowledge gained from the project workshops with their 240 members in up to 7 municipalities in the region. <p>Caveats to results:</p> <p>The dimensions of understanding and recognition included in this change descriptor have not been possible to verify for the Cauca project. First, the project has not yet produced its Phase 1 output. Second, national institutional stakeholders in particular indicated that they had participated. They recognised the quality and innovative potential of the vulnerability tool being produced, and acknowledged CDKN’s contribution.</p> <p>However, there were reasons to believe that they were not fully engaged and did not feel ownership. They appear to be waiting to see the output and the opportunity to validate it for their purposes and stakeholders. There was some sensitivity to the implied criticisms of national provision of information.</p> <p>This suggests that there will need to be ongoing engagement and a process of validation in Phase 2 before it can be said that all stakeholder have greater understanding and recognition of climate change vulnerabilities and adaptation options.</p> <p><i>Notes on description of change:</i> As a way to track change, this milestone may not have a sufficiently specific description of the change being sought. Identifying a behaviour change amongst actors could be helpful. It is also not clear when this result area will have been sufficiently achieved at the level of the programme.</p>
<p>Scientific information has been translated into a language and formats that are accessible and understandable for policy makers.</p>	<p>Successfully delivered in the Cartagena project.</p> <p>Positive points to note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Cartagena stakeholders highlighted the maps produced by INVEMAR showing vulnerability in the city. The maps were regularly referred to throughout the meeting. - The AVA concept will also provide a good visual way of showing vulnerabilities by different units of analysis – crop variety, natural vegetation, municipal area, community territory, water sources etc. The tool is intended to provide a Red, Amber, Green visual score against the various indicators of vulnerability. <p>Caveats to reported results:</p>

	The Country Monitoring Report reports a number of publications that have been produced. The fact that they have been produced is verified, but feedback from interviewees indicates that CDKN is not well-known in Colombia outside the stakeholder groups it is working with. So to what extent the publications have been accessed and read in Colombia is not possible to say. More strategic communications and awareness-raising is planned by the team, which this review recommends be done with a view to supporting change, not merely for PR.
Stakeholders have updated information and understand the implications of CC and participate in decision making processes.	Partially delivered in the Cartagena project. Stakeholders do have updated information, and there is evidence that the implications have been understood. The AVA project has not completed its final output yet. However, the participation in decision-making processes was not able to be verified.
Adaptation plans for sectors and ministries, including concrete projects and measures are defined and designed based on scientific information and stakeholder input.	This is the goal of all the projects; it is a medium term change in the impact pathway. The CDKN projects will be providing important inputs to sectoral plans, and providing examples of effective multi-stakeholder processes.
Concrete projects, including replicable pilot projects, are financed and in implementation in sectors and ministries.	This is a long-term change that it was not possible to assess. There are a series of proposed projects that have been identified for Cartagena, but these have not yet been prioritised or agreed on.

Evidence of results delivered

In terms of **activities and outputs**, In terms of activities and outputs CDKN have successfully delivered the project outputs detailed above, on time and to budget, apart from the TALA 0009 project which has been delayed due to having to generate information for the vulnerability model that was originally assumed to be held by the national information entities.

Overall, the CDKN Colombia Country programme is a successful programme. There is strong evidence that the **country engagement approach, plus strategic projects** is effective at producing both the product and process results that are required.

The key **short term outcomes** are:

- successful take-up by stakeholders of climate change adaptation as an economic issue, affecting productivity and competitiveness
- the endorsement by stakeholders of a set of ‘proven tools and processes’. Practical, science-based tools that support implementation planning and that are based on engaging multiple stakeholders, including those outside the formal institutional structures but who are influential, for example, the sector membership association and trade bodies.

CDKN Colombia and its supplier partners have identified strategic points where a combined intervention can make significant progress towards implementation, demonstrating in practice ‘what it takes’ to conceptualise, design, finance and implement adaptation measures.

Example 1: Cartagena's Chamber of Commerce and INVEMAR project stakeholders endorse results from Phase 1

At the meeting of the group, convened for the MTR, stakeholders listed their perceptions of what Phase 1 had achieved. It was agreed that there is now public awareness of the climate change issues, cross-cutting enough to bring interested actors together to coordinate. Cartagena is now considered a national example of how stakeholders can collaborate on the adaptation issue and to understand what it takes to implement this.

The information on the impacts of adaptation, the diagnostic tools and list of financeable projects are now agreed – they are useful inputs for all the entities and concrete in terms of proposals (event to decide on costed projects to take forward is programmed for February, so momentum going strong).

There were no spaces before to conduct this coordination, now there is, with established processes to convene and reach the actors. The 'political commitment' from the city government and the private stakeholders has been achieved.

There is still a need to raise awareness in the city and nationally more broadly by communications and media, and more of the trade and industry associations – the powerful 'gremios' - need to be brought into the process in Phase 2.

One of the stakeholders proposed a formal coordination unit and having one focal point in each organisation for Phase 2. Before the meeting, the INVEMAR and CDKN teams had discussed proposing a 'council for coordination of adaptation'. News of the mayor's proposal for a new office in the Planning Department was also shared, and it was agreed that both units could work in parallel. Actions were agreed for implementing the proposals within the next month.

Example 2: Cartagena's new Mayor Responds enthusiastically to the INVEMAR/CDKN project

Cartagena has many factors that make it both extremely vulnerable to climate change events such as floods and sea level rises, as well as being one of the economic powerhouses of the country, both through tourism and industry, a place of extremes of wealth and poverty. The political context is dominated by local interest politics. The industrial associations – the gremios – are also powerful actors. An important result is that the CDKN project has succeeded in engaging the Chamber of Commerce into the project.

The city administration of Cartagena has been involved with the CDKN/INVEMAR project to develop an adaptation plan for a year. The main link has been with planning, with continuity provided through the involvement of middle management, as well as the Secretaries of Planning. But in 2012, there were four changes of Secretary of Planning, as these are political appointments, then the mayor fell ill but has not resigned. An interim acting mayor was appointed just in December. The evaluator was invited to observe the first meeting with him and the new Secretary of Planning.

It was very uncertain how the incoming acting mayor would view the project. However, the response of the acting mayor was very encouraging. He is doing a Masters degree in environment and economic development, and so was impressed with the product of phase 1, which is the framework of guidance for the adaptation plan, the analytical tools e.g. maps of vulnerability and projections produced by INVEMAR, and a set of proposed adaptation interventions developed from the multi-stakeholder consultation process.

The acting mayor spelt out his support for the project: 'I have climate change at my heart, I used to have it at the level of discourse, but it is an issue of survival of our city now.'

CDKN presented CDKN and its role in the project. The message was tailored to the city's interests: 'We are focusing on making Cartagena competitive through adaptation. We understand that this has to work through a consensual process of all the stakeholders, which we have supported. CDKN provides some resources, and access to a national and international network of technical and research expertise on the issues.' The Mayor was very interested.

INVEMAR's Director presented the project: 'Cartagena is a flagship city, the commitment of the city authorities shows a political maturity to take a long-term view, adaptation will give advantages to investors in the medium-term. INVEMAR offers a system of science-based information through tools that support decision-making, not just the data.'

The Mayor referred to his own priorities, which is to get the reform of the Land Use Plan through at this next attempt, the planning instrument in which to integrate the adaptation plans so that it is sustainable beyond the changes in administrative personnel. He went further, proposing the formation of a special office for climate change adaptation within the municipal architecture that will sit within Planning, involving a team from INVEMAR. Although this offer has been made before, it is an opportunity to combine CDKN's support of a post within INVEMAR within this formal office. Staff profiles were discussed for immediate implementation.

The Mayor was responsive to the idea of having some costed interventions ready for financing as an output of the next phase. He asked about other donors, and the CEL mentioned the IDB which has funds for 'Competitive and Sustainable Cities'. The Mayor referred to other priorities and for which some of the financing was in place, for example, the plan to improve the drainage; a plan to extend the water treatment plants and supply of water; issue of providing social housing for victims of violence and of environmental events; social cultural behaviour change programme for solid waste management.

It was noted that the Mayor has access to his own sources of research and studies, e.g. Policarpa study on community responses to vulnerability. He asked if INVEMAR had partnerships with other universities.

Other opportunities highlighted by the Acting Mayor for the Phase 2 of the Cartagena included:

- Including the system of the coral Islas del Rosario into Phase 2 of the CDKN project. These are currently not covered by the Land Use Plan, but the Mayor showed his understanding of environmental issues by flagging not just the touristic value but the ecosystems services of the islands, as well as the social issues of having long-established indigenous groups living in dense populations on the islands.
- CDKN and INVEMAR responded that they are planning to integrate the Islas into the Phase 2 of the project.
- The Acting Mayor also mentioned that there are funds available for training on environmental issues within the framework of the local administration, especially the powerful neighbourhood Committees of Action, and the local leaders. There are 400 of these, but it was agreed that these groups would present a good opportunity for deepening and scaling the mainstreaming of adaptation in Phase 2.

Trajectory towards long-term results

The bases for progressing towards long-term results are in place. The extent to which the momentum is built on depends on how well the CDKN Colombia team are able to interpret the results they are seeing, and apply that learning to their strategies for the new phases and projects. This will depend on revising their impact pathway, *and documenting the thinking about how and why change can be supported* so that it offers a good framework for strategic decision-making and interpreting results, as they move towards scaling up.

Example 3: How could a national manual on adaptation principles for road-building contractors ensure that adaptation is 'built-in'?

The proposed short-term output in the Transport project is a manual for contractors outlining adaptation principles. This is mainly being driven by the Ministry of Transport's timetable on tendering and contracting its large projects.

The 'manual' could meet a short-term need, but looked at from the perspective of the drivers of change and impact pathway, how the manual is conceptualised will affect the trajectory towards long-term results. To illustrate, a manual is a standardised response to a stable problem, but the very nature of climate change means that adaptation requires flexible solutions in the face of dynamic problems. If every region and every road project has different challenges with regards to adaptation, and these are not even yet properly understood, then the 'manual' concept needs to address this right from the outset.

The manual is only the first output of a larger project, and many stakeholders will be consulted and engaged as part of the project. Project plans have already benefitted from feedback from CDKN's international experts. The CDKN team have a vision for how the manual could be developed as a tangible and useful deliverable, yet still provide a focus for the joint learning that the Transport sector and its stakeholders have yet to undertake to develop solutions to climate change adaptation and resilience of roads. It is recommended that the CDKN team document their thinking and assumptions about the product and process so that these can be checked and updated as results emerge.

Areas to strengthen

- **The continued need for engagement and follow-up of all stakeholders.** The next phases of the projects are likely to be more challenging in terms of maintaining the commitment of stakeholders when choices and investments will need to be made. Particularly for the AVA project, the vulnerability methodology and tool will need to be tested and verified by the institutional actors if it is to overcome the tensions caused by having been developed by universities rather than state or sectoral institutions.

Example 4: Institutional stakeholders watch with interest but do not yet feel full ownership

The stakeholders from the ministries and national environmental research institute highlighted that what was attractive about CDKN's offer was the combination of national and international technical expertise with a focus on public policy and instruments. The difference in approach that was highlighted was CDKN's desire to listen and to build a project together from within the institutions, so that it becomes co-owned and learning is also built-in. The quality and innovation of the CDKN projects was also acknowledged.

There was also acknowledgement that CDKN Colombia had achieved an important involvement and dialogue of actors and stakeholders in their projects, from rural communities to the Chamber of Commerce of Cartagena, helping them as national actors to establish closer links in the regions. However, it was highlighted that involvement in multi-stakeholder processes has provoked much reflection on the part of the stakeholders about what are the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions, for example, for providing information within a locality. There were some sensitivities to challenges posed by independent research entities.

The hope that was expressed is that frameworks and tools being developed in the projects could be tested and validated by the institutional and government actors. The joint approval is key because the methodologies being created require inputs of information and exchange between all these actors. Before scaling up, the CDKN projects need to allow a process of resolving the issues of jurisdiction, responsibility, authority, competence and financial administration. This could require a separate space for the government authorities to sort this out between them. The question remains on how to channel methodologies developed into the systems of all the institutions. It seems likely that Phase 2 is going to require more engagement and investment in relationship-building than Phase 1.

- **More and more strategic communications are needed.** The external stakeholders interviewed were not aware of CDKN as an interesting new actor on the scene. Some were aware of the Cartagena project, but not beyond that. Most were very interested in the CDKN concept of climate compatible development and felt that it should have a higher profile in Colombia to ensure that learning from projects' approaches and outputs is shared.

Relevance

All interviewees considered CDKN's interventions to be strategic, for the following reasons:

- The CDKN model is interesting and likely to be effective because of its local focus. Given the wide range of regional diversity, work at the national level can only achieve limited general framework policies. The local level is important for frameworks to support implementation.
- The focus on planning instruments is also effective, as there changes will be enshrined and norms will flow from there.
- The focus on productive sectors is also key to moving climate change out of the environment sector and into the mainstream.
- Cartagena is interesting because it is the nexus for many factors: city governance, competitiveness and growth, high levels of both affluence and poverty.
- The focus on the Land Use Plan is very important because it moves adaptation out of the environment and makes it an economic issue. From the UN experience, it is one of the drivers of success to influence these types of planning instruments.
- Cauca region is also important because it is a nexus for many factors – coffee production, indigenous groups, ecosystems that regulate the water supply for most of the country; it is one of the poorest regions, and on-going problems of violence and conflict.
- AVA methodology is considered to offer an innovation, if it can be kept simple. The focus on the decision-makers at the local level, e.g. the municipalities would be innovative.
- CDKN seems to have been persistent in pursuing the institutional actors, taking the dialogue right to the top, as well as working at very local levels.

Effectiveness

Niche and offering

CDKN Colombia's niche and offering was identified by stakeholders as:

- Having a holistic vision of climate change, adaptation and development
- Bringing a combination of technical expertise, a focus on public policy and instruments and building a multi-stakeholder, consensus approach
- Working at the nexus of science and policy – with very few comparators
- Having a clear mission but moderate in their position, good at listening to partner needs, able to co-produce projects with stakeholders
- Offering high quality technical knowledge and research expertise, in the team and through access to the CDKN international network

- Realistic about the institutional realities, but ambitious about what can be achieved through a multi-stakeholder, public, private and civil society approach.
- Having a real understanding of the importance of working locally first, from ground up to national level, and so having good potential for impact.

Both government and non-government stakeholders felt that CDKN offered something different to other funders or cooperation initiatives.

'CDKN does not bring pre-set projects, but facilitates a process so that the projects are born from within the institutions, they are co-produced hand in hand to meet needs. But our own learning is also enhanced in the process. The results are very different – there is institutional ownership and understanding and learning is institutionalised.' Government of Colombia official

These findings confirmed how the CDKN Colombia team themselves understand their niche and offering.

Drivers of effectiveness

Interviewees highlighted that this effectiveness depends on a **Country Engagement Leader** who is:

- i) a recognised and respected authority in the country amongst political, research, private sector and civil society actors;
- ii) has the institutional understanding to co-produce projects with key partners and stakeholders;
- iii) has the credibility and skills to convene multi-stakeholder processes, especially attracting powerful private sector actors.

Synergies between CDKN Output Areas

The CDKN Colombia projects represent quite a high degree of synergy between TA, research and knowledge management. Both the flagship projects are **research-driven** and led by research institutions and consortia (as suppliers), although with a TA objective. The two other projects being brought into the portfolio are also research projects. One of three main GoC stakeholders is the national environmental research institute, IDEAM.

The government stakeholders involved in the new transport sector project have indicated that research would be needed as there are no pre-existing solutions.

Partners in the CDKN projects have welcomed the access to international research expertise and new ideas, signalled as one of the drivers of effectiveness in many cases. Access to international platforms for knowledge sharing was also welcomed as an important benefit of involvement with a CDKN project.

Knowledge management and communications are also starting to play an increasing role. CDKN Colombia have maintained communications, and are now ramping up with a structured communications strategy. The strategy is well-designed and outlines specific target audiences. It could be further strengthened by linking it to the Impact Pathway so that it is optimised to support the changes that are needed, for example, building public understanding and support of climate change adaptation measures.

Negotiations support is not available to Colombia as a middle income country. Partnerships was not mentioned as a formal approach in the country strategy.

Challenges and risks for CDKN

These were seen as:

- For most ministries, the target is compliance with the adaptation requirements. But what is needed is on-going analysis, creativity and adaptation. Creating conceptual creativity in sectors not accustomed to dealing with adaptation issues is an on-going challenge, e.g. transport, but also agriculture and other productive sectors, e.g. mining and energy.
- In transport, there is practically no research on adaptation in transport, so there is nothing to fuel new approaches and solutions; this could be a good focus for CDKN.

Efficiency and wider VfM issues

Understanding of its costs, the factors that drive them, the linkages to its performance and an ability to achieve efficiency gains

It was not possible to make a thorough assessment of the VfM of the Colombia projects through a lack of comparators. The CDKN Colombia team understand that their driver of change is the engagement process and sustained follow-up of stakeholders. They consider that this investment at the country level is managed well through PWC procurement processes.

The projects have all achieved promising results within short timeframes of just over one year, and within relatively small budgets of £300,000. The new Transport project has been costed at a higher level of £400,000 but with the balance being spent on additional activities rather than management by the contractor.

There is potential to analyse the reach of the projects as a measure of value, for example, Cartagena involved 64 organisations and Cauca involved 600 individuals. There is potential for generating limited metrics on potential impact value, for example, the value of adapted and resilient roads to isolated, poor, rural communities.

Systems and structures to support efficiency

Some of the CDKN systems have not supported efficiency. For example, the requirements for public liability insurance which were not appropriate in the Colombia context took a year to negotiate.

The proposal and contracting process was identified as time-consuming by some interviewees, although it was recognised that inputs from international experts had strengthened proposals. Suppliers felt they had learned from the process.

Sustainability

The CDKN projects are considered by some interviewees to have sustainability as a focus. CDKN is influencing the factors that support sustainability including:

- Facilitating multi-stakeholder processes that take on their own momentum.
- Encouraging national and regional institutions assume responsibilities for addressing the issues, building their own capacity to do so and not to depending on international cooperation and projects, for example, understanding the measures and instruments that they can use, such as Land Use Plans and local private sector stakeholders identifying for themselves how they can build sustainability and understanding the actions that they can take without waiting for institutions or policies to be in place.

However, while these may be the foundations for sustainability, the next challenges for CDKN Colombia highlighted by stakeholders include:

- Replicating the results of the projects, identifying how these can be scaled up, developing options for plans and interventions for adaptation that are direct, specific, relevant and practical recommendations for government and other stakeholders.
- The results of the projects need to be better communicated and disseminated, including the lessons about process, the influence on policy and planning, and other achievements.
- Other productive sectors need to be engaged, including tourism, health and housing (on MADs' list), but also the mineral sectors and others.
- Ecosystems issues such as water management need to be brought in, and tools developed for managing the impacts and maximising the benefits for ecosystems and development.

In other countries, establishing engagement with the finance ministry has been identified as key factor for sustainability. The National Planning Department is the authority in charge of the financial planning of all the sectors. By law in Colombia, no donors are to be engaged directly with the Ministry of Finance unless it is requested by the sectors, so the NPD is the appropriate authority. CDKN have engaged the NPD through the steering group arrangements for the projects.

Learning

Lessons from CDKN Colombia's experience are clearly being learned. Some key lessons have been documented, for example, starting with small-scale, practical projects, building up in stages to larger scale interventions. The accompanying consultation and engagement processes also help to move the actors together. A key lesson has been to establish relationships with the permanent staff at different level to manage the impact of ever-changing leaders.

However, there are learning opportunities that are not being capitalised on due to a lack of linking learning questions to the Impact Pathway. CDKN Colombia's projects are producing valuable learning about both CCD themes and uptake processes – these could potentially not be captured and documented (although this is an issue across CDKN, not only for Colombia). Strategic learning questions that could be explicitly formulated to focus learning include:

- How do we manage the trade-offs between implementing adaptation + competitiveness and how will we know it is working? (e.g. Cartagena)
- What is the minimum information needed for a multi-dimensional vulnerability analysis? (e.g. AVA)
- What processes help to sustain focus and coordination under institutional instability? (e.g. focus on permanent middle management staff)

Annex 1 – People met

(See Annex 1 to main report)

Annex 2: Colombia's institutional landscape for climate change

1. Previous considerations

Since 2002, approximately, Colombia has been creating its own institutional framework to address the challenges, and the opportunities posed by Global Climate Change (GCC) to the country's development and economy.

From 2002 to 2008, the main focus was GCC mitigation, even though according to IDEAM (National Institute on Meteorology, Hydrology and Environmental Studies) national emissions of GHG accounted to 0.3-0.4% of the world's total GHG emissions. That is why the so called Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development (currently Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development) created the Climate Change Mitigation Group, depending directly from the Vice-Minister of Environment's office and later from the Minister's office itself. The initial aim was to support the development of mitigation projects understood as economic opportunities, within the framework of the CDM and the CONPES 3242 (Institutional strategy for selling environmental climate change mitigation services).

Simultaneously, the country developed the First National GCC Communication to the UNFCCC which identified the reduction of climate change vulnerability as a national priority issue, especially for key sectors such as water supply, agriculture, public health and biodiversity. This is maybe the yielding point in the national policies since for the first time the focus moved from mitigation to adaptation.

As a consequence, from 2007, with support from the IADB, Colombia started to develop a comprehensive policy framework for climate change, a process that concluded in 2011 with the delivery of the "Strategy to coordinate policies and actions to address GCC in Colombia" (CONPES 3700). This document establishes the national priorities on GCC, defines the basic institutional framework to coordinate the policy (stating that the National Planning Department will be the head of the foreseen National Climate Change System), and requires GCC to be treated not as an exclusive environmental but strategic national and sectoral issue.

Currently, the aforementioned policy is reflected in the implementation of three different strategies (they were not new strategies defined by the CONPES but rather ongoing ones articulated as part of the formulated policy): Then National GCC Adaptation Plan, Colombia's Low-Carbon Development Strategy and the National REDD Strategy, the latter basically related to mitigation (with a sectoral approach).

2. Public institutions

a. MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – MADS (www.minambiente.gov.co)

MADS is the main authority and the planning/implementer of GCC policies. The following two offices have a direct relation with this issue:

Climate Change Directorate, created in 2011, as a natural evolution of the previous GCC Mitigation Group; it is in charge of not only mitigation, but also adaptation and vulnerability reduction, themes and is leading the implementation of the National GCC Adaptation Plan and the Low-Carbon Development Strategy.

Forestry, Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Directorate (formerly called Ecosystems Directorate), in charge of the sustainable management of forests and deforestation control (National REDD

Strategy). Unfortunately, the original intention of concentrating GCC management from different perspectives within the Climate Change Directorate was hard hit when REDD issues were taken out and relocated under the Forestry Directorate.

Additionally, more than four months ago these two directorates are headless (with interim directors unable to take policy or strategic decisions), strongly affecting the coordination and implementation of actions, and the execution of financial resources.

b. NATIONAL PLANNING DEPARTMENT – DNP (www.dnp.gov.co)

DNP is the head of the proposed Executive Commission on GCC (COMECC) and is the Secretariat of the Financial Management Committee, both proposed in the CONPES. Within the DNP, the Vice-Direction of Environmentally Sustainable Development (SDAS) has a key role in implementing the CONPES, but no role have been designed for other sectoral directorates that have direct relationship with the corresponding ministries, a coordination mechanism that could prove itself ideal to articulate sectoral adaptations or mitigation plans.

Currently, DNP is carrying out a study on the long term impacts of GCC on national development (fundamentally economic growth and quality of life), using a Computable General Equilibrium Model that will not only provide information about these impacts but will also allow decision making to mitigate them.

It is important to point out that SDAS does not have the required staff to fulfil its duties in terms of policy coordination (only two staff people and the corresponding Vice-Director), and that is why external contractors, not contributing to strengthen the DNP capacities, have been hired. Besides, and very much MADS alike, this SDAS has had no director at all for the last 4 months, after its former director Carolina Urrutia quit the job.

c. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON HYDROLOGY, METEOROLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES – IDEAM (www.ideam.gov.co)

IDEAM is the most experienced and participation institute in climate change issues in Colombia, with the General Direction as well as the Environmental Studies and Ecosystems Directorates deeply involved in the corresponding activities.

IDEAM's role has been improved in the eyes of the Colombian public, through the provision of frequent and accurate meteorological information in the recent and destructive rainy seasons of 2010-2011. There has been also a process of internal capacities development in issues such as the definition of detailed GCC scenarios for Colombia, the follow up to deforestation processes, the generation of basic information to develop REDD projects and the coordination of pilot adaptation projects in Andean forests, highlands and glaciers.

Currently IDEAM is in the process of preparing the Third National Communication on GCC to be presented to the UNFCCC, a process partially to be funded by the GEF between 2013 and 2015.

d. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES

These research institutes (IAvH; INVEMAR; SINCHI; IIAP), all of them depending from the MADS, should be playing a key role in providing the information required to formulate sectoral or sub-national (because of the geographic emphasis of some of them) mitigation and adaptation plans. Amongst them, only INVEMAR (www.invemar.gov.co) has been involved in the pilot adaptation Project in Cartagena, funded by CDKN, while IAvH (www.humboldt.org.co) has participated in the design of adaptation programs in the Colombian Andes (Proyecto Macizo and INAP).

Nevertheless, it is possible to say that these institutions do not count on the required capacities nor the resources (financial, technical nor human) to address these actions in a proper way and do require thorough strengthening programs.

e. NATIONAL PARKS OF COLOMBIA (www.parquesnacionales.gov.co)

National Parks has participated in the design and implementation of the Macizo and INAP pilot adaptation projects, and has been the leading institution in the development of REDD projects in the Colombian Amazon basin.

f. OTHER SECTORAL MINISTRIES

Their participation is still limited on the design of adaptation or mitigation plans; it would be very important to promote the involvement of this ministries: Agriculture and Rural Development (www.minagricultura.gov.co), for adaptation programs in agricultural or cattle ranching areas; Transportation (www.mintransporte.gov.co) for adaptation of road, river, aerial and railway infrastructure; Housing, Cities and Territory (www.minvivienda.gov.co) for adaptation of vulnerable urban centres and public services supply; Health (www.minsalud.gov.co) for adaptation plans of the public health system.

g. NATIONAL ADAPTATION FUND (www.fondoadaptacion.gov.co)

This is the newest institution related to GCC management and perhaps the first one outside the scope of the MADS or the DNP. After two consecutive La Niña phenomena had devastating consequences all over the country, affecting infrastructure, houses, and threatening the lives and health of several million people, it was created in 2010 with the purpose of being the institutional mechanism to identify and prioritize the needs in the recovery/reconstruction phase, as well as to protect the population from economic, social and environmental threats.

Several stakeholders are coincident in considering that the actions of the Fund have been focused in the construction of infrastructure (engineering works to mitigate the risk) instead of providing adaptation strategies based on ecosystems management.

h. REGIONAL (SUB-NATIONAL) CLIMATE CHANGE NODES

Not really an institution but an array of local stakeholders, these Nodes have been created and supported by the MADS with the aim of implementing the national policy on climate change on a subnational level, incorporating the local vision of development. Within the Nodes there are representatives of local governments (departments and municipalities), regional environmental authorities, local branches of National Parks, universities, productive sectors and NGOs.

There are (or must be) Climate change Nodes in the Caribbean and Pacific Coasts, the Coffee Triangle, the North-eastern Andes, the Easter Plains and the Amazon Basin; all these nodes are in different stages of development, but it is foreseen that they will be the leading scenarios for adaptation actions implementation in more detailed scales.

3. Other institutions working on Climate Change

a. WORLD BANK (www.bancomundial.org)

The World Bank has supported and funded the formulation and implementation of public and private initiatives related to GCC. In the former, World Bank has been providing additional funding for the Investment for Sustainable Development (IDS) project, related with the management of climate risks.

Even if some of the World Bank's areas of intervention/funding are not directly related to GCC – i.e. public transportation, sustainable cities, sustainable cattle ranching practices -, it would be key that

these areas could include very precise adaptation goals/components; it is not clear if these components have been considered.

b. INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (www.iadb.org)

IADB was the main funding source for the formulation of CONPES 3700, as well as for the study on economic impacts of climate change. It has co-funded and supported the implementation of projects such as the Adaptation of water supply and regulation services to GCC in the Chingaza-Sumapaz-Guerrero region, related with water provision in Bogota and its surrounding region in Colombia.

Just like the World Bank, IADB funds other kind of actions (in agriculture, transport, basic public services, health) that should have key adaptation components, considered in the national policies.

c. UNDP (www.pnud.org.co)

UNDP has provided support and funding for adaptation pilot projects such as the Integrated National Adaptation Project – INAP, the Joint Adaptation Program in the Macizo Colombiano, and the Regional Comprehensive Program on Climate change for Colombia’s Capital Region – PRICC.

UNDP’s emphasis is on cross-cutting climate change in numerous development issues on those countries where it works.

d. ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs (Conservation Internacional, WWF, Fundación Natura, etc.)

A series of national organizations, or foreign ones with local branches, has been involved in the formulation and implementation of capacity strengthening, mitigation or adaptation programs, in several regions of the country.

Some of them have supported the Colombian central government and some local governments in the definition of their own policies or strategies, sometimes providing technical capacity and others providing the required funds.

These NGOs have been key in GCC management because they usually perform actions that should be executed by the public entities but are not because of the lack, or weakness, in capacity, resources and know-how.

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

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COUNTRY VISIT REPORTS: Bangladesh

Submitted by



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I would like to thank the various individuals listed in Annex 1 to this report, who gave generously of their time and were open and frank with their feedback on CDKN's work to date in Bangladesh. Thanks to them, it is to be hoped that this report offers useful constructive criticism and actionable recommendations that can help CDKN achieve its ambitious aims for its country work in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Thanks especially to Erin Roberts, Kashmala Kakakhel and Munjurul Khan, who helped organise and facilitate my visit to Bangladesh, in addition to offering valuable feedback and perspective.

Introduction

The following findings and recommendations are based on interviews conducted with a diverse group of key informants in Bangladesh (see Annex 1) during the week of 13-18 January 2013, coupled with telephone interviews both before and after this trip and email exchanges regarding outstanding questions. This assessment was also based on a quick review of documentation produced for the three key CDKN Bangladesh projects, namely:

- Work Programme For Bangladesh On Loss And Damage - TAAS-0026
- Adaptation Policy Options And Interventions For Climate Change Induced Displaced People Of Bangladesh - RSAS-0014
- Participatory Monitoring And Evaluation Of Community Based Adaptation - TAAS-0008

Before summarising my findings, I wanted to recognise that CDKN Asia staff were working under great pressure to disseminate funding based on a rapid diagnosis of country-level demand. They were reasonably successful in identifying and elaborating priority projects and producing useful early outputs, based on the feedback received from stakeholder interviews.

Yet the goal of the present country-level evaluation was to critically examine the performance of CDKN Bangladesh against its stated objectives and impact pathways, then provide constructive criticism of ways that the programme could be improved during the remainder of its 5-year contract, and during any potential future extension of its contract. The following findings and recommendations are provided in this spirit, in the hope that they will help CDKN and its partners continue improving their work so as to better achieve their common objectives.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Category	Key findings	Recommendations
Relevance	Widespread support for the three projects reflects country-level demand for work in these areas	None.
	CDKN's willingness to address critical yet risky issues is widely appreciated	None.
	Solid evidence of linkages between CDKN components but poor synergies between projects	Establish mechanisms to ensure that projects within Bangladesh and elsewhere in the Asia region share lessons and build on each others' experience.
	Ongoing engagement with service providers	None.
Effectiveness	Model for ensuring contract delivery is not ideal	It would be preferable if enforcement mechanisms could be written into contracts instead, for instance via imposing strict time limits with fines attached for non-compliance.
	Process of project design is insufficiently inclusive	Take more time for project design. Ideally this should be done collaboratively by diverse local and overseas partners, in order to capture the most innovative ideas and ensure that project design reflects local demand and realities. Consultations could include relevant central and local government, NGOs, CBOs, research organisations and private firms. If consultations are not possible, at the very least key local stakeholders should be asked to comment on the proposed project design before it is finalised. This will help ensure that any issues are identified from the outset while also helping to build ownership.
	Questions about the allocation of funds	Ensure that CDKN's procedures for making regional funding allocation decisions are as transparent as possible. Hold a consultation with a range of Bangladeshi and interested overseas stakeholders to discuss related issues.
	Questions about country focus and capacity building	Explore the possibilities to rejig the balance of CDKN consortia over time to have stronger representation from local partners.
Efficiency & VfM	CDKN's emphasis on rapid delivery of outputs is problematic	CDKN could adopt an understanding of VFM that explicitly recognises that this involves both delivering genuine value for target beneficiaries and doing so as efficiently as possible.
	Inadequate resources to deliver on the potential of projects in some cases	Consult more widely during project design to ensure that agreed workplans are realistic and provide the needed resources to deliver target results and impact.
	Partnerships create scope for "over delivering"	Continue placing emphasis on building partnerships with other relevant stakeholders
Impact	Some early successes and good groundwork, but questions about the 'direction of travel'	Primary research should be prioritised and budgeted for, namely a few rapid pilots in selected hotspot areas. This should include consulting with communities re possible adaptation options as well as examining the local viability of adaptation options being tested by other projects. The project should also seek to further clarify the L&D concept among stakeholders.
Sustainability	Solid start, but design issues threaten sustainability	Revisit the question of project duration with CDKN senior management.
Learning	Mechanisms for learning lessons are not always clear	Require suppliers to elaborate a lessons learned plan that (1) ensures different members of each consortia share their impressions and learn from each other's' experience and (2) generates lessons for policy makers and other interested professionals. These lessons could be included in CDKN's monthly newsletter and/or posted on the CDKN website


Results and Impact – CDKN Claims

Based on the demand expressed by the GoB, CDKN support in Bangladesh to date has involved the following seven projects. Yet of these seven projects, only three were deemed to be significant (shaded in yellow) by the CDKN Asia team, so my country assessment focussed exclusively on these three projects.

Project code	Title	Start Date	End Date	
1	RSAS-0014	Adaptation policy options and interventions for the climate change induced displaced people of Bangladesh	Feb 2012	Jul 2013
2	TAAS-0026	Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Country Initiative	Nov 2011	Mar 2013
3	TAAS-0008	Action Research on Community Based Adaptation in Bangladesh (ARCAB)	June 2011	October 2012
4	AAAS-0002	Bangladesh Engagement and National Diagnostic	Aug 2010	Mar 2011
5	TAAS-0030	Support to the Climate Vulnerable Forum	Oct 2012	Jan 2012
6	KMAS-0008	Looking at CCD in Asia using film	Oct 2012	Dec 2013
7	KMAS-0003	Enhancing climate change awareness and understanding amongst journalists in South Asia	March 2012	March 2014

According to CDKN, the Bangladesh country programme targets the following areas of intervention as a means to deliver the following changes in the short-term, medium-term and long-term.

CDKN Bangladesh Country Programme Impact Pathways (from Country Report)



The present evaluation found that the CDKN Bangladesh country programme was indeed active in all these various ‘areas of intervention’, and that it had made good progress towards delivering target outputs in all these areas. Yet the evaluation also raised numerous important questions about the current trajectory of the country programme, and whether it was really leading towards the changes anticipated. These arguments are detailed below, and examples from the three country projects are provided.

A quick summary of evidence to date that the country programme is delivering on the short-term and medium-term changes targeted is provided in the table below.

Anticipated change delivered by the country programme	Time-frame	Evaluator’s finding
New, reliable and nationally specific evidence exists on CC impacts and issues in BNG	ST	Evidence of some progress, but current trajectory raises concerns
New national or regional fora exist on CCD issues	ST	“ “
New tools and frameworks available to support the implementation and monitoring of CC responses in BNG	ST	Evidence of progress, though further work would lead to significantly greater change
BGD institutions demonstrate increased capacity to lead and convene others on CCD issues	ST	Evidence of progress
BGD is able to take informed and coordinated position in global debates on key technical issues	ST	Evidence of progress, but current trajectory raises concerns
Policy steps achieved at an international level on issues led by BGD	ST	“ “
BGD innovation and experience contributes to and influences international discourse on CCD issues	ST	“ “
Stakeholders in other countries are interested in accessing and using CCD and frameworks developed in BGD	ST	“ “
National decision makers access and use reliable and nationally relevant evidence to drive policy changes	MT	“ “
BGD demonstrates examples of good practice in CCD interventions which are replicated elsewhere	MT	“ “
BGD has a leadership position among LDCs on specific issues and is used as a roadmap for other LDCs in tackling CCD issues	MT	“ “
International and national developments in CCD lead to new policy mechanisms in BGD to address emerging issues	MT	“ “
Paradigm shifts in the framing of adaptation and mitigation issues to reflect BGD-led positions	MT	“ “

Relevance

a. Widespread support for the three projects reflects country-level demand for work in these areas

CDKN’s three current projects in Bangladesh enjoy widespread support among national stakeholders for the themes they are attempting to tackle, including strong interest from national policymakers. The projects clearly address emerging national priorities and respond to country-level demand. They are therefore poised to have clear policy impacts, provided they generate actionable outputs.

Recommendation: None

b. CDKN’s willingness to address critical yet risky issues is widely appreciated

Many stakeholders voiced appreciation for the fact that CDKN is funding early research and knowledge generation on critical emerging themes, saying this is unusual for a donor, since it could be seen as risky. Yet they observed that such knowledge is needed to develop national thinking on

these critical issues and to serve as the basis for policy development and programmatic action. This work may also offer an opportunity for Bangladesh to provide thought leadership on certain issues facing developing countries, due to their particular vulnerability to climate change impacts.

As one key informant observed, “Climate change creates major knowledge gaps, because the frontiers of knowledge are changing rapidly, including both the threats faced by poor communities and the options for helping them. Many people are very confused about what this means and how to deal with it.”

Recommendation: None

c. Solid evidence of linkages between CDKN components but poor synergies between projects

The CDKN Bangladesh projects generally show good evidence of linkages between CDKN components. For instance, the L&D project generates research papers but also provides TA to Least Developed Country negotiators at the international CC talks, and TA to GoB policymakers is now getting underway. Targeting linkages across these activity areas is widely appreciated, but also places a premium on ensuring that the findings acted upon are rigorous and firmly based in evidence.

However, interviews did not find evidence of synergies between projects being captured. Also, no stakeholders mentioned meaningful engagement with CDKN international staff, with the exception of the Asia regional office.

Recommendation: Establish mechanisms to ensure that projects within Bangladesh and elsewhere in the Asia region share lessons and build on each others’ experience.

d. Ongoing engagement with service providers

CDKN has remained actively engaged with projects and generally been supportive, which is good. But this input can also sometimes mean imposing lots of reporting demands on suppliers.

Recommendation: None

Effectiveness

e. Model for ensuring delivery not ideal

In some cases, project coordinators have had to chase up local subcontractors to ensure timely delivery of outputs (e.g., subcontracted L&D papers), which has been tiresome for all.

Recommendation: It would be preferable if enforcement mechanisms could be written into contracts instead, for instance via imposing strict time limits with fines attached for non-compliance.

f. Process of project design is insufficiently inclusive

Consultations with local partners during project design seem to be inadequate in some cases. The L&D project was designed primarily by overseas partners without substantive input from local partners, which meant that they didn’t realise the full scope of the project and the relevant project needs given the Bangladeshi context. While the ARCAB concept came from INGOs in developing countries, there seems to have been limited consultation with local partners during project design. One local partner commented, “These are new things, so we need to think them through together. In this, no one knows better, since we are all on the same learning curve.” He also noted that CDKN seems to be in a great hurry, which is understandable for project management but is counterproductive in the design phase when it is important to take time to consult with partners. The climate-induced migration project provides a counterexample. Its local partners feel their collaboration with their overseas partners are on a relatively equal footing, citing the example of

draft reports being sent back and forth between partners, with each making comments and being open to change (case study 1).

Recommendation: Take more time for project design. Ideally this should be done collaboratively by diverse local and overseas partners, in order to capture the most innovative ideas and ensure that project design reflects local demand and realities. Consultations could include relevant central and local government, NGOs, CBOs, research organisations and private firms. If consultations are not possible, at the very least key local stakeholders should be asked to comment on the proposed project design before it is finalised. This will help ensure that any issues are identified from the outset while also helping to build ownership.

Case study 1: The CIM project on climate-induced migration focuses on gathering and analysing primary data from affected communities to better understand an emerging phenomenon of critical importance to Bangladesh. Its data and analysis appear to be solid, but basic questions could be raised about the fundamental research design, which underlines the importance of taking greater time when designing projects and ensuring that the design process includes substantive input from a range of local stakeholders.

The project focuses on understanding why climate-induced migrants leave their homes and maps out livelihood options for migrants, based on the idea that migration can be a viable adaptation option. This is a hopeful and important perspective with strong policy relevance in Bangladesh. Notably, it can help Bangladesh plan for its anticipated migration flows, helping all stakeholders to recognise and capture the positive opportunities they offer. Simply put, this work can help develop climate-induced migration as a safe and positive adaptation option for Bangladesh. However, this work also neglects a key policy relevant question, namely whether there may be viable adaptation options available to these people within their communities that remain unexplored. These alternative options could involve developing irrigation systems, exploring new cropping systems and natural fertilisation options, facilitating access to drought-tolerant seed varieties, and developing local energy sources. The point is that these options represent possible alternative to climate-induced migration, and hence should really be examined at the same time to assess the best possible options for communities and the country. The project currently accepts the fact that communities are struggling to adapt as a given instead of problematising this point. An example is that some farming communities shifted to shrimp cultivation due to increasing salinisation and its greater profitability, but now the shrimp in some areas are being affected by a virus, which is reducing production and causing some to migrate. A possible adaptation in such areas would be to take measures to address this virus problem and support sustainable shrimp production.

g. Questions about the allocation of funds

Some stakeholders cited a perception that a large proportion of the CDKN funds allocated to projects for Bangladesh was in fact being captured by overseas partners. Others cited a perception that a large proportion of the funds distributed within Bangladesh were being captured by a small number of elite climate change professionals. A third perception was that the criteria used by CDKN to select its service providers strongly prioritised the academic publishing record of individuals while placing relatively little weight on professional experience working in the target communities or strong familiarity with the Bangladeshi context. Needless to say, all the key informants who voiced these concerns believed that they represented problems with CDKN.

It is unclear whether such perceptions are grounded in fact, but they are worth reporting nonetheless, since these issues were raised by various key informants. Both observations suggest a need to ensure that CDKN's procedures for making regional funding allocation decisions are as transparent as possible, and that this transparency is abundantly clear to its regional stakeholders.

These observations also suggest that it may be useful to hold a consultation with a range of Bangladeshi and interested overseas stakeholders on two questions: (1) desirable selection criteria for CDKN service providers working in Bangladesh, and (2) any potential downsides to allocating a larger proportion of country funds to local suppliers and how best to mitigate these risks.

Recommendation: Ensure that CDKN’s procedures for making regional funding allocation decisions are as transparent as possible. Hold a consultation with a range of Bangladeshi and interested overseas stakeholders to discuss related issues.

h. Questions about country focus and capacity building

While most of the local experts consulted were happy to be collaborating with overseas partners as part of CDKN consortia, some also raised questions about the balance of these partnerships. They complained that the overseas partners had too much influence, saying more balanced partnerships would be preferable. Reasons offered included ensuring that projects are as grounded as possible in local realities, fostering local ownership, and building the capacity of Bangladeshi professionals.

Recommendation: Explore the possibilities to rejig the balance of CDKN consortia over time to have stronger representation from local partners.

Efficiency and VfM

i. CDKN’s emphasis on rapid delivery of outputs is problematic

While stakeholders are broadly happy with the three current Bangladesh projects, many said CDKN’s current emphasis on rapid delivery of outputs is problematic. Some complained that CDKN did not allow adequate time for projects to reach their potential (case study 2), while others argued that CDKN’s emphasis on rapid delivery of outputs is actually counterproductive (case study 3).

Case study 2: ARCAB addresses a key knowledge gap, namely how to conduct M&E for a grassroots adaptation project, yet this work doesn’t go far enough due to CDKN’s emphasis on short-term funding to deliver rapid outputs. Climate change is now a huge issue and adaptation is an imperative, but many practitioners and donors still don’t know what an adaptation project looks like. How do you distinguish an adaptation project from something else, and how do you measure its adaptation effect? ARCAB has addressed these questions by developing an M&E tool thanks to support from CDKN. This tool can be used to identify the determinants of long-term climate resilience for communities. It shows what to measure (e.g., access to information regarding viable adaptation options and their benefits) and how, so it should be very useful to practitioners working at the grassroots level. This tool has already being taken up by ActionAid in Bangladesh and ARCAB in Kenya and Ethiopia, and CDKN is sponsoring presentations about the tool at workshops in Asia and Europe this spring.

While all this is a good start, the work is only half done. We now have a generic tool, but what’s missing is how to apply in different places facing different types of adaptation challenges. In BNG, only ActionAid has used the tool, and they’ve only done so in one area, so we don’t know how it would work in the various other hotspots. Another gap is to disseminate this tool and inform target users how to use it, so that it doesn’t just sit on the shelf. Simply put, the ARCAB work requires significantly more than the one year of funding provided by CDKN. “It’s risky to just provide short-term funding then rely on others to ensure projects deliver. In future, CDKN should consider providing funding for long enough to cover the key steps of the process.”

Case study 3: The L&D project has an unrealistically short timeframe to obtain solid results. Notably, gathering empirical evidence on vulnerable communities was seemingly not possible, and the project had to rely on key informant interviews with experts in the capital instead. These interviews allowed the project to frame key issues and raise relevant questions, but could not provide evidence-based answers. Yet at the same time CDKN is pushing for using this project to influence the international negotiations and policy. Several stakeholders cautioned that while it is exciting for the country to have this opportunity for high-level engagement and leadership, doing this without firm evidence is worrisome. Other stakeholders noted that the work on L&D is still at an early stage, with different key stakeholders in Bangladesh having very different understandings of this term. While these stakeholders applauded CDKN’s willingness to take on this difficult topic, they worried about it proceeding without addressing the problem of missing empirical evidence.

Recommendation: CDKN could adopt an understanding of VFM that explicitly recognises that this involves both delivering genuine value for target beneficiaries and doing so as efficiently as possible.
j. Inadequate resources to deliver on the potential of projects in some cases

Some stakeholders complained that CDKN failed to provide adequate resources to realise the potential of its projects, an issue that was linked to problems with project design (see case studies 4 and 5).

Case study 4: The original workplan for the L&D project was skeletal, so project implementation began with attending workshops and building partnerships with diverse stakeholders and then following up with these people, which was effective. Only via these consultations did the full scope of the project become clear. But this value has been achieved largely by committed staff putting in countless unpaid hours, which isn’t a viable or generalisable model. Also, the resulting project still falls short of what is needed to realise its potential. An example is that local contractors complain strongly about being underpaid, and it is notable that these modest payments have corresponded with outputs of uncertain quality in some cases. This raises the question of whether it might not be better to pay somewhat more while specifying better in contracts the different elements that must be included in outputs to ensure they reach the requisite level of quality.

Case study 5: The CIM project used 15 young Bangladeshis to conduct field interviews after training them. It then kept them on to help with data analysis, which has proven both effective and efficient. The precise use of the funds managed by the local partner is also fairly flexible, which has allowed them to allocate these resources on an ‘as needed’ basis, and has helped reduce expenditures.

Recommendation: Consult more widely during project design to ensure that agreed workplans are realistic and provide the needed resources to deliver target results and impact.

k. Partnerships create scope for “over delivering”

Some stakeholders mentioned how they had struck up partnerships with key communities of practice in order to ‘over deliver’ on their original workplans. For instance, the L&D project is serving as an input to important new work on harmonising DRR and CC adaptation in BNG. Another example is how ARCAB partnered with ActionAid to field test its new M&E tool for community-based adaptation in a vulnerable region of Bangladesh.

Recommendation: Continue placing emphasis on building partnerships with other relevant stakeholders

Impact

l. Some early successes and good groundwork, but questions about the ‘direction of travel’

All three of the Bangladesh projects have been successful at delivering useful early outputs. For instance, ARCAB developed a generic M&E tool for assessing community-based adaptation, while CIM has generated primary data and analysis of climate-induced migration. Despite their successes, these three projects have had minimal beneficial impact on vulnerable communities in Bangladesh to date. This is not a criticism, since it is only to be expected given the relatively short time since these projects got underway. The relevant question, however, is whether the current direction of travel of these projects inspires confidence that such impact is forthcoming in the near future. By this measure, the stakeholder interviews and document review raised numerous questions, as detailed in this report. It is hoped that the feedback presented in this report can help ensure that these promising projects fully deliver on their excellent potential (case study 6).

Case study 6: The L&D project has been highly effective at spurring dialogue on L&D both within Bangladesh and internationally regarding the L&D concept, and this is a major success for which the project proponents and CDKN can only be applauded. The project has also delivered various research papers on different aspects of L&D. On all this, stakeholders agreed that progress was “so far, so good”. Yet various stakeholders also argued that better evidence is now urgently needed to ensure that the anticipated impact of this project is achieved, and that its potential is not wasted.

As things stand, no primary research has been being conducted for L&D, with all its findings coming from the existing literature or from consultations with experts living in Dhaka (the Bangladeshi capital). Because no consultations have been conducted with vulnerable communities or those working directly with them, the project’s work lacks grounding in a basic sense. Notably, project partners lack firm evidence on key questions such as, “Which adaptation options are available to vulnerable communities in key hotspot areas?”, “How much do they cost, and how effective are they?” and “What are the remaining losses suffered?”

Various stakeholders also noted that basic questions such as the definition of the term “loss and damage” have not yet been resolved in Bangladesh. Notably, some see L&D as the final residual need after communities have strained every nerve to find workable adaptation options, while others view any losses from CC impacts or adaptation costs incurred as instances of L&D, and a basis for demanding compensation from the international community. Clearly, such questions must be resolved before Bangladesh can lead on this issue effectively on the international stage.

Sustainability

m. Solid start, but design issues threaten sustainability

The three Bangladesh projects have started well, but all three face issues concerning their sustainability. This follows from the fact that all three require follow-up funding in one form or another in order to fulfil their promise.

For instance, the L&D project has helped elaborate some key concepts and generated a buzz both within Bangladesh and internationally, thanks to bringing together different partners working on this topic. Critically, the Bangladeshi government is committed to developing a national mechanism on L&D, so the project has official buy-in, though details remain vague. Despite all this, the potential of this work to deliver sustainable outcomes and benefit vulnerable communities is at risk due to the design issues discussed above, notably the short timeframe of CDKN funding.

It is understandable to begin funding for risky projects with a short timeframe grant, but in order to secure sustainability this should then be followed up by a longer-term grant in order to deliver on the project's potential. One interviewee argued, "CDKN needs clearer thinking on funding, and a funding model that is conducive to optimal performance and longer-term planning."

Recommendation: Revisit the question of project duration with CDKN senior management

Learning

n. Mechanisms for learning lessons are not always clear

Stakeholders suggested that mechanisms for learning lessons – whether by staff or others – were not a strong point of the three Bangladesh projects, and didn't seem to be a key focus of CDKN. One key informant reflected, "It's not clear who the project is sharing lessons with and why". For instance, the learning mechanism currently used by the L&D project focuses on conducting surveys among participants at workshops. This is an important weakness, since projects need evaluation mechanisms to ensure they learn from their mistakes.

Recommendation: Require suppliers to elaborate a lessons learned plan that (1) ensures different members of each consortia share their impressions and learn from each other's experience and (2) generates lessons for policy makers and other interested professionals. These lessons could be included in CDKN's monthly newsletter and/or posted on the CDKN website.

Annex 5 – Summary of Findings from Additional Output reviews

Partnerships

- The Partnerships output has met or (greatly) exceeded its 2012 and 2013 milestones as defined by the CDKN logframe.
- The primarily simplistic and quantitative nature of the Partnerships output indicators (based on the self-reported aggregation of activities) may not appropriately reflect and capture the nature of the strategy and outcomes CDKN is endeavouring to deliver under the output. Based on this, there is a need to revise and enhance both the Partnerships output strategy and the logframe to more explicitly set out the strategy and more appropriately capture the outcomes.
- CDKN requires a more detailed elaboration of the Partnerships impact pathway and where this fits within / contributes to the overall CDKN Theory of Change – specifically setting out how Partnerships activities and projects feed into CDKN’s other four outcome areas through the DoC, as well as more broadly, how the Partnerships output is geared to supporting CDKN change overall.
- The Action Lab successfully brought together a dynamic and innovative group of CCD experts across government, academia, the NGO sector, and the private sector. It ‘announced’ CDKN’s arrival on the scene as an organisation that is willing:
 - To be demand-led with the CCD marketplace;
 - To both work in, and convene, partnerships across a wide spectrum of stakeholders;
 - To invest in innovate but risky concepts and ideas that have the potential to deliver impressive outcomes and impact; and,
 - To build relationships over time and through multiple stages as demonstrated by the Research Innovation Fund that came out of the Action Lab and the two subsequent Innovation Fund Rounds which have supported partnerships established and catalysed at the Action Lab.
- CDKN have added considerable value to the LEDS GP:
 - The LEDS Global Partnership is effectively convened. The LEDS Global Partnership has subsequently instituted a steering committee and CDKN was elected as its chair.
 - The makeup of the LEDS Global Partnership is substantially different following a membership drive through the LEDS Collaboration in Action workshop and the resulting regional LEDS network events.
 - The LEDS Global Partnership work programme was developed building on the outputs of the workshop. The work programme includes more than 10 topical working groups.
 - The LEDS regional networks were effectively convened and formed at the LEDS Collaboration workshop.
 - The workshop and engagement approach (interactive and action and learning focused) which CDKN had promoted was appreciated and embraced by the LEDS Global Partnership and the format has been replicated and built upon for the regional workshops.

- There is also evidence that CDKN have considered what LEDS GP success would look like in terms of outcomes over time through the creation of a strategic vision, theory of change, and an appropriate set of outcome statements.
- Through their work on Partnerships, CDKN can credibly claim to have made a significant contribution to Dimension 6 of their DoC “Changes in coordination, collaboration and mobilisation amongst key stakeholders.”
- CDKN needs to explicitly explain the rationale behind shifting Partnerships from a stand-alone to a cross-cutting output, and detail how CDKN’s cross-cutting output approach is operationalised.
- The process and mechanisms which ensure that the Partnerships output adds value to a CDKN programme that is ‘greater than the sum of its parts’ is under-developed. Synergies between outputs and interactions between CDKN output team members (predominantly based in London) and their Regional and Country counterparts appear to be unsystematic and sub-optimal, resulting in potential missed opportunities which could be realised with minimal additional resources. There is no formalised and systematic CDKN-wide approach across outputs and between Country and Regional programmes to ensure that opportunities are not missed. This issue of cross-output synergy and linkage with the Regional and Country programmes is revisited throughout the MTR.
- An area where the Partnerships output (and CDKN more generally) may not be optimally efficient relates to their ability to formalise partnerships with service providers through the contracting of services. Several Partnerships stakeholders interviewed by the MTR team indicated that the transactions costs of formally engaging with CDKN in a contractual relationship were prohibitively high.

Knowledge Management

The Knowledge Management output is meeting its objectives and producing good quality work. Its contribution in combination with other outputs such as Research and Technical Assistance can be seen in events such as the S-REX events and country activities such as Kenya.

However, it is suffering from having a very broad mandate and multiple roles internally and externally. KM activities are also working at a global level, which brings the challenge of interpreting abstract, de-contextualised results. Where KM has worked within a country setting, in combination with other outputs, its contribution is more tangible, especially in the area of supporting an *enabling environment* for CCD. This is an outcome area that would merit further exploration.

KM has evolved as CDKN has evolved. Now that the programme is maturing and has a better understanding of its drivers of effectiveness, the KM output would benefit from developing a framework of clear strategic concepts and a sense of its impact pathway, or theory of change.

The lack of one makes understanding KM’s different contributions and the outcomes it supports difficult. This can be seen in the assumptions made about ‘use’ of CDKN information when activities are mainly geared to support ‘access to information’, not ‘use’. (This is a common challenge for knowledge programmes.)

KM’s main links to the DoC is to ‘Changes in the usability of the evidence base’, closer to outputs than outcome. The results that are being reported are focused mainly on the knowledge broker support, and the projects focused on online information. The M&E report recognises that ‘use’ is not being tracked for KM projects, although our assessment shows that evidence of ‘reach’ is being

tracked, which could be a useful progress marker to track more systematically. However, there are no clear indicators for ‘capacity’, which is the focus of the knowledge broker and journalist support work.

KM has a lot overlap with aspects of the Research output, for example in policy influencing and supporting research use and uptake. In recognition of this, KM and Research have been brought together under the Director of Policy and Programmes to coordinate between the two and to link to the new Clusters. This coordination could be further improved by developing a theory of change that makes explicit assumptions about impact pathways and stages of change – a recommendation for the whole of CDKN.

KM has a strong contribution to make to CDKN’s emerging strategic learning agenda, but this needs to be thought through more robustly in terms of an impact pathway or theory of change, and structured learning questions that encompass *process*, *capacity* and *enabling environment* questions, as well as thematic issues.

KM has an explicit aim to work closely with country and regional teams on learning, and there is evidence that is in place in some countries, e.g. Kenya. This could be strengthened. Learning needs to draw from countries and regions and feed back to these.

Structured learning questions and an impact pathway would strengthen KM’s ability to make strategic choices about where and how it links with other Deep Engagement countries, for example Colombia.

Finally, KM sits at the nexus of corporate communications, strategic communications for the sector and communication about learning. This means that the reporting of ‘stories of change’ could be prey to capture by PR-style reporting of successes, rather than more challenging ‘stories of results and learning’.

To ensure a clear separation of these messages, ‘results and learning stories’ should be framed by the impact pathway and learning questions, and use a format that includes reference to context and other actors, descriptions of the challenge and task at hand, critical reflection on unintended results, and the contribution CDKN made in context. A similar model to the STAR interview technique could be developed (see the Colombia country report for a more detailed explanation).

Advocacy Fund

1. Virtually all interviewees highlighted the critical requirement to build trust with recipient countries, that this takes time and that CDKN had achieved this.
2. In terms of moving from Output to Outcome (via the DoC) we concur with the following key findings reported by the AR 2012-13:
 - Most change was observed amongst groups of negotiators from the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries in their capacity to influence negotiations. Evidence included making a greater number of relevant interventions, and agreeing priorities for desired outcomes in advance of meetings.
 - Significant changes were also observed in groups’ coordination, collaboration and mobilisation. Evidence included meeting in advance of negotiations to discuss strategy, and joining appropriate groups and cross-group coalitions based on shared progressive interests.
 - There was also evidence that this increased capacity to influence and to coordinate with other like-minded groups is already helping these groups influence final decision texts as well as increasing their press coverage during negotiations.

- So far there is little evidence of changes in the quality of knowledge and skills to support negotiators beyond fundamental support, such as technical briefing of delegates before and during negotiations, and little evidence that the poorest and most climate vulnerable countries are better able to leverage and channel climate change-related resources, such as international climate finance, strategically.
3. CDKN needs to make a huge effort to restrict their claims to building developing country capacity in negotiations as distinct from the results of that negotiating capacity. For example, DECC believe that CDKN has become too closely associated with Loss and Damage and the LDC group felt that one publication suggested adoption of the 2C position. Whether or not these are actually true is debatable. However, *CDKN should formalise a quality assurance process* by which relevant publications are reviewed to confirm this could not be easily misinterpreted as endorsing a particular negotiating position.
 4. In order to improve CDKN communications with DECC, CDKN should establish *regular systematic discussion* in place of ad hoc discussion.
 5. Going forward the AF should be less about building relationships (that are now in place) and more about strategy for COP 2015. *CDKN will need to consider how best to draw on DECC/DFID capacity for this.*
 6. CDKN have developed a very useful “outcome mapping-inspired” approach for identifying progress towards the Logframe Outcome ““Poorest and most climate vulnerable countries have improved influence over international climate change negotiations”. The “Expect to see”, “Like to see” and “Love to see” indicators do a good job of allowing for multiple impact pathways in a stochastic environment. *CDKN should review and justify whether the appropriate quantitative targets for these indicators remain:*
 - *Observations apply to 1-2 groups*
 - *Observations apply to 3-4 groups*
 - *Observations apply to 5 or more groups*
 7. There is a strong case for the AF to run until after the 2015 COP to give LDC negotiators security. This would require an extension to the CDKN contract as it is scheduled to end 6 months before the 2015 COP.
 8. The strict interpretation of DFID contract conditions by PwC means that suppliers face higher transactions costs of working with CDKN than with other funders (including those working directly for DFID). This reflects designing projects down to activities and detailed reporting requirements as well as the interpretation of procurement rules. There is a widespread feeling that CDKN procurement do not understand the realities of developing countries in the way that CDKN project managers do. For example, a request for a better copy of a receipt held up payment for 2 months. Also Example, African researchers having to pay hotel expenses and reclaim when they do not have the cash. *There is a need to lower the costs of doing business with CDKN.*
 9. There is potentially a large added value by forming partnerships with donors in advance to enable constraints such as requiring LDC government ministers to fly economy to be overcome.
 10. Our assessment of two side events held at COP 18 was that while these provided good networking they represented a lost opportunity in terms of thought leadership. Rather than using short presentations of existing material from panel members why not use the

opportunity to present significant CDKN research or KM results and change the way that listeners look at a particular CCD issue?

11. Many interviewees complained that high turnover within PwC meant that people are unfamiliar with the project and are overloaded as well. We understand that there has been an element of bad luck here and that staff are asked to commit for a year to work on the AF. *Staff turnover could be monitored and reported annually.*
12. There is considerable demand for negotiations support from middle income countries that share a progressive agenda. While this is likely to lie outside DFID's area of operation, lessons from the AF could be used in establishing a separate, potentially multi-donor version of the AF for middle income countries.

Research

Category	Key findings	Recommendations
Relevance	Good at supporting innovative and risky work	None.
	A broader strategy for eliciting country-level demand is needed, one that captures views from diverse stakeholders to ensure that demand spans key aspects	Examine the scope for applying a broader understanding of eliciting country-level demand across CDKN.
Effectiveness	Programme design failed to appreciate the practical constraints faced, notably the time required to conduct quality research	Re-examine the fundamental design issue of programme and project duration.
	Good at responding rapidly to the emerging policy literature, thanks to keeping track of developments and use of streamlined funding mechanisms	None.
	Communications focus can sometimes outweigh content, given the strong emphasis on delivering outputs rapidly	Ensure that all CDKN communications and policy advice are firmly grounded in evidence in order to maximise the chances that CDKN delivers strong outcomes for vulnerable people.
	A rigorous and impartial research commissioning process, but room for greater transparency and a more systematic approach encompassing all prospective bidders	Revisit the options available for research commissioning.
Efficiency & VFM	Strict application of contractual regulations imposes large administrative costs that are seen as unreasonable and problematic by various stakeholders	DFID should review these requirements and consider loosening some of them, if it can be shown that these create inefficiencies in the form of excessive administrative costs
	CDKN is good at administrative sides of contracting, e.g., verifying deliverables before issuing payment	Re-examine both the benefits and potential downsides of CDKN's administrative practices
	No-cost extensions would be useful, given the short timeframe of contracts	Consider the possibility of allowing short no-cost extensions, as needed
	CDKN's interpretation of VFM raises important questions, notably whether there is not a need to think more about the 'value' side of this equation	While the interpretation of VFM expressed by CDKN research staff is understandable, it might be useful to revisit these questions in light of the other observations made in this report

Category	Key findings	Recommendations
Impact	It's too early to properly assess research impacts, since research takes time	None.
	Questions about the types of impacts targeted, notably whether CDKN might focus less on traditional indicators of academic excellence given its policy focus	Revisit the question of the types of impacts that should be targeted by CDKN research, in light of a possible reframing of CDKN's niche
	Tension between building Southern research capacity and focus on excellence, with questions about whether CDKN has this balance right	Revisit these competing objectives to assess whether CDKN's approach to delivering them should be adjusted
Sustainability	Building capacity of researchers in the global South is important to sustainability, and hence should perhaps be a stronger priority for CDKN	Review possible ways to maximise CDKN's capacity to build capacity of researchers in the global South, within the context of maintaining a focus on research excellence.
Learning	The need to commission research rapidly early on was far from ideal, obliging CDKN to assess demand and develop proposals rapidly	If CDKN is extended, consider taking more time for research commissioning.
	Tension between responding to country-level demand vs. a more strategic approach, with reframing CDKN's understanding of thought leadership as a potential solution	Consider the possibility of reframing CDKN's conception of thought leadership. Potentially, CDKN could produce two distinct papers on each research topic, one for an academic audience and firmly rooted in the literature, the other for practitioners in partner countries and firmly rooted in the practical challenges of delivering CCD to vulnerable communities.